


The Intereſt of *Holland*.



IOHN DE WITT

Penſionary of Holland

THE

True Interest and *Political Maxims* OF THE REPUBLICK OF *Holland* and *West-Friesland.*

In Three Parts.

The First Treating of

Liberty in General.
Of Manufactures.
Fisheries.
Traffick.
Navigation.
Toleration of Religion.
A General Naturalization.
Freedom from Imposts.
Impartial Justice; and
Settling of Colonys.

Part II. and III.

Of a Free Navigation, and clearing the Seas.
Of War and Peace.
Of Treatys of Peace and Alliances, particularly with *England*, *France* and *Spain*.
Of the natural Strength and Fortifications of *Holland*. And
Of its Interest in all Respects as to the Government of a Single Person.

Written by JOHN De WITT,
and other Great Men in *Holland*.

Publish'd by the Authority of the States.

LONDON,
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154 L.11



The Preface.

THIS now full ten Years, ſince the infinitely wiſe and good God in the courſe of his overruling Providence was pleaſed to viſit me with Afflictions which produced ſuch melancholy thoughts in me, that if they had continued might have proved fatal to my Health. But becauſe things paſt cannot be amended by ſorrow or complaint, I accounted it a part of wiſdom to compoſe the diſorder of my Mind, by applying my thoughts to things more agreeable. And whereas from my tender Years I had been delighted with nothing more than the ſtudy of Hiſtory, Philoſophy and Political Government, I ſoon concluded that one of theſe would be very much conducing to my preſent purpoſe and recreation. And whilſt I was deliberating with my ſelf about the choice, I was deſired by ſome good Friends to ſet down in writing ſuch Political Thoughts as I had at ſeveral times communicated to them. Partly therefore for my own ſake, and partly for the ſatisfaction of thoſe to

whom I ow'd the greateſt deference, I undertook among other things to conſider the Fundamental Maxims of the Republick of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland.*

Theſe Thoughts drawn up in haſt, and without the leaſt Ornament of Language, I cauſed to be tranſcribed for the uſe of thoſe Friends who had prevailed with me to write them, and of ſome others who having a part in the Government of our Native Country, ſtand obliged to promote the Publick Welfare, and conſequently to inquire into the means conducing to that end. And I doubted not that if any thing ſet down in thoſe Papers ſhould be eſteemed ſerviceable to my Country, they would upon occaſion offer'd, make uſe of it to advance the Publick Intereſt.

But, contrary to my expectation, a Copy of this rough and imperfect Draught fell into the Hands of thoſe, who without my knowledg gave it to a Printer in order to be publiſhed to the World.

And this I found to be done by Perſons of an eminent Character, who not only condeſcended to peruſe my Papers, but alſo to ſtrike out ſome things, and to add divers others, in particular the 29*th* and 30*th* Chapters of that Edition, treating of *the Reaſons why the Liberty injoyed in* Holland *ſince the Death of the*

Prince of Orange *hath produced no more good; and what Publick Advantages have already risen from the Free Government.* And indeed the Stile of these Additions as well as the Subject, plainly discovers, that whatever had been altered, added or diminished, was done by Persons of so great and profound knowledg of all Affairs relating to the United *Netherlands* and Government of *Holland*, that they seem to have transacted all those things themselves, or at least to have been the principal Persons concern'd in them.

But when the Printer in hopes of more profit had surreptitiously reprinted this imperfect Work, which was never designed for the Press, I resolved carefully to review it, to make divers additions, and to reduce the whole into a better order; and having kept it by me about nine Years (the full time prescribed by one of the most judicious among the * Antients) to print and publish it to the World.

And because the Additions abovementioned have been highly esteemed by many, and are accounted by me to be of great moment, I shall incorporate them without alteration in this Impression, which I own exclusive of all other, and insert

* Nonumq; prematur in annum. *Hor.*

them in the fifth and ſixth Chapters of the Third Part. I ſhall likewiſe omit all ſuch matters as were expunged, out of the ſingular deference I ow to the Judgment of thoſe who did me that Favour.

To the truth of this I think my ſelf obliged to add, that I was never diſobliged by any Monarch, Prince, or Great Lord, much leſs by any of the Family of *Orange*: Neither have I ever received any particular favour from the Governours of any free State, or deſire any. So that it would be an apparent deviation from truth to affirm, that this Work was undertaken with a deſign either to flatter the Governours of this great and powerful Commonwealth, or to diſhonour the Memory of the Princes of *Orange*, who were formerly Captains General and Stadtholders of theſe Provinces. As if my intention had been only to ſhew that the Monarchical Adminiſtration of thoſe Princes was more prejudicial to *Holland*, than that of any other could have been.

On the contrary, the Service of my Country, which I value above all humane concernments, was the only thing I had in view when I wrote theſe Papers. I am no ſlaviſh Courtier, who can be unconcerned for the Welfare of his Country, and learns to ſpeak or be ſilent as beſt

pleaſes his Maſter. I am a true *Hollander*, who always calls a *Spade* a *Spade*, and hates all indirect paths. That I might therefore be in ſome meaſure ſerviceable to my Country and Friends, and like a good Citizen inſtruct ſuch as perhaps have leſs experience, I have endeavoured to inquire into the true Intereſt and Maxims of our Republick, and to follow the thred of Truth to the utmoſt of my Power.

And ſince all Men know that the preſervation and proſperity of a Country depends upon ſuch a Government as is conſiſtent with it ſelf; and Reaſon informs us that the welfare of *Holland* is founded upon Manufactures, Fiſhery, Trade and Navigation, I think my ſelf obliged particularly to conſider thoſe means of ſubſiſtance and Pillars of the State, with ſome Obſervations upon the late Government of a Stadtholder and Captain-General, which ſome ignorant and miſtaken *Hollanders* ſtill deſire.

This did at firſt bring me under ſome uneaſineſs, becauſe theſe United *Netherlands*, and particularly the Province of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, having had no other Stadtholders and Captains General except the Princes of *Orange* and *Naſſaw*, I doubted not that many ignorant and diſaffected Perſons, more inclined to the

increaſe

increaſe of a Prince's Power, than to the freedom and proſperity of their Country and themſelves, would not fail to ſay, that I had written this Treatiſe with no other deſign than to traduce and calumniate thoſe Illuſtrious Houſes. But when I conſidered that no Difficultys ought to diſcourage a Man from performing his duty, and that ill Men as well as ill Things were to be * reſiſted, I reſolved to go on, without any regard to thoſe who had always oppoſed the Liberty of this Country, and to write for the Common Good, tho Great Names ſhould happen to be concerned.

At leaſt I may juſtly ſay, that in all that I have written either for my ſelf, or my Friends of the Magiſtracy and others, touching theſe weighty matters, I have always avoided and abhorr'd the flatteries of ſome Writers, which I think not only deſtructive to Nations, but to Reaſon it ſelf; and could never offer violence to my Judgment, or ſlaviſhly lay a ſide my Pen. For a good Man ought in due time and place to ſpeak the Truth in the cauſe of his Country, tho with the hazard of his Life.

I conceive the publication of theſe Papers cannot be blamed, unleſs by thoſe,

* Tu ne cede malis, ſed contra audentior ito. *Virg.*

who

who maintain the Monarchical Power of the Princes of *Orange* to have been ſo great in *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, that the ſhadow of it ſtill remaining among us, ought to be ſufficient to deter all Men from writing any thing againſt the Intereſt of that Power, or to the diſadvantage of any Perſons of that Family, tho in other reſpects highly tending to the Publick Service.

But if this were our caſe, we might confeſs, that no Country ever fell into greater Slavery than *Holland* lay under during the Service and Government of thoſe Princes. Which I conceive our greateſt admirers of Monarchical Government will not allow, becauſe they uſed to extol the ſaid Princes for aſſiſting the States to reſiſt the King of *Spain* in order to deliver this Country from Oppreſſion, and not to exalt themſelves into his place; comparing them to *Virginius Rufus*, who having ſuppreſſed the Tyranny of *Vindex*, deſired only the following words to be engraven on his Monument;

Here lies Virg. Rufus *who expell'd the Tyrant, not for himſelf but for his Country.* Plin.

Prince *William* and his Son might in like manner have commanded their Heirs

to

to cauſe this their Immortal Atchievement to be engraven on their Tomb,

> *Here lies . . . . . who aſſiſted to defend his Country againſt our Earl* Philip 2d *King of* Spain, *in order to deliver us from Servitude, and not to be our Maſter ;*

If the States General had not order'd more words to be added, tho to the ſame effect, which may be ſeen upon a marble Monument erected at *Delft* 1620.

But becauſe I truſt my Country will not ſuffer her ſelf to be brought under the like intolerable Servitude, at leaſt not in this Age, I have preſumed to ſpeak of the true Intereſt and Maxims of *Holland* as far as I thought neceſſary. And this after the conſideration and mature deliberation of divers Years, I have delivered to be printed, not without the Knowledg and Allowance of my Natural Superiors, the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*.

I have always been and ſtill continue to be a lover of the Princes of *Orange*, both as they were Men, and as far as their Actions might tend to the advantage of *Holland* and the reſt of the *United Provinces*. I willingly acknowledg that Prince *William* the Firſt, with his Sons *Mau-*

rice

ice and *Henry*, have generally been eſ eemed in theſe Countrys as Men endued ith Noble and Princely Virtues, and lemiſhed with few Monarchical Vices.

For Hiſtory informs us that Prince *William* I. in the 11*th* Year of his Age, by the laſt Will of *René de Chaalons*, became Heir to all his vaſt Poſſeſſions: That at twelve he was placed by his Father in the Service of the Emperor *Charles* the *th* as his Page, in order to ſecure that great Inheritance to himſelf, by complying in the point of Religion, and getting the favour of the Emperor. By this means he became ſo acceptable to *Charles*, that he found no difficulty to take poſſeſſion of thoſe great Revenues in due time. We are alſo told that he carried himſelf with much prudence and evenneſs of Temper as well in adverſity as proſperity; that he had a good Underſtanding, a tenacious Memory, and a magnanimous Spirit; was not at all inſolent, but rather modeſt, affable and of eaſy acceſs, by which he gained the good will of all ſorts of Men. In ſhort, we are inform'd that he was a Perſon of few words, and knew very well how to conceal both his thoughts and his paſſions, tho he deſign'd to purſue them with the utmoſt conſtancy. He is ſaid to have been neither cruel nor covetous, La Pife. Bentivoglio. Van-Rheid.

vetous, not waſting his time in Gaming or Hunting; but on the contrary, free from moſt of thoſe Vices that reign in the Courts of Princes.

Concerning Prince *Maurice* the Hiſtorians of that time ſay, that his elder Brother *Philip* then living, and by virtue of the Will of *Rene de Chaalons*, as well as in the right of his Mother, and that of Primogeniture, claiming the Inheritance of his Father, as neceſſarily devolved to him, he ſo acquainted himſelf during the Troubles of the *Netherlands* with all Manly and Princely Exerciſes that he became a Perſon of great ability. And tho at the Death of his Father he exceeded not the Age of 17 Years, had no Sums of Mony in ſtock, ſaw his Father's Eſtate encumbred with many and great Debts, and his own Affairs as well as thoſe of theſe Countrys in a very low condition; yet being naturally of great penetration and ſagacity, prudent, frugal and laborious, he overcame all thoſe Difficultys, and was not blemiſhed with many Court Vices; not delighting in Muſick, Dancing, Hunting, Gluttony or Drinking.

As to Prince *Henry*, his elder Brothers *Philip* and *Maurice* were Heirs to the Paternal Eſtate and Lordſhips which his Father left, and the latter poſſeſſed all th

great Offices of Prince *William* in this Country (except the Stadtholderſhip of *Frieſland* and *Groningen*, which fell to his Nephew *William Lodowick*) ſo that there was little appearance during his Youth, that he ſhould ever have been advanced to thoſe Honours he attain'd to, and therefore it muſt be acknowledged, that the Courtiers had little reaſon to corrupt him in his Education.

This Prince was forty Years of Age before he was advanced from the Command of Colonel of the Horſe, to take poſſeſſion of the great Offices, or rather Monarchical Power that had been introduced by ways of Violence into the Government of *Guelderland*, *Holland*, *Utrecht* and *Overyſſel*, and might have learned by the Conſpiracy which had been formed againſt his Brother upon thoſe alterations, that the Sovereign Power of theſe Provinces might be ſooner and more certainly obtained by real or at leaſt ſeeming Virtues, than by open Force and avowed Vices, becauſe the Legal Magiſtrates and the Inhabitants of theſe Countrys had not yet been accuſtomed to commend all the Vices and Blemiſhes of Princes for Virtues. 'Tis therefore ſaid in praiſe of Prince *Henry*, that he was affable and courteous, of a good underſtanding and great application to Buſineſs; and uſed not to miſ-

pend his time in the Pleaſures and Luxury ſo common in Courts. And theſe three Princes having had a better Education, and a more free and uſeful Converſation with Men than other Monarchs and Princes uſually have, they became more commendable and better Monarchs and Princes, than they would otherwiſe have been.

And if, notwithſtanding all this, any one will go about to aſperſe the Lives, Services and Government of theſe deſerving Monarchs, as if they were common; and maintain that Prince *William* the Firſt was much addicted to Drinking after the *German* manner; if they ſhould accuſe him of Incontinency, and Riot in keeping ſuch a Court as very much impaired his Eſtate, in order to procure Creatures to favour his Ambitious Deſigns; whilſt preſſed by Ambition on one ſide and Want on the other, he uſed all kind of Arts to make himſelf Lord of theſe Provinces, in prejudice to the King of *Spain*, whoſe Right he who was his Stadtholder ſtood obliged to maintain, or elſe to lay down his Commiſſion, fomenting our inteſtine diſorders, that he might render himſelf Sovereign of all the *Netherlands*, and more eſpecially of thoſe Parts which were under his own Government.

Hooft. Strada. Rheid.

And

And tho this might be excuſed by ſaying, that * *Illuſtrious Ambition, accompanied with Poverty, may violate Laws and Equity:* Yet his three Sons *Philip*, *Maurice* and *Henry*, can hardly be juſtified, who mutually engaged in the Year 1609 to take poſſeſſion of their Paternal and Maternal Eſtates, and to divide them equally, with the excluſion of all their Siſters and Creditors, who had any juſt pretences upon their Father's Eſtate.

Neither can theſe hardſhips be excuſed or removed, by alledging that at the inſtance of theſe Princes, the States of the *United Provinces* were moved to allow their Siſters an annual Penſion, and the Creditors of the Father recommended to the ſame States for payment. For we cannot from hence infer any great Virtues of theſe Princes, but only the Goodneſs, Generoſity and Bounty of the States General, and eſpecially of the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*.

But to return, if it be ſaid that Prince *Maurice* was not only ſcandalouſly Incontinent, but withal ſo Ambitious, that forgetting what he ow'd to the Province of *Holland*, and to the Beſt Patriots in the *Leiceſtrian* Times, who next under God was the principal cauſe of his

* Si violandum eſt jus, regnandi cauſa violandum eſt. *Eurip.*

Safety and future Greatneſs, he took away his Life in a moſt unwarrantable manner, and contrary to the Laws of that Province.

Laſtly, If any Man ſhould accuſe Prince *Henry* of ſhameful Lewdneſs, and affirm that when he had inherited the vaſt Poſſeſſions of his two Brothers, and been advanced to all thoſe great and profitable Offices which Prince *Maurice* had enjoyed, he became riotouſly profuſe and extravagant in his Expences: That he manifeſted his inſatiable Ambition on many occaſions, by aſſuming much more Power than ever had been conferred on him, intruding himſelf into the Stadtholderſhip of *Groningen* in the Year 1640, and wreſting the Surviverſhip of that of *Frieſland* from his own Nephew Count *William*; more eſpecially by taking the Field for ſo many Years together with vaſt Armys at a prodigious expence, to make his own Name famous by Conqueſt, tho to the prejudice and oppreſſion of *Holland*; and this in order to make himſelf or his Son Sovereign of theſe Provinces. I ſay, if ſuch things ſhould be ſaid, ſome Men would return the following Anſwer.

Such Accuſers ought to know that the Princes of *Orange*, who are Men and not Angels, ſhould not be blamed for ſuch Faults as are common to all Men; or at leaſt

leaſt to thoſe of great Birth, together with all ſuch as are advanced to the greateſt Dignities. Inferior Lords uſually and without ſcruple take poſſeſſion of their paternal Eſtates without paying any Debts; and all young and healthy Men are violently inclin'd to Women. Beſides, 'tis not juſt to require Moderation in the Sons of Princes; and indeed two of theſe having either never married at all, or not till they arrived to a conſiderable Age, could not be guilty of ſo great a Crime as if they had been engaged in Marriage.

As to the Profuſion and Exceſs of Drinking uſed in their Court, to the great diminution of the Revenues, 'tis a thing ſo univerſally practiſed, eſpecially in the *Northern* parts, that none of theſe Princes ought to be ſo much blamed for it, as Prince *Maurice* deſerves to be commended for the Frugality and Sobriety of his Family.

And we have no reaſon to wonder at the ingratitude of the ſaid Prince, but on the contrary ought rather to wonder that any wiſe Man, after he has obliged Princes in the higheſt manner, ſhould expect any better recompence, ſince Reaſon and Experience, with all the Hiſtorys of Antient and Modern times, do unanimouſly teach us, that no other Rewards are

to be expected from Kings and Princes for extraordinary Services. For Princes being perſwaded that their Inferiors are always bound to do them much more ſervice than they perform, 'twould be a rare and unexampled thing to find one who ſhould think himſelf oblig'd to any. And if by chance a Prince of ſuch underſtanding were found, he would hardly like ſuch a Benefactor, and for that very reaſon ſend him out of the World upon the firſt fair opportunity.

And therefore if the words of *Loviſe* Princeſs of *Orange*, may be taken for true, " That the Services and good Offi-" ces performed by the Advocate *Barne-*" *felt* to the Houſe of *Orange* and *Naſſau* " were ſo great, that he had acted not " only like a Friend but a Father, and " that the Family was obliged to ac-" knowledg all they had received from " thoſe of *Holland* to have been procured " by his means; then, according to the uſual courſe of things of this nature, neither he nor the Province of *Holland* ought to have expected any other reward than they received.

Laſtly, Concerning the Ambition of theſe Princes, 'tis well known that all Men ſpread the Sails to a fair Wind. Ambition in Princes meets always with Applauſe; and when they either encroach upon a

free

free People, or advance their Conqueſts by ſucceſsful Wars abroad, they are exalted to the Heavens, ſtiled *always Auguſt*, Enlargers of their Empire, and the moſt glorious of Monarchs. And many will be ready to ſay that the Princes of *Orange* deſerve as much Praiſe for increaſing their Authority in the Government of theſe Countrys, as induſtrious Merchants for their Ingenuity in augmenting their Eſtates by Navigation and Trade. For the whole Buſineſs and Employment of Princes conſiſts in endeavouring to increaſe their Power.

If any Man ſay, that as fraudulent Merchants are to be abhorred with all their Profits and ill-gotten Goods, ſo deceitful and Tyrannical Princes ought not to be commended for their ſucceſsful Frauds and Violences; 'tis anſwered, that Princes are not uſually eſteemed for their Truth, Juſtice and Integrity, like other Men, but for their Power, and Knowledg how to exert both Force and Fraud upon a Happy Conjuncture.

For an inſtance of this, *Philip* the Second of *Spain* by fixing his Reſidence in that Kingdom, and calling home 4000 *Spaniards*, who were the only Military Force he had in theſe Provinces, gave a fair opportunity to *William* Prince of *Orange*, who was then in the Vigor of his

Years, and about 30, poſſeſſed of a vaſt Eſtate, and by the King made Stadtholder of *Holland*, *Zealand* and *Utrecht*, to engage the States, together with the inferior Magiſtrates and other Inhabitants in his Party. On the other hand, the ſaid Prince had great opportunitys to make himſelf Maſter of theſe Countrys, becauſe the States themſelves, as well as the inferior Magiſtrates and Commonalty, had been for many Years oppreſs'd under their Lords of the Houſes of *Burgundy* and *Auſtria*; none had experienced the Happineſs enjoyed under a free State, and few underſtood the Advantages of a Republick above the Government of a ſingle Perſon. So that he had great cauſe to hope he might not only withdraw himſelf from the Obedience he ow'd to his Maſters, but bring the States themſelves under his Power, together with all the inferior Governours and Inhabitants of theſe Provinces, which would certainly have hapned in the Year 1584, if the Hand of a Murderer had not put an end to his Life.

However the Princes of *Orange* have underſtood ſo well how to manage their own Affairs, as to obtain an increaſe of Power to be conferr'd upon them from time to time under colour of neceſſity, or this failing, to break through all Rights,

Pri-

Privileges and Laws, and yet deſerved not ſo much Blame, as the States and inferior Magiſtrates, who were intruſted with the Government of theſe Countrys, and who by making four of thoſe Princes Captains General for Life, ſo ill maintained and preſerved the Free and Legal Government, that nothing could be denied to them, without hazarding that Liberty, or rather ſhadow of Freedom, which they ſeemed yet to poſſeſs. Unleſs perhaps one might ſay, and prove by former experience, as well as by latter complaints of our Inhabitants, that the Power of the Captains General and Stadtholders has been ſo great, even from the beginning of our Troubles, by reaſon of their numerous Adherents, together with the common People and ſtanding Army, that Men may more reaſonably wonder, how the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* have ſo often adventured to ſhew their Zeal to maintain their Legal Government and Libertys, with the apparent hazard of their Lives and Eſtates.

If theſe things are true, the Reader may conclude, that if the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, with the Inhabitants, Manufactures, Fiſhery, Trade and Navigation, have been intolerably burdened, and yet greatly neglected and

discouraged during the Power of those Officers; whilst *Holland* in the mean time was left without defence either by Sea or Land, tho necessitated to take up incredible Sums of Mony at Intereſt to carry on their ambitious Designs: I think I have to my Power declined to publiſh the defects of the Princes of *Orange*, since I make no other than a general mention of their insatiable desire of Dominion, which has exhausted our Treasure, and weakned the Frontiers as well as the inland Citys of the Province of *Holland*.

Besides, it is hoped a prudent Reader will easily conceive what pernicious effects might be expected from a succession of such Princes in the Government of *Holland*, and at the same time consider, whether the late Prince *William* would not have proved another Monarch both in his Life and Government, if God, who is our Deliverer, had not taken him away before the 25*th* Year of his Age; since he being the eldest Son of his Father, was to inherit his vast Possessions and Princely Dignitys: And to this end in the Year 1631, before he had attained the Age of five Years, he was placed among the Governours of the *United Provinces*, who seemed unwillingly willing to give up the Liberty of their Country; and in all respects to

be able, willing and neceſſitated to bear an Univerſal Slavery, by granting and promiſing to a Child the future Succeſſion of all his Father's Offices; and whether the ſaid Prince *William* the 2*d*, who was continually converſant with Foreigners and other Slaviſh Courtiers, had any better Education or Converſation with Men than other ordinary Monarchs uſe to have: Or whether, after the reverſion of the Stadtholderſhip of *Frieſland* had been taken from Count *William*, in order to qualify the Prince to obtain the eldeſt Daughter of the King of *Great Britain* in Marriage, this Prince would not of neceſſity have been Sovereign of theſe United *Netherlands*.

An underſtanding Reader will alſo conſider, whether our late Stadtholder of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* had not ſpent his time in ſuch a manner, tho he died before the 25*th* Year of his Age, as to furniſh me with abundant matter of Writing, if I were inclin'd to publiſh the blemiſhes of his Life and ſhort Government; and whether I have not ſpoken of him with as much regard and temper, as my deſign of explaining the Intereſt of *Holland* would permit: And I conceive on this Subject I have fully manifeſted my Moderation.

But

But to return from this long Digreſſion; the Reader is deſired impartially to read this Book, which was written by me not only with a compoſed and ſedate Mind, but with a ſincere affection to Truth and to my Country: and by weighing and conſidering what is here ſaid concerning the true Maxims and Intereſt of *Holland*, he will be able to judg whether I have effected my deſign. And if he thinks otherwiſe, I deſire him however to believe that I have uſed the beſt of my endeavours to that end; and contenting my ſelf to have done what I could, think I cannot but deſerve thanks from my Native Country, for exciting by this Attempt ſome abler Hand to rectify my Miſtakes, and finiſh the Work.

And tho the matters treated in this Book have been carefully weighed and conſidered ſince the Year 1662, and indeed ſo much altered and enlarged, as to make the whole Compoſition to ſeem new; yet I would not have any Reader think that I believe it muſt of neceſſity pleaſe him; ſince in ſome reſpects I my ſelf am not contented with it, and particularly becauſe it fell too haſtily at firſt from my Pen: And tho afterwards it was maturely conſidered and review'd; yet many pieceswere inſerted, accommodated and fitted

ted to ſeveral parts, as well as my leiſure would give me leave, whilſt I wanted either time or application to peruſe the whole, as if it had not been compoſed by me, or to invent and write with more Order and Method.

So that there is reaſon to believe that divers accidents may give occaſion to review this Subject, which concerns the Proſperity of the moſt Powerful Republick at this day in the World. Which that it may be done ſucceſsfully, may our Gracious God grant us ſuch happy times, as may encourage Men both in publick and private to conceive and write whatever ſhall tend to the Service of our Native Country.

The

The Contents.

PART I.

Chap. 1. *Wherein are laid down the General Political Maxims which tend to the Prosperity of all Countrys: And some Reasons to make it evident, that the same do aptly agree to* Holland *and* Westfriesland. Page 1.

The true Interest of all Countrys consists in the Prosperity of all the Inhabitants, 2. *'Tis the Interest of Monarchs to weaken the Subject, that they may assume what Power they please,* 3. *But of Republican Rulers, to procure rich and populous Citys,* 6. Holland's *Interest consists in promoting Manufactures, Fishing, Traffick,* &c. 7. *The Interest of Courtiers and Soldiers, directly against them,* 8. *'Tis dangerous for the wiser sort to declare against the Government of single Persons,* 9. *Whether People naturally are to be govern'd by one Person: Whether the* Dutch *are so peevish that they cannot be govern'd otherwise, or would be happier under a Stadtholder than formerly under Earls,* 10. *Whether they are too stupid to be govern'd by a Commonwealth,* 12.

Chap. 2. *That the true Interest and Political Maxims of* Holland *may be well understood, it must not be consider'd as*

in

in Speculation it ſhould be, but as it ſtands at preſent. P. 15.

Holland *may be improv'd to the moſt perfect Republic,* 15. *In Affairs of Polity we muſt ſtrike the Ball as it is found lying,* 16. *What is underſtood by* Holland's *Intereſt,* 17. *The Proſperity of the Rulers of* Holland *depends on the Subjects; which formerly conſiſting of divers Republics, could not have the ſame Intereſt,* 18. *But inaſmuch as they now center in one, the Intereſt of* Holland *is made evident,* 19.

Chap. 3. *Of* Holland's *natural Burdens and Hindrances.* P. 20.

Its Situation: the Inconveniences thence ariſing in time of Peace, by the Seaſons, by the propinquity of the Sea, lowneſs of the Country, poorneſs of Land, and ſmallneſs of Territory, 21, 22, 23. *The Miſchiefs caus'd by War are intolerable, the Inhabitants paying yearly to the State by the ordinary Taxes about* 14 *Millions of Guilders,* 23. *What in time of War,* 24.

Chap. 4. *Of the natural Product and Advantages of* Holland. P. 24.

Chap. 5. *That the Inhabitants of* Holland *cannot be fed by its own Product.* P. 25.

Chap. 6. *That* Holland *lies very commodiouſly to fetch its Proviſion out of the Sea, and to provide it ſelf by other Arts and Trades: and how great a means of Subſiſtence the Fiſherys may prove to us.* P. 26.

The

The great number of Inhabitants, a powerful means to fix Traffick in Holland, 27. *How conſiderable the Fiſherys of* Holland *are*, 28.

Chap. 7. *That no Country in* Europe *is fitter for Traffick than* Holland; *and how great a means of Subſiſtence Commerce is to it.* P. 30.

Of the Traffick of Holland, *its convenient ſituation for Trade*, 30. *Its Advantage would be much greater, if the Trade to the* Indys *were free*, 32, 33. *Low Intereſt of Mony beneficial to Trade*, 33. *Chargeable Living in* Holland *occaſions Merchandizing*, 34.

Chap. 8. Holland *by Fiſhing and Traffick has acquir'd Manufacturys and Navigation: how great a means of Subſiſtence Manufactury, and Ships let out to Freight prove to them.* P. 34.

Traffick depends on Fiſhing and Manufacture, Manufacture on Fiſhing and Traffick, 34. *Navigation on Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Commerce*, 35. *Climate of* Holland *proper for Manufacture. A free Government inclines all to get Eſtates*, 36.

Chap. 9. *That the Inhabitants of* Holland, *being in a ſtate of Freedom, are by a common Intereſt wonderfully linked together; which is alſo ſhew'd by a rough Calculation of the Number of Inhabitants, and by what means they ſubſiſt.* P. 37.

The greateſt Traders in Fiſh, makers of Manufactures, and owners of Ships depend one upon another, 37, 38. *Husbandmen*, &c. *a neceſſary conſequence of other Inhabitants*, 38. *Our Rulers Proſperity depends on the Succeſs of*

of all their Subjects. 'Tis *calculated how the People in* Holland *are maintain'd*, 39, 41. *How many Inhabitants there are*, 40. 'Tis Holland's *happineſs to have her Inhabitants link'd together*, 43. *But the greateſt unhappineſs that ſhe may be ruin'd by advancing a ſingle Perſon*, 44.

Chap. 10. *Why the heavy Taxes occaſioned by War, have not driven Fiſhing, Trading, Manufactury, and Shipping out of* Holland P. 45.

Chap. 11. *The antient State of Manufacturys, Fiſherys, aud Navigation in* Europe. P. 46.

Above 700 Years ago there were few Merchants in Europe; *Inconveniences thence ariſing*, 46. *The* Flemings *firſt traded in Manufactures here; next the* Brabanders, 47. *Laſtly the* Hollanders *and* Engliſh, 48. *When and how the Aſſociation of the* Hans *Towns was erected: How the Trade fell to* Bruges, Antwerp, *and* Amſterdam, 49.

Chap. 12. *It is particularly ſhewn, that Fiſhing and Traffick muſt entirely ſettle in* Holland, *and Manufacturys for the moſt part, and conſequently Navigation, or ſailing upon Freight.* P. 51.

How the Trade of Antwerp *remov'd to* Amſterdam, 50, 51. *And not to the* Zealand *Iſlands, nor to* France, England, *nor any Eaſtern Citys*, 52. *Why all Manufactures did not leave* Flanders, *and fix in* Holland, 53.

Chap. 13. *That* Amſterdam *is provided with better means of Subſiſtence, and is*

a greater City of Traffick, and Holland *a richer Merchandizing Country, than ever was in the World.* P. 55.

How Amſterdam *by its Commodious Situation is become the greateſt Trafficking City in the World,* 55. *A quick Sale of all imported Goods occaſion'd thereby,* 56. *The* Hollanders *are the chief Navigators of the Sea; the benefit thereof,* 57.

Chap. 14. *That Freedom or Toleration in, and about the Service and Worſhip of God, is a great means to preſerve many Inhabitants in* Holland, *and to allure Foreigners to dwell amongſt us.* P. 58.

The Clergy in moſt other Nations perſecute thoſe that differ from the publick Sentiments, 59. *Tho their Authority is only to teach and exhort,* 60. *Many to eſcape that Perſecution, fly into* Holland. *Perſecution detrimental to the State,* 62, 64. *Hinders the Converſion of the Erroneous,* 63. *Toleration eſpecially needful in* Holland, *particularly for Roman Catholics: our Wars againſt* Spain *grounded on the like Reaſon,* 65.

Chap. 15. *A ſecond means to keep* Holland *populous, is a plenary Freedom for all that will cohabit with us, to follow any Occupation for a Livelihood.* P. 66.

Such a Freedom is more beneficial in Holland *than in moſt other Countrys, but to a few old Inhabitants it is detrimental,* 68. *'Tis likewiſe profitable to the Rulers,* 70.

Chap. 16. *That Monopolizing Companys and Guilds, excluding all other Perſons*

ſons from their Societys, are very prejudicial to Holland. P. 70.

Wherein ſelect Companys are hurtful, 70. *Out of their Abundance they become waſteful and ſlothful,* 71. *They cauſe the Inhabitants of other Countrys to draw our means of Subſiſtence to them. Whether if all Countrys have an open Trade, it would prejudice our Traffick,* 72. *Companys trading by Charter have often ruin'd Trade and Navigation,* 73. *Prov'd by the* Greenland *Company.* 74.

Chap. 17. *That Fiſhers, Manufacturers, Merchants, and Owners of Freight Ships, ought not as ſuch to be charged, by paying any impoſition to the Country, under any pretext whatſoever.* P. 76.

The ignorance of ſuch as are for Impoſitions on Fiſhery, Manufactures, &c. *illuſtrated by a Fable,* 78. *The building of Shipping, and Drapery, do manifeſt, that what the other Inhabitants pay to the Government, is drawn from the Fiſherys, Traffick,* &c. 79, 80.

Chap. 18. *That Freedom of Religion is, contrary to all Reaſon, obſtructed in* Holland. P. 80.

Toleration was formerly more obſtructed, by Placaets againſt the Remonſtrants *and* Papiſts. *The Reaſons of thoſe Placaets now ceaſe,* 81.

Chap. 19. *That the Freedom of Fiſhery and Traffick in* Holland *is in ſome meaſure unjuſtly reſtrain'd.* P. 83.

A Monopoly Charter ſometimes uſeful to ſettle a Trade, 81. *Prov'd by the* East-India *Company: Tet that Trade, when ſettled, if manag'd by a ſelect Company, thwarts the Pub-*

lic Good, 84. *Land-Conquests carried on by Merchants, are not tenable against all Enemys*, 89.

Chap. 20. *That Manufactures, and other Mechanic Works, are imprudently restrain'd.* P. 87.

Chap. 21. *That the heavy and manifold Imposts will at length destroy the Prosperity of this Country.* P. 88.

Chap. 22. *The Grounds and Reasons upon which the greatest Caution is to be us'd in laying the Tax of Convoy-mony, or Customs.* P. 92.

'Tis possible some Goods and Ships may be charg'd to the benefit of Holland, *yet there ought to be great caution as to prohibited Goods*, &c. 92. *Last-mony, as now laid, is very detrimental*, 93. *As appears by Inland Broad-cloth, Worsted yarn, and raw Silk*, 94. *The charging such Goods as come by Land-carriage, will increase Navigation*, 95. *As will likewise the charging of some foreign Shipping, and foreign made Wares. Raw imported foreign Goods ought to be charged little; such as come by Rivers, more*, 96. *We ought to ease imported unwrought Goods, of which our Manufactures are made; and to ease our own, and charge Outlandish Manufacture. These Maxims better observ'd by the* English *than* Dutch, 97.

Chap. 23. *That in levying Convoy-mony, we in* Holland *deviate in many particulars from these Maxims, and in many things have observ'd them well.* P. 98.

The

The prohibiting the Exportation of Gold and Silver, has bin detrimental to Holland, 98. *The not charging of Fiſherys, and the Eaſtern Trade, is well order'd, but not the Corn-Trade. How much* Holland *is concern'd to have the Staple of Corn*, 99. *Manufactures are too much charg'd*, 100. *As alſo our Husbandmen. The Intereſt of Merchants has been much neglected by paying* 1 *and* 2 per Cent. *on Goods imported and exported, as appears by raw Silk and Grograin Yard*, 101. *That the Sea muſt maintain it ſelf, is a detrimental Maxim for* Holland, *and why*, 104.

Chap. 24. *What Profeſſions of the Inhabitants of* Holland *ought to be more or leſs burden'd with Taxes, or favour'd by the Politick Magiſtrate.* P. 105.

The beſt way of raiſing Taxes, is to charge all Wares conſum'd at home; to make all Inhabitants pay equally, but eſpecially ſuch as have any public Imployments, and why, 107. *And after that all that live upon others, and thoſe that live on the Lands*, 108. *Alſo all immoveable* Holland *Goods*, 109. *In caſes of neceſſity all moveable and immoveable Goods jointly, tho that is very hard and unequal*, 110. *Caution to be us'd in weakning the four Pillars of the State*, viz. *Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Freight-Ships*, 111. *Yet in an urgent neceſſity they may be charg'd ſomething*, 112. *How much is ſhown*, 113, 114, 115. *And as they may be more or leſs charg'd, ſo the Rulers ought to favour them proportionably*, 116. *In what reſpects is ſhewn*, 117, 118. *Colleges ſhould be erected of ſuch as are intereſted in Manufactures and Fiſherys,*

especially one for Trade; else private Interest will be prefer'd to publick, 118, 119. *As appear'd by the Directors of the* Levant *Trade*, 120, *Who favour'd Freight-Ships more than* Holland *Manufactures, and did other things naturally tending to destroy the* Levant *Trade*, 121, 122.

Chap. 25. *The Antient State of Justice in* Holland *and* West-Friesland *being related, it is likewise shewn, that the Laws and Order of Justice ought to be fram'd for the greatest advantage of Trafick.* P. 124.

'Tis shewn how defective and tyrannical the State of Justice was in the times of the Earls of Holland, 125. *By reason of the paucity of Judges, and their passing Sentence as the Earls, &c. pleased*, 126. *What little amendment has been since made, especially as to Trade, is shewn*, 127. *By the little provision made against designing Bankrupts*, 128. *What Order might be taken against them*, 129. *Settlements before Marriage prejudicial to Creditors. A Debt-book under Oath ought to be a sufficient ground for an immediate Execution*, 130. *Vindications and Evictions prejudicial. Present Justice by a Court-Merchant very necessary, but the* Beneficium Inventarii *detrimental*, 131. *As are likewise Letters of Cession or Attermination*, 132. *What Punishments are necessary against designing Bankrupts*, 133. *The Advantages of the foregoing Method*, 136. *A reasonable Allowance should be given to an honest, tho insolvent Merchant*, 137. *Our Courts of Justice ought to consist of many Counsellors, and why*, 138.

Chap.

Chap. 26. *That the ſettling of* Dutch *Colonys in Foreign Countrys, would be very advantageous for the Rulers and People of* Holland, *and for Traffick and Commerce as well as Navigation.* P. 139.

In all Countrys will be found many diſtreſſed Perſons; the Reaſons of it, 139, 140. *Who being diſcontented, may occaſion great Evils: How it happens to be ſo,* 141. *'Tis therefore neceſſary to give them ſome Vent by Colonys:* Holland *has had fair Opportunitys for it, and ſtill would have if the* Indian *Companys would make uſe of them,* 142, 143. *Who cannot trade in all the Countrys under their Diſtrict, while the* Holland *Merchants want more Countrys to trade in,* 144. *But are not incourag'd by thoſe Companys,* 145. *Such Foreigners as yield to the hard Slavery of thoſe Companys, are not fit for Colonys,* 146. *Theſe matters elucidated by the yearly Placaet publiſhed at* Batavia, *which is exhibited at large,* 147—153. *The* Hollanders *are naturally inclin'd to erect Colonys,* 153. *And fitter for it than any other Nation,* 154.

PART II.

Of the Intereſt of *Holland* in relation to Foreign Princes and States.

Chap. 1. *THAT a free Navigation ought to be carefully kept, and defended, againſt all Pirates and Enemys. How this may be put in practice; and after what manner it has been heretofore done or omitted.* P. 156. *Moſt Merchandize being imported from, and exported to Foreign Parts, and our Ships being of no defence, it is neceſſary to ſcour the North Sea from Pirates, and to keep the* Mediterranean *clear by Convoys,* 157—159. *This will be done, as the Rulers are well or ill affected,* 160. *This Maxim confirm'd both by Reaſon and Experience: Before the Year* 1300, *our Earls and Gentry neglected Navigation; but afterwards, when the Citys were concern'd, they took more care of it,* 161—165. *Prince* William *took care to ſcour the Seas, becauſe he could not ſubſiſt but by the Proſperity of our Inhabitants,* 166. *The clearing of the Seas intruſted to Count* Maurice, *and the Earl of* Leiceſter *jointly,* 168. *But the ſaid Earl neglected it, and greatly prohibited our Navigation,* 170. *After, in regard of Pr.* Maurice's *minority, it was devolv'd on the States and Princes concern'd therein. In* 1593, *to pleaſe the Prince, the Seafaring Inhabitants were*

were neglected, 171. *In* 1597, Holland *loſt much of its Strength at Sea, and how*, 172. *The Prince of* Orange, *and the Inland Provinces, tho little or nothing concern'd, were veſted with a Power in Sea-affairs*, 173. Zealand *by a majority of Commiſſioners prevents any good from being done in the Maritime Affairs of* Holland, 175. *All which is detrimental to* Holland, 176. *A remarkable Inſtance of the Perfidiouſneſs of the* Zealand *Capers*, 177. *Their Commiſſioners being permitted for Life, or a long term of years, are too hard for our* Holland *Commiſſioners, who are ſettled but for* 3 *years*, 178. Holland *and its Citys having ſo little Authority for ſcouring the Seas, the* Dunkirkers *began to infeſt them*, 179. *In* 1602, *the States prohibited Traffick beyond the Cape of* Good Hope, *but incourag'd Free-booting at Sea*, 180. *The* Hollanders *in the* Straits *much plagu'd by Pirates*, 181. *Our Whale-fiſhers much damaged by the* Engliſh: *To redreſs which, the deſperate Polity of pardoning Criminal Pirates was made uſe of*, 182. *As likewiſe that of rooting out the* Turkiſh *Pirates*, 183. *After Pr.* Maurice *would allow of no prolongation of the Truce, and the* Scans *of* Mardike *was built, the* Dunkirkers *infeſted us much by Sea*, 185. *The States General prohibited our Inhabitants to trade in* America *and* Africa, *by erecting a* Weſt-India *Company*, 186. *And the* Eaſt-India *Company had their Charter prolong'd*, 187. *To the great detriment of our Inhabitants*, 188. *The Commonalty of* Holland *loaded more than ever with extraordinary Subſidys for ſcouring the Seas, ſtill as much infeſted as before*, 189. *This was more evi-*

dent when Pr. Henry had the Administration, 190. He obstinately continued the War beyond Holland's ability, whereby in 7 years after she became 51 Millions in Arrears, 191. And the Inhabitants still paid their Subsidys, 192. Yet the Seas were never the more clear'd, 194. But the Directors of the great Fishery were forc'd to provide Convoys at their own charge, 195. The sad effects of the Order of the States General and Prince of Orange to cast our Enemys at Sea overboard, 196—198. To quiet the Commonalty, some of the Admiralty were punish'd, and new Orders given out, 199. Tho without effect, and why, 200. By which means these Countrys were reduc'd lower than ever since the Truce, whereupon the States of Zealand deposed their Admiral, 201. And the Council of State made Complaints of the great Confusion of Affairs: both which Pr. Henry took very ill. The Rulers of Amsterdam would have scour'd the Seas with 10 Men of War, but were prevented, 202. The Prince of Orange, and the Deputys of the Generality shew'd some Zeal to redress Affairs, 203. But without any good Issue: On which the States of Holland desir'd the payment of unnecessary Land-Forces might be postpon'd, the better to keep the Seas clear, 204. Such Ships as sail'd Northerly, &c. had Convoys paid by themselves, but upon hard Conditions: And the Deputys of the Generality devolv'd the Authority of clearing the Seas on Pr. Henry, 205. Notwithstanding the Inhabitants were more than ever expos'd to the Dunkirkers, 206. At last some Privateers being perswaded to go out, it was quickly discern'd how easily the Seas might be scour'd, 207. But being

being ill paid, it appear'd that the Pr. of Orange, *&c. would not keep the Seas clear*, 208. *Their ill Conduct particularly seen about the* West-India *Company*, 209. *Making the Subscribers poor, and then deserting them; while they chose rather to keep up the War by Land, which run the Treasury of* Holland 120 *Millions in debt*, 210. *All which Sums were mostly imploy'd to aggrandize* France, *while the Sea was neglected*, 212. *The design of the Cabinet Lords was to advance the Prince, and to lessen* Holland, 213. *Admiral of* Holland *perceiving how things were manag'd, laid down his Commission*, 214. *The K. of* England *pretended to the Dominion of the Seas*, 215. *When the poor Inhabitants complain'd of their Losses*, &c. *it was little regarded by Pr.* Henry, 216. *The Losses by Sea continuing, the States of* Holland *complain'd, that the Mony collected for the Seas was converted to Land-service*, 217. *The* Dunkirkers *took our Ships before our Ports, even after our Victory in the* Downs, 218. *Which the Deputys, and Pr.* Henry *proposing to secure by new Expedients, the States of* Holland, *especially the Magistrates of* Amsterdam, *set themselves stoutly against it*, 219, 220. *Whereupon they proceeded no further, the Sea being still as much neglected as afore*, 221. *A great number of Bankrupts was hereby occasion'd. The States of* Holland *again threatned not to pay the Land-Forces, but had not Courage to stand to it*, 222. *Instead of redressing Complaints, their Mony was applied to assist* Portugal, 223. *And the Officers of the Army paid to the full, and liberally rewarded.*

ed. New Taxes propos'd to defend the Western Navigation, 224. *As if the other Taxes ought not to be applied to the maintenance of our Trade by Sea*, 225. *After we had Peace with* Spain, France *began to prey upon us, which caus'd a vast number of Bankrupts*, 227. *These new Troubles lasted till after the Death of Pr.* William. *Objection answer'd, That these Provinces flourish'd under the Government of the said Princes*, 228. *Our Thriving proceeds from the Wars of our Neighbours, our own Situation, and shadow of Liberty*, &c. 229.

Chap. 2. *Above all things War, and chiefly by Sea, is most prejudicial, and Peace beneficial to* Holland. P. 230.

This appears, in that our Debts are confiscable in an Enemys Country, and our Navigation and Trade thereby obstructed, 231. *A Calculation of the Different Produce of the Customs and Convoy-mony in a time of War and Peace*, 231, 232. *Land-Conquests will hasten* Holland's *Ruin*, 232. *This well known to the Prince's Party, and likewise to Pr.* Maurice, 233. *Several Citys have been taken by us, which tho they yield but one Million yearly, require 4 Millions to keep. All Offensive Wars ought to be forborn*, 234.

Chap. 3. *That* Holland *has antiently receiv'd these Maxims of Peace.* P. 235.

This demonstrated by the Intercursus magnus, *which was sign'd by all the trafficking Citys*, 236. *It appears also by the Earls of* Holland's *having no standing Force, especially in times of Peace; likewise by* Phil. de Comines. *Duke* Charles *of* Burgundy *the first who*

who kept ſtanding Forces, 237. *The Union of* Utrecht *ſhews how careful theſe* Netherlands *were to avoid a new War*, 238.

Chap. 4. *Some Caſes laid down, in which it ſeems adviſable for* Holland *to ingage in a War; and yet theſe being well weighed, it is concluded, that* Holland *nevertheleſs ought to ſeek for Peace.* P. 239.

Whether we ſhould make War to free our ſelves from foreign Taxes, 239. *Or to hold the Ballance of* Europe: *We muſt firſt grow ſtrong and healthful*, 240. Holland's *Intereſt, ſince the Weakneſs of the* Spaniard, *is alter'd*, 241. *Whether an uncertain Peace be worſe than a War*, 242. *No ſuch thing as a certain Peace*, 243. *That 'tis unadviſable to ſtand only on one's Defence, anſwer'd*, 244. *'Tis true of Monarchs, not of free Republics; becauſe they are ſingle, and oppreſs their Subjects, whereas the Rulers of a Republic are many, and govern more gently, and are naturally ſhy of a War*, 245. Holland, *tho ſhe defended her ſelf ſtoutly againſt* Spain, *rather to be compar'd to a Cat than a Lion*, 246. *Tho by bearing Impoſitions, ſhe might be compar'd to an Aſs, in the times of our Stadtholders*, 247. *What has been diſcours'd, illuſtrated by certain Fables: Firſt of the Lion and Huntſman. By gaining time many Evils may be avoided*, 248. *The Fable of a wiſe Man and a Fool: For Peace ſake we ought to yield ſomewhat*, 249. *This confirm'd by the Fable of a Frog and a Crab*, 250: *The Fable of a Fox, Wolf, and Bear*, 251. *Of the Fox, Cat and Huntſman*, 252. *Small Buſineſs*

ſineſs with uprightneſs, is better than much Clutter with great Craft, 253.

Chap. 5. *Inquiry made whether and how the Welfare of any Country may be preſerv'd by Treatys of Peace.* P. 255.

To comprehend what a Treaty of Peace, or an Alliance is, we muſt conſider that all Actions look either at the future, or the preſent, 255. *And what care muſt be taken in making of mutual obligatory Contracts; which ought to take place with Particulars, and with Sovereigns*, 256. *When and how long thoſe Contracts are to be kept, eſpecially with Monarchs*, 257. *Who ſeldom know what is juſt and fit, as the Civil Rulers do. In Treatys of Alliance men are apter to be wrong'd than by Treatys of Peace*, 258. *And when moſt; eſpecially when they are made with Sovereigns, who tho they have a Superintendency over Religious Worſhip, value it but little*, 259. *It is a madneſs to make Princes conſiderable Preſents, tho ſometimes to Favorites it may be adviſable*, 260. *Who are compar'd to hungry Dogs. The general Cauſes of all Contentions and Treatys are, Peace, Hope, and Vain-glory*, 261. *No Alliance with a Greater is good, unleſs he firſt perform his Contract*, 262.

Chap. 6. *Some Conſiderations particularly relating to Alliances between* Holland *and Inferior Powers.* P. 263.

All Alliances for Conqueſt detrimental to Holland, *as alſo for advancing Trade, if made with Republics*, 263, 264. *The Union of* Utrecht *has been miſuſed, to the prejudice of* Holland. *Other Republics, whether* German

or

or Italian, *would be much leſs ſerviceable to us*, 265. *What Alliances are to be made with leſſer Monarchs*, 266. *Who hating Republics, eſpecially ours, we muſt always be upon our guard. We may more ſafely make Alliances with Weaker than with Stronger*, 267.

Chap. 7. *Some Conſiderations touching the Alliances which* Holland *might enter into with mightier Potentates than themſelves; and firſt with* France. P. 269.

France *did formerly ſubſiſt wholly by Agriculture, not ſo now*, 269. *Liſt of Manufactures and Commoditys exported out of* France, *of which there is yearly tranſported above* 30 *Millions, whereof* Holland *takes off the greateſt part*, 271. France *formerly took off many* Holland *Goods, but not now: cannot hurt us by Land, and by Sea is not conſiderable*, 272. *But in the* Mediterranean *ſhe may hurt us. Our Naval Forces may keep* France *in a continual Alarm: ſo that we may compel them to a Peace*, 273. *And purſue our own Intereſt againſt them*, 274.

Chap. 8. *Conſiderations concerning* Holland's *entering into Alliances with* Spain. P. 275.

Spain *ſubſiſts by its Commerce with the* Weſt-Indys: *yields Wool, and takes off more of our Manufacture; has no Ships nor Mariners; its Dominions much diſpers'd*, 275. *Our Naval Power can hinder their Communication.* Spain *ſtands in fear of* France, *has had Pretenſions upon* Holland, *bounds upon it*, 276. *Being in a good condition for a defenſive War, we may purſue our Intereſt againſt* Spain, 277.

Chap.

Chap. 9. *Considerations touching* Holland's *entring into Alliance with* England. P. 278.

England *formerly subsisted by Husbandry, without Naval Strength; and in some measure depended on the Drapery of the* Netherlands, *but now not at all, and why*, 278. *Is become formidable to all the Princes of* Europe, *and why*, 279. *By its convenient Situation, is design'd for the Dominion of the Sea*, 280. *How much* England *may be benefited by a Peace with* Holland, *or damaged by a War*, 281. *A War by Sea too chargeable for* England, *when we have a great Naval Strength, and why*, 282. *And is unserviceable to the Courtiers*, 283. England *may be plunder'd Landward, but* Holland *not. All Monarchs, especially the* Englisſh, *very laviſh of their Treaſure, and Thieviſh*, 284. *All Republics, especially* Holland, *are Frugal. A War with* England *will be detrimental to us Both*, 285. *We ought to give the* Englisſh *good words, notwithſtanding a War threatned*, 286. *Above all we ought not to pleaſe them by altering our free Government*, 287. *But to preſerve it ſound and intire, and to have no offenſive Alliances with them*, 288. *But a defenſive Alliance with them againſt* France *may be proper*, 289.

Chap. 10. *Some General and Particular Inferences drawn from the foregoing Conſiderations touching all our Allies.* P. 289.

General Maxims againſt the three moſt Potent Monarchs, France, England, *and* Spain, 290. *In matters of Polity relating to an Enemy,*

my, none ought to be faintbearted. Contracts with leſſer States are the beſt, 291. A good Alliance with a Republic is better than with a King. Alliances with France, Spain and England, are dangerous; yet rather than have France for our Neighbour, almoſt all Alliances are good, 292. We ought to make no Alliance with England ſave againſt France, 293. Benefit of Alliances conſiſts in never performing firſt, and why, 294. Princes trifle with Oaths. The Concluſion illuſtrated by a Fable of an old and rich Man, and a young Country Fellow, 295. Weak States, improving their natural Strength, do commonly defend themſelves againſt a bold aggreſſing Neighbour, 296.

Chap. 11. That Holland heretofore under the Government of a ſingle Perſon was in continual Tumults and Broils: And that under a Free Government it can defend it ſelf againſt all Foreign Power better than formerly. P. 297.

In order to conſider whether Holland can ſtand againſt all Potentates, we muſt not regard what flattering Courtiers have given out, 297. A Ruler that governs as if his State could not be ſecure, acts like a Monſter, 298. Holland hath ſtood of it ſelf 700 years together: it had Tumults under its Earls, becauſe in thoſe Diviſions they ſought their own Advantage, 299, 300. It was antiently much weaker than it is now: yet hath at all times defended it ſelf well, 301. Even againſt the King of Span, tho he was very formidable, who was not only beat off, but other United Provinces in the mean time fortified by Holland,

302. *What the other Provinces contributed was of little value,* 303. Holland *in the interim was compel'd to groan under the Yoke of the Captain General. Moſt of the other Provinces were inrich'd with her Mony,* 304. Holland *has caſt off the Yoke of all her Enemys, but that of her Miniſters,* 305. *The States of* Holland *never ſo much oppreſt under the Earls of* Burgundy *or of* Auſtria, *as under the Stadtholders of* Orange, 307. Holland *now is better ſurrounded with the Sea and Rivers, and provided with great and populous Citys,* 308. *And with a Free Government; while at the ſame time the* Burgundian *and* Spaniſh *Princes remain in* Spain, *and their Power is every way diminiſh'd,* 309. Holland *is now better able than ever to defend her ſelf: Againſt which 'tis objected, that Landward ſhe is worſe fortified than ever, and the adjacent Provinces and Citys are very ſtrong; and that ſhe has not kept her Right of giving Commiſſions to her Officers without the Province,* 310. *How this hapned againſt all Rules of good Government,* 311. *While our Fiſhers and Merchant Ships are taken at Sea,* 312.

Chap. 12. *That* Holland *during its Free Government cannot be ruin'd by any Inteſtine Power.* P. 314.

Inquiry whether Holland *may be ruin'd by Factions, in caſe one Province ſhould take the Prince of* Orange *for their Head,* 314. *'Tis anſwer'd in the Affirmative, but elſe not: Much leſs could the Deputys of the Generality, depriv'd of ſuch a Head, be able to cauſe Commotions,* 315. *Whether the free* Holland *Rulers*

Rulers are likely to bring in the Trojan *Horſe*, 316. *This hapned in part in theſe* Netherlands, *becauſe the Earls, Statholders*, &c. *were not to be contradicted*, 317. *'Tis not probable it will happen ſo now, and why*, 318. *The States of* Holland *have expreſs'd their Sentiments of this Matter in their Deduction*, 319. *They will not eaſily forget the Violence of their own Captain General*, 320. *Nor loſe their Free Government, but with the loſs of their Lives*, 321. *In* 1667 *they made a perpetual Edict to preſerve their Government, forbidding the Election of any Magiſtrates*, &c. 322. *And ſecluding all Stadtholders of any Province from being Captain-General*, 323. *Swearing never to ſuffer any thing repugnant thereto, and that all Captains General ſwear to maintain the Free Government*, 324. *Whether our free Citys, if at variance, could ruin each other. All Republicks, having Governours for Life, will come to ruin*, 326. *Thoſe without ſuch Heads, never will, as appears in* Germany *and* Switzerland, 327. *Who are cautious of chuſing a Political or Military Head; while our Head has caus'd almoſt all our Diviſions*, 328. Holland *without a Head can never be inwardly raviſh'd*, 329.

Chap. 13. *That* Holland *during its Free Government is very well able to reſiſt all Foreign Power.* P. 330.

What is to be ſuppos'd, that Holland *may repel all Foreign Force*, 331. *It can eaſily ſtand againſt the other United Provinces, and why*, 332. Groningen *and* Frieſland *are now, both by Intereſt of Government and Situation, ſeparated from* Holland, 333. Over-Yſſel *being without a Head, can never make War upon* Holland; *and being a free Republic, will probably never chuſe a Head*, 334. Guelderland *may make War upon us, yet with greateſt Damage to it ſelf*, 335. *This is not confuted by the Incurſion of* Martin van Roſſem, 336. Guelderland *lies perfectly open to* Holland: *The Province of* Utrecht *is wholly indefenſible*,

defensible, 337. *And will always continue so: It will never make War upon* Holland, *nor endanger her Liberty by such a Head*, 338. *If the two Vassal Citys in* Zealand *depend on the first Noble, then is* Holland, *not only by Situation but Interest, almost divided from* Zealand, 339. *Which by means of a chief Lord might happen; tho come which will,* Holland *can easily repel* Zealand's *Force*, 340. *And the conquer'd Citys being on the Generalitys Fund, are less able to make War against* Holland, 341.

Chap. 14. *That* Holland, *tho she does not fortify her Citys, if she keeps united with* Utrecht *only, is able to defend her self against all the Potentates of the World.* P. 342

If the other Provinces should elect one Head, and have foreign Forces to join against us, yet could we be able to repel them, 343. Viz. *by making a Graft, which would render us invincible by Land*, 334. *The Charge of which is computed two ways*, 345. *What would be necessary to lay out in Fortifications, and what to be paid once for all*, 346. *All which being done, there would be less to be kept by Garisons than* Bolduke, Bergen, *and* Breda *now require*, 347. Utrecht *is inseparably link'd to* Holland *by Situation and Government, and by mutual Inclination*, 348

Chap. 15. *That every great City in* Holland, *whether well or ill fortified, is able to defend it self against all Force from without.* P. 350

Each City is able to stand out a Winter's Siege, 350. *Tho the great Citys be not fortified, yet they may resist all foreign Forces*, 352. *This appears by the Examples of the Free Imperial Citys of* Germany, *the Cantons of* Switzerland, Ragousa, *and* Lucca, 353. *The Cities of* Holland *can better subsist than those*, 354. *The Example of* Harlem *taken by the* Spaniards *does not disprove this*, 355. *The Rulers should not suffer Suburbs to be built*, 356. *They should keep vacant Places within the City*, 357. *They should fortify their City*;

Citys, and provide all Neceſſaries againſt an Enemy, 358. *Conſtantly exerciſe the rich Citizens in Arms, and have ſome Mony in ſtore,* 359. *But not much, and why,* 360. *Little concern needful for good Alliances,* 361. *The Sum and Concluſion of the Two firſt Parts of this Book, preſenting at one view all that is neceſſary for* Holland's *Intereſt both at home and abroad,* 362——365.

PART III.

Chap. 1. *IN which Inquiry is made in what the Intereſt of the Free Rulers of* Holland, *as to all the Particulars by which the People may live happily, conſiſts.* P. 366.

The Power of raiſing or ruining a People is in the Magiſtrates, 367. *Moſt Rulers ſeek their own Advantage more than others,* 368. *'Tis conſider'd what a Republic and a Monarchy really are; not where the Name, nor yet where the Right and the Name alone are, but where the Power likewiſe is,* 369. *The Right and Name vaniſh by degrees before the Power and Effect,* 370. *This ſeen by ſhewing of what importance the Love of the People is, or that of the Soldiery,* 371. *The Rulers as well as People us'd to be ſwayed by the Soldiery,* 372. *As appears by the* Roman *Republic, which could not preſerve its Freedom under the Heads of the Soldiery,* 373. *The Public Freedom of* Holland *cannot ſubſiſt under a perpetual Head over its Forces,* 374. *Fiſherys, Manufactures,* &c. *depend upon having free Rulers,* 375. *The Magiſtracy yielding little Profit here, they oft breed up their Children to Merchandizing,* 376. *Whatever is neceſſary for the Proſperity of the Country, is profitable to the Rulers,* 377. *Freedom of Religion not hurtful to free Rulers, and why,* 378. *The Heads of the Seditions uſe the Tongues and Pens*

of Preachers as the Cat's Paw, 379. *Prudent Toleration of the* Romish *Religion would not be hurtful*, 381. *Coercion in Religion would prove hurtful, and wherein*, 382. *As happened in the* Roman *and* German *Empire*, 383. Heathen *Priests and* Jews *have not caused so many Seditions as the* Christians *have*, 384, 385. The Christian *Priests always able to influence their Hearers, especially in Monarchys, where there is but one Religion*, 386. *Why it ought to be feared in* Holland, 387. *A free Burgership would advance the Interest of Rulers, by causing populous Citys*, 388. *They will thereby have an easy Government, and be better secured against Foreign Power*, 389. *Select Companys*, &c. *prejudicial to free Rulers, and wherein*, 390. *They ought to be cautious in raising Convoy-mony*, 391. *Free Rulers will regulate Courts of Justice, settle Colonys*, 392. *And keep the Seas clear from Pirats*, 393. *They ought especially to aim at Peace, and why*, 394, 395. *To make good Alliances*, 396. *And to fortify their Cities*, 397.

Chap. 2. *Wherein is consider'd the Interest of the Monarchical Government in* Holland *as to all the foregoing Matters, by which the Commonalty may thrive or prosper.* P. 397.

Monarchical Government would be very chargeable in Holland, 398. *Would lessen and weaken great Citys*, 398. Amsterdam *would especially be in that danger*, 399. *Favourites and Courtiers will rifle and drain the People*, 400. *They will drive no Trade, but to the prejudice of others*, 401. Hollanders *having an Aversion to Court Flatterers, a* Dutch *Prince will entertain Foreigners*, 402, 409. *Church-Government consisting of Councils and Classes, will offend Monarchs*, 403. *A Prince by making Bishops acquires a Power over his Subjects*, 404. *Bishops are intolerable in Republicks, but much desired in Monarchical Governments*, 405. *They are Enemies to Toleration*, 406. *Princes will easily change the preaching*

ing of Sermons into reading of Homilies,&c. as was begun in England, *and practiſed in* Tranſylvania, *&c.* 407, 408. *They promote Monopolies. Under a ſingle Perſon Cuſtoms would be heightined,* 410. *To leſſen the Greatneſs of Cities, while the Cuſtoms are put into their own Coffers,* 411. *Juſtice would be thereby corrupted,* 412. *As* Culenburg, Vyanen, *&c. do evidence. Few Colonies ſettled by Monarchs,* 413. *This is not confuted by the* Spaniſh *and* Engliſh *Colonies, and why. Our* Indian *Companies have hindred the ſettling of Colonies,* 414. *The Sea would not be at all cleared, and why,* 415. Holland *would be always falling into Wars, make bad Alliances, and continue unfortified,* 416. *This proved by what we ſuffered under our Earls,* 417, 418.

Chap. 3. *Wherein is examined whether the Reaſons alledged in the two preceding Chapters, receive any Confirmation from Experience.* P. 419.

Traffick has thriven little in America, Aſia *and* Africa, *and not at all but in Republics,* 420. *As firſt at* Sidon, *when it was a free Government; which loſt all its Trade by Sea when it fell under a Monarch,* 422. Tyrus *flouriſhed in Traffick and Navigation ſo long as it kept its free Government,* 423. *After which it loſt all its Traffick,* 425. Tyre *and* Sidon *kept their Freedom under the* Phenician *Kings, and the* Romans, 428. *The Inhabitants of* Banda *and* Amboyna *great Merchants during their Free Government,* 429. *But are now under a miſerable Subjection. The City of* Carthage *kept its Trade and Navigation under its Freedom,* 431. *But loſt both by War, and the Slavery thereupon following,* 432. Milan, Florence, *&c. have loſt their Liberty and Traffick; while* Genua, Lucca, Venice, *and the* Hans *Towns retain theirs,* 433. *In the* Netherlands *Merchandize and Navigation have been both advanced and ruined,* 434. *Manufactures throve in* Holland *whilſt the Earls were weak,* 435.

The

The Stadtholders would have driven Traffick out of Holland, *but were prevented*, 436.

Chap. 4. *Reasons why the Inhabitants of* Holland *were no more damnified under the Government of the Captains General or Stadtholders.* P. 437.

This occasioned by the ill Government of the Neighbouring Countries, and the Shadow of our Republican Government, 438. *The time when the Captains General did good or harm, ought to be considered; and first as to Prince* William *I. who placed his Safety in some measure in* Holland's *Prosperity*, 439. *The Earl of* Leicester *did not so. Prince* Maurice *being young, and obedient to the States, did much good*, 440. *But afterwards, following bad Counsel, did much harm*, 441. *Under* Henry's *Government, all Merchant Ships and Fishers were a continual Prey to the* Dunkirkers: *He sought to continue a chargeable War on us*, 442. *Making clandestin Covenants of several Lordships for himself of the King of* Spain's, 443. *And unknown to the States, the King of* Spain *was promised that the Romish Religion should be maintained in several Places*, 446. *The Ruin of* Holland *was designed by our last Stadtholder*, 447. *Who domineered extremely over* Holland, 448. *And had the Thanks of the other Provinces for it*, 449.

Chap. 5. *The Reason why the General Liberty in* Holland *hath caused no more Benefit since the Death of the Prince of* Orange, *the last Stadtholder of* Holland, *and Captain General during Life.* P. 450.

Why there was no easing of the Imposts, 451. *Because* Holland *was in Debt* 140 *Millions*, &c. *The* English *and the* Eastern *Wars were likewise Occasions of it*, 452. *Our Captains General have been the Cause of our dreadful Taxations; the Sums taken up being misspent for the Conquest of Cities, and thereby to keep* Holland *in Slavery, whic:*

is illustrated by a Similitude, how much the Country thrives better now than under the Stadtholders, 453. *Then Money was taken up at Interest to consume and waste, but now we husband it to pay off the Debts contracted by them*, 454. *The* French *and* English *Depredations by Sea hapned by means of the late Government*, 456. *The War with* England *was brought on us for the sake of the House of* Orange, 457. *The* English *sought our Friendship first. Some Rulers still remaining Slaves to the House of* Orange, *oppos'd themselves against the Alliance with* England, 458. *The* English *Ambassadors suffered great Contempt, which the States of* Holland *could not prevent; on which they parted discontented*, 459. *This was the real Cause of the first* English *War. The Remainders of the former Government, the Cause of the* Eastern *War*, 460. *The Duke of* Brandenburg, *&c. wheedl'd* Holland *into it, first getting us into an Allyance with him, who having got a good Sum of us, broke from it, and join'd the* Swede, 461. *Which caus'd the Treaty of* Elbing *for us, the Advantages of which are reckon'd up*, 462, 463. *Why the same was not ratified. The D. of* Brandenburg, *to obtain the Electoral* Prussia, *fell again from the* Swede, *and join'd the* Polander, 464.

Chap. 6. *What good Fruits the Beginnings of a Free Government have already produc'd, from the Death of the last Stadtholder, to the Year* 1662. P. 465.

First the not taking up Money at Interest, and the reducing of 5 *to* 4, *in order to discharge the Capital taken up*, 466. *This is not comprehended by many of our People*, 467. *Who understand not that the Country's Guardians should give no higher Interest for the Orphans Use than for their own. How great the Fruits of this Discharge are, is set forth by a Similitude*, 468. *The Benefit of this Reduction under the Stadtholders was converted to the levying of many Soldiers*, 469. *The third*

Fruit

Fruit of this Free Government is, A great part of the ſuperfluous Soldiery is disbanded, whereby Holland *ſaves* 500000 *Guilders yearly, which goes to the diſcharging of Debts*, 471. *The fourth Fruit is, That all Contentions of Cities and Provinces are ended to ſatisfaction, which yet are moſtly caus'd by ſuch as affect Slavery*, 472. *Whereas the Stadtholders fomented many Differences, and generally wrong'd the injur'd Parties; as appears by the Amneſty of* 1651. 473. *And the allaying the Diſſenſion in* Over-yſſel, *which had broke out into an open War*, 474. *What happned in* Groningen *is worthy Obſervation, where the Stadtholder not being able, deſir'd the States to compoſe the Differences*, 475. *Which they did, as likewiſe many others in divers Places*, 476. *The moſt conſiderable Fruit of the Free Government is, the Inclination of the Powers of* Holland *to ſtrengthen the Naval Forces*, 477. *The good Effects of which are particularly ſhewn*, 478——480.

Chap. 7. *The third and laſt Part concluded with this, That all good Inhabitants ought to defend the Free Government of* Holland *and* Weſt-Frieſland *with their Lives and Eſtates.* P. 480.

Chap. 8. *The Concluſion of the whole Book, with a Declaration of the Author's Deſign, and a Caution both to the ill and well affected Readers.* P. 487.

ERRATA.

PAG. 17. lin. 1. read *Art and Love.* p. 32. l. 32. dele *ſo.* p. 39. marg. r. *depends.* p. 223. marg. dele *comma* after *Fiſhers.* p. 373. marg. l. 11. r. *could not preſerve.* p. 378. marg. l. 5. for *thoſe* r. *it.* p. 435. dele the laſt marginal Note. p. 450. marg. l. 3. r. *but little.* p. 453. marg. l. 9. for *and* r. *were.* p. 466. marg. l. 11. r. *taken up.* p. 474. marg. l. 5. r. *had broke.*

The True Intereſt, and Political Maxims of the Republic of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland.*

PART I.

CHAP. I.

Wherein are laid down the General Political Maxims which tend to the Proſperity of all Countrys: And ſome Reaſons to make it evident, that the ſame do aptly agree to Holland *and* Weſtfrieſland.

THAT we may not abruptly ſpeak of the true Intereſt and Political Maxims of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, nor yet ſurprize the Reader with unknown Matters, I judg it neceſſary to begin with a general Diſcourſe of the Univerſal and true Political Maxims of all Countrys: That the Reader being inlightned by ſuch Reaſoning, may the better comprehend the true Political Maxims of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland.* And ſeeing that almoſt all the People in *Europe*, as the *Spaniards*, *Italians*, *French*, &c. do expreſs the ſame by the word *Intereſt*, I ſhall

The true Intereſt of all Countrys, conſiſts in the Proſperity of all the Inhabitants.

often have occaſion to uſe the ſame likewiſe here for brevity ſake, in the ſame ſenſe that they do: *viz.* Seeing the true Intereſt of all Countrys conſiſts in the joint Welfare of the Governors and Governed; and the ſame is known to depend on a good Government, that being the true Foundation whereon all the Proſperity of any Country is built; we are therefore to know, that a good Government is not that where the well or ill-being of the Subjects depends on the Virtues or Vices of the Rulers; but (which is worthy of obſervation) where the well or ill-being of the Rulers neceſſarily follows or depends on the well or ill-being of the Subjects. For ſeeing we muſt believe that in all Societies or Aſſemblies of Men, Self is always preferred; ſo all Sovereigns or Supreme Powers will in the firſt place ſeek their own Advantage in all things, tho to the prejudice of the Subject. But ſeeing on the other hand true Intereſt cannot be compaſſed by a Government, unleſs the generality of the People partake thereof; therefore the Publick Welfare will ever be aimed at by good Rulers. All which very aptly agrees with our *Latin* and *Dutch* Proverb, that, *Tantum de publicis malis ſentimus, quantum ad privatas res pertinet*; *i. e.* We are only ſenſible of publick Afflictions, in ſo far as they touch our private Affairs; for no body halts of another Man's Sore.

Whereby it clearly follows, that all wiſe Men, whether Monarchs, Princes, Sovereign Lords, or Rulers of Republicks, are always inclined ſo to ſtrengthen their Country, Kingdom, or City, that they may defend themſelves againſt the Power of any ſtronger Neighbour. The Rulers Welfare therefore does

does ſo far neceſſarily depend on the Welfare of the Subject; elſe they would ſoon be conquer'd by ſtronger neighbouring Princes, and be turn'd out of their Government. Thoſe Monarchs and Supreme Powers, who by bad Education, and great Proſperity, follow their Pleaſures, ſuffer their Government to fall into the hands of Favorites and Courtiers, and do commonly neglect this firſt Duty; the ſaid Favorites in the mean time finding themſelves veſted with ſuch Sovereign Power, do for the moſt part rule to the Benefit of themſelves, and to the Prejudice, not only of ſuch voluptuous and unwary chief Magiſtrates, but alſo of their Subjects; and by conſequence to the weakning of the Political State; ſo that we have often ſeen Revolutions of ſuch Monarchies by the ill Government of Favorites. But ſuch Princes as are wiſe, and do not entruſt their Power in other Mens hands, will not omit to ſtrengthen their Dominions againſt their Neighbours as much as poſſible. Bnt when Monarchies, or Republicks are able enough to do this, and have nothing to fear from their neighbouring States or Potentates, then they do uſually, according to the opportunity put into their hands by the Form of their Government, take Courſes quite contrary to the Welfare of the Subject.

For then it follows as truly from the ſaid General Maxims of all Rulers, that the next Duty of Monarchs, and Supreme Magiſtrates, is to take ſpecial care that their Subjects may not be like generous and metalſom Horſes, which, when they cannot be commanded by the Rider, but are too headſtrong, wanton, and powerful for their Maſter, they reduce, and keep ſo tame

Whence 'tis the Intereſt of Monarchs to weaken and impoveriſh the Subject, that they may aſſume to themſelves what Power they pleaſe.

Ariſt. Polit. *l.* 5. *c.* 11. and manageable, as not to refuſe the Bit and Bridle, I mean Taxes and Obedience. For which end it is highly neceſſary to prevent the Greatneſs and Power of their Cities, that they may not out of their own Wealth be able to raiſe and maintain an Army in the Field, not only to repel all Foreign Power, but alſo to make Head againſt their own Lord, or expel him. And as little, yea much leſs may Prudent Sovereign Lords or Monarchs permit that their Citys, by their ſtrong Fortifications, and training their Inhabitants to Arms, ſhould have an opportunity eaſily, if they pleas'd, to diſcharge and turn off their Sovereign. But if herein a Sovereign had neglected his Duty, there's no way left for him, but to wait an Opportunity to command ſuch populous Citys and Strongholds by Citadels, and to render them weak and defenceleſs.

L. 7. *c.* 11. ibid. And tho *Ariſtotle* ſays that it very well ſutes an Oligarchical State to have their Citys under command of a Caſtle, yet this is only true of a great and populous City, that hath a Prince over it, and not of a City that governs it ſelf, or hath a ſhare in the Supreme Government; for in ſuch a Republick, the Governour of that Citadel would certainly be able to make himſelf Maſter of that City, and to ſubjugate or overtop his Rulers. And we ſee that this Reaſon is ſo ſtrong and clear, and confirm'd by Experience, that the Hiſtory of all former Ages, as well as the Age we live in, teach us, That the Rulers of Republicks, whatever they are, have wiſely forborn erecting Citadels, and do ſtill continue to do ſo. So that it appears that the ſaid Maxim tending to the overthrow of great and populous Cities, may be attributed

tributed to Monarchs and Princes at all times, but never to Republicks, unleſs when they have inconſiderately ſubdued great Cities; and tho not willing to demoliſh them, yet are willing to keep them diſtinct from the Sovereign Government. But if the inconſiderate Reader be ſo far prepoſſeſs'd in favour of Monarchy and againſt Common Freedom, that he neither can nor will ſubmit himſelf to this way of Reaſoning, nor to the venerable and antient Leſſons of old and renowned Philoſophers; then let him know, that the Chriſtian and Invincible Monarch *Juſtinian* has for ever eſtabliſhed the ſaid Monarchical Maxim by form of Law in the *Corpus Juris*, now become the common Law-book of all Civiliz'd People, and eſpecially of Chriſtians. * For the ſaid Emperor having by his Captain General of the Eaſt, *Beliſarius*, reconquer'd from the *Goths* that part of *Africa* which he had formerly loſt, and brought it under his ſubjection, gave him no order that the Inhabitants of great Citys ſhould be better diſciplin'd and provided with Arms, or ſtrengthned by good Walls, that they might jointly with eaſe defend themſelves, and their great and populous Citys, againſt the Aſſaults of thoſe Barbarous People: But on the contrary, he commands the ſaid Captain General *Beliſarius* (and conſequently, according to the *Roman* Laws, all his other Governours of Provinces) to make ſuch proviſion, that no City or ſtrong

As the Emp. Juſtinianus *in his* Corpus Juris, *in form of a perpetual Law, has eſtabliſh'd it.*

* *Beliſario Magiſtro militum per Orientem, &c. Interea vero ſi aliquas Civitates ſeu Caſtella per limites conſtituta providerit tua Magnitudo nimiæ eſſe Magnitudinis, & propter hoc non poſſe bene cuſtodiri ad talem modum ea conſtrui diſponat, ut poſſint per paucos bene ſervari, &c.* Cod. l. 1. Tit. 27. par. 14.

Hold lying on the Frontiers be ſo great as it could not be well kept; but in ſuch Caſes ſo to order them to be built, that they may be well defended with few Soldiers, and particularly ſuch as were in pay, and depended only on the Emperor of *Rome*.

And tho weak, voluptuous, dull and ſluggiſh Monarchs neglect all theſe things, yet will not the Courtiers who govern in their ſtead, neglect to ſeek themſelves, and to fill their Coffers whether in War or in Peace: and thus the Subjects Eſtates being exhauſted by Rapine, thoſe great and flouriſhing Cities become poor and weak. And to the end that the Subject ſhould not be able to hinder or prevent ſuch Rapine, or revenge themſelves, thoſe Favorites omit no Opportunities to deveſt thoſe Populous Cities of all Fortifications, Proviſion, Ammunition of War, and to hinder the exerciſing of the Commonalty in the uſe of Arms. Since it appears from the ſaid Maxims, that the Publick is not regarded but for the ſake of private Intereſt; and conſequently that is the beſt Government where the Chief Rulers may beſt obtain their own Welfare by that of the People: It follows then to be the Duty of the Governours of Republicks to ſeek for great Cities, and to make them as populous and ſtrong as poſſible, that ſo all Rulers and Magiſtrates, and likewiſe all others that ſerve the Publick either in Country or City, may thereby gain the more Power, Honour and Benefit, and more ſafely poſſeſs it, whether in Peace or War: And this is the reaſon why commonly we ſee that all Republicks thrive and flouriſh far more in Arts, Manufacture, Traffick, Populouſneſs and Strength, than the Dominions and Cities of Mo-

The Intereſt of Republican Rulers, is to procure rich and populous Citys. Ariſt. Pol. l. 7. c. 11. l. 5. c. 11.

Monarchs: * for where there is Liberty, there will be Riches and People.

To bring all this home, and make it ſute with our State, we ought to conſider that *Holland* may eaſily be defended againſt her Neighbours; and that the flouriſhing of Manufactures, Fiſhing, Navigation, and Traffick, whereby that Province ſubſiſts, and (its natural Neceſſities or Wants being well conſidered) depends perpetually on them, elſe would be uninhabited: I ſay, the flouriſhing of thoſe things will infallibly produce great, ſtrong, populous and wealthy Cities, which by reaſon of their convenient Situation, may be impregnably fortified: All which to a Monarch, or one Supreme Head, is altogether intolerable. And therefore I conclude, that the Inhabitants of *Holland*, whether Rulers or Subjects, can receive no greater miſchief in their Polity, than to be governed by a Monarch, or Supreme Lord: And that on the other ſide, God can give no greater temporal Bleſſing to a Country in our Condition, than to introduce and preſerve a free Commonwealth Government.

Holland's *true Intereſt conſiſts in promoting Fiſhing, Manufacture, Traffick*, &c.

But ſeeing this Concluſion oppoſeth the general and long-continued Prejudices of all ignorant Perſons, and conſequently of moſt of the Inhabitants of theſe *United Provinces*, and that ſome of my Readers might diſtaſte this Treatiſe upon what I have already ſaid, unleſs ſomewhat were ſpoken to obviate their Miſtakes, I ſhall therefore offer them theſe Reaſons.

Altho by what hath been already ſaid, it appears, That the Inhabitants of a Republick are infinitely more happy than the Subjects of a

* *Quippe ubi Libertas, ibi & Populus & Divitiæ.*

Land governed by one ſupreme Head; yet the contrary is always thought in a Country where a Prince is already reigning, or in Republicks, where one Supreme Head is ready to be accepted.

The Intereſt of Courtiers and Souldiers is directly againſt them.

For not only Officers, Courtiers, idle Gentry, and Souldiery, but alſo all thoſe that would be ſuch, knowing, That under the worſt Government they uſe to fare beſt, becauſe they hope that with Impunity they may plunder and rifle the Citizens and Country People, and ſo by the Corruption of the Government enrich themſelves, or attain to Grandeur, they cry up Monarchical Government for their private Intereſt to the very Heavens: Altho God did at firſt mercifully inſtitute no other but a Commonwealth Government, and afterwards in his Wrath appointed one Sovereign over them. Yet for all this, thoſe Blood-ſuckers of the State, and indeed of Mankind, dare to ſpeak of Republicks with the utmoſt Contempt, make a Mountain of every Molehill, diſcourſe of the Defects of them at large, and conceal all that is good in them, becauſe they know none will puniſh them for what they ſay: Wherefore all the Rabble (according to the old * Latin Verſe) being void of Knowledg and Judgment, and therefore enclining to the Weather or ſafer ſide, and mightily valuing the vain and empty Pomp of Kings and Princes, ſay *Amen* to it; eſpecially when kept in Ignorance, and irritated againſt the lawful Government by Preach-

1 Sam. 1.8,12.

Which is not believed by ſome,

Becauſe among others, the manner of judging among all common Subjects, tends to the Advantage of Monarchy.

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* —— *Sed quid?*
Turba Remi ſequitur Fortunam, ut ſemper, & odit
Damnatos. Juven.

ers,

ers, who aim at Dominion, or would introduce an independent and arbitrary Power of Church-Government; and ſuch (God amend it) are found in *Holland*, and the other United Provinces, inſomuch, that all vertuous and intelligent People have bin neceſſitated to keep ſilence, and to beware of diſcloſing the Vices of their Princes, or of ſuch as would willingly be their Governors, or of Courtiers and rude Military Men, and ſuch ambitious and ungovernable Preachers as deſpiſe God, and their Native Country.

And how dangerous it is for the wiſer ſort to declare themſelves to the prejudice of Governments by ſingle Perſons.

Nay there are few Inhabitants of a perfect Free-ſtate to be found, that are inclinable to inſtruct and teach others, how much better a Republick is than a Monarchy, or one Supreme Head, becauſe they know no Body will reward them for it; and that on the other ſide, * Kings, Princes, and great Men, are ſo dangerous to be converſed with, that even their Friends can ſcarcely talk with them of the Wind and Weather, but at the hazard of their Lives; and Kings with their long Arms can give heavy blows. And altho all intelligent and ingenuous Subjects of Monarchs, who have not, with lying Sycophantical Courtiers, caſt off all Shame, are generally by theſe Reaſons, and daily Experience, fully convinced of the Excellency of a Republick above a Monarchical Government; yet nevertheleſs, many vertuous Perſons, lovers of Monarchy, do plauſibly

Which yet out of love to my Native Country, I have here performed, and enquired,

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* —— *Sed quid violentius aure Tyranni,*
Cum quo de pluviis aut æſtibus aut nimboſo
Verè locuturi Fatum pendebat amici? Juven.

maintain,

Whether any People naturally are to be governed by one Person.

maintain, that ſeveral Nations are of that Temper and Diſpoſition, that they cannot be happily governed but by a ſingle Perſon, and quote for this the Examples of all the People in *Aſia* and *Africa*, as well as *Europe*, that lie Southerly. They do alſo alledg, that all the People who lie more Northerly, are more fit to be governed by a ſingle Perſon, and with more Freedom; as from *France* to the Northward, all abſolute Monarchical Government ceaſeth; and therefore maintain or aſſert, with ſuch ignorant Perſons as I mention'd before, that the *Hollanders* in particular are ſo turbulent, factious, and diſingenuous, that they cannot be kept in awe, and happily governed, but by a ſingle Perſon; and that the Hiſtories of the former Reigns or Government by Earls, will ſufficiently confirm it.

Whether the Hollanders *are ſo peeviſh, that they cannot be governed but by a ſingle Perſon?*

But on the other ſide, the Patriots, and Lovers of a Free-ſtate will ſay, That the foregoing Government by Earls is well known to have bin very wretched and horrid, their Reigns filling Hiſtory with continual Wars, Tumults, and deteſtable Actions, occaſioned by that ſingle Perſon. And that on the contrary, the *Hollanders*, ſubſiſting by Manufacture, Fiſhing, Navigation, and Commerce, are naturally very peaceable, if by ſuch a Supreme Head they were not excited to Tumults. Whether this be ſo or not, may be learned and confirmed too in part from thoſe Hiſtories.

Deductie. Part 2. ch. 3, 4, 7, 13.

Whether they would be happier under a Stadtholder, than formerly under Earls?

But here it may be ſaid, That things are much altered within theſe 100 Years laſt; for *Holland* then ſubſiſted moſtly by Agriculture, and there were then no Souldiery, Treaſure, or fortified Places to be at the Earl's diſpoſal.

But

But when he had Wars, it was with the help of his Homagers and Tenants, only Subſidies or Money being given him at his Requeſt by the States of the Country: And moreover, the Cities of *Holland*, and Caſtles of the Nobility were (according to the then Method of War) ſo ſtrong, that they could not be taken by the ſaid Earls, without great Forces imployed againſt them; ſo that the States of *Holland* in their Aſſemblies, have boldly contended for their Rights againſt the Earls Encroachments. Therefore theſe Earls, on the other ſide, by reaſon of their great Dignity, had many Adherents that depended on them, which muſt needs make that Government by Earls every way unſteady, weak, and tumultuous.

To this an approver of Monarchical Government may further add, That *Holland* now wholly ſubſiſts by Traffick, and that one Supreme Head, Captain-General, or Stadtholder, would have his own Life-Guards at the *Hague*, the Place of Aſſembly, and likewiſe the Aſſiſtance of a great and well-paid Army, and of all the Preachers, and by them the love of the whole Populace; and that at his Pleaſure he may diſpoſe of all the impregnable Frontier Towns of thoſe Provinces that have no Suffrages or Voices in the State, tho he ſhould not increaſe his Strength by any foreign Alliances, or by Colluſion and Flattery with the Deputies of the other Provinces of the Generality, inſomuch that the States of *Holland* would not dare, no not in their Aſſemblies, to open their Mouths againſt the Intereſt of ſuch a Supreme Head, or if they did, he would order his Souldiers to take them by the Collar, and might eaſily overpower moſt of the Cities of *Holland*, the

the People being unaccuſtomed to Arms, and moreover divided, Fortifications but ſlight and mean in compariſon of the preſent way of Fortifying: So that one may truly ſay, That the *Hollanders* by ſetting up one Supreme Head over themſelves, may now with Eaſe, and without Tumult, be govern'd like Sheep, by an irreſiſtible Sovereign, againſt whom they durſt not ſpeak one word, when he ſhould think fit to ſheer, flea, or devour them.

Now what there is in this, and whether the *Hollanders* would be happy in ſuch a Condition, I ſhall at large hereafter give you my Judgment.

Whether they are too ſtupid naturally to be governed as a Commonwealth

But as to the Stupidity of the *Hollanders*, whether that be ſo great, as that they have not Wit enough to form a free Commonwealth; and having found that precious Jewel of Freedom, would, with *Eſop*'s Cocks, prefer a grain of Corn before it: This is what hath not been judged ſo hitherto, but on the contrary. Which that it may be evident to the Reader, he may be pleas'd to obſerve the prudent Conduct of the States of *Holland*, at their great Aſſembly in the Years 1650 and 1651. as alſo ſeriouſly to ponder and weigh the manifold Reaſons and Examples produced to this end in their *Deduction* of the Year 1654. All this is yet further confirmed by that magnanimous Reſolution of the 23*d* of *January* 1657. wherein the States of *Holland* unanimouſly declared, after conſulting the General Aſſemblies, or Common-Halls of the reſpective Cities in that Province, to hold for a Fundamental and certain Maxim, "That to place a perpetual "Head, Chieftain, or General over the Ar-"my, is not only needleſs, but likewiſe ex-"ceeding prejudicial, and that accordingly in

The States of Holland, *ſince the Year* 1650, *having manifeſted the contrary by manifold Acts, as alſo*

" this Province all things ſhall be thus directed;
" That whenever in a time of War, and preſ-
" ſing Neceſſity, the States of *Holland*, with
" the other Provinces, ſhall think fit to pro-
" ceed to elect a General for the Army, or
" that upon any other Occaſion a Captain-
" General ſhould be choſen, then not to chuſe
" ſuch a Chieftain as ſhall have a perpetual
" Commiſſion, but for ſuch an Expedition,
" Campagn, or Occaſion only as may happen,
" *&c.* And moreover, you may there ſee, that theſe, and other vigorous Reſolutions of the like Nature, were taken with this ſpecial Proviſo, " That the ſaid Reſolution ſhall not
" be diſpenſed with, but by the unanimous
" Conſent of all the Members of the ſaid Aſ-
" ſembly.

By this you may perceive, that the Suppoſition of the *Hollanders* being flegmatick and dull, and of a ſlaviſh Nature, is altogether groundleſs; for ſeeing they became not free but by the death of the laſt Stadtholder and Captain-General, and that it was unſeaſonable and imprudent before that time, for them to ſhew their commendable Zeal for their Freedom, and their Skill in point of Government: And ſeeing it is evident, that a Generation of Men that are in Freedom, muſt be overcome, before we can paſs a right Judgment thereof, and ſtop the mouths of Oppoſers; we muſt therefore leave it to God and Time: and if ſuch as like Monarchical Government, and thoſe baſe and ſlaviſh oppoſers of Liberty ſurvive thoſe times, they will then be able to diſcern which of the two Governments is founded on beſt Reaſon.

It ſhall not ſatisfy me to have ſaid thus much in general; for ſeeing the States of *Holland* in their

Becauſe the States of Holland, *in their Deduction, affirm the contrary.*

Deductie. Par. 2 Chap. 6. Art. 29.

their Deduction, *Chap.* 6. *Art.* 29. declare, That they will not loſe their Freedom, but with their Lives; I ſhall therefore preſume to give my Opinion of the Political Maxims of *Holland*, hoping that my ſincere Zeal and Uprightneſs to expreſs the ſame for the Benefit of the Publick, will be ſo acceptable to our lawful Rulers, that tho I may have failed in ſome things, and by ſtating the true Intereſt of my Country, have been neceſſitated to reflect on Perſons, who ſeek their Advantage to the prejudice of *Holland*, as it is now governed; the ſaid Rulers, and true Lovers of their Native Country, will ſo favour this Work, and its Author, againſt the ſaid malevolent Perſons, that it ſhall never repent him to have been the firſt generous and bold Undertaker of ſo commendable a Work. But howſoever things happen, or Times oppoſe it, *recte feciſſe merces eſt, & ipſa ſui pretium virtus*; (*i. e.* to do good is a Reward of it ſelf, and Virtue carries its own Recompence along with it) I ſhall then, having done my Duty as an honeſt Man, good Citizen, and upright Chriſtian, that may not bury his Talent, be able to take Comfort in my ſincere Endeavours: And Poſterity, into whoſe Hands theſe Writings may fall, will, in ſpite of all the preſent Powers that oppoſe it, be able to judg impartially, and that with a ſound Judgment; becauſe by that time they will have learned, by joyful or ſad Experience, whether *Holland*'s Intereſt can be ſettled upon any other Foundation or Maxims than thoſe herein expreſt; and whether theſe Reaſons of mine will not be confirmed by the Experience of following Ages.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

That the true Intereſt, and Political Maxims of Holland *and* Weſt-Frieſland *may be well underſtood*; Holland *muſt not be conſidered ſo, as in Speculation it ſhould be, but as it now ſtands at preſent.*

BEING now about to enquire into, and lay down ſome Maxims for *Holland*'s continual Proſperity; it ſeems at firſt View to be neceſſary, that we conſider the Nature of the Country, foraſmuch as it is in it ſelf perpetual; and what means may be found to improve it to its beſt Advantage, and what good Fruits and Effects are to be expected from ſuch Improvement. In order whereunto, we are firſt to conſider the Soil, Rivers, Meers of *Holland*, and its Situation upon the Sea, with the Communication it may have with other Nations. And next we are further to conſider, what People *Holland* ought to be inhabited with, *viz.* whether with few, or many, in order to earn their Bread: as alſo how the Rulers ought to deport themſelves towards Foreign Princes and Governments: And laſtly, by what Form of Government, and how the People ought to be governed. But becauſe ſuch Speculations uſe to build *Rempublicam Platonis*, *Ariſtotelis*, *Eutopiam Mori*, a Philoſophical Republick in the Air, or ſuch a one as was never yet found, the thoughts of it will afford little Benefit: Nor is this ſtrange, conſidering that ſo many People cannot be ſuddenly brought to an uninhabited Country, to erect a Political State, according to

Concerning all which, Expedients may be found, whereby Holland *may be improved to the moſt perfect Republick.*

Wherefore ſuch Speculations would produce little Benefit.

to the ſaid Speculation, and keep it on foot when it is eſtabliſh'd. And ſince in all populous Countries there is ſome Form of Government; therefore I ſay again, thoſe Speculations are for the moſt part uſeleſs. For if inquiry be made into the Polity of all eſtabliſhed Governments, we ſhall always find, that there are ever an incredible number of ignorant and malevolent People, Enemies to all Speculation, and Remedies, how good ſoever, which they conceive or really foreſee will be prejudicial in any wiſe to themſelves; and rather than admit them, they will preſs hard to imbroil the State more than it was before. Beſides, there is an endleſs number of Political Maxims which have ſo deep a Root, that it is great folly to think any Man ſhould be able, or indeed that it ſhould be thought fit to root them out all at once: And conſequently it would be yet a greater piece of Imprudence, if in *Holland*, *tanquam in tabula raſa*, as on a ſmooth, and in a very clean and good piece of Ground, we ſhould go about to ſow the beſt Seeds, in order to make it an Angelical or Philoſophical Republick: So true is that good and antient Political Maxim, * That in Polity many bad things are indulged with leſs inconveniency than removed; and that we ought never in Polity (as in playing at Tenis) to ſet the Ball fair, but muſt ſtrike it as it lies; it being alſo true, that on every Occurrence a good Politician is bound to ſhew his

Becauſe in Affairs of Polity we muſt ever ſtrike the Ball as it is found lying.

* *Multa ſcire pauca exequi*, Cor. Tacit.
Multa facere non oportet quæ facta tenent.
Curando fieri quædam majora videmus
Vulnera, quæ melius non tetigiſſe fuit.

Art,

and Love to his Native Country, that by ſuch conſtancy the Commonwealth may by degrees be brought to a better condition. I do therefore conceive my ſelf oblig'd to conſider *Holland* in the State as it now is, and hope that thoſe Thoughts will produce the more and better Fruits, ſince thoſe that duly conſider the preſent State of it, will find that they agree for the moſt part with the Climate, Soil, Rivers, Meers, Situation, and Correſpondence which ſuch a Country ought to have with other Dominions, and eſpecially with a free Commonwealth Government, which we have now at preſent in being: And I hope I ſhall not digreſs from it. By the Maxims of *Holland's* Intereſt, I underſtand the Conſervation, and Increaſe of the Inhabitants as they now are, conſiſting of Rulers and Subjects. I ſhall likewiſe diligently enquire by what means this Intereſt may be moſt conveniently attained. And tho in the firſt place the Intereſt of the Rulers ought to be conſidered, becauſe diſtinctly and at large it always ſeems to occaſion the Subjects Welfare and Proſperity; and a good form of Government is properly the Foundation whereon all the Proſperity of the Inhabitants is built: I ſhall nevertheleſs conſider in the firſt place the Preſervation, and Increaſe of the number of Subjects, not only becauſe it is evident in all Governments, and eſpecially in all Republics, That the Number or Paucity of Subjects is the Cauſe of an able or weak Government; but alſo becauſe ambitious Spirits can ſeldom find a multitude of People living out of civil Society and Government, that will ſubject them-

What is underſtood by Holland's *Intereſt.*

Namely, and eſpecially the Proſperity, and Increaſe of the Subjects.

themſelves to them: And on the contrary, where many Inhabitants are, there will never want Rulers, becauſe the weakneſs and wickedneſs of Mankind is ſo great, that they cannot ſubſiſt without Government; inſomuch that in caſe of a vacancy of Rulers, every one would ſtand Candidates for it themſelves, or elect others. And above all, I find my ſelf obliged more fully to conſider and promote the welfare of the Subjects in *Holland* above that of the Rulers; becauſe in this free Commonwealth Government, it is evident that the durable and certain Proſperity of the Rulers does generally depend on the Welfare of the Subjects, as hereafter ſhall be particularly ſhewn. And to give the unexperienc'd Reader ſome inſight at firſt, it is convenient to premiſe that *Holland* was not of old one Republick, but conſiſted of many, which in proceſs of time choſe a Head or Governour over them by the Name of *Earl*, or *Stadtholder*: But ſeeing he had of old no armed Men or Soldiery of his own as Dukes had, but was to be content with his own Revenues, and to rule the Land, or rather adminiſter Juſtice to each Country according to their particular Cuſtoms and Laws, they nevertheleſs continued ſo many ſeveral Republicks. And tho in proceſs of time they were jointly brought to a Sovereign Republic, yet is it alſo true that the Members of this *Dutch* Republic are of very different Natures and Manners. For *Amſterdam*, *Rotterdam*, *Horn*, *Enchuyſen*, *Medenblick*, *Edam*, *Monnikendam*, *Dort*, *Schiedam*, *Briel*, &c. lying on the Sea, or on Rivers where Ships of great burden may conveniently arrive; *Haerlem*, *Delf*, *Leyden*, *Grude*,

Seeing the Proſperity of the Rulers of the Republick in Holland *depends on the Subjects.*

Becauſe Holland *was not of old one Country, but conſiſted of many Republicks; and alſo becauſe of the diverſe ſituations of the Cities, it cannot poſſibly have one and the ſame Intereſt.*

Grude, *Gorcum*, *Schoonhoven*, *Alkmaer*, *Purmereynde*, &c. lying within Land, are not to be come at but with Veſſels that draw little Water: Beſides which the Gentry who live in the plain or open Countrys of *Holland*, having great Eſtates, and being not under any Government, ſeem to have a quite particular Intereſt. Wherefore every intelligent Perſon may eaſily judg that a diverſity of Rulers, Subjects, Countrys, and Situations, muſt needs cauſe a diverſity of Intereſts, ſo that I cannot write of *Holland*'s Proſperity as of a diſtinct Country: Nevertheleſs I incline, and do intend to bring it under one Title, as far as all its Cities or Lands can be comprehended in one Intereſt, to the beſt of my knowledg and skill. Which to do methodically, I ſhall in the Firſt Part inquire into, and ſhow the Maxims tending to the Welfare or Damage of *Holland* within its own confines. In the Second Part I ſhall propoſe how *Holland* muſt procure its own Welfare as to Foreign Princes. And in the Third Part I ſhall enquire, and ſhew by what Form of Government ſuch a Country and Inhabitants ought to be governed according to their true Intereſt, ſeeing this is the general Foundation whereon all the Proſperity or Adverſity aforeſaid is founded.

And yet foraſmuch as they all center, and agree in one, the Intereſt of Holland *is made evident.*

CHAP. III.

Of Holland's *natural Burdens and Hinderances.*

Holland's Situation.

HOLLAND lying in the Latitude of 51 to 53 degrees, North Latitude upon the Sea; having many Inland Rivers, and being beſides a very low and plain Country, is thereby ſubject to many Inconveniences.

And Inconveniences thence proceeding, even in a time of perfect Peace.

First, There are ſharp and very long Winters, ſo that there is need of more Light, Firing, Clothing, and Food, than in warmer Countries: beſides which, all the Cattle of our Paſture-land muſt be then houſed, tho thereby we beſtow more coſt and pains, and yet reap leſs profit of milk-meats than in Summer, or in other adjacent Lands, where the Cattle remain longer, or perhaps all the Winter in the Field.

By the Seaſons.

Secondly, The Seaſons are here ſo ſhort, that they muſt be very punctually obſerved, to return us any Profit by our Plough'd Lands; for the Seed in this moiſt Country being rotted and conſumed in the Earth, cannot be ſowed again conveniently.

By the Propinquity of the Sea.

Thirdly, By the Vicinity of the Sea, and Plainneſs of the Land, it is ſubject in Spring, and Autumn, not only to unwholeſom Weather for the Inhabitants, but in the Spring the ſharp cold Winds blaſt moſt of the bloſſoms of the Fruit-trees; and in and about Autumn much unripe Fruit is blown down by our uſual ſtorms of Wind.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, It is to be conſidered above all, That theſe Lands lying for the moſt part lower than the Floods of the Sea, and Rivers, muſt withſtand the terrible Storms of the Ocean, and Shoals of Ice, againſt which it muſt be defended with great expence: For the making of one Rod long of a Sea Dyke coſts ſometimes 600 Guilders. On the Rivers alſo, the Charge of maintaining the Banks is very great; and the moſt chargeable of all is, that notwithſtanding ſo great an expence, the Water of our Dykes and Low-lands ſometimes breaks thro, and overflows the Country; ſo that above all this extraordinary Charge, and Damage, they cannot drain the Country by Mills in ſome Years. And touching the ordinary Charges in maintaining Dykes and Sluces, *&c.* how great an expence this muſt be, we may well imagine by the yearly Charges of *Rynland*, which is about 80000 Acres or * Morgens in compaſs, which hath not much communication with the Sea, nor with running, but only with ſtanding Waters; and yet as to Acredg-money and inland Charges, every Acre muſt pay at leaſt two Guilders; beſides, for draining out of the Rain-water by Mills to turn it out by Trenches, each Acre 30 Stivers; likewiſe towards Foot-paths, Highways, and maintaining the Ditches, at leaſt 20 Stivers more. And laſtly, they are liable to many Fines, and Troubles, when they chuſe their *Bailiffs*, *Dyk-graves*, and *Heemraden* for Life, who are wholly independent on the Landed-men; tho they may elect their Judges yearly, or continue their *Heemraden*.

And lowneſs of the Country.

* *A Morgen is about two Engliſh Acres.*

Also poorneſs of Land.

Fifthly, It is evident that *Holland* affords no Minerals, or the leaſt Product of Mines; ſo that out of the Earth there is nothing to be had but Clay and Turf, nor even that, but with the ſpoiling or disfiguring of the Ground.

Holland thus contending and wreſtling with the Sea, Rivers, and drained Meers, can hardly make 400000 profitable Acres, or Morgens of Land, Down and Heath not included. For according to the Calculation taken in the Year 1554. there were found about three hundred thouſand Morgens, and ſome hundreds more. Likewiſe the States of *Holland* and *Zealand*, in a Remonſtrance ſince made to the Earl of *Leiceſter*, ſay, That theſe two Provinces with all their Heath, Down, and Grounds delv'd out, could make in all but five hundred thouſand Morgens. So that I conjecture *Holland* may now make in all four hundred thouſand Morgens, or Acres of Land. Seeing the Chronicle of *Zealand* (according to the Account given in by the Surveyor *Everſdyke*) teſtifies, that in 1643. all the Iſlands of *Zealand* contributed to the yearly Poundage, no more than for one hundred eighty three thouſand three hundred and fifty Gemeeten, and ſixty three Rods of Land: The Gemeetens of the Down-lands being reckoned after the rate of three for two. So that if two Gemeetens are reckoned againſt one *Holland* Acre, then all the abovementioned Gemeetens would make out no more than 91675 Morgens, and 63 Rods.

Smallneſs of Territory.

Poorneſs of the Soil.

And ſeeing the Ground in *Holland* is for the moſt part every where either Sand, Moor, or Fenn, it muſt neceſſarily be inriched; and

 becauſe

becauſe ſuch improvement of it, by reaſon of the looſneſs of the Land, ſinks down, it requires it the oftner.

This is the Condition of *Holland* in a time of perfect Peace; what will it be then when we conſider, that the *Hollanders* muſt not only ſcour, or clear the Sea from Enemys, and defend their Towns and Country againſt all Foreign Force, but that they have alſo charged themſelves with much more than the Union of *Utrecht* obliged them to, with the keeping of many conquered Citys, and circumjacent Provinces, which bring in no Profit to *Holland*, but are a certain Charge, being ſupply'd by that Province with Fortifications, Ammunition-houſes, Victuals, Arms, Cannon, Pay for the Soldiers, yea, and which is a ſhameful thing to mention, with Guard-houſes, and Money for quartering of Soldiers?

So that the Miſchiefs cauſed by War, are intolerable.

And how heavy the ſaid Burdens muſt needs be to the *Dutch*, may be eaſily imagined, if it be conſidered, that beſides the Cuſtoms and other Revenues of the Earls or States of *Holland*, in the Year 1664. by the ordinary Charge which was levied of the Inhabitants, one Year with another, was paid

	Guilders.
To the States of *Holland*	11000000
To the Admiralty of the *Maſe*	472898
To the Admiralty of *Amſterdam*	2000000
To the Admiralty of the Northern Quarter	200000
In all—	13,672898

For by the ordinary Taxes the Inhabitants pay to the State about 14 *Millions of Guilders yearly.*

And in time of War they pay for the 200th Penny, 2400000, and for half Poundage 1200000, and for Hearth or Chimney-Money 600000 Guilders.

And if it be considered that since that time, by reason of the Wars, there were new ordinary Taxes imposed; and that the extraordinary, namely, the two hundredth Penny brings in 2400000, and the half Verpondinge, or Poundage, 1200000; And lastly, the Chimny-money six hundred and seventy thousand *Holland* Guilders; and that all those Burdens are born by the Inhabitants, besides the many Excises, and great Sums of Money which they must pay in their Citys for their Maintenance: These things I say considered, we may well conclude, that the Inhabitants of *Holland* are exceeding heavily burdened and charged.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Natural Product and Advantages of Holland.

The Natural growth of Holland, and what it yields.

TO ballance these heavy Burdens beforementioned, the inland Waters yield nothing but Fish, Water-Fowl and their Eggs, the Downs only Conys: Four hundred thousand Acres, or Morgens of Land, nothing but Brick-earth, Turf, Corn, Herbs and Roots, Fruit of Trees, Flax, Hemp, Reeds, Grass, Madder, Cattel, Sheep, Horses. But the Downs may be also said to yield Lime and Sand. And how unsufficient all these Products from so small and inconsiderable a Bottom are in themselves for the subsistence of so many Inhabitants, every one may easily imagine.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

That the Inhabitants of Holland *cannot be fed by its own Product.*

BUT if we ſhould ſuppoſe that all the Land in *Holland* could be, and were ſowed with the moſt neceſſary Grain, *viz.* Wheat; and that every Morgen in *Holland* produced fifteen Sacks of Wheat, yet would not four hundred thouſand Acres of Land yield for two millions of People, each a pound of Bread *per* day. And poſſibly there are now more People imployed about the manuring of Land, than can be fed on it. So that if we ſhould make a calculation of all the Fruits which the Earth yieldeth, with what elſe is neceſſary for the uſe of Man, and continually imported, it would evidently appear that the Boors, or Husbandmen and their Dependents, would fall very much ſhort of Food, Drink, Apparel, Houſing and Firing. Therefore if the *Hollanders* did not by their Induſtry make many Manufactures, or by their Labour and Diligence reap much profit by the Seas and Rivers, the Country, or Land of *Holland*, were not worthy to be inhabited by Men, and cultivated, no not tho the People were very few in number, and no Subſidies, Impoſts, or Exciſes raiſed on them, for their common defence againſt a Foreign Enemy. On the other ſide, *Holland* being now inhabited by innumerable People, who bear incredible heavy Taxes, Impoſts and Exciſes, and muſt neceſſarily be ſo inhabited, the eaſier to bear ſo great a Burden,

Whereby it appears that Holland, *whether in Peace or War, cannot feed, or ſuſtain it ſelf.*

den, and to defend themſelves againſt all their neighbouring Potentates: We may ſafely ſay, that *Holland* cannot in any wiſe ſubſiſt of it ſelf, but that of neceſſity it muſt fetch its Food elſewhere, and continually invite new Inhabitants from Foreign Parts. I therefore find my ſelf obliged to ſearch into, and more particularly demonſtrate the Ways and Means by which the ſame may be procured.

CHAP. VI.

That Holland *lies very commodiouſly to fetch its Proviſion out of the Sea, and to provide it ſelf by other Arts and Trades: and how great a means of Subſiſtence the Fiſheries may prove to us.*

So that the Inhabitants muſt ſeek their Bread out of the Sea by fiſhing, or aſhore by Manufactures, and Arts.

Holland is very well ſituated to procure its Food out of the Sea, which is a common Element; it lies not only on a Strand rich of Fiſh, near the *Dogger-Sand*, where Haddock, Cod, and Ling may in great abundance be taken, and cured; but alſo near the Herring-Fiſhery, which is only to be found on the Coaſt of *Great-Britain*, *viz.* from St. *John*'s to St. *James*'s, about *Schet-Land*, *Pharil*, and *Boekneſs*; from St. *James*'s to the Elevation of the Croſs about *Boekneſs* or *Seveniot*, from the Elevation of the Croſs to St. *Katherines* in the deep Waters Eaſtward of *Yarmouth*. And this Herring Fiſhing, which it is now 250 Years ago ſince *William Beakelſon* of *Biervliet* firſt learned to gill, ſalt, and pack them up in Barrels, together with the Cod-Fiſhery, is become

become ſo effectual a means of Subſiſtence for theſe Lands, and eſpecially ſince ſo many neighbouring Nations, by reaſon of their Religion, are obliged upon certain Days and Weeks of the Year, wholly to refrain from eating of Fleſh; that the *Hollanders* alone do fiſh in a time of Peace with more than a thouſand Buſſes, from 24 to 30 Laſts burden each, and with above one hundred and ſeventy ſmaller Veſſels that fiſh for Herrings at the Mouth of the *Texel*: So that thoſe thouſand Buſſes being ſet to Sea for a Year, wherein they make three Voyages, do coſt above ten Millions of Guilders, accounting only the Buſs with its Tackle, at 4550 Guilders, and the ſetting forth to Sea 5500 Guilders, there remaining nothing of all its Victuals and Furniture the ſecond Year, but the bare Veſſel, and that much worn and tatter'd, needing great Reparation. So that if theſe 1000 Buſſes do take yearly forty thouſand Laſt of Herrings, counting them at leaſt worth 200 Guilders *per* Laſt, they would yield in *Holland* more than eight Millions of Guilders.

And ſeeing that of late Men have begun to make very much uſe of Whale-Oil, and Whale-Fins, which are taken to the Northward not far from us, inſomuch that with Southerly Winds, which are common in this Country, we can ſail thither within ſix or 8 days: The Trade of Fiſhing, and Salt, may eaſily be fix'd and ſettled with us; for to fix thoſe Fiſheries, and ſeveral Manufactures, and conſequently the Trade and Returns thereof depending on Navigation, and Ships let out to Freight, we ought duly to conſider, that the greateſt Difficulty for ſo innumerable a People

The great number of Inhabitants is a powerful means to fix Traffick in Holland.

People to ſubſiſt on their own Product, proves the moſt powerful means to attract all foreign Wares into *Holland*, not only to ſtore them up there, and afterwards to carry them up the Country by the *Maſe*, *Waal*, *Yſſel*, and the *Rhine* (making together one River) to very many Cities, Towns, and People, lying on the ſides of them (the moſt conſiderable in the World for conſumption of Merchandiſe) but alſo to conſume the ſaid imported Goods, or to have them manufactur'd: It being well known, that no Country under Heaven, of ſo ſmall a Compaſs, has ſo many People and Artificers as we have; to which may be added, that no Country in the World is ſo wonderfully divided with Rivers and Canals, whereby Merchandize may be carried up and down with ſo little Charge.

How conſiderable the Fiſheries of Holland *are, is mentioned by certain* Engliſh *Writers*

Emanuel van Meteren ſays, That in the ſpace of three days, in the Year 1601. there ſailed out of *Holland*, to the Eaſtward, between eight and nine hundred Ships, and 1500 Buſſes a Herring fiſhing; which is eaſy to believe, if we may credit what the *Engliſh* Authors mention, *viz.* *Gerard Malines* in his *Lex Mercatoria*, and Sir *Walter Rawleigh*, and which *Lievin van Aitzma*, Anno 1653. *pag.* 863. doth in ſome meaſure confirm, *viz.* That there are yearly taken and ſpent by the *Hollanders* more than three hundred thouſand Laſt of Herrings, and other ſalt Fiſh: And that the Whale fiſhing to the Northward, takes up above twelve thouſand Men, which ſail out of theſe Countries. For ſince the *Greenland* Company, or (to expreſs my ſelf better) the Monopolizing Grant thereof was annulled, and the Whale-fiſhing ſet open in common, that

that Fiſhery is increaſed from one to ten: So that when we reckon that all theſe fiſhing Veſſels are built here at home, and the Ropes, Sails, Nets, and Cask made here, and that Salt is furniſh'd from hence; we may eaſily imagine that there muſt be an incredible number of People that live by this means, eſpecially when we add, That all thoſe People muſt have Meat, Drink, Clothes, and Houſing; and that the Fiſh, when caught, is tranſported by the *Hollanders* in their Veſſels through the whole World. And indeed if that be true, which Sir *Walter Rawleigh* (who made diligent inquiry thereinto, in the Year 1618. to inform King *James* of it) affirms, That the *Hollanders* fiſhed on the Coaſt of *Great Britain* with no leſs than 3000 Ships, and 50000 Men, and that they employed and ſet to Sea, to tranſport and ſell the Fiſh ſo taken, and to make returns thereof, nine thouſand Ships more, and one hundred and fifty thouſand Men beſides: and if we hereunto add what he ſaith further, *viz.* that twenty Buſſes do maintain eight thouſand People, and that the *Hollanders* had in all no leſs than 20000 Ships at Sea; as alſo that their Fiſhing, Navigation, and Traffick by Sea, with its Dependencies ſince that time, to the Year 1667, is encreaſed to $\frac{1}{3}$ more: I ſay, if that be ſo, we may then eaſily conclude, that the Sea is a ſpecial means of *Holland*'s ſubſiſtence; ſeeing *Holland* by this means alone, yields by its own Induſtry above three hundred thouſand Laſts of ſalt Fiſh. So that if we add to this, the Whale-fin, and Whale-oil, and our *Holland* Manufactures, with that which our own Rivers afford us, it muſt be confeſſed, that no Country

Who out of Envy nevertheleſs overrate this means of our Subſiſtence.

try in the World can make ſo many Ships-lading of Merchandize by their own Induſtry, as the Province of *Holland* alone.

CHAP. VII.

That in Europe *there is no Country fitter for Traffick than* Holland; *and how great a means of Subſiſtence Commerce is to it.*

Of the Traffick of Holland.

HAving thus conſidered *Holland*'s conveniency for the Fiſhing Trade, and it coming into my Thoughts, that all the Traffick of *Holland* ſeems chiefly to have riſen out of it, and ſtill to depend upon it; I ſhall now give my Opinion wherein that Aptneſs or Conveniency moſtly conſiſts.

But firſt let me ſay, that by the word *Traffick*, I mean the buying of any thing to ſell again, whether for Conſumption at home, or to be ſold abroad, without altering its Property, as buying in foreign Countries cheap, to ſell dearer abroad; the moſt conſiderable part of which is what I underſtand by the word Traffick.

Holland's *convenient ſituation for Trade.*

Secondly, I ſay, that *Holland* is very conveniently ſeated for that end, lying in the middle of *Europe*, accounting from St. *Michael* the *Arch-Angel* in *Muſcovia*, and *Revel*, to *Spain*. And as to our lying further off from *Italy* and the *Levant*, and more to the Eaſtward, it is a thing very neceſſary, inaſmuch as moſt of the bulky and coarſe Goods, as Pitch, Tar, Aſhes, Corn, Hemp, and Timber

Timber for Ships, and other uſes; as alſo *Pomerania* and *Pruſſia* Wool muſt be fetch'd from thence, and brought hither; becauſe the better half of thoſe Goods is conſumed or wrought up in this Country: And becauſe very many Wares may be ſent up and down the Rivers of the *Rhine* and *Maſe*, whereby it appears, that the *Hollanders* ſail with as many more Ships to the Eaſtward, as they do to the Weſtward.

To which the Conqueſts of the East-India *Company contribute.*

Thirdly, The conquer'd Lands, and ſtrong Holds of the *Eaſt-India* Company are now become very conſiderable, in order to ſecure to *Holland* the Trade of all Spices, and *Indian* Commodities, which is already pretty well fixed to it. And this improvement of Trade might be made much more conſiderable, if the ſaid Conquerors would not, by virtue of their Grant or Patent, hinder all the other Inhabitants of theſe Lands from trading to thoſe Conqueſts, and to innumerable rich Countries, where the ſaid Conquerors, for Reaſons of State may not, or for other Reaſons cannot, or perhaps will not trade. Yea, tho the ſaid free Trade of our Inhabitants (to the greater benefit of the Participants) were in ſome meaſure limited, and circumſcribed to thoſe Lands and Sea-Ports lying in their Diſtrict, to which they never yet traded, I ſhould then expect to ſee much more fruit of that Trade, and Monopoly together, than of their Monopoly alone: For if our *Eaſt-India* Company could find ſome Expedient, either as to Freight of Goods, to permit all the Inhabitants of theſe Lands freely to lade their Goods on board the Company's own Ships, or to import and export all manner of Goods to the

the Places of their Conqueſts, and back to this Country, or in proceſs of Time, by laying Impoſts on the Conſumption of the inhabiting Planters, who would reſort thither in great numbers by reaſon of a Free Trade, or by any other imaginable means tending to give it an open Trade, they would thereby reap much more Profit than the poor Participants now commonly and with much uncertainty do enjoy; and then, if afterwards the ſaid Participants would be perſuaded to deny themſelves ſo much of their Privilege, or authorized Monopoly, as to ſet open that Trade in ſome good meaſure to the Inhabitants of theſe *United Provinces*, it would queſtionleſs produce to our Induſtrious and Inquiſitive Nation, ſo many new and unheard of Conſumptions of all our Manufactures, eſpecially of Wool, and ſo great a Trade, Navigation, and Commerce with that vaſt Land of *Africa*, and the incredibly great and rich *Aſia*, which lies ſo convenient for Trade, that many hundred Ships would yearly make Voyages thither, and bring their Returns hither, eſpecially from and to *Amſterdam*; and by means of which alone, we ſhould certainly, and very eaſily work all other Foreigners out of thoſe *Indian* Seas. Whereas on the other hand, to the end we may preſerve our *Eaſt-India* Trade, conſiſting yearly of no more than 10 or 16 Ships going and coming, we find our ſelves continually drawn into ſo many Quarrels and Contentions with thoſe foreign Nations, with eminent Danger of loſing by ſuch Diſſenſions and Wars, not only our *European* Trade, but alſo thoſe conquered *Indian* Countries, and conſequently that Trade alſo for want of Planters,

And the Advantage Holland *hath, would be incredibly augmented, if the Trade to the* Indies *were free for all the Inhabitants.*

Planters, and by the exceſſive great Expences which they muſt be at more and more yearly, by reaſon of ſuch great numbers of Soldiers as lie in their Gariſons, and which will and muſt increaſe with their Conqueſts; as (God amend it) hath but too plainly appeared by the *Weſt-India* Company of this Country.

An open Trade to the Weſt-Indies *would increaſe Traffick and Navigation.*

This Advantage which *Holland* hath for Commerce and Traffick, would be yet more improved, if the *Weſt-India* Company, in all Places of their Diſtrict, would alſo ſet that Trade open: And in caſe things are ſo conſtituted, that the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-India* Trade cannot be preſerved but by mighty Companies, as ſome indeed affirm, who underſtand the *India* Trade, and have the Credit of affirming what they ſay, with good ſhew of Reaſon; yet this however muſt be confeſs'd, that the ſaid Companies, as now conſtituted, do attract and preſerve to *Holland* all the Trade which depends on their vaſt Equipages, Ladings, and Returns.

The low Intereſt of Mony helpful hereunto.

Fourthly, It is a great Advantage for the Traffick of *Holland*, that Mony may be taken up by Merchants at 3 ½ *per Cent.* for a Year, without Pawn or Pledg; whereas in other Countries there is much more given, and yet real Eſtates bound for the ſame: So that it appears, that the *Hollanders* may buy and lay out their ready Mony a whole Seaſon, before the Goods they purchaſe are in being, and manufactur'd, and ſell them again on Truſt (which cannot be done by any other trading Nation, conſidering their high Intereſt of Mony) and therefore is one of the greateſt means whereby the *Hollanders* have gotten moſt of the Trade from other Nations.

The chargeable living in Holland *constrains the Inhabitants to Merchandising.*

Fifthly, There being many Duties and Subsidies to be paid in *Holland*, and little got by Lands, Houſes, or Mony let out at Intereſt; and we having alſo no Cloiſters, and but few Lands in Fief, or held by Homage; and the Women moreover being very fruitful of Children, and Men making equal dividends of their Eſtates among them, which can therefore be but ſmall, and ſo not fit to be put out to Intereſt: All this, I ſay, is another great Cauſe of the advancing of our Traffick.

CHAP. VIII.

That Holland, *by Fiſhing and Traffick, hath acquired Manufacturies and Navigation; and how great a means of Subſiſtence Manufactury, and Ships let out to Freight prove to them.*

THO it is evident by our Hiſtories, that in many Cities in *Holland* great quantities of Manufactures were made, when all the *European* Traffick and Navigation was moſtly driven by the *Eaſterlings* and *Hans-Towns*, and before Fiſhing, Traffick, and freighting of Ships were ſettled in theſe Provinces; and that conſequently we might ſay with good Reaſon, That Fiſhing and Traffick, together with Ships ſailing for Freight, took their riſe rather from the Manufactures, than the Manufactures took their riſe from them: Yet generally it is certain, that in a Country where there is Fiſhing and Traffick, Manufacturys and freight Ships may eaſily be introduced. For from

Traffick depends on Fiſhing and Manufacture.

Manufacture depends on Fiſhing and Traffick.

from them there muſt of neceſſity riſe an opportunity of bringing Commodities to be wrought up out of foreign Parts; and the Goods ſo manufactur'd may be ſent by the ſame Conveniency beyond Seas, or up the Rivers into other Countries.

Thus we ſee that in *Holland* for the ſame reaſon, all ſorts of Manufactures of Silk, Flax, Wool, Hemp, Twyne, Ropes, Cables, and Nets, are more conveniently made, and yield better Profit than in any other Country, and the like; coarſe Salt boiled; and many Ships are built by that means with outlandiſh Timber. For it is evident that Shipwrights work in *Holland* muſt not be conſidered as a mere Conſumption, but as a very conſiderable Manufacture and Merchandize, ſeeing almoſt all great Ships for Strangers are built by the *Hollanders*. Beſides which Manufactures, there are others of neceſſary Uſe, as well as for Pleaſure or Ornament; which are of ſuch a Nature, that moſt of them require Water, whether it be to work them, or for cheapneſs of Carriage: And when by the ſhallowneſs of the Waters there would be otherwiſe a defect, that want is ſupply'd by the conſtant Winds that blow upon our low and plain Land, which joining to the Sea are thereby repleniſhed.

Navigation, or Shares in Shipping, depend on Manufactures, Fiſheries, and Commerce.

And as to the owning of Parts of Ships let out to freight, it appears that a Ship lying for Freight in a Country where Fiſhing, Manufactury, and Trading flouriſh, will be able to get its Lading in a very ſhort time: And that in Countrys where they don't flouriſh, ſuch Ships muſt ſail from one Port to another, and loſe much time in getting Freight: So that ſuch as are Owners of Ships, muſt neceſſarily

fix in ſuch a Country where Shipping may ſooneſt find their full Lading.

The Climate of Holland very proper for Manufacture.

Beſides all which, *Holland* lies in ſo cold a Climate, that the People are not hindred from working by reaſon of the Heat of the Country, as elſewhere: And ſeeing for the moſt part we have but a groſs Air, eat coarſe Diet, and drink ſmall Beer, the People are much fitter for conſtant Work; and by reaſon of the great Impoſitions, they are neceſſitated to uſe all the ſaid means of Subſiſtence, *viz.* to make Manufactures by Land, to fiſh by Sea, to navigate Ships for Trade at home and abroad, and to let out their great and ſmall Veſſels to Freight.

A free Republican Government inclines all to get Eſtates.

And ſeeing the Inhabitants under this free Government, hope by lawful Means to acquire Eſtates, may ſit down peaceably, and uſe their Wealth as they pleaſe, without dreading that any indigent or waſteful Prince, or his Courtiers and Gentry, who are generally as prodigal, neceſſitous, and covetous as himſelf, ſhould on any pretence whatever ſeize on the Wealth of the Subject; our Inhabitants are therefore much inclined to ſubſiſt by the forenamed and other like ways or means, and gain Riches for their Poſterity, by Frugality and good Husbandry.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

That the Inhabitants of Holland, *being in a State of Freedom, are by a common Intereſt wonderfully linked together; which is alſo ſhew'd by a rough Calculation of the Number of Inhabitants, and by what Means they ſubſiſt.*

That the foremention'd means of Subſiſtence, and alſo the Inhabitants are linked together.

WE are moreover well to conſider, That Fiſhing is not the ſole Cauſe of Traffick, nor Fiſhing and Traffick the Cauſe of Manufactury; as alſo that theſe three together do not always give occaſion for the Shipping that is let out to Freight, which is meant by Navigation: But that Fiſhing flouriſhes much more in thoſe Parts, becauſe Traffick, Navigation and Manufactures are ſettled among us, whereby the Fiſh and Oil taken may be tranſported and conſumed. Likewiſe that more than the one half of our Trading would decay, in caſe the Trade of Fiſh were deſtroyed, as well as all other ſorts of Commodities about which People are imployed in *Holland*; beſides that, by conſequence the *Inland Conſumption* of all Foreign Goods being more than one half diminiſhed, the Traffick in thoſe Parts would fall proportionably.

Namely the greateſt Traders in Fiſh, and Makers of Manufacture.

It is alſo certain, that of neceſſity all ſorts of Manufactures would be leſſened more than a Moiety, if not annihilated, as ſoon as this Country ſhould come to be bereft of Fiſhing, and of Trading in thoſe Commodities which are ſpent abroad. And concerning Owners of Ships let out to Freight, it is evident that they

wholly depend on the Proſperity or Succeſs of Fiſhing, Manufactury, and Traffick: For ſeeing our Country yields almoſt nothing out of its own Bowels; therefore the Ships that lie for Freight, can lade nothing but what the Merchants or Traders put on board them of Fiſh, Manufactury, or Merchandize. And as little would Foreign Ships carry Goods to *Holland*, in caſe no Fiſhermen, Merchants, or Traders dealing in Manufactury dwelt there. And contrariwiſe it is certain, that our Fiſhers, Manufacturers and Traders, find a mighty Conveniency and Benefit in our great number of Freight-ſhips, which continually lie for Freight in all Parts of the World, and are ready to carry the ſame at an eaſy Rate to any place deſired. So that the *Engliſh* and *Flemiſh* Merchants, *&c.* do oft-times know no better way to tranſport their Goods to ſuch Foreign Parts as they deſign, than to carry them firſt to *Amſterdam*, and from thence to other places, eſpecially when our Admiralties, according to their Duty, take care to convoy and defend our Merchant Ships, with Men of War, againſt all Pirates, or Sea-robbers whatſoever. It is alſo evident, that the Husbandmen, or Boors of *Holland*, can very well ſell all the Product or Profit of their Land, Cattel, Firing, *&c.* to the Inhabitants that are Fiſhers, Manufacturers, Traders, Navigators, and thoſe that depend on them; which is a great Advantage beyond what all other Boors have, who for the moſt part have their Commodities ſpent abroad, and conſequently muſt bear the Charges of Freight, and the Dutys outwards and inwards, and muſt alſo allow a double

And the Owners of Shipping of thoſe three together.

The Husbandmen and Artificers not concern'd in Manufactures, are as a neceſſary Conſequence of all other Inhabitants.

Gain to the Merchants and Buyers. So that this great number of People, that are not Husbandmen, are I think the only Cauſe that thoſe Country Boors, tho heavily tax'd, are able to ſubſiſt. And ſeeing all the ſaid Inhabitants have need of Meat, Drink, Clothing, Houſing, and of the Gain gotten by Foreign Conſumption that is needful to ſupport it; it is evident, that all the other Inhabitants depend and live upon the foreſaid Fiſhers, Traders and Navigators.

And how remarkable it is, that all Rulers and others, who for any Service depend on them, have a Benefit by their great Numbers, is ſo clear, that there needs no more be ſaid for proof: For when there were but few Inhabitants in this Country, within leſs than 100 Years, the moſt eminent Offices of Burgomaſter, and *Schepens* or Sheriffs, were even in the principal Cities ſo great a Burden as not to be born without much Charge; whereas it is now become profitable to be but a City Meſſenger, or Undertaker to freight Ships, ſeeing Men are thereby enabled to maintain their Families.

Our Magiſtrates Proſperity depend on the Succeſs of all their Subjects.

Furthermore, having a mind to convince the Reader, not only by my Reaſoning, but by his own Experience, that the Proſperity of *Holland* is built upon the foreſaid means of Subſiſtence, and on no other; I find my ſelf obliged to make a Calculation of the Number of People in *Holland* that are fix'd Inhabitants, or depend upon them; and at the ſame time, as far as I am able, to reckon in what proportion thoſe People are maintain'd by the means of Subſiſtence before-mentioned. In order to this I ſhall on the one hand conſider, that Sir *Walter Raleigh* endeavouring to

All which is ſet forth by a rough Calculation, how the People in Holland *maintain themſelves.*

move King *James* of *England* to advance the Fishing Trade, Manufactures, and Traffick by Sea, hath possibly exceeded in his Account of the Profits arising from it, and augmented the number of the People that live upon it somewhat above the Truth.

And likewise is considered how many Inhabitants there are in Holland.

And on the other hand I shall consider what *Gerard Malines* saith, in his *Lex Mercatoria*, *Ann.* 1622. that in *Flanders* there were then counted one hundred and forty thousand Families; which being reckoned, one with another, at five Persons each, they would amount to seven hundred thousand People. I shall likewise consider that in *Holland* that same Year, the States laid a Poll-Tax upon all Inhabitants, none excepted save Strangers, Prisoners, and Vagrants, and those that were on the other side the Line; yet were there found in all *South-Holland* no more than four hundred eighty one thousand nine hundred thirty and four: Altho the Commissioners Instructions for that end were very strict and severe, to prevent all Fraud and Deceit. However that we may make the better guess whether this was a faithful Account, I shall give you the Particulars of it as registred in the Chamber of Accounts.

Dort with its Villages,	40523
Haerlem with its Villages,	69648
Delft with its Villages,	41744
Leyden and *Rynland*,	94285
Amsterdam and its Villages,	115022
Goude and its Villages,	24662
Roterdam with its Villages,	28339
Gornichem with its Villages,	7585

Schiedam with its Villages,	10393
Schoonhoven with its Villages,	10703
Brid with its Villages,	20156
The *Hague*,	17430
Heusden,	1444
	481934
And supposing that *West-Friesland* might yield the fourth part of the Inhabitants of *South-Holland*, it would amount to	120483
In all	602417

But because possibly none but intelligent Readers, and such as have travelled, will believe, what we see is customary in all Places, that the number of People in all Populous Countrys is excessively magnified, and that the Common Readers will think, that since many would be willing to evade the Poll-Tax, there was an extraordinary Fraud in the Number given in: I shall therefore follow the common Opinion, and conclude, that the Number of People was indeed much greater, and that these Countries are since that time much improved in the Number of Inhabitants; and accordingly I shall give a guess as by vulgar Report, that the whole Number, without excluding any Inhabitants whatsoever, may amount to two Millions and four hundred thousand People, and that they maintain themselves as followeth, *viz.*

And with what proportion they live by the said means.

By the Fisherys at Sea, and setting them out with Ships, Rigging, Cask, Salt, and other Materials, or Instruments, and the Traffick that depends thereon. 450000.

By Agriculture, Inland-fishing, Herding, Hay-making, Turf-making, and by furnishing

ing thoſe People with all ſorts of Materials
200000. as they are Boors, or Husbandmen, 200000.

By making all manner of Manufactures, Shipping, Works of Art, Mechanick or Handicraft Works, which are conſumed abroad; as likewiſe by Trade relating to the ſaid Ma-
650000. nufactures, 650000.

By Navigation or ſailing for Freight and Trade jointly, by which I mean carriage into Foreign Parts for ſelling and buying; as alſo carrying to and from *Holland* all ſuch Wares and Merchandiſe as relate not to our Fiſhing and Manufactury, nor depend thereon: And laſtly I include herein alſo all Inhabitants that are any ways ſerviceable to ſuch Traders, and Ships let out to Freight, amounting in all
250000. to 250000.

By all theſe Inhabitants, as being Men, Women, and Children, that muſt be provided, and by working about what is ſpent in this Country, as Food, Drink, Clothing, Houſing, and by making or ſelling Houſhold Stuff, and all other things for Art, Eaſe,
650000. Pleaſure, or Ornament, 650000.

By the labour and care of all the abovementioned Perſons, being Gentry without Employment or Calling, Civil Magiſtrates and Officers, thoſe that live upon their Eſtates or Mony, Soldiers, the Poor in Hoſpitals,
200000. Beggars, *&c.* 200000.

2400000. In all 2400000.

And tho this Calculation, whether conſider'd as to the Number of the Inhabitants, or their proportionable means of Subſiſtence, is very rough and uncertain; yet I ſuppoſe it

it to be evident, that the eighth part of the Inhabitants of *Holland* could not be ſupplied with Neceſſaries out of its own product, if their Gain otherwiſe did not afford them all other neceſſaries: So that *Homo Homini Deus in Statu Politico*, one Man being a God to another under a good Government, it is an unſpeakable Bleſſing for this Land, that there are ſo many People in it, who according to the Nature of the Country are honeſtly maintain'd by ſuch ſutable or proportionable means, and eſpecially that the welfare of all the Inhabitants (the idle Gentry, and Foreign Soldiers in pay excepted) from the leaſt to the greateſt, does ſo neceſſarily depend on one another: and above all it is cheifly conſiderable, that there are none more really intereſted in the Proſperity of this Country than the Rulers of this Ariſtocratical Government, and the Perſons that live on their Eſtates.

'Tis the Happineſs of Holland *to have ſuch as are linked together in Intereſt.*

For Fiſhers, Boors, or Country People, owners of Ships let to Freight, Merchants and Manufacturers, in a general deſtruction of a Country, could eaſily tranſport themſelves into Foreign Parts, and there ſet up their Fiſhing, Agriculture, or Husbandry, Shipping, Merchandize and Manufactures: But ſuch as have Lands, or immovable Eſtates, cannot do this; and ſuppoſing they could, and ſhould ſell their Eſtates and remove into other Countries, yet would they there have no Calling to ſubſiſt by, much leſs can they expect to be made uſe of in the Government, or procure any Office or Advantage depending upon it.

How-

And the greateſt unhappineſs, that the Proſperity of all the Inhabitants may be ruined by one ſingle Error of State.

However, this excellent and laudable Harmony and Union may be violated, even to the Ruin of all the Inhabitants, none excepted but Courtiers and Soldiers, and that by one ſole miſtake in Government, which is the Electing one Supreme Head over all theſe Inhabitants, or over their Armys. For ſeeing ſuch a ſingle Perſon for the increaſe of his Grandeur, may curb and obſtruct *Holland*'s Greatneſs and Power, by the Deputies of the leſſer Provinces of the Generality, who alſo may in their Courſe check the great and flouriſhing Cities in their own Provincial Aſſemblies, by the Suffrages or Votes of the envious Gentry. And the leſſer Cities, and the great Perſons, Courtiers and Souldiers being all of his Party, and depending on him, muſt needs prey upon the induſtrious or working Inhabitants, and ſo will make uſe of all their Power for their own benefit, and to the detriment of the Commonalty. And to the end they may receive no let from the great and ſtrong Cities of *Holland*, it follows that they would either weaken or leſſen all ſuch Cities, and impoveriſh the Inhabitants, to make them obedient without control. Which if ſo, we have juſt cauſe continually to pray, *A furore Monarcharum libera nos Domine*; God preſerve *Holland* from the Fury of a Monarch, Prince, or one Supreme Head. But what there is of reality in this, ſhall be handled hereafter in a Chapter apart.

Namely by advancing a ſingle Perſon over the Civil Magiſtracy and Soldiery.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

That Queſtion conſider'd, why the heavy Taxes, occaſioned by War, have not driven Fiſhing, Trading, Manufactury, and Shipping out of Holland?

IT is not enough to know how happy in general this Country is, in finding Imployment for ſo many Hands, and affording them ſuſtenance, ſeeing there have been many cauſes which would have hindred the Succeſs of our Fiſhing, Navigation and Traffick, had there been but one Country among the many that are near us, well ſituated for Fiſhing, Manufactury, Traffick, and Navigation, which during our Wars and Troubles had ſeen and followed their own true Intereſt; moſt of our neighbouring Nations, all that time being in a profound Peace, ſeemed to have leſs hinderance for promoting Manufactures, Traffick, employing of Ships for Freight and Fiſhing, than our Nation. So that to purſue the true Intereſt and Maxims of *Holland*, we ought particularly to know the Reaſon, why the great inconveniencies of Taxes and Wars that we have laboured under, have not occaſioned the Fiſhing, Manufactury, Traffick, and Navigation, to ſettle and fix in other Countries; as for example in *England*, where if all be well conſidered they have had far greater Advantages of Situation, Harbours, a clean and bold Coaſt, favourable Winds, and an Opportunity of tranſporting many unwrought Commodities, a laſting Peace, and a greater freedom from Taxes than we have.

Why Traffick has not fix'd in other Countries.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Before we anſwer the ſaid Queſtion, we ſhall relate the antient State of Manufacturies, Fiſheries, and Navigation in Europe.

THAT I may from hence derive ſome Light, I ſhall premiſe a brief Relation how theſe Affairs ſtood in antient times.

Above 700 Years ago there were few Merchants in Europe.

It is well known, that 6 or 700 Years ago, there were no Merchants in all *Europe*, except a few in the Republicks of *Italy*, who lived on the *Mediterranean*, and traded with the *Indian* Carravans in the *Levant*; or poſſibly there might be found ſome Merchants, tho but in few Places, that drove an Inland Trade: ſo that each Nation was neceſſitated to ſow, build, and weave for themſelves to the Northward and Eaſtward, where there were then no Outland nor Inland Merchants; and therefore in caſe of ſuperfluity of People, they were compelled by force of Arms for want of Proviſion, and to prevent ill Seaſons, and Hunger, to conquer more Land. And this cauſed the Irruptions of the *Celtæ*, *Cimbri*, *Scythians*, *Goths*, *Quades*, *Vandals*, *Hunns*, *Franks*, *Burgundians*, *Normans*, &c. who till about the Year 1000 after Chriſt's Birth, were in their greateſt Strength; all which People, and in a word, all that ſpake *Dutch* or *German*, exchanged their Superfluitys, not for Mony, but as it is reported, thus: Two Hens for a Gooſe, two Geeſe for a Swine, three Lambs for a Sheep, three Calves for a Cow; bartering of Corn was then alſo in practiſe, by which

How great Inconveniences thence aroſe.

Em. Suiero annal. de Flandes.

which they knew how much Oats was to be given for Barley, how much Barley for Rye, and Rye for Wheat, when they wanted them; ſo that except for eatable Wares there was neither Barter nor Traffick.

The Flemings *were here the first Traders in in Manufactures*

The *Flemings* lying neareſt to *France* were the firſt that began to earn their Livings by weaving, and ſold the ſame in that fruitful Land, where the Inhabitants were not only able to feed themſelves, but alſo by the ſuperfluous growth of their Country could put themſelves into good Apparel; which young *Boudewyn* of *Flanders*, about the Year 960, conſiderably improved, by ſetting up yearly Fares or Markets in ſeveral Places, paying no Duty or Toll for any Goods, either exported or imported. By which means that way of Merchandize improved 300 Years ſucceſſively, altho thoſe Commodities were only conſumed in *France* and *Germany*, till the many prejudicial or hurtful Laws of the *Halls*, which at firſt were fram'd on pretence of preventing deceit, and the debaſing of Commodities, but were in truth intended to fix thoſe Manufactures to the Cities: But at laſt having by force, which is ever prejudicial to Traffick, driven much of this weaving Trade out of the Cities into the Villages; the Wars between *France* and *Flanders* drove it back from the Villages to *Tienen* and *Lovain* in *Brabant*; notwithſtanding which the *Brabanders* being nothing more prudent, did by the ſame Occaſion, *viz.* the Laws of the Halls, and Impoſts on Manufactury during the War againſt *France*, occaſion many Tumults and Uproars among the Weavers, about 100 Years after in *Flanders*, where at *Gent* in the Year 1301,

Next them the Brabanders.

in

in a Tumult occasion'd by some coercive Laws and Orders about their Occupation, there were slain two Magistrates, and eleven other Inhabitants. And at *Bruges* the next Year after, for the same Cause, there were slain above 1500 in a Tumult. Likewise at *Ypres*, upon the same Occasion, there being a Mutiny, the *Voght*, or chief Magistrate, with the ten *Scheepens* (being all the Magistrates of the City) were killed. And such like Accidents hapned afterwards in *Brabant*, amongst others at *Louvain*, where, in a great Tumult of the Cloth-weavers with their Adherents, divers Magistrates were slain in the Council-house, and several of the Offenders fled into *England*, whither they first carried the Art of Drapery. But many other Cloth-weavers, with their Followers, as well *Brabanders* as *Flemings*, dispersed themselves into the Countries beyond the *Mase*, and into *Holland*; and amongst other Places, many of them fixed at *Leyden*. Mean while, the *German* Knights of the Cross, after the Year 1200, under pretence of reducing the Heathens to the Christian Faith, made themselves Masters not only of barren *Pomerania*, and the River *Oder*, which they suffered the converted Princes to enjoy, but of rich *Prussia* and *Lysland*, and the Rivers *Weissel*, *Pregol*, and *Duina*, and consequently of all those which fall into the Sea, out of fruitful *Poland*, *Lithuania*, or *Russia*. By which Conveniency the Eastern Cities that lay neareſt to the Sea, began to fetch away their bulky and * unwrought Goods, and to carry them to the *Netherlands*, *England*, *Spain*, and *France*, and likewise from thence to and fro to export and import all the Goods that

Lastly, The Hollanders *and the* English.

* *Which were transported beyond the Seas, and dealt in by the* East-*Country People.*

that were ſuperfluous or wanting.

And ſeeing by the Wars about the Year 1360, between *Denmark* and *Sweden*, they ſuffered great Loſſes by Sea, and amongſt others were plundered by the famous *Wisbuy*, ſixty ſix of their Cities covenanted together, to ſcour or cleanſe the Seas from ſuch Piracies, and to ſecure their Goods: And thus they became and continued, by that Eaſtern Trade, the only Traffickers and Carriers by Sea, beating by that means all other Nations out of the Ocean, till after the Year 1400, that the Art of ſalting and curing of Herrings being found out in *Flanders*, the Fiſheries in theſe *Netherlands* being added to our Manufactures, proved to be of more importance than the Trade and Navigation of the *Eaſterlings*, and therefore encreaſed more and more with the Traffick by Sea to *Bruges*, which laſted to the Year 1482, when *Flanders* had Wars with the Arch-Duke *Maximilian*, about the Guardianſhip of his Son and his Dominions, which laſted ten Years. Mean while *Sluys*, the Sea-Port of *Bruges*, being for the moſt part infeſted, thoſe of *Antwerp* and *Amſterdam*, to draw the Trade to their Cities, aſſiſted the Duke in his unbridled Tyranny, and barbarous deſtruction of the Country, thereby regained his Favour, and attain'd their own Ends. And ſeeing the *Italians* by their *Levant* Trade, had gotten ſome Seed of Silk-worms from *China* and *Perſia*, and raiſed ſuch abundance of thoſe Worms, and Mulberry Trees, that they wove many ſilk Stuffs, and in proceſs of time had diſpers'd their Silks every where, and began to vent many of them at *Antwerp*: And moreover, when the

When, and how the Aſſociation of the Hans-Towns *was erected.*

And how the Trade fell to them of Bruges, Antwerp, *and* Amſterdam.

Paſſages to the *Weſt* and *Eaſt-Indies* by Sea were diſcovered, and the *Spaniards* and *Portugueſe* ſold their Goods and Spices at *Antwerp*; as alſo that the *Netherlandiſh* Drapery was much of it removed into *England*; and the *Engliſh* alſo ſettling their Staple at *Antwerp*, theſe things produc'd many new Effects.

How great a Merchandizing City Antwerp *formerly was.*

1. Tho *Antwerp* was, in reſpect of its good Foundation, and far extended Traffick, the moſt renowned merchandizing City that ever was in the World, ſending many Ships to and again from *France*, *England*, *Spain*, *Italy*, and making many ſilk Manufactures; yet *Brabant* and *Flanders* were too remote, and ill ſituated for erecting at *Antwerp*, or near it, the Fiſhery of Haddock, Cod, and Herring, and for making that Trade as profitable there, as it might be in *Holland*.

The Trade of which, by reaſon of our Fiſheries and Manufactures, withdrew into Holland.

2. Tho the *Eaſterlings* built their Eaſtern Houſes, and ſet up their Staple at *Antwerp*, yet had they not the Conveniency at once of tranſporting their Corn ſo far from the Eaſtward, in purſuance of their new correſpondence with the *Spaniards* and *Italians*, but were neceſſitated to have it laid up anew in *Antwerp*, to prevent its ſpoiling; eſpecially when we add this Conſideration, That thoſe remote Lands had not occaſion to take off whole Ships ladings of fine Wares which *Antwerp* afforded, as the *Antwerpers* could take off whole Ships ladings of Herring, and ſalted Fiſh, beſides the rough and unmanufactur'd Eaſtern and many other Commodities, which are manufactur'd and ſpent in this Country.

3. The *Hollanders* Fiſhery of Haddock, Cod, and Herring, and the great Conveniency they have of ſelling them all at home, and tranſporting

ing them abroad, was the Reaſon that the *Eaſtern* Countries took off very much of our Herrings and Salt. The Trade to that Country, ſince the breaking in of the Inlet or Paſſage into the *Texel*, about the Year 1400, when the River *Ye* began to be navigated with great Ships, ſettled it ſelf by degrees moſtly at *Amſterdam*, and part of it in *England*.

CHAP. XII.

For anſwer to the former Queſtion, it is here particularly ſhewn, that Fiſhing and Traffick muſt entirely ſettle in Holland, *and Manufacturys muſt do the like for the moſt part, and conſequently Navigation, or ſailing upon Freight.*

THIS was the ſtate of Trade till the Year 1585, when *Antwerp* was taken by the Prince of *Parma*. For that City being thus wholly ſhut up from the Sea, and the King of *Spain* very imprudently neglecting to open the *Scheld*, being deſirous, according to the Maxims of Monarchs, to weaken that ſtrong City, which he thought too powerful for him, and to diſperſe the Traffick over his many other Cities; he bent all his Strength againſt the Frontiers of *Gelderland*, *England*, and *France*, whereby the Merchants of *Antwerp* were neceſſitated to forſake their City, and conſequently to chuſe *Amſterdam* to ſettle in, which before the Troubles was, next to *Antwerp*, the greateſt Mercantile City of the *Netherlands*.

How the Trade fell from Antwerp *to* Amſterdam.

therlands. For when we rightly conſider the innumerable Inconveniencies found in all Iſlands, and eſpecially Northward, by reaſon of Storms, and long Winters, in the Conſumption of Goods bought, and the neceſſary Communication with many inland Neighbours; every one may eaſily imagine why the *Antwerpers* ſat not down in the adjacent Iſlands of *Zeland*; and beſides, neither in *France* nor *England* was there any liberty of Religion, but a Monarchical Government in both, with high Duties on Goods imported and exported. And tho the Proteſtant Merchants, by reaſon of the great Peace, and good ſituation of *England*, would have moſt inclined to ſettle there; yet were they diſcouraged from coming into a Country where there were no City-Exciſes or Impoſts on Lands, or any other Taxes equally charging all, whether Inhabitants or Strangers; but heavy Taxes and Cuſtoms laid on all Goods imported and exported, by which Foreigners and their Children and Grandchildren, according to the Laws of the Land, muſt pay double as much as the natural *Engliſh*; yea in the Subſidies of Parliament, which extend to perpetuity on Foreigners and their Children, they muſt pay double Aſſeſſment: Beſides which all Strangers are excluded from their Guilds and Halls of Trade and Manufactures; ſo that none have the Freedom there to work, either as Journey-man, or Maſter-workman, ſave in that whereof the Inhabitants are ignorant. And all theſe Diſcouragements were alſo for the moſt part in the *Eaſtern* Cities; yea in *England* as well as in the *Eaſtern* Cities, a Foreigner, tho an Inhabitant, was not ſuffered to

Why not to the Zeland *Iſlands,*

Nor to France *nor* England,

Nor to any Eaſtern *Citys.*

to ſell to any other but Citizens; nor to ſell Wares by Retail, or for Conſumption, or to buy any ſort of Goods of Strangers, or of Inhabitants that are Strangers, neither by Wholeſale nor Retail: All which made them think *England* no fit place for them to ſettle in.

It happened alſo at the ſame time, that the King of *Spain* allowing no where a Toleration of Religion, but making continual War, and utterly neglecting the ſcouring and cleanſing of the Seas, the Fiſhing, and remaining Traffick of the *Flemiſh* Citys, which they drove into Foreign Parts, did wholly ceaſe; ſo far were they from recovering the loſt Trade of *Antwerp*. So that the *Flemiſh* Fiſhing alſo fell into *Holland*: But the Manufactures were thus divided; one third of the Dealers and Weavers of Says, Damask, and Stockings, *&c.* went caſually into *England*, &c. becauſe that Trade was then new to the *Engliſh*, and therefore under no Halls nor Guilds. Another great part of them went to *Leyden*; and the Traders in Linen ſettled moſt at *Haerlem*. But there were ſtill a great number of Traders in Manufactures that remained in *Flanders* and *Brabant*: For ſeeing thoſe Goods were continually ſent to *France* and *Germany* by Land-carriage, it was impoſſible for us to prevent it by our Ships of War, or any other Means imaginable.

Why all the Manufactures did not abandon Flanders *and* Brabant, *to fix with the Traffick and Navigation of* Holland.

On the other ſide, ſeeing that in *Flanders* and *Brabant*, eſpecially in the Villages where the Manufactures are moſtly made, there are but ſmall Impoſts paid, and in *Holland* the Taxes were very great, they might therefore have born the Charge of carrying thoſe Goods by Land into ſome *French* Harbours,

Namely by reaſon of the heavy Taxes in Holland.

from whence they might have bin tranſported to any part of the World: And therefore upon good advice we thought it our Intereſt to permit thoſe *Flemiſh* Manufactures, tho wrought by our Enemies, to be brought into our Country of *Holland*, charging them with ſomewhat leſs Duty than they muſt have been at by going the furtheſt way about. And thus did thoſe Manufactures of Foreign Countrys, by means of Immunities from Impoſts and Halls, greatly improve and flouriſh in thoſe Villages, becauſe they could be made as cheap or cheaper than ours, which from time to time were more and more charged with Dutys on the Conſumption. Yea, and which is worthy of admiration, they were charged with Convoy-mony and other Taxes upon Exportation, till about the Year 1634. when by the *French* and *Dutch* Wars, and Winter-quarters, all the moſt flouriſhing Villages of *Flanders*, *Brabant*, and the Lands beyond the *Meuſe* were plundered, and the richeſt Merchandizing Citys obſtructed from ſending away their Goods. So that the Citys of *Holland* were hereby filled with Inhabitants, and their Manufactures ſold there; which was the greateſt cauſe of the increaſe of Trade in this Country, and the ſubſequent Riches of the Inhabitants.

*

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

That Amſterdam *is provided with better means of Subſiſtence, and is a greater City of Traffick, and* Holland *a Richer Merchandizing Country, than ever was in the World.*

BUT above all *Amſterdam* hath thriven moſt in all ſors of Merchandizes, and means of Subſiſtence and Enlargement. For tho it ſeems not to be ſo well ſituated as many other Towns in *South* and *North-Holland*, for receiving Goods that come from Sea, and tranſporting others beyond Sea, as alſo becauſe of the ſhallowneſs of the *Pampus*, for which Ships muſt lade, or unlade moſt of their Goods, and wait for Winds in that unſafe Road of the *Texel*; yet in this particular of the greateſt conſideration, *Amſterdam* lies better than any Town in *Holland*, and poſſibly better than any City in *Europe*, to receive the Fiſh Manufacture, and other Commoditys which are taken and made by others, and eſpecially to receive from the Shipping into their Warehouſes Store-goods to be ſpent at home. And it is well known to all Perſons whether Owners of Ships ſailing for Freight, or Merchants, that this is a very great Conveniency for readily equipping and full lading of Ships, and ſelling their Goods ſpeedily, and at the higheſt price, which is ten times more conſiderable than a conveniency of importing or exporting Goods ſpeedily, or than the damages ſuffered by the Storms,

Why Amſterdam *is become the greateſt City of Traffick in* Europe.

Namely by reaſon of its ſituation for Trade.

which may happen (tho but ſeldom) in the *Texel*. For Men having an eye to their ordinary and certain Profit according to true information of the preſent opportunity of Gain from abroad, whether remote or near at hand, by Export and Import, they are ever moved more by ſuch an Opportunity, than deterred by ſuch Misfortunes, eſpecially if they have kept or reſerved ſuch an Eſtate or Credit as to be ſtill able to continue their Traffick. At leaſt it is certain that Misfortunes depending on ſuch unknown and uncertain Cauſes, and happening ſo ſeldom, are ever little apprehended, and eaſily forgotten by thoſe that have not had any loſs by that means. And if any one ſhould doubt whether *Amſterdam* be ſituate as well and better than any other City of *Holland* for Traffick, and Ships let out to Freight, let him but pleaſe to conſider in how few hours (when the Wind is favourable) one may ſail from *Amſterdam* to all the Towns of *Frieſland*, *Overyſſel*, *Guelderland* and *North-Holland*, *& vice verſa*, ſeeing there is no alteration of Courſe or Tides needful: And in how ſhort a time, and how cheap and eaſily one may travel from any of the Towns of *South-Holland*, or other adjacent Inland Citys to *Amſterdam*, every one knows. And it hath evidently appeared how much the convenient ſituation of *Amſterdam* was eſteemed by the *Antwerp* Merchants, ſince the Trade of *Antwerp* fixed no where but at *Amſterdam*. And after that the *Antwerp* Trade was added to their Eaſtern Trade and Fiſhing, the *Amſterdammers* then got by their Sword the whole *Eaſt-India* Trade, at leaſt the Monopoly of all the richeſt Spices, and a great

Which cauſes a quick ſale of all imported Goods.

Trade to the *Weſt-Indies*; and upon that followed the Whale-fiſhing: as alſo by the *German* Wars, they acquired the conſumption of the *Italian* Silk Stuffs, which uſed to be carried by Land, and ſold there. And beſides, the raw Silks have given them a fair opportunity of making many Silk Stuffs, as did the Halls of *Leyden*, and an ill Maxim of not early laying out the Ground of a City, or not ſuffering any out-Buildings beyond the place allowed for building, which was the only occaſion that the weaving of Wool was practiſed, not only in many other Provinces and Citys, but alſo throughout *Holland*, and eſpecially at *Amſterdam*. And at laſt thereupon followed the Troubles in *England*, and our deſtructive tho ſhort War with them, and theirs againſt the King of *Spain*; as alſo the Wars of the Northern Kings among themſelves, which were ſo prejudicial to us. By thoſe eight Years troubles the Inhabitants of *Holland* probably loſt more than they had gain'd in 20 years before.

The Hollanders *are become the only Carriers and Navigators of the Seas, which is a great Bleſſing for all our Inhabitants.*

It is nevertheleſs evident that the *Hollanders* having well-nigh beaten all Nations by Traffick out of the Great Ocean, the *Mediterranean*, *Indian*, and *Baltick Seas*, they are the great, and indeed only Carriers of Goods throughout the World; catching of Herring, Haddock, Cod and Whale, making many ſorts of Manufactures and Merchandize for Foreign Parts. Which is ſo great a Bleſſing for the Inhabitants, and eſpecially for the Rulers of the Land, and thoſe that are benefited by them, that a greater cannot be conceived. And ſeeing I may preſume to ſay that I have clearly ſhewn, in the foregoing Chap-

Chapter, that *Holland*'s Welfare and Proſperity wholly depends on the flouriſhing of Manufacturys, Fiſhery, Navigation of Ships on Freight, and Traffick; it ſeems that the Order of Nature obliges me to give my Thoughts in particular of all Matters whereby the *Holland* Manufacturies, Fiſheries, Ships let out to Freight, and Traffick, may be improved or impaired. But ſeeing that would afford us endleſs Matter of Speculation, exceeds my Skill, and is inconſiſtent with my intended Brevity; I ſhall ſatisfy my ſelf in laying down the Principal Heads thereof, and that in ſhort.

CHAP. XIV.

That Freedom or Toleration in, and about the Service or Worſhip of God, is a powerful Means to preſerve many Inhabitants in Holland, *and allure Foreigners to dwell amongſt us.*

By Liberty of Conſcience many People may be drawn out of other Countrys to inhabit Holland.

IN the firſt place it is certain, that not only thoſe that deal in Manufactures, Fiſhing, Traffick, Shipping, and thoſe that depend on them, but alſo all civilized People muſt be ſuppoſed to pitch upon ſome outward Service of God as the beſt, and to be averſe from all other Forms; and that ſuch Perſons do abhor to travel, and much more to go and dwell in a Country, where they are not permitted to ſerve and worſhip God outwardly, after ſuch a manner as they think fit. And alſo that as to Freedom about the outward Service of God, during

during the Troubles, and ſhortly after; when the Manufacturies, Trading, and Navigation for Freight began to ſettle in *Holland*, the Magiſtrate was ſo tender and indulgent, that there were very few uſeful Inhabitants driven thence by any rigour or hardſhip, much leſs any Foreigners: So that it brings that Maxim into my mind, that * the ſureſt way to keep any thing, is to make uſe of the ſame Means whereby it was at firſt acquired.

And among thoſe Means, comes firſt into conſideration the Freedom of all ſorts of Religions differing from the Reformed. For in regard all our Neighbours (except *Great Britain*, and the *United Provinces*) and for the moſt part all far remote Lands, are not of the Reformed Religion; and that the Clergy under the Papacy have their own Juriſdiction: And ſeeing, if not all thoſe that are called *Spiritual*, yet the Clergy at leaſt that differ from us, have in all Countrys a ſettled Livelihood, which depends not on the Political Welfare of the Land: We ſee that through humane Frailty, they do in all theſe Countrys think fit to teach and preach up all that can have a tendency to their own Credit, Profit, and Eaſe, yea, tho it be to the Ruin of the whole Country; and moreover, when the Doctrine, Counſel, and Admonition of theſe Men is not received by any of their Auditors, theſe Clergymen do then very unmercifully uſe to proſecute them *Odio Theologico*. Whereas nevertheleſs all Chriſtian Clergymen ought to reſt ſatisfied, according to their

Seeing the Clergy in all Neighbouring Nations generally perſecute thoſe that differ from the Publick Sentiments.

* Res facile iiſdem artibus retinentur quibus initio partæ ſunt.

Maſter's

Maſter's Doctrine, to enlighten the Minds of Men with the Truth, and to ſhew them the way to Eternal Life, and afterwards to endeavour to perſwade, and turn ſuch enlightned Perſons in all humility and meekneſs into the Path that leads to Salvation. It is evident that all People, eſpecially Chriſtians, and more particularly their publick Teachers, ought to be far from compelling, either by ſpiritual or bodily Puniſhment, thoſe that for want of Light and Perſwaſion are not inclined to go to the Publick Church, to do any outward Act, or to ſpeak any words contrary to their Judgment: For *Poteſtas coercendi*, the coercive Power is given only to the Civil Magiſtrate; all the Power and Right which the Eccleſiaſticks have, if they have any, muſt be derived from them, as the ſame is excellently and unanſwerably ſhewn by *Lucius Antiſtius Conſtans*, in his Book *de Jure Eccleſiaſticorum* lately printed.

Which yet oppugns the Doctrine of the Goſpel.

Indeed the eſſential and only difference between the Civil and Eccleſiaſtical Power is this, That the Civil doth not teach and adviſe as the other doth, but commands and compels the Inhabitants to perform or omit ſuch outward Actions, or to ſuffer ſome certain Puniſhment for their Diſobedience; ſo that they have dominion over the Subject, *ſive volentes*, *ſive nolentes*, whether they will or no. Whereas on the other ſide, the Duty of Chriſtian Teachers is to inſtruct and adviſe Men to all Chriſtian Virtues, as truſting in God our Saviour, the hope of poſſeſſing a future eternal bleſſed Life, and the love of God and our Neighbour. Which Virtues conſiſting only in the inward Thoughts

Whoſe Authority is only to teach and exhort.

1 Cor. 13.

Thoughts of our Minds, cannot be put into us by any outward Violence or Compulſion, but only by the inlightning and convincing Reaſons of Miniſters, who to effect this, muſt on all occaſions comply with the State and Condition of their Hearers, and be the leaſt amongſt them: And thus making themſelves the leaſt, and thereby converting moſt, and bringing forth moſt good Fruits, they ſhall be the firſt in the Kingdom of Heaven. *Whoſoever will be chief among you, let him be your Servant.* Mat. 20. 27. And beſides, it is well known that our Lord Chriſt pretended to no other Kingdom or Dominion on Earth *(his Kingdom not being of this World)* than that every one being convinced of this his true Doctrine, and wholeſom Advice, and of his holy Sufferings for us, ſhould freely be ſubject to him, not with the outward Man only, to do or omit any Action, to ſpeak or be ſilent, but with the inward Man *in Spirit and Truth*, to love God, himſelf, and his Neighbour; to truſt in that God and Saviour in all the Occurrences of our Lives, and by his infinite Wiſdom, Mercy and Power, to hope for a bleſſed and everlaſting State for our Souls. So that it became not his Diſciples, or Followers, and Apoſtles, much leſs our preſent publick Preachers, to ſet themſelves above their Spiritual Lord and Maſter, to lord it over others. *The Kings of the Gentiles exerciſe Lordſhip over them; but ye ſhall not be ſo.* Luke 22. 25, 26. The Goſpel alſo teacheth us, that they ſhould not lord it over the People, but ought to be their Servants, and Miniſters of the Word of God. But notwithſtanding all this, we ſee, that by theſe evil ambitious Maxims of the

Clergy,

Clergy, almoſt in all Countrys, the Diſſenters, or ſuch as own not the Opinion of the publick Preachers, are turned out of the Civil State and perſecuted; for they are not only excluded from all Government, Magiſtracys, Offices and Benefices (which is in ſome meaſure tolerable for the ſecluded Inhabitants, and agrees very well with the Maxims of Polity, in regard it is well known by experience in all Countrys to be neceſſary, as tending to the common Peace, that one Religion ſhould prevail and be ſupported above all others, and accordingly is by all means authorized, favoured, and protected by the State, yet not ſo, but that the exerciſe of other Religions at the ſame time be in ſome meaſure publickly tolerated, at leaſt not perſecuted) but are ſo perſecuted, that many honeſt and uſeful Inhabitants, to eſcape thoſe Fines, Baniſhments, or corporal Puniſhments, to which by adhering to the prohibited Service of God they are ſubject, abandon their own ſweet native Country, and, to obtain their Liberty, chuſe to come and ſit down in our barren and heavy-tax'd Country.

So that many, to eſcape that Perſecution, forſake their native Country, and come into Holland.

Yea, and which is more, in ſome Countrys theſe Churchmen will go ſo far, as by an Inquiſition to inquire who they are that differ from the Opinion of the authorized Preachers; and firſt by Admonition and Excommunication, bereave them of their Credit, and afterwards of their Liberty, Eſtate, or Life. And as heretofore the *Romiſh* Clergy were not ſatisfied with obſtructing the Divine Service of thoſe that diſſented from them, but laboured to bring the Inquiſition into all Places;

Which Perſecution for worſhipping of God, is very detrimental to the State.

Places; ſo would it be a great wonder if the Eccleſiaſticks in *Holland* ſhould not follow the ſame worldly courſe, to the ruin of the Country, if they conceiv'd it tended to the increaſe of their own Profit, Honour, Power and Grandeur. At leaſt we ſee it in almoſt all Countrys, where the beſt and moſt moderate, yea even where the Reformed Clergy bear ſway, that diſſenting Aſſemblies are prohibited. And ſeeing that the Publick Divine Worſhip is ſo neceſſary for Mankind, that without it they would fall into great ignorance about the Service of God, and conſequently into a very bad Life; and ſince Man's Life is ſubject to many Miſeries, therefore every one is inclined in this wretched State to nouriſh or comfort his Soul with the hope of a better: And as Men hope very eaſily to obtain the ſame by a free and willing attention to a Doctrine they think to be built on a good Foundation; ſo every one may eaſily perceive how impoſſible it is to make any Man by compulſion to hope for ſuch advantage, in that which he cannot apprehend to be well grounded; and accordingly the diſſenting Partyclearly diſcover the Vanity of all manner of Force in Matters of Religion.

And hinders the converſion of the Erroneous.

Moreover, ſeeing all Matters of Fact, and likewiſe of Faith, muſt in ſome meaſure be proved by Teſtimony of good Credit, ſuch as is irreproachable, or beyond exception; and that all that are thus perſecuted, whether by Excommunication, Fines, Baniſhment, or corporal Puniſhments, reproach and hate their Perſecutors, to wit, the publick Authoriſed Preachers, as their Enemies; it is evident that thoſe Perſecutors loſe all their weight

weight to perſwade People in Matters of Faith by means of their publick Authority, which otherwiſe would be great among the common People. And beſides, we ſee, that all perſecuted People continually exerciſe their Thoughts upon any thing that ſeems to confirm their own Judgment, and oft-times out of mere ſtomachfulneſs and animoſity will not ponder and ſedately conſider their Enemies Reaſons: ſo that the Perſecuted People being wholly turn'd aſide from the Truth of God's Worſhip by ſuch Violence and Compulſion, become hardned in their Error. By this means manifold Wars, Miſerys, and removals of Habitations have been occaſioned ſince the Reformation: and the like Actions will ſtill have the like Effects. How prejudicial ſuch coercive Practices are, eſpecially in rich Trafficking Cities, *Lubeck*, *Collen*, and *Aix la Chappelle* may inſtruct us, where both the Rulers and Subjects of thoſe lately ſo famous Cities have ſince the Reformation loſt moſt of their Wealth, and chiefly by ſuch compulſion in Religion; many of the Inhabitants being thereby driven out of their reſpective Cities, and Strangers diſcouraged from coming to reſide in them. And tho according to clear Reaſon, and Holy Writ, the true Glory and Fame of all Rulers conſiſts in the multitude of their Subjects, yet do theſe Churchmen (forgetting their Credit their Country, and their God, which is a threefold Impiety) continue to teach, That it is better to have a City of an Orthodox or ſound Faith, ill ſtocked with People, than a very populous, and Godly City, but tainted with Hereſy. Thus it is evident that to allow

And hurtful to the Civil State.

low all Men the exerciſe of their Religion with more freedom than in other Nations, would be a very effectual means for *Holland* to allure People out of other Countrys, and to fix them that are there already; provided ſuch Freedom be not prejudicial to our Civil State and free Government. For, as on the one ſide thoſe of the *Romiſh* Religion have their Spiritual Heads, and the K. of *Spain* (heretofore Earl of *Holland*) for their Neighbour, who may help the *Romaniſts* in the time of Inteſtine Diviſion; ſo on the other ſide it is manifeſt, that our own Government by length of time is enlarged, and the *Spaniſh Netherlands* become weak; and that notwithſtanding the Renunciation of the ſaid Superiority over *Holland* we are in Peace with them, it is alſo certain that by perſecuting the *Romaniſts* we ſhould drive moſt of the Strangers out of our Country; and the greateſt number of the diſſenting old Inhabitants, *viz.* the Gentry, Monied-men and Boors, who continue to dwell amongſt us, would become ſo averſe to the Government, that in time it would be either a means to bring this Country into the Hands of our Enemy, or elſe drive thoſe People out of the Country: which Cruelty would not only be pernicious, but altogether unreaſonable in the Rulers and Reformed Subjects, who always us'd to boaſt that they fought for their Liberty, and conſtantly maintain'd, that ſeveral publick Religions may be peaceably tolerated and practiſed in one and the ſame Country; That true Religion hath advantage enough when it's allowed to ſpeak, *Errantis pœna doceri*, and that there is no greater ſign of a falſe Religion (or at leaſt

So that eſpecially in Holland *toleration of Religion is needful.*

Pol. diſc. of D. C. lib. 4. Diſc. 6. p. 320.

Likewiſe for the Roman Catholicks.

Becauſe our Wars againſt Spain *are grounded on the like Reaſon and Equity.*

leaſt of one to the truth of which Men dare not truſt) than to perſecute the Diſſenters from it. So that it appears that Toleration and Freedom of Religion is not only exceeding beneficial for our Country in general, but particularly for the Reformed Religion, which may and ought to depend upon its own Evidence and Veracity.

CHAP. XV.

A ſecond Means to keep Holland *Populous, is a plenary Freedom for all People that will cohabit with us, to follow any Occupation for a Livelihood.*

Freedom to be given to all Inhabitants to ſet up, and live by their Trades;

NEXT to a Liberty of ſerving God, follows the Liberty of gaining a Livelihood without any dear-bought City-freedom, but only by virtue of a fixed Habitation to have the common right of other Inhabitants: Which is here very neceſſary for keeping the People we have, and inviting Strangers to come among us. For it is ſelf-evident that Landed-men, or others that are wealthy, being forced by any accident to leave their Country or Habitation, will never chuſe *Holland* to dwell in, being ſo chargeable a Place, and where they have ſo little intereſt for their Mony. And for thoſe who are leſs wealthy, it is well known, that no Man from abroad will come to dwell or continue in a Country where he ſhall not be permitted to get an honeſt Maintenance. And it may be eaſily conſidered how great an inconveniency it

it would be in this Country, for the Inhabitants, eſpecially Strangers, if they ſhould have no Freedom of chuſing and practiſing ſuch honeſt means of livelihood as they think beſt for their Subſiſtence; or if, when they had choſen a Trade, and could not live by it, they might not chuſe another. This then being evident, that Strangers without freedom of earning their Bread, and ſeeking a Livelihood, cannot live amongſt us: and as it is certain, that our Manufactorys, Fiſherys, Traffick and Navigation, with thoſe that depend upon them, cannot without continual Supplys of Foreign Inhabitants be preſerved here, and much leſs augmented or improved; it is likewiſe certain, that among the endleſs Advantages which accrue to *Holland* by Strangers, and which might accrue more, our Boors may be likewiſe profited. For we ſee that for want of Strangers in the Country, the Boors muſt give ſuch great yearly and day-wages to their Servants, that they can ſcarcely live but with great toil themſelves, and their Servants live rather in too great plenty. The ſame inconveniencies we are likewiſe ſenſible of in Citys amongſt Tradeſmen and Servants, who are here more chargeable and burdenſom, and yet leſs ſerviceable than in any other Countries.

It is certain, that in all Cities, tho they invite Strangers to cohabit with them, the antient Inhabitants have Advantage enough by the Government and its Dependencies. And it is evident, that the old Inhabitants, who live by their Occupations, have a great Advantage over the new Comers, by their many Relations, Cuſtomers, and Acquaintance,

moſt of the old Manufactures, and great Inland Conſumption: All which particulars yield the old Inhabitants certain Gain. But new Comers leaving their own Country upon any Accident, and beſides their moveable Goods, bringing with them the knowledg of what is abounding, or wanting in their native Country, and of all ſorts of Manufactures; they cannot live in *Holland* upon the Intereſt of their Mony, nor on their real Eſtates: ſo that they are compelled to lay out all their Skill and Eſtate in deviſing and forming of new Fiſheries, Manufactures, Traffick, and Navigation, with the danger of loſing all they have. For he that ſits idle in *Holland*, muſt expect to get nothing but certain and ſpeedy Poverty; but he that ventures may gain, and ſometimes find out and meet with a good Fiſhery, Manufacture, Merchandice, or Traffick: And then the other Inhabitants may come in for a ſhare in that new Occupation, which is alſo very needful, becauſe the old handicraft Works being beaten down lower and lower in price, yield leſs Profit. And therefore it is neceſſary that all Strangers that are Maſters, Journey-men, Conſumptioners, Merchants, Traders, *&c.* ſhould live peaceably amongſt us, without any Diſturbance, Let, or Moleſtation whatever, and uſe their own Eſtates and Trades as they ſhall judg beſt.

Is more beneficial in Holland *than in moſt other Countries.*

To a few old Inhabitants it is detrimental.

And tho this will be ever detrimental to ſome old Inhabitants, who would have all the Profit, and bereave others of it, and under one pretext or other exclude them from their Trade; and therefore will alledg, That a Citizen ought to have more Privilege than a Stran-

Stranger; yet all Inhabitants who have here a certain place of Abode, or deſire to have it as they are then no Strangers, but Inhabitants, ſo ought they to be permitted, as well as the Burgers, to earn their neceſſary Food, ſeeing they are in greater want than their Oppoſers. And it is notorious, that all People, who to the prejudice of the common Good would exclude others, that are likewiſe Inhabitants of this Land, from the common means of Subſiſtence, or out of the reſpective Cities, and for that end would have ſome peculiar Favour from the Rulers beyond the reſt, are very pernicious and miſchievous Inhabitants: It is alſo certain, that a State which cannot ſubſiſt of it ſelf, ought not to deny that Strangers ſhould live amongſt them with equal Freedom with themſelves, under pretence of the Privilege and Right of Cities; nor ſhould they exclude any Strangers, but endeavour continually to allure in new Inhabitants; elſe ſuch a State will fall to ruin. For the great Dangers of carrying on new Deſigns, of being robb'd at Sea, of ſelling their Goods by Factors to unknown People, on twelve Months Credit, and at the ſame time running the hazard of all Revolutions by Wars and Monarchical Governments againſt this State, and of Loſſes among one another, are ſo important (yet all to be expected) that many Inhabitants concerned in the Fiſheries, Traffick, Manufactury, and conſequently in Ships ſet out to Freight, will give over their Trade, and depart the Country when they have been ſo fortunate as to have gained any conſiderable Eſtate, to ſeek a ſecurer way of living elſewhere. On the other hand, we are

to conſider, that there will ever be many Bankrupts and forſaken Trades, both by reaſon of the dangers of foreign Trade, and intolerable Domeſtick Taxes, which cannot be denied by any that knows that in *Amſterdam* alone there are yearly about three hundred abandoned or inſufficient Eſtates regiſtred in the Chamber of Accompts of that City; and therefore there are continually many Inhabitants, who finding the Gain uncertain, and the Charge great, are apt to relinquiſh it. So that it is ever neceſſary that we leave all ways open for People to ſubſiſt by, and a full Liberty, as aforeſaid, to allure Foreigners to dwell among us. Moreover, tho it be not convenient in general for Strangers (*i. e.* ſuch who, tho they dwell in *Holland*, and have continued there ſome conſiderable time, are not Natives) to partake of the Government, yet is it very neceſſary, in order to fix them here, that we do not exclude them by Laws.

Yea this Freedom is profitatable to the Government of the Land.

CHAP. XVI.

That Monopolizing Companies and Guilds, excluding all other Perſons from their Societys, are very prejudicial to Holland.

How hurtful ſelect Companies and Guilds are,

MUCH leſs ought we to curb or reſtrain our Citizens and Natives, any more than Strangers, from their natural liberty of ſeeking their livelihoods in their Native Country, by ſelect and authoriz'd Companies and Guilds: For when we conſider, that all the

Trade of our common Inhabitants is circumſcribed or bounded well nigh within *Europe*, and that in very many parts of the ſame, as *France*, *England*, *Sweden*, &c. our greateſt Trade and Navigation thither is crampt by the high Duties, or by Patent Companies, like thoſe of our *Indian* Societies; as alſo how ſmall a part of the World *Europe* is, and how many Merchants dwell in *Holland*, and muſt dwell there to ſupport it: We ſhall have no reaſon to wonder, if all the beneficial Traffick in theſe ſmall adjacent Countries be either worn out, or in a ſhort time be glutted with an over-trade. But we may much rather wonder, why the greateſt part of the World ſhould ſeem unfit for our common Inhabitants to trade in, and that they ſhould continue to be debarred from it, to the end that ſome few Perſons only may have the ſole Benefit of it. It is certainly known that this Country cannot proſper, but by means of thoſe that are moſt induſtrious and ingenious, and that ſuch Patents or Grants do not produce the ableſt Merchants. But on the other hand, becauſe the Grantees, whether by Burgerſhip, ſelect Companies, or Guilds, think they need not fear that others who are much more Ingenious and Induſtrious than themſelves, and are not of the Burgerſhip, Companies, and Guilds, ſhall leſſen their Profits; therefore the certain Gains they reap make them dull, ſlow, unactive, and leſs inquiſitive. Whereas on the other ſide, we ſay that Neceſſity makes the old Wife trot, Hunger makes raw Beans ſweet, and Poverty begets Ingenuity. And beſides, it is well known, now eſpecially when *Holland* is ſo heavily taxed, that other leſs bur-

To all thoſe means of Subſiſtence, whereby to deprive them and leſſen their number;

Who out of their abundance become waſtful, dull and ſlothful.

burdened People, who have no Fiſheries, Manufactures, Traffick, and freight Ships, cannot long ſubſiſt but by their Induſtry, Subtilty, Courage, and Frugality. In a word, theſe Patent-Companies and Guilds do certainly exclude many uſeful Inhabitants from that Trade and Traffick. But thoſe that poſſeſs theſe Privileges with ſufficient knowledg and fitneſs, need not fear that others that are more Induſtrious and Ingenious than themſelves, ſhall prevent them of their Profit by the exerciſe of the like Abilities and Parts; neither can it be ſo fully carried on and improved for the common benefit of the Country, by a ſmall number of People, as by many: So that in the mean time other People that we cannot exclude from that Traffick or Manufacture by means of our Grants and Guilds, have a great Opportunity of profitably improving that which ſo fooliſhly, and with ſo much churliſhneſs is prohibited to our common Inhabitants. Whereas otherwiſe, the provident and induſtrious *Hollanders* would eaſily draw to them all foreign Trade, and the making of incredibly more Manufactures than we now work on. That which is objected againſt this is, That the *Hollanders* are a People of ſuch a nature, that if the Trade were open into *Aſia*, *Africa*, and *America*, they would overſtock all thoſe Countries with Goods, and ſo deſtroy that Trade to the prejudice of *Holland*; which is ſo far from the truth, and all appearance thereof, that it is hardly worth anſwering. For firſt, ſo great and mighty a Trade by the *Hollanders*, in thoſe vaſt and trafficking Countries, would be the greateſt Bleſſing to them that could be wiſhed for upon Earth; would

So that the Inhabitants of other Countrys may the eaſier and ſooner draw our means of Subſiſtence to themſelves.

Enquiry made, whether if all Countries have the freedom of an open Trade, it would diminiſh our Traffick in general, or quite deſtroy it.

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would to God any of us could ever ſee *Holland* ſo happy. And next it cannot be denied, that even in this ſmall *Europe*, the overſtocking of Countries with Goods may indeed leſſen the Gains of ſome particular Merchants; but yet after ſuch a manner that the ſaid overſtocking with the ſaid Goods really is, and can be no other than an effect or fruit of a preſent overgrown Trade of this Country, in proportion to the ſmallneſs of thoſe Countries with which we are permitted to traffick. And Thirdly, It is evident, that the *Hollanders* by ſuch overſtocking have never yet loſt any Trade in any Country or Place of *Europe*, nor can they loſe it ſo long as that Trade remains open, becauſe that ſuperfluity of Goods tranſported is ſoon ſpent, and that ſame Trade is by the ſame or ſome other of our Merchants immediately reaſſumed and taken up, ſo ſoon as by a following ſcarcity in thoſe Countries there is any appearance of making more Profit by thoſe, or other Commodities.

And the impoſſibility thereof is made manifeſt.

But ſuppoſing it to be true, that the *Dutch* Merchants by overſtocking thoſe trading Countries ſhould run a riſque of loſing that Trade in ſome Parts; yet conſidering the ſmalneſs of thoſe Lands, it would then be doubly neceſſary to prevent the ſame by ſetting open the Trade to *Aſia*, *Africa*, and *America*, for all the Merchants of *Holland*. But on the other ſide, it is certain that the licenſed monopolizing Companies, by the unfaithfulneſs, negligence, and chargeableneſs of their Servants, and by their vaſt, and conſequently unmanageable Deſigns, who are not willing to drive any Trade longer than it yields

As alſo that trading Companies by Charter have ever leſſen'd Trade and Navigation, and oftentimes quite ruin'd both.

yields exceſſive Profit, muſt needs gain conſiderably in all their Trade, or otherwiſe relinquiſh and forſake all Countries that yield it not, which nevertheleſs would by our common Inhabitants be very plentifully carried on.

Which appears by vacating of the Greenland *Company's Charter.*

In this reſpect it is worthy obſervation, That the Authorized *Greenland* Company made heretofore little profit by their Fiſhing, becauſe of the great Charge of ſetting out their Ships, and that the Train-oil, Blubber and Whale-fins were not well made, handled, or cured; and being brought hither and put into Warehouſes, were not ſold ſoon enough, nor to the Company's beſt advantage. Whereas now that every one equips their Veſſels at the cheapeſt Rate, follow their Fiſhing diligently, and manage all carefully, the Blubber, Train-oil, and Whale-fins are imployed for ſo many Uſes in ſeveral Countrys, that they can ſell them with that conveniency that tho there are now fifteen Ships for one which formerly ſailed out of *Holland* on that account, and conſequently each of them could not take ſo many Whales as heretofore; and notwithſtanding the new prohibition of *France*, and other Countrys, to import thoſe Commoditys; and tho there is greater plenty of it imported by our Fiſhers, yet thoſe Commoditys are ſo much raiſed in the Value above what they were whilſt there was a Company, that the common Inhabitants do exerciſe that Fiſhery with profit to the much greater benefit of our Country, than when it was (under the management of a Company) carried on but by a few. It is beſides very conſiderable, That for the moſt part all Trades and Manufactures manag'd by Guilds in *Holland*, do ſell all their

their Goods within this Country to other Inhabitants who live immediately by the Fiſherys, Manufacturys, Freight-ſhips, and Traffick: So that no Members of thoſe Guilds, under what pretext ſoever, can be countenanced or indulged in their Monopoly, or Charter, but by the excluding of all other Inhabitants, and conſequently to the hindrance of their Countrys Proſperity. For how much ſoever thoſe Members ſell their Pains or Commoditys dearer than if that Trade or Occupation was open or free, all the other better Inhabitants that gain their Subſiſtance immediately, or by conſequence by a Foreign conſumption, muſt bear that loſs. And indeed our Fiſhermen, Dealers in Manufactures, Owners of Freight-ſhips, and Traders, being ſo burdened with all manner of Impoſts, to oppreſs them yet more in their neceſſity by theſe Monopolies of Guilds, and yet to believe that it redounds to the good of the Land, becauſe it tends to the benefit of ſuch Companies, is to me incomprehenſible. Theſe Guilds are ſaid indeed to be a uſeful ſort of People; but next to thoſe we call idle Drones, they are the moſt unprofitable Inhabitants of the Country, becauſe they bring in no profit from Foreign Lands for the Welfare of the Inhabitants of *Holland*. *Eſop* hath well illuſtrated this folly by a Cat, who firſt lick'd off the Oil from an oiled File, and continued licking, not obſerving that ſhe had by little and little lick'd her Tongue thorow which was given her to ſuſtain her Life, and carry Nouriſhment into her Body, nor that ſhe fed not on a File which did not conſume, but on her own Blood before her Tongue was totally conſumed.

On

On the contrary, I can ſee no good, nor appearance of good, which the Guilds in *Holland* do produce, but only that Foreign Maſters and Journeymen Artificers, having made their Works abroad, and endeavouring to ſell them to our Inhabitants, thereby to carry the Profit out of our Country into their own, are herein check'd and oppoſed by our Maſters of Guilds or Corporations. But beſides that this is more to the Prejudice than Advantage of the Country, ſince by conſequence our Fiſhers, Manufacturers, Traders, and Owners of Ships let to Freight, are thereby bereft of the Freedom of buying their neceſſaries at the cheapeſt Rate they can; it is alſo evident that this feeding of Foreigners upon the *Hollander* would be more ſtrenuouſly and profitably oppoſed and prevented, in caſe all handicraft Work, and Occupations were permitted to be made, ſold and practiſed by all, and no other People, except ſuch as have their ſetled Habitations in this Country.

CHAP. XVII.

That Fiſhers, Dealers in Manufactures, Merchants, and Owners of Freight-Ships as ſuch, ought not at all to be charged by paying any Impoſition to the Country, under what Pretext ſoever.

IF it be granted that the forementioned means of ſubſiſtence, namely, Fiſhing, Manufactury, Traffick, and Freight-ſhips, are

are ſo neceſſary in, and for *Holland*, as hath been above demonſtrated; and if the *Hollanders* who have no native Commodities muſt yet hold Markets equally with other Nations, who may deal in their own Wares, or Manufactures made of their own Materials; then it follows, that our Rulers ought not, under any Pretence whatſoever, to charge or tax their own Inhabitants, Fiſhers, dealers in Manufactures, Owners of Freight-Ships, or Merchants as ſuch. And I ſuppoſe every one will eaſily grant me this Concluſion in the general, becauſe of its own perſpicuity: For indeed, how fully and fixedly ſoever Fiſhing, Manufactury, Navigation, and Commerce ſeem to have ſettled themſelves in *Holland*; yet it is evident, that one Stiver of profit or loſs more or leſs, makes a Commodity which is *in æquilibrio*, and that happens very often (namely when it is hardly diſcerned whether the Profit be ſufficient to continue the making of that Commodity) wholly to preponderate, or be at a ſtand; even as a pair of Scales wherein ten thouſand Pounds or leſs is weighed, being ballanced, one of them is as eaſily weighed down with a Pound-weight, as if there were but a hundred Pounds in each Scale. And by conſequence it is evident, that our own Fiſherys, and Manufactures, with their dependencies, as alſo the Traffick in thoſe Wares, whether imported or exported, ought not at all to pay for Tonnage, Convoy, or other Duties, nor any thing when brought to the Scale, unleſs they are ſold. I know that all ſuch Impoſitions, through the Ignorance of thoſe that are unacquainted with Trade, are counted very light and inſignificant;

Eſpecially about Traffick in Holland.

cant; but thoſe that are more intelligent and concerned therein, do know * that you may pull a large Fowl bare, by plucking away ſingle Feathers, eſpecially in *Holland*, where with light Gains we muſt make a heavy purſe.

Illuſtrated by Fable. The Antients have compared theſe inconſiderate People to Mice, who being to live on the Fruit of an Orchard, found that the Roots of the Trees reliſh'd well, and were of good Nouriſhment, ſo that they made bold to eat of them; whereby the Trees, for want of ſufficient root, being depriv'd of their uſual Nouriſhment, bore leſs Fruit: and the wiſeſt of them told the others the reaſon of it, but were not believed by the Fooliſh and Greedy Mice that continued gnawing and devouring of the Root. And when in the following Year, beſides this unfruitfulneſs, thoſe Trees that had loſt many of their Roots and Fibres, were either blown down by the Storms, or kill'd by the Froſt; the wiſe Mice did thereupon once again warn their imprudent Brethren againſt it, who anſwered, That it was not their undermining and eating the Roots, but the fierce Storms and ſharp Winter that was the cauſe of it. So that they continued feeding on the Roots, till the Trees were ſo diminiſhed, that both the wiſe and fooliſh Mice muſt either die of hunger, or ſeek a better habitation.

Beſides this, antient Hiſtory teacheth us, That *Antigonus* King of *Macedonia* being imprudently covetous, was not content with the Health of his Subjects, and the Profit

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* Gutta cavat lapidem non vi, ſed ſæpè cadendo:
Adde parum parvo, tandem fit magnus acervus.

which

which he and they receiv'd from the Impoſts paid by Strangers, who came to drink his Mineral Waters, but he would needs tax the very Fountain it ſelf, by laying a Duty upon every meaſure of Water: which was ſo unacceptable to God and Nature, that the Fountain dried up, inſomuch that he thereby loſt not only the Health of his Subjects, but the Impoſt on the Conſumption; and for this ſuper-Impoſt on the Well, he was curſed and derided by his Subjects and Strangers.

From the Fiſheries, Manufactures, and Traffick, is drawn from all parts, what the other Inhabitants pay to the Magiſtracy.

And indeed if we conſider, that all Dutys levied on Conſumption muſt at the long run be born by the Fiſhermen, Manufacturers, Traffickers, and Owners of Ships, who for the moſt part employ all the People here directly or indirectly, we muſt acknowledg, that they alone are above meaſure burdened thereby, and diſcouraged by Impoſts above all others. Which will evidently appear, if you conſider it in an Example or two, and inquire how much Wages is here paid for building and ſetting to Sea a Ship of 200 Laſts, or rather how many Carpenters, Smiths, Ropemakers, Sail-makers, &c. muſt be employed about ſuch a Veſſel, and how much in the mean while they muſt altogether pay to the State, whether for Impoſts, or for Poundage of Houſe-hire. For I doubt not but it will charge a Ship with ſome hundreds of Guilders more than if we had no Impoſts, and conſequently it muſt be ſold ſo much the dearer. And if moreover we conſider, that the Owners who ſet to Sea ſuch a Ship to ſeek a Freight, muſt afterwards victual her with our Proviſion and Drink for the Seamen, upon which our Impoſts charge very much, you will the eaſier

As the building of Shipping,

easier discern it. And this would likewise appear manifestly, if we consider, that the price of weaving half a Piece of ordinary home-made broad Cloth, amounts to seventy Guilders, and that this Mony is presently spent, (for such Workmen, tho they can, will not lay up any thing) then we should see, that of this 70, more than twenty Guilders is paid for Imposts, and Poundage upon House-hire; for a half Piece of Cloth requires the Labour of twenty eight People for fourteen days, or at least so many may thereby be fed by the Heads of Families (reckoning five to a Family) and then we see that a half Piece of Cloth is thereby charged with twenty Guilders.

And Drapery do manifest.

And tho the Fisheries and Traffick are not oppresst near so much with such Impossts, yet it certainly is, and continues an intolerable Error, and thwarts the Welfare of the whole State, to burden any Dealers in Manufactures, Fishers, or Merchants, as such; for we do not take due care for the prosperity of the Country, unless by all Ways and Means we lighten their Burdens, and remove what makes them uneasy.

CHAP. XVIII.

That freedom of Religion is against all Reason obstructed in Holland.

HAving hitherto spoken of four considerable ways of preserving the Prosperity of *Holland*, I think it not fit to go over any more

more tending to the ſame end, till I firſt briefly hint how *Holland* hath governed it ſelf as to the ſaid Expedients. And firſt as to freedom of Religion, it is certain that having till this time been greater in *Holland* than any where elſe, it hath brought in many Inhabitants, and driven out but few; yet it is alſo certain, that ſince the Year 1618, we have begun to depart from that laudable Maxim more and more.

Toleration of Religion was formerly more obſtructed.

Firſt with the *Remonſtrants*, perſecuting them by Placaets, Fines, and Baniſhments, and driving them into other Lands: Afterwards with the *Romaniſts*, by diſturbing them more and more in their Aſſemblies with ſevere Placaets, and more rigorous Execution, notwithſtanding that by the Proſperity of our own Government, the great Increaſe of the Proteſtants, the Peace, and the K. of *Spain*'s Renunciation of any Pretence, Right, or Title, for himſelf, or his Heirs after him, to theſe *United Provinces*; The moving Reaſons of our firſt Placaets againſt the *Romaniſts*, ſeemed to have been taken away. So that now, in order to enjoy their Liberty, they muſt pay a heavy Tax annually, to the Profit of the Bailiffs and Schouts, which ſeems to be impoſed for them, and for no other Cauſe; for the Government reaps no Benefit by it. This is no leſs unreaſonable, than detrimental to the Land: For if we cannot ſpare the Benefit which accrues to us by their Abode and Traffick, why ſhould we prohibit that which is not hurtful to the State, and whereof the *Romiſh* Inhabitants make ſo great Account, and without which they cannot dwell amongſt us? If we permit none but ſmall Aſſemblies in

Namely by Placaets againſt the Remonſtrants and Roman *Catholicks.*

Altho the moving Reaſons of the firſt Placaets now wholly ceaſe.

Cities, in the Houſes of known Citizens, with ſuch Prieſts as are beſt approved of by the Rulers, that Inconvenience would have an end, and Peace and Friendſhip increaſe more and more among the good Inhabitants, yea and the true Religion too. And moreover, our State would avoid that Vexation which now by diſturbing thoſe prohibited Meetings may happen: And on the contrary, the State could incur no danger by thoſe well known Aſſemblies, where every one might have free Acceſs, and no matter of ſecreſy could be conſulted of; but the Publick Safety would every way be better ſecured. But what ſhall we ſay? not only the Politicians, but alſo the Clergy are Men; and commonly the ſweet Temper of ſuch as have ſuffer'd under Perſecution is changed into Force and Violence, ſo ſoon as they become Maſters of others: then they forget the Evangelical Leſſon, and the Law of Nature, *to do nothing to others but what they would have done to themſelves*; and on the contrary, they remember and practiſe that old tyrannical and accurſed Maxim, *As he hath done to me, ſo will I do to him; and he that hath the Power, let him uſe it.* And to ſpeak all in a word, what the Pſalmiſt ſays, *It is good for me that I have been afflicted, that I might learn thy Statutes*; is not truer in Adverſity, than in Proſperity. *They are not in Trouble, neither are they plagued like other Men; therefore Pride compaſſeth them about as a Chain, and Violence covereth them as a Garment.*

Pſal. 119. 71.

Pſal. 73. 5, 6.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIX.

That the Freedom of Fiſhery and Traffick in Holland *is likewiſe in ſome meaſure unjuſtly reſtrain'd.*

THE Freedom of Fiſhery and Traffick is greater in this Country than elſewhere, and yet heretofore there were many Placaets publiſhed concerning the Herring, and other Fiſheries, which tend altogether to the benefit of foreign Fiſhers, who are not bound to obey them. We formerly manag'd the Whale-fiſhing by a monopolizing Company, excluſive of all others; and how miſchievous that proved to *Holland*, appears now, that that Fiſhing is open to all Men, whereby it is advanced from One to Ten, yea to Fifteen, as was before ſhewn more at large. But erecting an *Eaſt*, and a *Weſt-India* Company, was a quite different thing; for it appeared to be a neceſſary Evil, becauſe our People would be trading in and about ſuch Countries where our Enemies were too ſtrong for particular Adventures: So that this ſeemed to have been neceſſary in all Reſpects, to lay the Foundation of that Trade by a powerful arm'd Society. And ſeeing this Country, ingaged in War againſt the King of *Spain*, had need of uſing all its Strength, it was very prudently done to erect thoſe two Societies. But that Trade being now ſo well ſettled, we may juſtly make it a doubt, whether the ſaid Companies ought any longer to continue

Sometimes a Monopoly Charter is uſeful to ſettle a Trade.

on the ſame foot. Some wiſe Stateſmen do with probable Reaſons maintain, that the politic Rule of * preſerving a thing beſt, by the ſame means whereby it was acquired, cannot agree with theſe Companies: For it is certain, that the firſt moving Reaſon of thoſe Grants to them, which was the War with the King of *Spain*, now ceaſeth, and that in caſe of any new War againſt that People, they would no longer be formidable to us, but we to them. And ſecondly, as it is well known that it was neceſſary at firſt to make ſome Conqueſts upon the Spice Iſlands of the ſaid Enemy, becauſe the more Lands they conquered, the more Right and Ability they would acquire to the Trade which might happen in thoſe parts: So it cannot be denied, that when thoſe good and neceſſary Conqueſts are made, the Grounds and Maxims of the proſperity of the ſaid Companies begin to juſtle and oppugn the general Good of this Country, which is manifeſtly known to conſiſt in a continual increaſe of our Manufactures, Traffick, and freight Ships: Whereas nevertheleſs the true intereſt of ſuch Companies conſiſts in ſeeking the benefit of all the Members, even with Foreign, as well as our own Manufactures, and (to the great prejudice of all other our Inhabitants) by importing Manufactures and other mechanick Works into this Country, and vending them throughout *Europe*; and in ſhort, by making the greateſt Profit with the leaſt Traffick and Na-

As appeared by the East-India *Company.*

But that Trade when ſettled, if manag'd by a ſelect Company, runs counter to the general Good.

* Res facile iiſdem artibus retinentur quibus initio partæ ſunt.

vigation.

vigation. As it is acknowledged, that if the *East-India* Company can gain more by importing *Japan* Garments, *Indian* Quilts and Carpets, *&c.* than raw Silk; or if the Company, by causing a scarcity of Nutmegs, Mace, Cloves, Cinamon, *&c.* could so raise the price of them, that they might gain as much by one hundred Lasts as by a thousand: We ought not then to expect that those raw Silks, and unnecessary and great Disbursments which they are at, should cause a greater Trade and Navigation than those hundred Lasts would just require, but that they would rather, to shun greater Traffick and Navigation, destroy all the Superfluity they have in the *Indies.*

And it can be as little denied of such Companies, that the more Lands they conquer, the more of their Stock they must necessarily spend for the Preservation and Defence of such Lands; and the more Dominion they have, the less are they able to mind and augment their Traffick: Whereas on the contrary, our particular Inhabitants by those manifold conquered strong Holds and Lands, would have so much the more Conveniency and Security to trade in the *Indies.* We have now, to say no more, quite lost our open Trade of *Guiney*, and that of Salt in the *West-Indies*, which were heretofore so considerable by the erecting of the *West-India* Company; and the Mischief which was done to the King of *Spain* in the *West-Indies*, is recoil'd back, and fallen upon us: So that we cannot cry up that Company, who have bound the hands of particular Men, and made War instead of Traffick, unless at least they would

So that that Monopoly ought then to have been taken away.

in the mean time ſuffer all our Inhabitants freely to trade in all their Conqueſts. On the contrary, that Company hath impoveriſh'd many of our good Inhabitants. Whereas by an open Trade, and conſequently well ſettled Colonies, we ſhould not only, with ſmall Charge, have eaſily defended thoſe vaſt Lands of *Brazil*, *Guiney*, *Angola*, St. *Thomas*, &c. againſt all foreign Power, but (which is more conſiderable) have been able to carry on a very great Trade with our own Nation, without fear that any foreign Potentate ſhould ſeize our Ships, Goods, or Debts, to which thoſe *Hollanders* that trade only in *Europe* are continually expoſed. And how profitable and ſecure that Trade would have been, may eaſily be apprehended, if it be well conſider'd, that the ſaid Lands yield the beſt ſort of Commodities that are in requeſt over all *Europe*, and are not to be had ſo good elſewhere, *viz.* Sugar, Brazil-wood, Elephants-Teeth, Gold, *&c.* and that which thoſe Inhabitants have need of in Return, *Holland* could for the moſt part have ſupplied them with, as Victuals, Drink, and Apparel, yea even with moſt Materials for building of Houſes, Ships, *&c.* whereas now we are deprived of all theſe Advantages. This is the ordinary Fruit and Puniſhment of Monopolies and Conqueſts, which for want of Colonies they muſt keep up at a continual great Charge. May our *Eaſt-India* Company conſider this effectually, before it be too late.

Elſe we wholly loſe that Trade, for Land-Conqueſts carried on by Merchants are not at the long run tenable againſt all Enemies.

CHAP. XX.

That Manufactures, and other Mechanick Works, are no leſs imprudently reſtrained.

The Freedom of Manufactures is more and more obſtructed.

BY the freedom allow'd Men to gain a Livelihood by ſuch things as are liable to Conſumption, or by Handicrafts, it's certain that we have kept an infinite number of People in the Country, and have beſides drawn in many Foreigners to it: For in moſt Citys of *Holland* there has been ſufficient Liberty given. But afterwards People withdrew from many Citys, through the miſchievous Nature of ſome Men, who rather chuſe a ſudden Profit, tho to the general damage of their native Country, than that which comes in by degrees with continued Gain to the Republick: For private or peculiar Profit is the chief Foundation (tho it always goes under the Notion of a general Advantage) of all thoſe Reſtrictions and Burdens impoſed on the Citizens by Corporations or Guilds, which ſerve to no other end but to keep good People out of their Citys, and in the mean while to give the Members of ſuch Corporations a laſting opportunity of being enrich'd by their fellow Inhabitants, and of ſelling their Goods and Manufactures the dearer to their Neighbours, and ſo of levying as it were an Impoſt upon them.

At leaſt it cannot be denied, but that Halls relating to Manufactures, or any other ſort of handicraft Ware, with Overſeers or Inſpectors appointed by common conſent; or the chief Men of the Guilds to circumſcribe or

limit the ſame; or by publick Acts of State to appoint how thoſe Wares muſt be made which we ſell into Foreign Lands, are as ridiculous as prejudicial. For it ſuppoſeth two very impertinent things: Firſt, That the Foreign Buyers muſt needs purchaſe of us ſuch Manufactures and Mechanick Works as we ſhall pleaſe to make, be they what they will: And, ſecondly, that in other Countrys they muſt not make thoſe ſorts of Manufactures, and handicraft Wares which we prohibit. Whereas on the contrary it may be ſaid, that the Makers of them have hit the right Mark, when they can beſt pleaſe the Buyer, and the Buyer can gain moſt by them. And it is certain that all our Manufactures and other Mechanick Works, may be made and ſpent not only in the Country Villages and Towns of *Holland*, but alſo in very many neighbouring Countrys; and that they may be there made with far leſs Impoſts on the Conſumption than with us: By which it appears that it would have been much better for *Holland* never to have laid on thoſe Reſtrictions and Prohibitions.

CHAP. XXI.

That the heavy and manifold Impoſts will at laſt deſtroy the Proſperity of this Country.

Taxes on Conſumption and Merchandize in Holland *too burdenſom.*

AS to Impoſts upon imported or exported Goods, and Taxes upon Conſumption, and real or immoveable Eſtates; I ſuppoſe former

former Ages levied none ſuch in time of Peace. For when the Earls of *Holland* ſuppoſed they ſhould have occaſion for an extraordinary Supply in time of War over and above their Revenues, they came in Perſon, and according to their Privilege deſired it of the Aſſembly of States; who ſometimes granted it for a ſhort time, and ſometimes refuſed it, and were ever very cautious of granting any ſtanding Supply of Mony, as knowing their Liberty could not ſubſiſt but under ſuch an Earl as had neither Forces nor Mony beforehand. And onr Hiſtorians count it a great Offence in our Earls, that they endeavoured to make theſe Lands tributary: For which reaſon the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth deſiring a Stiver to be impoſed upon each Acre or Morgen of Land, could not obtain it; and his Son *Philip* not without great trouble, got an Impoſt for nine Years to help to defray the Charge of the War againſt *France*, but on this Condition, that all Sums ſo levied, ſhould be received and diſpoſed by ſuch as the State impowered to do it. And on the ſame ground the States of *Flanders* and *Brabant* have to this day preſerved their Liberty of granting the King ſuch Requeſts, or (as it moſt commonly happens) of denying them. It makes nothing againſt what I have now ſaid, that the Earls of *Holland* have heretofore receiv'd Cuſtoms upon Goods imported and exported, ſeeing according to their Privilege the Citizens of the Trading Citys of *Holland*, viz. *Dort*, *Haerlem*, *Delf*, *Leyden*, *Amſterdam*, &c. are Cuſtom-free; ſo that ſuch Dutys do only concern Strangers, and even for them they are very eaſy. But in the time of the Stadtholders

holders Government in the *United Provinces*, ſays *Grotius*, " By * endeavouring not to give " the Duke of *Alva* the tenth Penny, we af- " terwards gave all. After which being in Baniſhment, he wrote to his Friends here in this manner: " We † bore all manner of " Taxes and Impoſts, without preſerving " the leaſt ſhadow of our common Freedom. For the ſame Taxes are by the long continuance of the Wars now ſcrew'd up ſo high, that the like was never ſeen in any Republick, much leſs in a Trafficking Country: ſo that it will be the greateſt wonder in Nature for us to ſuſtain thoſe intolerable Burdens long, and, driving no Trade with our own native Commodities, to be able to traffick as othe Nations do. Nevertheleſs I willingly acknowledg, that if we muſt needs raiſe no leſs than fifteen Millions of Guilders yearly in this Country, we have hit upon the moſt convenient courſe for it, *viz.* to charge the oldeſt Inhabitants moſt, as being moſt fixed to the Country by the Advantage of the Government, and their immoveable Eſtates: For Land is moſt liable to pay Poundage, the 40*th* Penny upon ſale, and the 20*th* Penny of Inheritances, by thoſe of the Collateral aſcending Line, as alſo the Tax of the 200*th* Penny moſt ſtrictly levied. But thoſe manifold, yea innumerable Impoſts upon Conſumption, concern Merchandize and Manufacture only ſo far as thoſe who are main-

To be able to continue long, and the Country to thrive.

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* Omnia dabant, ne decimam darent. *Grot. Hiſt.*

† Omnia datis, & ne quidem Libertatis umbram retinetis.

tain'd

tain'd by them are Men, and muſt live by them. Beſides it is well known, not only that in Conſumptions there may be great variety, but alſo that People do manifeſtly ſpend moſt of their Income upon Pomp and Ornament, Superfluity, Wantonneſs, Pleaſure and Recreation. So that Fiſhermen, Manufacturers, Seamen and Watermen, who are moſtly poor, pay but little to this Tax; whereas the richer Inhabitants pay very much; and it cannot be denied but that they ſeem voluntarily to pay thoſe Impoſts on Conſumptions.

But in real Burdens and Taxations, the Favour and Hatred of the firſt Aſſeſſors has not only an Influence, but thoſe that are oppreſs'd by them, cannot free themſelves from them by prudential Forethought and Frugality. Moreover it is apparent, that he who increaſes his Eſtate by induſtrious and frugal living, is moſt burdened: And he that by lazineſs and prodigality diminiſheth his Eſtate will be leſs taxed. So that Virtue is unjuſtly oppreſt, and Vice favoured. Whereas on the contrary, the Impoſts on Conſumption fall heavy upon the Riotous, and indulge and incourage the Virtuous. But tho in all Events, the forementioned Sums of Mony yearly demanded for defence of the Country, be raiſed after the eaſieſt way poſſible; yet the immenſeneſs of the Sum will not ſuffer us to imagine that our People continuing to be thus burdened, ſhall always be able to ſell their Merchandize at as low, or lower Rates than other Foreigners, who are charged leſs, and work up their own Growth and Manufactures ready for the Merchant. So that

Or Poundage, and the eighth Penny.

That the Inhabitants ought as ſoon as poſſible to be eaſed.

that it is abſolutely neceſſary that our Inhabitants be eaſed of ſuch Burdens as ſoon as poſſibly may be.

CHAP. XXII.

The Grounds and Reaſons upon which the greateſt Caution is to be us'd in laying the Tax of Convoy-mony, or Cuſtoms.

Some exported and imported Goods, and Ships, may poſſibly be charged to the benefit of Holland.

BUT the Impoſt on Goods Imported and Exported, and that on Shipping, is a quite different thing; for ſome may poſſibly be laid for the Benefit of the State, ſome without prejudice to it, and ſome cannot be laid without great and certain detriment to *Holland*. I ſhall therefore expreſs my Sentiments particularly upon this Subject, and do premiſe, that ſo long as our Polity about Sea-affairs is built upon the ſame Foundation as it was in the Year 1597. that Prohibition of any Ships or Merchandize whatever, whether imported or exported, muſt always be of great Concernment to *Holland*. The like may be ſaid of laying any new or higher Duty of Tonnage, or Convoy-mony for clearing the Seas; ſeeing we daily find that ſome Provinces, Admiralties, and Citys, intending to tolerate the ſame among themſelves, do privately connive and ſuffer them to be ſmugl'd, or brought in Cuſtom-free, in order to gain that Trade of Navigation and Commerce to themſelves; and yet will be ſure to be the moſt zealous in cauſing ſuch Prohibitions, and the

Holland *ought to be very wary as to prohibited Goods, and taxing of Merchandize or Shipping.*

the laying in of higher Convoy-mony and Taxes for clearing the Seas, to be impoſed by the States-General. So that commonly the faireſt dealing Provinces, Admiraltys and Citys of the *United Provinces*, and the moſt upright Merchants ſuffer by the ſaid Placaets, while the moſt fraudulent and diſhoneſt Merchants do generally ſo contrive Matters, as to get Friends at Court, by whoſe Favour they find Means to benefit themſelves to the prejudice of honeſt Men.

See the Grievances of the Magiſtrates of Zierickzee of the Year 1668. in Novemb.

In the firſt place it is worthy obſervation, that in this Affair, nothing can be more detrimental than to charge all Ships, or Goods coming in or going out with Tonnage-duty, without diſtinction: for tho it be pretended to be taken of the Shipping only, yet it is evident that all the Goods they carry muſt pay for it. And to pay for clearing the Seas, and thereby charging all Goods, according to their Value, with one *per Cent.* or the like, is ſtill more prejudicial. To make this more evident, I ſhall inſiſt the longer upon it. Seeing *Holland* of it ſelf yields almoſt nothing, and the greateſt part of our Traffick conſiſts in Fiſherys, Manufactures, Mechanic Works, and their Dependencies, ſo that we muſt take thoſe Fiſh, and fetch the unwrought Materials for Manufactures, and all that is neceſſary thereunto from Foreign Parts; and likewiſe moſt of our Fiſh, and wrought Goods, muſt afterwards be tranſported to Foreign Parts. And ſeeing it is evident that the Fiſheries, Manufactures, and other Mechanick Wares, may be practiſed and made in other Countrys, it is an inexcuſable weakneſs to burden thoſe neceſſary Means of Livelihood, and all other Mer-

Laſt-mony, as now laid, is very detrimental, becauſe it charges all without diſtinction.

Merchandize without diſtinction, and thereby indanger the driving them into other Nations where they are leſs charged. How much this thwarts all good Maxims of Polity, I ſhall ſhew by an Example or two. It was antiently very wiſely conſidered, how much we were concerned in the Manufactury of Woollen Cloth, and therefore a half-Inland made Cloth was charged with no more than 4 Stivers for Exportation; whereas if it had paid 1 *per Cent.* for clearing the Seas, it would have paid 30 Stivers. So that every one may perceive the Diſparity, and into what danger we run by ſuch Errors, of loſing this Trade, and driving out of our Country a very great number of People, as waſhers of Wool, Pickers, Scourers, Carders, Spinners, Weavers, Dreſſers, Fullers, Dyers, Nappers, Preſſers, *&c.* with the makers of the Inſtruments neceſſary to thoſe Imployments. And laſtly, it is the way to cauſe the Trade of unwrought Goods, thereunto ſubſervient, and made uſe of likewiſe in the Manufactures, to withdraw very readily into other Countrys, eſpecially if beſides all this, we do in the ſame impolitick manner tax the unwrought Goods ſerving to the ſame end, which is againſt all good Polity, and the great Prudence of our Anceſtors, who having well conſidered how much Weaving concerns us, very wiſely ordered all Wool imported to be free, and all Yarn woven here to pay but 15 Stivers the 100 *l.* and but one *per Cent.* to be paid for clearing the Seas; the Wool for an Inland Half-cloth ten Stivers, and the Yarn for a home-made Camlet 45 Stivers the Piece; which yet by the ordinary Convoy or Cuſtoms

As is inſtanced by particular Examples; viz. of Inland Broadcloth.

Of Worſted-yarn for weaving.

ſtoms (counting 15 Stivers for 100 Pounds) is charged but with one half Stiver the Piece; at leaſt according to the firſt intent of the Confederate States, it ought to be charged with no more. So that it is an inexcuſable Folly, and would be a very prejudicial Exaction to charge the Importer with more than 15 Stivers Convoy-mony for 100 Pounds of *Turky*-Yarn brought into this Country to be woven. And it is no leſs imprudent ſo greatly to burden raw Silk imported, as if it were of no concern to us, which by winding, throwing, and weaving, is ſo profitable to this Country. From all which I ſuppoſe every one will eaſily perceive how prejudicial this great Difference is.

Of Raw Silk.

But in all Events, whether for paiment of Convoy-mony, Direction, or Tonnage-mony, or for clearing the Seas, it would be needful for the greater improvement of the Navigation of *Holland*, that all Foreign imported Goods ſhould be leſs charged than thoſe that come in by Land: Whereas on the contrary we ſee daily that very many *Levant*, *Italian*, &c. fine Wares are brought in by Land-carriage. And how much it concerns our Inhabitants we may eaſily imagine, when we conſider that the Ships built here, are ſet to Sea victual'd and mann'd, but the Carriers and their Wagons are Foreign, and of no concern to us: And beſides, our Merchandize on board Ships is always in our Power, or at leaſt we may convoy and defend them with our Men of War as they go and come, whereas thoſe that go by Land-carriage are in the Lands and Power of other Princes, ſo that they may at all times make ſeizure of them.

To increaſe Navigation, it were needful to charge ſuch Goods as come by Land-carriage.

2. All

As also some foreign Shipping.

2. All Ships and Wares, coming out of Countries where our Inhabitants lade not at all, or at least not without paying Duties, ought in proportion to be charged here with as much Impost as our advantagious Situation, and great Consumption can bear: And where ours pay more Impost than is taken in the Country where the foreign Masters of Ships do live, we ought likewise to take as much of them here as was taken of ours. And thus having the Navigation to our selves, we may preserve the same, as also the Passage on the Rivers.

And Foreign made Wares.

3. All wrought Goods which we can make in this Country, should be charged when imported with so much, and no more than the Traffick may bear. And all Foreign made Goods ought to be charged with more than those made at home, being sold for consumption or wearing; and also the same Goods in passing upon Rivers into other Countries, ought to be charged again so much, as they may not be carried with less Charge thro other Dominions to those Rivers. We are moreover duly to observe, that we ought not to charge any foreign Goods that are to be transported again, whether manufactured or not, so as that our Merchants should find it their Advantage to pass by our Havens, and chuse rather to carry those Goods from one Foreign Country to another, which might perhaps be effected, especially in very coarse Goods, whose Lading and Unlading cost more than ordinary. But the Wares Imported or Exported by the Rivers, we may charge much more, especially all coarse or bulky Goods, which cannot be brought hither by Land:

Raw imported foreign Goods ought to be little charged.

Those that come by, or upon Rivers, more.

For

For the Rivers we have under our command. And again, by charging the Goods brought in by Rivers, our Navigation and Traffick is favoured; and the Cities that lie upward have for many Years paſt bereft the *Netherlandiſh* Veſſels of their Freight on thoſe Rivers, by their Staple Duty. Of which great Hardſhip we cannot complain with any Reaſon, while any Cities in *Holland* practiſe the like.

We ought to eaſe all imported unwrought Goods, whereof our Manufactures are made;

4. All imported rough Goods, which our Inhabitants are to work up, ought not at all to be charged: But rough Goods, as aforeſaid, exported, we ought to charge ſo much as they can bear.

And to eaſe our own, and charge Outlandiſh Manufacture.

5. Goods manufactured in this Country, and exported, ought not at all to be charged. But on the contrary, we ſhould charge all foreign made Goods, either Imported or Exported, as much as may be, without hazarding the loſs of that Traffick.

As for charging foreign Goods, and manufactur'd Wares, Ships, and Maſters of Ships, tho it be a matter of great Weight, yet I know not of any thing that hath been done in it. But the *Engliſh*, *Anno* 1660, ſettled their Rates of Cuſtoms and Convoy-Mony ſo well, according to theſe Maxims, to favour their Inhabitants as much as they could, and to burden all foreign Maſters of Ships, and Merchants; that if we continue charged in this Country ſo unreaſonably as at preſent, and there too, and the *Engliſh* on the other hand continue to be ſo favourably uſed, both here and at home, they will bereave us of much of our Trade, unleſs the Merchants there under that Government, be for other Occaſions oppreſſed with many and

Which Maxims the Engliſh *have much better follow'd than we. See their Book of Rates of Tonnage and Poundage.*

heavy Taxes, whereunto Traffick, under Monarchs and Princes, is always wont to be much expoſed.

CHAP. XXIII.

That in levying Convoy-mony, we in Holland *deviate in many particulars from theſe Maxims, and in many things have obſerved them well.*

Firſt, it hath been very detrimental to Holland, *that they there prohibited the Exportation of Gold and Silver.*

FIRST it is well worthy Obſervation, that the Inhabitants of *Holland* can trade in no Countrys but by carrying Goods thither, which having ſold, and turned into Mony, they convert it into other Goods which they find there, or failing that, return their Money into *Holland* by Exchange: But if ſuch foreign Lands have little or no occaſion for our Goods, but afford rich Commodities, then is it evident that we cannot trade with them to any purpoſe, unleſs we carry thither Gold and Silver in Coin, or Bullion. And ſince by conſequence every one knows that *Norway*, the *Eaſt-Country*, *Smyrna*, *Perſia*, *India*, *China*, &c. do afford us infinitely more Merchandize than they take of us, we cannot trade with them but by Gold and Silver; and that moreover, theſe Provinces, at leaſt that of *Holland*, cannot ſubſiſt without the ſaid Traffick. Therefore we cannot enough wonder at the Ignorance, or ill Conduct of the States-General, who by many repeated Placaets in the Years 1606, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1621, &c. prohibited the exportation of coined or un-

uncoined Gold and Silver. And tho it may be ſaid, that the ſaid Placaets being well known to be detrimental, had no long duration, yet is it certain that the Scouts, and Advocat Fiſcal, did for a long time, nay and ſometime ſtill make uſe of them to moleſt and diſquiet our trading Inhabitants.

But the not charging of Fiſheries, and the Eaſtern Trade, is reaſonably well ordered.

But as to what concerns the Freedom and Advantages of Fiſhery, and the *Eaſtland* Trade, as alſo other unwrought Goods imported, they are indifferently well ordered, ſeeing they pay little or nothing of Duty, either on Import or Export, except that the Owners of the Herring-Buſſes, to ſecure themſelves againſt Sea-Robbers, or Pyrats, do yearly at their own Charge, ſet out ſeven Ships of War: Which, for a Fiſhery of ſo much importance to the Country, is too heavy a Burden, or at leaſt a very great Charge. But foreign Salt imported or exported, is not at all charged. Fiſh of our own taking, Herring, Wood, Aſhes, Pitch, Tarr, Hemp, pay nothing inward, and but very little outward. But Corn, againſt all reaſon, pays Duty inward, ſome more, and ſome leſs, and likewiſe when exported is too much charged.

See the Rates of the Convoymony.

But not the Corn-Trade.

And how much Holland is concerned in having the Staple of Corn.

If we conſider how much muſt neceſſarily be gained in this Country, by Owners of Ships, Maſters, Mariners, Corn-Porters, Hirers out of Granaries to ſtow the ſame, and Corn-ſhifters, before it is ſent by our Merchants into other Countries: We ought in all reſpects to eaſe, and be more favourable to our Stores or Staple of Corn, Merchandize, and Fiſhery, and to keep the Staple of Corn within our Country; that ſo during bad Seaſons, and the Scarcity thereof in other Nations, we may

have it always cheaper with us than in any other Countries; and beſides that, we might enjoy many other publick Advantages, which out of ſo redundant a Treaſure as is the Store and Staple of Corn, might in very many Caſes and Accidents be improved by wiſe Magiſtrates. Whereas on the contrary, if by an imprudent burdening of that Commodity we loſe that Staple; this indigent and populous Country would in many Caſes, as bad Harveſts, and croſs Accidents of this World, fall into many extraordinary and unforeſeen Inconveniencys. But above all it is to be lamented, that our own Manufactures are ſo unreaſonably charged with Convoy-mony, or Cuſtoms, and much more with the Duty of clearing the Seas; but they are chiefly oppreſt by the Impoſition laid on the Conſumption: So that the Intereſt of the Manufactures and Mechanick Works is very ill look'd after. For tho undreſt Wool pays but 1 *per Cent.* of its worth at Importation, yet certain it is that it pays too little at Exportation. Flax, Silk, and Yarn are alſo too much charged upon Importation, and no more (againſt all reaſon) at Exportation. And as to weaving, or to ſpeak plainer, all woven Goods; it is wonderful why we ſhould charge woven Goods, whether Imported or Exported by Sea, or Rivers, ſo high as we fooliſhly do, or (in reſpect of their great Value) much more than foreign Commodities; yea (which is a ſhameful thing) the undreſt *Engliſh* Cloths are at Importation not charged at all, and the *Engliſh* Traders enjoy every way more Freedom, and exemption from Taxes in *Holland*, than even our own Inhabitants.

But Manufactures are too much charg'd.

See the Rates of Convoy-mony. The Treaty of the Engliſh *Court in* Holland, *and* L. V. Aitzma's *Hiſt. of the Year* 1656. pag. 635.

The

The Intereſt of our Husbandmen, or Boors, is alſo much neglected; for what ſolid Reaſon can be given, that the *Holland* Butter exported is double as much charged as that of *Frieſland?* Likewiſe, that all foreign Butter and Cheeſe may be imported Duty free; but all foreign Cheeſe exported, is charged with no more than that of *Holland.* *As alſo our Husbandmen.*

But eſpecially we may wonder, that the Rulers of *Holland* could ever find it good to charge all Merchandize, without diſtinction, at Importation with 1 *per Cent.* and at Exportation with 2 *per Cent.* of its Value: as if it were not enough to ſubject the Merchant by the rated Convoy-mony, to the Charges, Pains, loſs of Time, and Seizures, which muſt, and will lawfully oftimes happen, and ſometimes alſo to the unjuſt Vexation and Trouble of many, and delays of the Cuſtom-houſe Officers, Searchers, Collectors, and Fiſcal, whereby many times fit Opportunities of ſending away or ſelling of their Goods are loſt: ſo that by the ſaid one and two *per Cent.* of the Value, all Merchandize, even thoſe which ought by all means to be favoured, are ſo heavily charged, as in the foregoing Chapter is ſhew'd. And beſides, power is given to the ſaid Fiſcal and head Cuſtomer or Collector, to ſeize all Goods for their own Uſe, paying one ſixth part more than the Importer values them: Which is a miſchievous thing to the Merchant; for in far more remote Countrys (for example, at *Smyrna*, or *Meſſina*, Grograin Yarn or Silk) Goods being bartered or bought, and not knowing whether thoſe Goods may be damaged in the Voyage or not, and much leſs whether the ſame are ſo bar- *And eſpecially the Intereſt of Merchants has been much neglected, by paying one and two* per Cent. *upon Goods imported and exported.* *Which appears plaineſt by raw Silk, and Grograin Yarn.*

tered or bought in, as to yield Profit or Loſs, yet are they bound blindly to rate theſe Goods. Whereas on the other ſide, the Fiſcal or Collector may take or leave them at their Pleaſure. Beſides, this one and two *per Cent.* is for the Merchant ſo great a Charge, and deprives them of ſo much Profit, that by this alone very many Goods that come from abroad, and will not ſell off here, paſs by our Country, and are carried to other Ports.

The truth is, when we conſider all theſe heavy burdens upon the Merchandize and Manufactures of *Holland*; and then on the other hand, that we can in no wiſe ſubſiſt long without them, I cannot ſufficiently wonder at that Folly; for it is too nice and tickliſh a Caſe to lay any reſtraints upon the Mouth, through which all Nouriſhment muſt paſs into the Body. We ought to ſuſpect and be jealous of all things which have any tendency, either to bereave or ſtraiten us of Life; eſpecially ſeeing we can fail but once, and thoſe that gueſs at things are apt to miſtake. Perhaps it may be ſaid, that Neceſſity juſtifies all things, and that the Wars brought a fear upon us of loſing both Country and Trade at once. Indeed he that is ſtraitned by Water or Fire, will leap through the Fire, or catch hold of a naked Sword to preſerve his Life: But they muſt be Fools when there is no ſuch Neceſſity, that will ſuffer their Bodies to be harm'd by Sword or Fire. That late Puiſſant neighbouring Enemy, in reſpect of whom Merchandize was ſo heavily charged, is (God be praiſed for his Mercy) ſo weakned by making War againſt us, that for eighteen Years together he was neceſſitated to offer us a Peace that was

Which may be excuſed becauſe neceſſity breaks Law.

See Aitzma's *Treaty of Peace*

But it is imprudent to continue that Tax for clearing the Seas of Enemies when there is no need.

was ſhameful for him, and glorious for us, before we would grant it him.

And theſe Provinces, that may be accounted to have been formerly unarmed, in reſpect of their preſent condition, as *Groeningen*, *Frieſland*, *Over-yſſel*, *Guelderland*, &c. have always been able to defend themſelves againſt Foreign Force and were very hardly by diſſenſion among themſelves brought to ſtoop to that mighty Emperor *Charles* the 5*th*. So that now there is no ſhadow of Reaſon to believe that being provided for the moſt part by the Mony of *Holland* with Fortification, Cannon, Arms, and Ammunition, they are not now able in a profound Peace to defend themſelves with their own Force againſt the Attempts of a weaker Neighbour. On the other hand it is true, that ſome of them being ſenſible of their own Power, are not concern'd for the uneaſineſs of the *Hollanders* by Sea, nor will they contribute a Penny to eaſe them, but contrary to the Terms of the Union of *Utrecht*, as if that Union were only made againſt the K. of *Spain*'s Attempts by Land, pretending that all Wars, and Robberys by Sea, ought and may be ſufficiently maintained, prevented and defended by Convoy-mony, and conſequently ſufficiently provided for by the Merchants of *Holland*. Whereas nevertheleſs the ſaid *Holland* Merchants, beſides their particular Burdens as Men and Inhabitants, bear all Impoſitions, whereby *Holland* is not only defended by Land againſt all Men, but likewiſe all the other United Inland Provinces; Which in truth hath continued to this day, at the charge of much more Contribution for *Holland*, and much leſs for the other Provinces,

And we in perfect Peace by Land.

Art. 5, 6. ces, than by virtue of the Union of *Utrecht* they are obliged to. So that it is high time for *Holland* to mind her own Advantage, and discharge her self of all needless Expences for these Provinces, and bestow them on her own defence, whereof she hath every way, and evermore occasion by Land, and especially by Sea. For if in truth that Maxim used by the other Provinces be true, That the Sea must maintain it self, and that consequently all means to clear the Seas, and to regain the Merchants loss after such Plundrings by Foreigners, and Damage sustained by Sea, must cause the Rates of Convoy-mony to be rais'd higher in proportion to that necessity; all which must be fetcht from the Merchant. If so, I say, *Holland* must necessarily decay and fall to ruin, considering that by the Constitution of the Trade at Sea, and the many Countrys about us, not only in the *Sound* and *Channel*, but also by the fundamental Government of *Tunis*, *Tripoli*, and *Algier*, they must be for ever pirated on by Sea. For by this Rule it would follow, that *Holland* should always bear its own Burdens, and those of the other Provinces too by Sea, and so in a time of Peace, as well as War, should also bear most of the Charge by Land: And that the others on their parts should wallow in Idleness and Gluttony with the Wealth of *Holland*.

That the Sea must drip or maintain it self, is a very detrimental Maxim for Holland.

Because the Turk *will ever continue his Depredations at Sea.*

Voyage to the Levant, par le Sir des Hayes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIV.

What Profeſſions of the Inhabitants of Holland, *ought to be more or leſs burdened with Taxes, or favoured by the Politick Magiſtrate.*

But if Holland *by a former miſgovernment, muſt be burdened with a yearly paiment of* 15 *Millions of Guilders;*

BUT ſome will perhaps object againſt what I have affirmed, that during the time of the late Monarchical Government in theſe Provinces, and the remainders of it, as alſo when we waged an Offenſive War, and ſeemed to leave our Navigation as a Prey to the *Dunkirkers*, *Holland* was burdened by Mony taken up at Intereſt, and other Taxes to the Sum of fifteen Millions yearly; therefore to rid our ſelves of ſo great a Burden under a free Government, it was neceſſary to levy Mony of the Inhabitants by ſeveral ways and means. And ſecondly it may be objected, That when eaſy or indifferent Levies will not raiſe Mony enough for ſecuring the Country, and Navigation againſt any ſudden Attempt, then we muſt find out other ways and methods which at preſent would be hurtful, but if continued any conſiderable time, would be miſchievous to the State, yea ruin it. And therefore we in *Holland* have very prudentially practiſed all thoſe and no other means and ways of raiſing Mony, but ſuch as are now uſed by the State.

Then no wonder if ſome hurtful ways of raiſing Mony have been uſed, and ſtill be continued.

It will be fit to lay down ſome method in ſuch Caſes of Taxings.

But tho the firſt Objection be true, yet we may doubt whether the ſecond be ſo. Therefore I find it good to examine here what Ways or Expedients are fit to be uſed to procure

cure Mony in ſuch an Exigence, that ſo the Reader himſelf may more exactly judg whether, and when the Magiſtrates of *Holland* have in this particular taken care of the Welfare of the Land in general, or have been neglective of it: And having expreſſed the ſame in as few words as may be, I ſhall afterwards, becauſe of the general Concernment of the thing, conſider more fully, whether all Eſtates of the Inhabitants of this Country can be equally favoured; and in caſe they cannot, which of them ought more or leſs to be cheriſhed and conniv'd at.

Under this head we ought firſt to raiſe Mony by way of Impoſt.

Namely, ſeeing all People do naturally endeavour to diſcharge and free themſelves of Burdens, tho even by burdening of others, or when that cannot be fully obtained, then will they ſeek to eaſe themſelves of that Burden by procuring Partners to bear it: Every one will then immediately judg that we ſhould charge thoſe of Foreign Nations that frequent *Holland*, who are no Members of our Political Body, which we call the State, with all imaginable Taxes, and by all means to eaſe our own Inhabitants, as being true Members of our own Body. But ſeeing we have ſhewn you before, that *Holland* cannot ſubſiſt without Commerce and Merchandiſe with Foreigners, we might by ſo doing take ſuch Methods as would prevent them from coming into *Holland*, to our great prejudice; and therefore we ought to be very wary and cautious about it, eſpecially conſidering, that an extraordinary charge upon thoſe Strangers would not much eaſe us: So that conſequently there is no other way, but to bear ſo great a Burden with as many helpers as we can procure,

procure. And it cannot be denied but we ſhall procure more Supporters, if we charge all Goods with ſome Impoſt that are uſually worn or conſumed by the People as they are Men and Women. *All Wares that are conſumed at home.*

And ſeeing thoſe Impoſts which are moſt freely and ſpontaneouſly paid, are leaſt offenſive and irkſom; we ſhould therefore obſerve this order, *viz.* firſt, and moſt, to charge ſuch Goods as tend to Eaſe, Pleaſure, and Ornament: And then ſuch as no Man can be without, as Meat, Drink, Houſing, Firing and Light, ſeeing Strangers hereby will pay alike with the Inhabitants, and none will be favoured or exempted.

And ſeeing by all theſe Means the ſaid Sum of fifteen Millions cannot be levied, we ſhould then afterwards in taxing the People, ſo charge them, as that all may bear their Parts equally, none excepted. But ſince this is not practicable, but by taxing all Peoples Eſtates to make Men pay alike without diſtinction, or by a blindfold Poll; both which means of raiſing Mony being ſo unequal, and full of hardſhip, do ever cauſe great diſtaſte among the People: we ought therefore to proceed to the charging of ſome particular ſort of Inhabitants, who bring in no Profit to the Country, but on the contrary live upon the other Inhabitants. *And alſo all Inhabitants of* Holland.

And among them are firſt all Inhabitants, who from or on behalf of the State, or Citys, open Countrys, drainers of Water, makers of Dykes, have any benefit of Power, Honour, or Reward, more than other Inhabitants. For ſeeing they may refuſe ſuch Offices, Dignities and Employments, to eſcape thoſe *But eſpecially ſuch as have any publick Imployments and Buſineſs of Profit in* Holland, *excluding others.*

thoſe Taxes, and that we need not give them but to ſuch Inhabitants as are qualified for, and petition to have them; no Inhabitant therefore to evade ſuch Taxes, will need to abandon the Country, nor have any reaſon to complain of a Burden which he annually loadeth himſelf with: and yet by this Expedient much Mony may be raiſed for the common good, without burdening any of the other Inhabitants the more.

And after them all Inhabitants that live upon other Inhabitants.

Next to them ſhould follow ſuch Inhabitants as are Teachers, Artiſts, and their Inſtruments, for ſo much as they are imployed about Matters of Eaſe, Pleaſure, Ornament, *&c.* that are made uſe of in this Country. And after theſe former, all Maſters and Journymen of ſuch Trades who live by our own Inhabitants only; ſuch as Bakers, Brewers, ſellers of Wine and Fiſh, Butchers, Taylors, Shoemakers, Carpenters, Maſons, Smiths, and Glaſiers, *&c.* But in ſuch a caſe it were needful, for the keeping of our Proviſion, and to ſuffer Strangers to live upon us as little as is poſſible, to charge all their Goods or Manufactures imported into *Holland* for Conſumption, ſo high, that our own may go better off than thoſe that are Foreign.

And next them thoſe that live upon our Lands or Fund.

Next would follow ſome Charge or Tax to be laid upon ſuch Inhabitants as live upon our own Lands; ſuch as are our Husbandmen, Graſiers, and Inland-fiſhers, for they will hardly forſake us becauſe of our taxing them, ſeeing they may always be eaſed in better Times.

And ſince all theſe Means of raiſing Mony will burden none but ſuch as are Inhabitants in this

this Country, and while they find their Maintenance amongst us; it is evident that all the said ways for raising of Mony will excite the Commonalty to Ingenuity, Diligence and Frugality, and then they will be easily born.

As also all immoveable Holland Goods.

But in case all these Expedients will not raise Mony sufficient, we may then charge either ordinarily or extraordinarily all immoveable Goods, Lands and Houses, with yearly Taxes, or by Impositions upon Alienations and Inheritances of them; wherein nevertheless there be those Difficultys, that those Taxes will not be paid with any freedom, but wholly by compulsion: And that the said immoveable Goods being for that end to be valued, that Valuation cannot be made without partiality, and these Burdens will be then very unequally born. Besides, that by the accidental unfruitfulness of the Lands, and standing empty of their Houses, the Owners and Tenants of them wanting a great part of their yearly Rent on which they depend for the maintenance of their Familys, they must necessarily suffer these two unavoidable Inconveniences. But seeing all Owners of immoveable Estates who dwell out of the Land must also help to bear these Burdens, without any prejudice to the Estates of our common Inhabitants; and the Owners of Land that dwell in the Country, are so tied to *Holland* by their immoveable Estates, that they cannot but with great difficulty remove their Habitation to other Countrys: This means therefore of raising Mony, may be used without hurting the State.

By Taxes on all moveable and immoveable Goods jointly.

Finally, In an extreme necessity of Mony, there may be impos'd a general Tax on all the move-

moveable and immoveable Eſtates of the Inhabitants, whereby they may pay the thouſandth, two hundredth, and one hundredth Penny: I ſay, in an unuſual great Neceſſity, becauſe by theſe Taxes there would fall a greater hardſhip upon the common Inhabitants, and damage to the State, than could fall by any other Expedient of this nature; for Foreigners would bear nothing of this, but our Inhabitants only. And ſeeing the Aſſeſſors are wholly ignorant of Mens perſonal Eſtates, and what the Inhabitants do owe, or is owing to them; and if they did know the value of them, yet could they not tax them ſo equally as may be done in the caſe of immoveable Goods: We may therefore eaſily ſee, what by favour and hatred, and by ignorance of the Aſſeſſors, eſpecially in the trading Province of *Holland*, where Riches are very tranſitory and uncertain; that there muſt be an intolerable inequality in bearing this Tax. Thoſe that would honeſtly declare their Eſtates might lighten the Tax; but the fraudulent will unavoidably make it heavier. Beſides, many Inhabitants poſſeſſing neither immoveable Eſtates nor Merchandize, but living here on the Intereſt of their Mony, to elude theſe heavy Burdens, may remove to ſome neighbouring Country, to the greater prejudice of this State than if any other of the forementioned Inhabitants ſhould forſake us; for ſuch People frequently drawing their Revenues from other Parts, and ſpending them here, they gain not by our Inhabitants, but they gain by them. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing ſuch Perſons as live on their Rents, are in reſpect of the other Inhabitants

Which notwithſtanding is a very hard and unequal Tax.

but

but few in number, and do not ſet many People at work for a Livelihood, therefore the ſaid Tax may and can be raiſed without any remarkable prejudice to the State.

We ought to be cautious of weakning the four Pillars of our State, viz. Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Freight-Ships.

And it is more eſpecially to be obſerved, that if by reaſon of all theſe Taxes many Inhabitants ſhould forſake *Holland* and ſettle in other Countrys; yet they, or other ſuch Perſons, when the Tax after a while ſhould be releaſed, might eaſily be drawn to return to *Holland*, or others would ſucceed them out of our own Country, ſo long as our Manufactories, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Freight-Ships remain and flouriſh amongſt us: Seeing they are the four main Pillars by which the Welfare of the Commonalty is ſupported, and on which the Proſperity of all others depends, tho they earn not their Living immediately by them. This will not be denied, if we rightly apprehend, that many People are brought into our Country that are Strangers, or were formerly Inhabitants, Teachers, Artiſts, Conſumptioners, Tradeſmen, and ſuch as live on their Rents, becauſe there are many People here that live, or have lived by Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Freight-Ships, and do all of them afford Work, or a Livelihood for the other Inhabitants beforementioned. But that on the other ſide the Manufacturers, Merchants, Fiſhers, and Owners of Ships let to Freight, will not return from Foreign Lands to theſe Parts, or be invited hither becauſe there are, or have been in *Holland* many Teachers, Artiſts, Conſumptioners, Tradeſmen, and Men that live on their Rents, ſeeing theſe do ſet to work or employ the foreſaid People, and have their greateſt

greateſt Profit from Foreign Parts, at leaſt not from theſe laſt mentioned People that are Natives.

But nevertheleſs upon an urgent neceſſity thereunto preſſing, we ſhould charge them leaſt.

But ſuppoſing the general Neceſſity of levying Mony to be ſo great, that we could not raiſe enough by all the forementioned Taxes, or could not find out any Expedient to raiſe the ſame but what were prejudicial; ſo that to defend the Commonwealth, or preſerve our Body Politick againſt ſome formidable Enemy, we ſhould be ſo put to it, as to tax the abovementioned Pillars of the Land, and be pinch'd in our chiefeſt means of Livelihood for a ſhort time, in hope that ſuch urgent and preſſing Neceſſitys will ſoon have an end, and that then thoſe Taxes will be taken off; and doing thus, we may both ſecure our Country, and our Eſtates: Let us then ſee what Order we are to take in purſuit of this Method. And in the firſt place to expreſs my ſelf clearly, by the words *Manufacturers*, and *Fiſhers*, I underſtand all ſuch as live by any Trade in or about Fiſhing, making, tranſporting, and ſelling of our *Holland* Manufacturys and Fiſherys. And by the word *Traders*, I mean, all ſuch Merchants that ſell nothing by retail; but ſuch as trade ſolely, whether at home or abroad, in all or any Commodities, except *Holland* Manufactures, and Fiſherys, and ſuch as depend on them. And by the word *Owners of Ships*, I underſtand no other Owners than ſuch as ſet Ships to Sea, either for our own Service, or for other Merchants upon Freight.

And now to come to the matter in hand, we ought well to conſider, that we muſt lay the leaſt Tax upon that means of Subſiſtance

ſtance which moſt concerns us, and which we are apt ſooneſt to loſe, and being loſt is not eaſily retrieved, and which might beſides draw away with it other Trades or means of Subſiſtance. So that ſeeing in *Holland* there are ſix hundred and fifty thouſand Inhabitants who are maintained by Manufactures, and ſuch as depend on them, and thoſe Manufactures are not certainly fixed to us, ſince we cannot furniſh our ſelves with the unwrought Materials of them from our own Country, but from other Parts; yea the greater part of them being eaſily carried by Land, may be made, carried, and ſold in Foreign upland Countrys. And if this ſhould happen, our Merchants and Owners of Freight-Ships would be oblig'd to remove and betake themſelves, either to them, or to the Countrys and Sea-Harbours next to them; and if we ſhould once loſe thoſe Manufactures, and that our Merchants and Owners of Ships ſhould go over to another Country which affords thoſe Materials for the making of them, they would probably never return to us. Wherefore it appears that we muſt charge them little or nothing, and the rather, ſeeing our Manufactures are already charged with Impoſts on the Conſumption, much more than our Fiſherys, Traffick, and Freight-Ships.

The Manufactures.

And ſeeing our Fiſherys, by the propinquity of the Coaſts, where Haddock, Cod, Herring, and Whale are taken, are more fixed to us, and always will be ſo than to moſt other Countrys; and that by our over-taxing them, we have neglected and diſregarded them, they may poſſibly return to us again

The Fiſherys more.

if we eaſe their Charge, conſidering our convenient Situation; whereby it appears that we ought to tax them ſooner, and more than our Manufactures: Nevertheleſs ſeeing there are four hundred and fifty thouſand People employed in the Fiſherys; and the loſs of the ſaid Fiſherys to our Merchants and Owners of Ships, would give them occaſion to remove into thoſe Countrys where the ſaid Fiſherys might be eſtabliſh'd: It appears therefore that we ought not inconſiderately to charge our Fiſherys too much.

Traffick yet more.

But for as much as it cannot be apprehended, that while *Holland* preſerves her Manufactures and Fiſheries, ſhe ſhould loſe all her Traffick in Foreign Manufactures, Fiſherys, and other Merchandize, and that this Traffick does not at moſt maintain above one hundred and fifty thouſand People in *Holland*: It therefore again appears, that we ought ſooner, and more to charge thoſe Trafficks than our Manufactures and Fiſherys. Yet ſeeing thoſe Trafficks being removed into other Countrys, our Owners of Ships might firſt ſend their Ships thither, and many of themſelves follow after: It likewiſe appears, that we ought to charge that Traffick leſs than the Owners of Ships.

And ſeeing the Owners of Freight-Ships inhabiting theſe Provinces do receive incomparably more advantage from our Inland Manufactures, and our own Fiſherys and Trade, than any Foreign Owners of Ships can do; yea, for as much as there be no Supporters of the Countrys Proſperity, but what are Servants to our Manufacturies, Fiſherys, and Traders: It is not therefore imaginable that we

we can loſe them ſo long as we can preſerve our Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Traffick; ſo that the ſaid Ships may be charged ſooner, and more than Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Trafficks. Yet ſince thoſe Ships lie for Freight in Foreign Countrys, and there raiſe Mony from Strangers, they may in ſome meaſure be eſteemed a ſupport of our Proſperity; and ſince there may poſſibly be fifty thouſand People maintained that way, and that by their being charged too much our own Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Traffick, for which we are moſt concerned, might in ſome meaſure come to ſuffer at long run: We ought not therefore to proceed inconſiderately to the charging of them. Tho we ſhould loſe our Freight-ſhips, yet we ſhould not therefore loſe our Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Traffick; but on the contrary, by their means, and by leſſening the Taxes at any time, the Freight-ſhips would eaſily be induced to return to *Holland*. We know that heretofore in *Flanders*, *Brabant*, and *Holland*, many Inhabitants were maintained by Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Traffick, when the *Eaſterlings* were the only Carriers and Mariners by Sea: As alſo that the ſaid Owners of Freight-ſhips were for the moſt part gradually compelled by our Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Traffick, to forſake thoſe *Eaſterlings*, and to ſettle in *Holland*. And we ſtill find every day, not only that our Owners of Freight-ſhips are ſervicable to the Manufacturers, Fiſhers, and Traders of other Countrys; and to that end ſend their Ships from one Harbour to another, to tranſport their Goods at a price agreed on; but alſo that there are always Strangers here, who

And the Part owning of Shipping moſt of all.

As appears by many Reaſons.

for the ſake of our Manufactures, Fiſheries, and Traffick, by reaſon of ſome Freedom and Privileges they have above us, either in their own Countrys, or in their Voyage, do come and enter their Ships for Freight amongſt ours.

And as theſe 4 Pillars of the Country's Proſperity may be more or leſs charged;

So that it being now ſhewn at large what Eſtates of our Common Inhabitants ought moſt or leaſt to be charged with Impoſts, in order to levy fifteen Millions of Guilders yearly, we may from the ſame reaſons in ſome meaſure calculate upon all occaſions which of the Inhabitants ought to be moſt or leaſt favoured by the Magiſtracy, and conſequently I ſhould finiſh this Chapter: But ſeeing the Welfare of the Inhabitants moſt certainly depends on the good Maxims of the Rulers in that matter, I ſhall enlarge ſomewhat more upon of it.

So in all Events the Rulers ought to favour them proportionably.

Altho Civil Rulers are very well termed Fathers, and the Subjects their Children, yet herein is the difference, that Parents do indulge and take equal care of their Children to their utmoſt power, or at leaſt ought not to favour one to the prejudice of another, and in no caſe to ruin one Child to provide for others, tho better Children: And that contrariwiſe the Politick Governours making up with the Generality one Body Politick, which we call the *State*, muſt ſhew more or leſs Favour, yea Hurt and Ruin, to ſome who are more or leſs profitable, or pernicious to the State. As for Inſtance, thoſe that commit Theft and Murder, *&c.* who are puniſhed with Death or otherwiſe, for the good of the reſt, and to deter them from committing the like Evils.

From

From which it follows; *Firſt*, That all Inhabitants, none excepted, ought to be favoured more than Strangers, as much as is proper. Yet ſo that none be favoured, who by any Imployment can earn their living by others their fellow Subjects, to the prejudice of thoſe by whom they procure their Bread: Becauſe in ſuch a caſe it would be fooliſh, that thoſe who depend upon any thing ſhould be favoured to the prejudice and ruin of that very thing whereon they depend. And beſides, it is neceſſary that we always remember to favour moſt, and conſequently preſerve in *Holland* ſuch Inhabitants, who can with more eaſe than others get their Livings in other Countrys, and tranſport themſelves thither.

Namely, firſt the things themſelves before their Dependencies.

Secondly, It follows by the ſaid Maxims, That all Inhabitants who ſeek their Profit and Livelihood from other Countrys, ought more to be favoured than thoſe who in this Country live on their Fellow-Inhabitants.

2ly. *The Foreign before the Inland Traders.*

Thirdly, It follows from hence, That ſuch Inhabitants, who by their Gains acquired by Foreign Countrys contribute moſt to the ſubſiſtence of the Inhabitants, and conſequently of the State, ought moſt to be favoured; but with this Caution, That the Maſter ſhould be more favoured than the Servant; and our Merchants who traffick in our own Manufactures, and Fiſherys in Foreign Countrys, above all others who are employed about the making or taking of the ſame. All which being well conſidered, it unanſwerably appears that the Politick Rulers of *Holland* ought leaſt of all to favour Strangers with any Power or Privilege, and conſequently more and more to favour the inhabiting Mechanicks, Maſters,

3ly. *The Maſters ever before the Servants.*

Journeymen, Teachers, Artiſts, Conſumers of any Goods in the Land, Husbandmen, Graſiers, Inland-Fiſhers, ſuch as live on their Eſtates, Owners of Ships, Merchants, Fiſhermen, and finally almoſt all ſuch Inhabitants who are employed about Manufactures ſpent in Foreign Parts.

Eſpecially to erect Colleges of Perſons according to the proportion, that are intereſted for themſelves.

And altho ſome may object, That the ſaid Advantages and Diſadvantages cannot be procur'd or avoided, unleſs, as aboveſaid, the High and Subordinate Government conſiſts of ſo many Rulers and Magiſtrates, that none of them could benefit himſelf to the prejudice of the Community: Yet it is very well known, that any violent Change in the Welfare of the common Inhabitants of *Holland*, would at leaſt much ſooner ruin the beſt and moſt uſeful Subjects, than improve them. And conſequently it ought to ſatisfy the lovers of their Country, if the Rulers and Magiſtrates take ſo much care that the ſubordinate Colleges of Polity, Treaſury and Juſtice, about the Manufacturys, Fiſheries, Trade and owning of Ships, be ſo formed, that ſuch Perſons as are employed therein, be moſt intereſted in the Proſperity of Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Freight-ſhips, and conſequently leaſt in any other way of ſubſiſtence; becauſe otherwiſe every one will to the prejudice of others, tho they ought more to be tendered as more profitable, draw the Water to his own Mill, and lay his Burden on another Mans Shoulders. So that there ought to be among the Directors that are the Superintendents, or have the overſight of Manufactures, at leaſt, as I conceive, four for foreign Conſumption, two to overſee the ma-

About Manufactures.

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king of ſuch Manufactures, one over the Inland-Conſumption, and one over the Service depending on thoſe Manufactures. As for Example, Among the Directors for the Woolen Cloth-Trade, there ought to be four Merchants dealing in Cloth, two Clothiers, one Draper, one Dyer or Cloth-worker, *&c.* Likewiſe among the Directors concerning our Foreign Fiſherys, there ought to be in proportion at leaſt four Merchants that trade in thoſe Commoditys, two over the ſetting out of the Veſſels and cauſing the Fiſh to be taken, one over the Inland-Conſumption thereof, and one over the Fiſhing it ſelf. And if the Rulers of theſe Lands, or any Citys thereof in particular, were inclined for preſervation and increaſe of Traffick in general, to erect a Common Council with Authority to make Statutes and Laws relating thereunto; then ſuch a Council ought to be form'd after this proportion, *viz.* of twenty four Merchants dealing in *Holland* Manufacturies, ſixteen Merchants in *Holland* Fiſherys, ſix Merchants in other Commoditys which belong not to our Manufacturies and Fiſherys, and at moſt but two Owners of Ships, becauſe ſuch Owners and the Maſters of Ships in that quality are for the moſt part Servants to the others, and depend on them, and without them are of ſmall conſideration. And if among the Judges or Commiſſioners ſet over the making of Manufactures, Fiſherys, Aſſurances, Maritime Affairs, *&c.* there ſhould be ſome intereſted Perſons, it is evident, that in all ſuch Colleges the ſame proportion ought to be obſerv'd, that in caſe Partiality ſhould take place among the Judges, the Loſer ſhould at

Fiſherys.

Eſpecially a College or Merchant-Court for Trade.

Elſe private Intereſt will be ſought againſt the common Good:

120
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leaſt have this Comfort in his Misfortune, that his Loſs would tend to the benefit of the Community, in advancing Manufacturies, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Freight-Ships: whereas otherwiſe the Trouble of ſeeing himſelf diveſted of his Livelihood, and Goods, by undue Orders, and unjuſt Sentences, and all to the loſs and detriment of the Commonwealth, would be intolerable.

As appears by the Directors of the Levant *Trade, who are generally concern'd in Ships let to Freight.*

And that this may appear not to be ſpoken at random, let us pleaſe to remember that *Roelof Martinſon Vygeboom* of *Horne*, a Shipmaſter, or the Owner of the Ship called the *Emperor Octavianus*, having in the Year 1663, ſuffered his Veſſel laden by the *Turkiſh* Emperor's Subjects, to be taken for a Prey by ſome Ships of War belonging to *Malta*, *Legorn*, and *Venice*, for which they paid him a very great Freight; the ſaid Emperor of *Turkey* required of *Livinus Warnerus* our Reſident at *Conſtantinople* ſatisfaction for the ſame: He by his Faintheartedneſs, Treachery, or Covetouſneſs, made a promiſe within three Months and fifteen Days, to pay the *Turks* ſeventy eight thouſand four hundred and forty five Lyon Dollars for Satisfaction; and that the ſaid Sum might the ſooner be obtain'd, the ſaid Reſident commanded, and thereupon the Conſul ordered, that not only all *Holland* Ships ſet out to Freight ſhould be ſeized in all the Havens of the *Levant*, which hath ſome glimpſe of Equity in it, but alſo all the Goods of the Innocent *Holland* Merchants, who were conſtrained to pay that Mony for their Redemption. It is eaſily imagined that this happened, becauſe the Reſident and Conſul knew that the Directors of the *Levant* Trade living

See the Judicial and Political Conſiderations of the Turkiſh *Avenie, printed* 1663.

 in

in *Holland*, were moſtly concerned in the Ships let out to Freight that uſe the *Levant*, that it would have been very ill taken by them, and that they might have ſat on the Skirts of the Reſident and Conſul, if their Ships had been ſeized for that reaſon. We afterwards ſaw the ſtrength of this particular Intereſt clearer in *Holland:* For theſe Merchants who were unjuſtly forced to lay down this Mony, and being to be diſcharged, the ſaid Directors, who give their Advice to the States-General in many Caſes, laid down in this particular no Expedient, nor any thing like it, whereby to procure this Mony to the leaſt loſs of the Land, or charging themſelves or other Owners or Maſters of the *Levant* Ships; no, nor to charge themſelves together with the Merchants; but on the contrary, have totally freed the ſaid Owners and Maſters of the ſame, and to the greater prejudice of the Country, yea, and the ſpoil of our Manufactures, charged one *per Cent.* upon all Goods outward and inward, not excepting *Holland* Cloth, raw Silks, and Yarn, making together two *per Cent.* So that the States following their Advice, Traffick and Manufacture will be for ſo much imprudently charged to perpetuity, ſince the ſaid oppreſſive Tax will hardly ever be releas'd. And if we add hereunto, that all other Traffick of the common Inhabitants of the Provinces, that is not under the Tuition or Care of ſuch Directors, being driven into Countries where our Conſuls reſide, the Maſters and Owners of each Ship going or coming in, muſt pay to the Conſul a certain Fee for his Conſulage. But that the ſaid Directors of the *Levant* Trade, for as much as they

Who have favoured theſe freight Ships more than the Holland *Manufactures and Traffick;*

Bringing the Charge of the Reſident and Conſuls Avenies, &c. on all our Manufactures and Traffick:

they are Owners of Ships, have caſt that burden from off their own Shoulders, and laid it upon our own Merchants, yea on our Manufactures and all manner of *Levant* Wares, without diſtinction of Clothes, Grograin Yarn, raw Silk, *&c.* going or coming to or from the *Levant*, to the benefit of the Reſident at *Conſtantinople*, and the Conſuls that reſide in thoſe Havens on the behalf of this State, charging them with 1½ *per Cent.* being together, going and coming, three *per Cent.* which upon ſo rich a Trade makes up a Princely Revenue, and Royal Maintenance. And altho the ſaid Reſidents and Conſuls take their Reward of the *Holland Levant* Merchants, and having no other Buſineſs to diſpatch but the Concerns of their Traffick and Navigation, ought to have remembred, that they being only clothed with a Character of the State, the better to effect the ſame, and for no other end, unleſs for Order and Decency, are really and indeed but Miniſters of the *Levant* Merchants, and ſo muſt continue, ſeeing they have at the Port of *Conſtantinople* in effect not any the leaſt buſineſs of State to negotiate, as Peace, War, Alliances, Aſſiſtance, *&c.* between the reſpective States. Nevertheleſs this ſhadow of their Monarchical Adminiſtration, and aſſuming an Authority, and taking example by the Miniſters of Monarchs, who likewiſe reſide there: adding hereunto, that this too great Income for Citizens of a free Commonwealth, hath all along raiſed in them a Monarchical Pride, and beſides occaſions oftimes other heavy Taxes, and continual Quarrels againſt the ſaid *Holland* Merchants, who are not willing nor able to endure ſo chargeable

And that by cutting too large Thongs out of others Leather;

Whereby the Reſidents and Conſuls carry it as if they were Lords over the Levant *Merchants.*

Which miſmanagement may ſoon ruin the Levant *Trade*

able and oppressive a Power, which will destroy our important *Levant* Trade in a short time.

Let none object, that all that Mony is not exacted to the Rigor, nor comes into the Residents and Consuls Purse; for they enjoy most of it, and the Factors charge their Principals with it, insomuch that this considerable *Levant* Trade, and our Manufactures depending upon it, by this prejudicial Management of those chargeable Residents and Consuls, and by five *per Cent.* unnecessarily charged, and without any reason to favour and clear the Owners and Masters of Ships, tho they cause more Troubles in those Parts than the Merchants themselves, and also in other respects are subject to them, and consequently have more occasion of our Residents and Consuls Advice than our Traders, and are the cause of their much greater Charge.

So that you may see by what I have said, that if the Courts of Justice relating to the Fisheries, Manufactures, Traffick, Insurances, and Maritime Affairs, are no better ordered according to the Maxims of *Holland*'s Prosperity, whereof I know none as yet: Then certainly our Manufactures, Fisheries, and Traffick in this Country, being too little favoured, and too much oppress; and that all concerned therein having any difference with their Labourers, Servants, Messengers, Letter-Carriers, Ship-Masters, or Owners of Ships, they have great Reason ever to comply with them, or to fear a mischievous Verdict or Sentence, tho their Cause be Just and Good. For since we cannot bereave Judges of their human Nature, we ought in such Cases

So that we may expect the like Inconveniencies from all other ill reformed Colleges.

Caſes to expect that they will take more care for themſelves, or their Friends, than for the Publick Good.

And thus by degrees I am come down to matters of Juſtice about Traffick, whereof I purpoſe to ſpeak more at large.

CHAP. XXV.

The Antient State of Juſtice in Holland *and* Weſt-Frieſland *being here related, it is likewiſe at the ſame time ſhewn, that the Laws and Order of Juſtice ought to be framed for the moſt Advantage of Traffick.*

IT is well known that the *German* Emperors drove out of theſe Lands the *Normans*, and according to their Cuſtom divided the Provinces among twelve or thirteen Lords their Favourites, making one of them the Earl, who, as the *Emperor's Stadtholder, was to govern this Country with the Aſſiſtance of the ſaid Nobility, without Souldiery. And in caſe of War, if he and theſe Noblemen, and common Inhabitants, were not able to defend themſelves againſt a foreign Power, he was to be aſſiſted by the Duke of the next adjacent Mark-Lands, who was always arm'd, and had 12 Earls under him, and at his diſpoſal.

Purſuant to this our Earls, with conſent of the States of the Land, framed and appoint-

* Tanquam Cæſaris Præſidem ejus Provinciæ. *Annal. Douſæ.*

ed

ed all the Laws or Orders over the whole Province; and their reſpective Dykegraves, Bailiffs and Schouts, with their Counſellors, Homagers, Judges, and Sheriffs, made all peculiar Laws and Ordinances for the reſpective Waters in the Country, open Lands, Villages, and Cities, and omitted not in their Laws to expreſs the Puniſhment and Fines which the Offender was to ſuffer or pay. And moreover, our Earl had power, with all other Earls, as being chief Judg himſelf, or by Bailiffs and Judges depending on him, and in his Name, to give Sentence and Judgment between the Inhabitants. It is obſervable, that all Criminals, who had forfeited their Lives, were to forfeit their Eſtates alſo, and that all Confiſcations and Fines came to the Earls, or to the Bailiffs and Schouts, who for that end held their Offices by Farm. And to the end that thoſe miſerable Subjects might undergo Trial before the Judges that were Parties; we are to take notice, that our Earls following the ungodly Maxims of Monarchical Government in adminiſtring Juſtice, ſtood much upon the enlarging of their Power and Profit, and but very little on the welfare of the common People: for they empowered theſe Bailiffs and Schouts, according to their Will and Pleaſure, to take cognizance of all Crimes and Offences, whether really committed or not, to favour or proſecute all the Inhabitants, without Appeal to any but the Patron, *viz.* the Earl. And tho it was very neceſſary for the Gentry, common People, and Citizens, the better to obtain juſt Sentences, to appoint upon all occaſions a very great number of Judges, and to give them a Liberty, with-

Relation made of the State of Juſtice, as in the times of the Earls of Holland, *who were Sovereign Lords.*

'Tis ſhewn how defective and tyrannical it then was,

without reſpect of Perſons, to vote with Balls or otherwiſe privately: Or if few Judges were appointed in thoſe Courts and Places of Juſtice, with command to vote publickly, that then at leaſt thoſe Bailiffs, Schouts and Judges at certain times being complained of, were obliged to give an account of their Actions before a very great number of them. Yet our ſaid Earls upon all, yea the moſt weighty Occaſions, would place no more but here and there an *Azing*, or five or ſeven Judges in the open Country, and about ſo many Sheriffs or Aldermen in the Cities; obliging them, whether in Criminal or Civil Cauſes, ever to deliberate or vote openly in Preſence of the Earl, his Bailiffs or Scouts, and to give no Account or Reaſon to any but himſelf for what they acted.

By reaſon of the paucity of Judges;

By which Form of Juſtice, the Earls and their Bailiffs and Schouts might favour or oppreſs all the Inhabitants, under pretext of adminiſtring that ſacred Juſtice to which they were ſworn. For they could give what Sentence they pleaſed by reaſon of the paucity of Judges, which they were fain to comply with, if they would hold their annual Employments, and eſcape the Reſentment of their ſaid Lords. And when at beſt the ſaid Earls, Bailiffs, and Schouts did not concern themſelves with the matter in queſtion, if one of the Parties, whether Plantiff or Defendant, were favour'd or hated by the Judges, and the other not, then in ſuch Caſe, * an upright Sentence was ſeldom paſſed.

And their paſſing Sentence as the Earls and their Bailiffs and Schouts pleaſed.

* Quia Favor aut Odium in Judice plus valet quam optima Lex in Codice.

And

And tho ſince that time, by the abjuration of the Government of Earls, and eſpecially ſince the death of the late Stadtholder of *Holland*, the greateſt occaſion of Favour or Hatred in reſpect of Judges and Sheriffs, and conſequently the greateſt occaſion of unrighteous Sentences, either in greater or leſſer Affairs, was taken away; yet nevertheleſs the Bailiffs and Schouts in regard of the common People, and eſpecially in Criminal Affairs, hold their former Power and Reſpect. By which remainder of that Tyrannical Government by Earls, the Inhabitants may be very much oppreſſed upon this account, becauſe the Judges and *Scheepens* being continued in their former ſmall number may be miſled, unleſs we ſhould ſuppoſe them to be deveſted of their humane Nature, and not to be mov'd by their familiarity with, or hatred of the ſaid Bailiffs and Schouts, or by the Bribes, and Love or Hatred of the Plaintiff or Defendant; and becauſe no further Appeals, or Account is to be given to higher Powers at appointed Times and Places, upon the complaint of any Perſons thereunto impowered, and likewiſe becauſe they are not obliged to ſuffer any Puniſhment in caſe of Error.

What little Amendment hath been for the Publick Good ſince theſe times, about Matters relating to Juſtice.

But becauſe I purpoſe more eſpecially to conſider our Adminiſtration of Juſtice, as it tends to the benefit and increaſe of our Fiſhery, Manufactures, Traffick and Freight-Ships, I ſhall paſs over all theſe common Defects and Faults in other Matters of Juſtice, and purſue my Aim and Purpoſe in this only.

But my aim being chiefly at Trade, I ſhall ſhew,

Next

Next to the perfect Freedom of the People, and the more or leſs taxing and favouring the ſeveral Trades or Eſtates of the People of *Holland*, it is neceſſary that Juſtice be equally adminiſtred againſt all open Violence which may be acted in the Land: which ſeeing it would be hurtful, not only to the Merchants of our Manufactures, and Fiſherys, and Traders in Foreign Commoditys, together with the Owners of Freight-Ships, but alſo to other Inhabitants, both Subjects and Rulers; ſo that no Aſſembly, or Body of Men whatever, without ſecuring themſelves againſt it, can poſſibly ſubſiſt; there is of antient Times an Order of Juſtice appointed, tho very defective. But tho Fraud (whereby we may wrong a Man of his Due as well as by Force) ought not to be leſs puniſhed, and that Merchandizing depending eſpecially on the Probity of Men, yet by falſe Deceit may be perfectly ruined; it is therefore to be wondered at, that *Holland* hath been able to preſerve its Traffick, as it muſt here be carried on with ſo many Laws, or by the help of Laws derived from the Maxims of the Warlike *Roman* Republick, which give the Merchants here an opportunity to gain more by Fraud than by honeſt Dealing. And on the other hand, here is ſo little care taken by good Orders and Laws to defend the honeſt Merchant againſt the Fraud and Deceit of thoſe who bear the Name of Merchants, and to help them to recover their own; that we may well ask the Reaſon, Why all the bad People of Foreign Countrys come not into *Holland*, that under pretext of Merchandizing they may openly learn

How detrimental deſigning Bankrupts are,

And how little proviſion is made againſt them.

learn to cheat in the beneficial way now ſo much practiſed, and that with impunity? For, * 'tis the Rod makes the Children good. Now to eſtabliſh ſome better Order in this, it would ſeem needful, that none ſhould be ſuffered to drive any Traffick in *Holland*, till firſt he hath entered the Place of his Abode in a publick Regiſter, which would have this effect. Firſt, That the Parents and Kindred of the ſaid Merchant, if they have not made a contrary Entry in the ſame Regiſter within a Year, ſhall not be allowed by any laſt Will and Teſtament, to leave to the ſaid Merchant a leſs Legacy than without a Will they might, to the prejudice of his Creditors: Moreover, it ſhall not be lawful for any Merchant, eſpecially a Bankrupt, in any caſe to refuſe any profitable Bequeſt or Legacy. For this he cannot be ſuppoſed to do but in order to defraud his Creditors; and for that reaſon he ought to be prohibited legally to alienate any Eſtate, ſave for a gainful Title, and that he hath receiv'd the Value of it beforehand. I underſtand hereby, that if he happen to be a Bankrupt afterwards, all his Donations, Conveyances and Portions given for Marriage, or Eſtates bequeathed or conſigned to his Children, ought to be applied to the benefit of his Creditors. For we ſee here too often the Truth of this *Engliſh* Proverb, *Happy is that Son whoſe Father goes to the Devil.*

What Order might be taken to prevent it.

Which comes in here.

And as it ought to be unlawful for a Mer-

* Oderunt peccare mali (quales omnes natura ſumus) formidine pœnæ.

And Settlements before Marriage.

chant to endow his Wife with a Marriage Jointure to the prejudice of his Creditors, so ought the Wife to be prohibited to covenant to have her Option of part in Profit or Loss: For there is nothing more rational than that he * who will have the Profit, must bear the Loss. Yea, the Parents, and neareſt Kindred of such a Wife, ought to demean themselves in all things in respect of Inheritance, as the Relations of the Husband himself: And excluding Community of Estate, or the bringing in of engaged Estates, they ought to be entred in the publick Register.

The ordinary Register or Books of Accounts of such Merchants who are in Reputation for Honesty, and corroborated by Oath, ought in all respects to be equivalent to any Notars Acts, and nothing ought to be preferred to it except special Mortgage; seeing the Custom of the Country is such, that to prefer Orphans, Rent, or Jointure, *&c.* to be first paid, is prejudicial to Traffick, and consequently to the whole Republick. But if at any time it be found that a Merchant hath falsified his Books or Register, and confirmed them by Perjury, he ought then in all respects to lose his Life as a false Coiner, that all Men may be terrified by so severe a Punishment, not to enrich themselves falsly and treacherously with other Mens Estates, to the prejudice of the Commonwealth.

A Debt-book under Oath ought to be a sufficient ground for an immediate execution.

Yea, it seems to me that Traffick, and the Accounts of a credible Merchant, is of so much concernment, seeing the Constitution of the same is such here, that it neither al-

* Quem commoda, eum incommoda sequantur.

lows

lows or permits of any other Evidence: That therefore upon the ſaid Regiſter alone confirmed by Oath, there ought immediate Execution to be taken as for Mony due to the State. For if Traffick is with us *ſalus Populi*, the Country's Safety, what reaſon can there be of not uſing the like Means *(pari paſſu)* as the State doth?

Vindications and Evictions.

It is alſo very prejudicial, that a Sale ſhould be counted for ready Mony, when after delivery of the Goods the Mony is not immediately paid. For when the Seller gives up his Right of the Goods by truſting of the Buyer, he gives ſuch knaviſh Buyers great Opportunitys of making great Bankrupts: And he who on the other ſide by his Imprudence is in the greateſt Fault, does afterwards by his unjuſt Vindication or Proſecution for his Goods, take away the Eſtate of the other Crditors.

Preſent Juſtice by a Court-Merchant is very neceſſary.

There ought in each City to be at leaſt one particular Court of Juſtice to decide Matters between Buyer and Seller, that ſo ſuch Suits may not only be ſpeedily ended, but that the Judges apprehending the way of Trading the better, may give or adminiſter the better Juſtice and ſound Judgment for the Land: Whereas the Merchants now find, that their Suits cauſed by difference in Accounts, are almoſt never ended but by Agreement of the Partys when they grow weary of the Law, and that moſtly to the benefit of the unrighteous Caviller, according to the Proverb, *The Cavillers are gainers.*

But the Beneficium Inventarii *is detrimental, as are*

It is very unreaſonable and prejudicial to the Merchant, That the Eſtate of one deceaſed ſhould be ſuffered to have *Beneficium Inven-*

Inventarii, the Right of making an Inventary of the Eſtate, when the common Creditors will become his Heirs; * ſeeing the Creditors muſt bear the loſs if the Eſtate falls ſhort of their Debts, they ought to reap the Profit when there is more: Whereas otherwiſe thoſe unmerciful greedy Heirs by that courſe of Juſtice, in the firſt caſe they caſt off the Burden from their own backs, and in the ſecond caſe they carry away the Profit.

Letters of Ceſſion, or Attermination.

And no leſs hurtful are Letters of Ceſſion, or Attermination, renouncing the Eſtate, and gaining of Time. And ſince no Perſons are proſecuted by the Publick for particular Debts, it is reaſonably to be preſumed, that the Creditors will not prejudice themſelves by taking over-rigorous Courſes with any Perſon that cannot really pay, but is willing to do it; nor to bereave them of their good Name, and drive them into Extremities. But on the contrary, a diſhoneſt Man having concealed and made over his Eſtate, will enrich himſelf, and ſeek eaſe, by delivering up his whole Eſtate upon a falſe Oath.

On the contrary, it would be profitable for the Commonwealth, if upon the leaſt Complaint of a Debtor's non-payment, they ſhould forthwith make him give in Security; or in caſe of refuſal, to keep him and his Books of Account in cloſe Ward. For in caſe he ſhould then ſhew himſelf able to pay, he might ſoon be releaſed upon Security; and being unable, we ſhould be able to prevent

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* Secundum naturam eſt commoda cujuſque rei eum ſequi, quem ſequentur incommoda.

his

his running away, and his giving in a falſe Account of his Debts, and his thieviſh making over and abſconding his Books and Eſtate. In all ſuch Events, it ought to be lawful to impriſon knaviſh Debtors, with their Wives and adult Children, by Publick Authority, and to keep them in a publick Workhouſe, to make them earn their own Bread, according to the Law of *Moſes*, and the *Roman* Laws of the Twelve Tables. Yea and in caſe the wickedneſs of eminent and great Debtors be aggravated by foul and knaviſh Circumſtances, we ought, according to the Proclamation of the Emperor *Charles* in the Year 1540. to uſe them as we do Thieves for Burglary, hang them on a Gallows, without ſuffering in any wiſe, as now it often happens, that ſuch Bankrupts remain dwelling among us, and continue driving their Traffick under another's Name; according to the Proverb, * *Let him pay with his Perſon, that cannot pay with his Purſe.*

What ſevere Puniſhments are neceſſary againſt deſign'd Bankrupts. Viz. *To deprive them of their Liberty.* Exod. 22.

Or take away their Lives.

But in caſe the Bankrupt be fled with his Books and Eſtate, without the Juriſdiction and reach of *Holland*, and is protected by the Civil Authority of that Place; I ſhould think it convenient for the benefit of *Holland* to proceed thus. Firſt, By virtue of a general Law, all ſuch Perſons ought to be proſecuted as publick betrayers of their Country, amounting to as much as † being guilty of High-Treaſon; the rather, ſeeing ſuch a villanous Bankrupt hath no leſs need of help

* Qui non habet in ære, luat in pelle.
† Læſæ Majeſtatis reos.

to carry on his wicked Deſign, than to betray his Country: At leaſt he cannot ſo have conceal'd Matters, but that the Accomptants and Caſhiers, his Men-ſervants and Maid-ſervants muſt have ſome knowledg of it; and therefore they ought all of them to be apprehended, and if upon examination it were found that they had aſſiſted in conveying away ſuch theiviſh Bankrupts, it were good to examine them upon the Rack more ſtrictly if there were cauſe of ſuſpicion of the thing; or elſe upon their Oaths according to the occaſion. For if the Rack be of any good uſe, it muſt be in caſes whereon the Proſperity of the Country depends, and where it's known there muſt be Aiders and Aſſiſters in ſuch groſs Knaverys.

And all Creditors and Debtors ought to be oblig'd by Laws and Publications,

We might alſo at the ſame inſtant publickly proclaim throughout the whole Land, that whoſoever hath any Eſtate of, or ows any thing to the Perſon ſo fled, ſhould immediately diſcover it, on pain of being puniſhed as betrayers of their Country, and concealers of that Villany: and all perſons ſhould forthwith be examined upon Oath who are ſuſpected to know any thing of it; declaring by promiſe, That all thoſe who ſhall uprightly purge themſelves, ſhould be accounted men of Probity, altho they had formerly aſſiſted in that Wickedneſs; and if otherwiſe, they ſhall at all times be proceeded againſt and puniſhed as perjured betrayers of their Country, when by a third Perſon it ſhall come to be known.

To bring in all their Claims, whether to the benefit or charge of the deficient Eſtate.

And all ſuch as claim, and pretend to any thing of the Fugitive's Eſtate, ought alſo to be oblig'd immediately to lay claim to it upon great Penaltys, whereby two very great Evils would

would be prevented; for seeing * no Man becomes wicked to the highest degree all of a sudden, therefore all such who were lately possessed of the Estate of such Bankrupts, and consequently had not used or imployed it as their own, should immediately bring in the same: The rather that while the Act was fresh, they could not arrive at so exact a knowledg of their Estates and Books as they might afterwards, by the seizing and examination of the Offenders and their Associates. And,

2*ly.* All those that pretend to any thing of the Bankrupts Estate, being also ignorant of what might come to be known of his Condition, and whether there were any appearance at any time of compounding with him, should be necessitated to give in their real Debts: Whereas we see now, that all such Estates are grasp'd by dishonest Persons in such a manner, that there is seldom any thing left for the honest Creditors, because People may conceal all Debts with impunity, and on the other side, may enlarge their Pretences after they see the Matter brought to an issue.

This being done, the Bankrupt ought to be summoned in on a certain prefixt Day and Hour, in which time the Creditors ought to have leave absolutely to compound with him, and to stop their Proceedings at Law. But if the Bankrupt neither appears nor agrees, he ought to be hanged *in effigie* on a Gallows, and all his Children Old and Young declared Infamous.

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* Nemo repentè fit pessimus, aut fuit turpissimus.

By all which means jointly applied, many deſigned Bankrupts would be prevented.

If all theſe Particulars could take effect immediately upon the freſh Act, and before People could have laid aſide the ſhame of ſuch a new piece of Knavery, I judg it would be of great influence to make Men honeſter: Whereas now they learn by degrees, That it is better to have other mens Eſtates than none at all; and * that we can ſpend another Man's Eſtate with much more Pleaſure than our own. Having overcome all ſhame, Men can live eaſier and quieter in an infamous condition than to trouble themſelves about Points of Honour, and pay ſo dear for them too. But ſeeing in all theſe Proſecutions the Benefit of the Creditors ought to be aimed at, ſince it is purely an endeavour to make the moſt of it for them, therefore they ought to be enabled after that time to agree with their Creditors, and to annul the Sentence; for *fiat Juſtitia & pereat mundus*, becomes a Judg's Mouth very well; for they not being Sovereigns, are for the ſake of their Honour, Oath, and Office, bound to judg by the Laws, and not contrary to them: wherein if they fail, they are in all well ordered Republicks to be complained of, and puniſhed. But the Proverb does not at all become wiſe Politicians, where *Salus Populi*, and not the Peoples Ruin, muſt be the ſupreme or higheſt Law.

And likewiſe better Agreements made with fugitive Bankrupts.

And ſeeing we ought on the one ſide to compare theſe Fugitives, and baſe and unworthy Cheats, to thoſe vagrant and thieviſh Drones among the Bees, which by all means ought to be kept out of the Land, or to be purſued and

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* Qu'il n'y a chere, que de gens a l'arriere.

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deſtroyed: ſo on the contrary we ought to look on all honeſt Merchants, who through want of foreſight, by the Injuſtice or breaking of others, by Storms, Misfortunes, Robberies at Sea, or War, have loſt their own Eſtates, and part of others, and ſo cannot pay their Debts: I ſay, we ought to regard them as profitable Bees with compaſſion, declaring and promiſing them, that all ſuch Perſons, making their Loſſes appear, and not withdrawing themſelves from Juſtice, ſhall reſerve, and hold to their own uſe the tenth part of what they had to begin to trade with at firſt, and not be troubled at all by their former Creditors, and may remain in good Name and Fame with their Children, tho they had enjoyed great Portions or other Gifts, as being a righteous Fruit of their uprightneſs, and a Comfort in their Adverſity. But ſeeing between theſe miſchievous Thieves, and their Children, and theſe unfortunate Loſers who are much to be lamented, there is no difference either in Puniſhment or Infamy, it cauſeth many who otherwiſe would be honeſt, through neceſſity to ſtep out of the honeſt way, and to take ill Courſes. For if Opportunity makes a Thief, Neceſſity does it much more.

There ought to be given to an honeſt, tho inſolvent Merchant, a reaſonable allowance.

But ſuppoſing all uſeful Laws were made for the Benefit of Traffick and Navigation, and the inferior Judges were well inclined to cauſe them to be put in execution, nevertheleſs as things now go in *Holland*, they may for the moſt part be made of none effect by appealing to a higher Court. For as our Courts of Judicature conſiſt not of above 10 or 12 Judges, ſo they cannot hear and give Judg-

Our Courts of Juſtice ought to conſiſt of many Counſellors.

Judgment at more than one Bench, and much leſs have their Underſtandings exerciſed to comprehend all Differences that occur, whereby the Suits, becauſe of the great number and trouble of them, remain depending there almoſt to perpetuity, and at laſt are all of a very uncertain iſſue. To redreſs which it were neceſſary, that the number of Judges ſhould be ſo encreaſed, that for ſome particular Caſes there may be ſome appointed out of that number, who according to the weightineſs of the Cauſes may bring in and report the ſame in full Court, to have Sentence pronounced upon them. By theſe means quicker and better Juſtice would be adminiſtred, not only among the Commonalty, and eſpecially the Merchants; but likewiſe among all other the more eminent Inhabitants, whether Secular or Eccleſiaſtic, who might be minded to promote Treaſon or Sedition, would be deterred by ſo conſiderable a Court, that is accountable to none but their lawful Sovereigns, that is, the Aſſembly of the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, and would carefully watch againſt ſuch villanous practices as abovementioned, which now, *impunitatis ſpe*, by the length of Suits, and ſlow Juſtice, are but too frequent.

That might give more diſpatch, and paſs juſter ſentences.

And might be a Terror to all ſeditious and traitorous Perſons.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVI.

That it would be very advantageous for the Rulers and People of Holland, *and for Traffick and Commerce, as well as Navigation, to erect* Dutch *Colonies in Foreign Countries.*

BUT ſuppoſing all the Expedients before-mentioned, to attract or allure Foreigners to become Inhabitants of *Holland*, were practiſed, and thoſe Inhabitants made to ſubſiſt by due adminiſtration of Juſtice, yet would there be found in *Holland* many old and new Inhabitants, who for want of Eſtate and Credit, live very uneaſily, and therefore would deſire to remove thence. It is evident, firſt, as to Perſons and Eſtates, that the Inhabitants here are not only expoſed to the ordinary Misfortunes of Mankind, of not foreſeeing future Events, Weakneſs, and Want; but beſides, they make very uncertain Profit by Manufactures, Fiſhing, Trading, and Shipping. And on the other ſide, by Sickneſs, Wars, Piracies, Rocks, Sands, Storms and Bankrupts, or by the unfaithfulneſs of their own Maſters of Ships, they may loſe the greateſt part of their Eſtates, while in the interim they continue charg'd with the natural burdens of *Holland*; as great Houſe-rent, Impoſts and Taxes: nor have they any reformed Cloiſters to provide creditable Opportunities for diſcharging themſelves by ſuch Loſſes of maintaining their Children, or according to the Proverb, to

In all Countrys there will ever be found many diſtreſſed Perſons,

Thro the uncertain Profit, and certain Taxes born by the Inhabitants:

to * turn Soldier or Monk; ſo that by ſuch Accidents falling into extreme Poverty, they conſequently loſe their Credit and Reſpect among Men: for to † have been rich is a double Poverty, and nothing is leſs regarded than a poor Man's Wiſdom; in ſuch Caſes he would find himſelf in the moſt lamentable Condition that can befal a Man in this World.

As alſo by the Oligarchical Government.

And 2*ly*, as to Reputation: It is well known that in this Republick, the Government conſiſts of very few Men in proportion to the number of Inhabitants, and that the ſaid Government is not by Law annexed or reſtrained to any certain Family, but is open to all the Inhabitants: ſo that they who have been eight or ten Years Burgers, may be choſen to the Government in moſt Cities, and have the moſt eminent Employments of *Scheepen* or Burgomaſter. Whence we may infer, That many that are the Ofspring of thoſe that were heretofore made uſe of in the Government, and alſo many others, who by reaſon of their antient Stock, and great Skill in Polity and extraordinary Riches, through natural Self-love and Ambition, conceive themſelves wronged, when other new ones of leſs fitneſs and Eſtate, are choſen to the Government before them; and therefore thinking themſelves undervalued, ſeek a Change, and would be induced to tranſport themſelves to other Countries, where their Qualifications, great Eſtate and Ambition might produce ve-

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* Deſperatio facit Militem aut Monachum.

† Divitem fuiſſe duplex paupertas.

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ry good Effects. Whereas on the other ſide, whilſt they continue to dwell in theſe Lands, they ſpeak ill of the Government and Rulers in particular. And if by this, or any other Accident, Tumults ſhould be occaſioned againſt the Rulers in particular, or the Government it ſelf, they being Perſons of Quality, might become the Leaders of the Seditious, who to obtain their end, and to have ſuch Inſurrections tend to their Advantage, would not reſt till they had diſplaced and turned out the lawful Rulers, and put themſelves in their Places, which is one of the ſaddeſt Calamities that can befal the Republick, or Cities: Seeing * Rulers, who became ſuch by Mutiny, are always the Cauſe of horrible Enormities before they attain the Government, and muſt commit many Cruelties e'er they can fix themſelves on the Bench of Magiſtracy.

Which Malecontented Inhabitants might occaſion great Evil to the Land.

And ſeeing we have already made many Conqueſts of Countries in *India*, and finding how hardly (and that with great Charge of Souldiers) they muſt be kept; and that the Politicians of old have taught us, that there is no better means, eſpecially for a State which depends on Merchandize and Navigation, to preſerve foreign Conqueſts, than by ſettling Colonies in them: We may eaſily conclude that the ſame Method would be very uſeful and expedient for our State.

Thirdly, It is well known, that the pooreſt People of all the Countries round about us, come to dwell in *Holland* in hope of earning

Eſpecially becauſe the pooreſt People come into Holland *from the adjacent Lands.*

* Res dura, & Regni novitas me talia cogunt, *&c. Virg.*

their

their living by Manufactury, Fiſheries, Navigation, and other Trades; or failing that, that they ſhall have the benefit of Almshouſes and Hoſpitals, where they will be better provided for than in their own Country. And altho in this manner very many poor People have been maintain'd, yet in bad times it could not laſt long; but thence might eaſily ariſe a general Uproar, with the plunder, and ſubverſion of the whole State: To prevent which, and other the like Miſchiefs, and to give diſcontented Perſons and Men in ſtraits an open way, the Republicks of *Tyre*, *Sidon*, *Carthage*, *Greece*, and *Rome*, &c. in antient times, having ſpecial regard to the true Intereſt of Republicks, which were perfectly founded on Traffick, or Conqueſts of Lands, did not neglect to erect many Colonies: Yea even the Kings of *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *England*, &c. have lately very profitably erected divers Colonies, and continue ſo doing in remote and uncultivated Countries; which formerly added an incredible Strength to thoſe antient Republicks, and do ſtill to *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *England*, &c. producing beſides their Strength, the greateſt Traffick and Navigation. So that it is a wonderful thing that *Holland* having theſe old and new Examples before their Eyes; and beſides by its natural great Wants, and very great Sums of Mony given yearly for Charity to poor Inhabitants, and being yearly preſt by ſo many broken Eſtates, and want of greater Traffick and Navigation, hath not hitherto made any free Colonies for the Inhabitants of *Holland*; tho we by our Shipping have diſcovered and navigated many fruitful uninhabited,

So that we ought to give thoſe Malecontents, and over-taxed People, ſome vent by Colonies.

Whereunto Holland hath had a fair Opportunity;

habited, and unmanured Countries, where, if Colonies were erected, they might be free, and yet ſubject to the Lords the States of *Holland*, as all the open Countries, and Cities that have no Votes amongſt us are: And it might cauſe an incredible great and certain Traffick and Navigation with the Inhabitants of *Holland*.

It is well worthy Obſervation, that theſe Colonies would no leſs ſtrengthen the Treaſure and Power of the States in Peace and War, than they do thoſe of *Spain*, *Portugal*, and *England*, which during the manifold inteſtine Diſſenſions and Revolutions of State have always adhered to their antient Native Country againſt their Enemies. And by this means alſo many ambitious and diſcontented Inhabitants of *Holland* might conveniently, *ſub ſpecie honoris*, be gratified, by having ſome Authority in and about the Government of the ſaid Colonies. But ſome may object, that heretofore the Rulers of *Holland* in the reſpective Grants or Charters given to the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-India* Companies, have given them alone the Power of navigating their Diſtricts, with excluſion of all other Inhabitants, which extend ſo far, that out of them the whole World hath now no fruitful uninhabited Lands, where we might erect new Colonies; and that thoſe Diſtricts are ſo far ſpread, becauſe our Rulers truſted that the ſaid Companies could and would propagate and advance ſuch Colonies: tho ſuppoſing thoſe Colonies muſt indeed in Speculation be acknowledged ſingularly profitable for this State, yet nevertheleſs thoſe reſpective Diſtricts and Limits, bounds of the ſaid Companies, were purpoſely extended ſo far

And yet would have, in caſe the Eaſt *and* Weſt-India *Companies would make uſe of them*;

far by the States General, and eſpecially by the States of *Holland*, effectually to hinder the making of thoſe Colonies, ſince our Nation is naturally averſe to Husbandry, and utterly unfit to plant Colonies, and ever inclined to merchandizing.

Who neither will nor can trade in all the Countries under their Diſtrict.

To which I anſwer, That it's likely the firſt Grants or Charters, both of the *Eaſt* and *Weſt*, and their copious Diſtricts, were probably made upon mature deliberation; but that the Rulers perceiving afterwards how very few Countries the ſaid Companies do traffick with, and what a vaſt many Countries and Sea-Ports in their Diſtricts remain without Traffick or Navigation, they cannot be excuſed of too great imprudence in that they have, notwithſtanding the continuance of ſuch Diſtricts to this day, kept their common trading Inhabitants conſiſting of ſo great numbers from thoſe uninhabited Countries by our Companies: So that by reaſon of the want of trafficking Countries, or new Colonies in little *Europe*, and its Confines, the *Hollanders* are neceſſitated to overſtock all Trade and Navigation, and to ſpoil and ruin them both, to the great prejudice of ſuch Merchants and Owners of Ships on whom it falls, altho *Holland*, during that time of their Trades being overſtock'd, had a greater Commerce, and deterred the Traders of other Countries from that Traffick which the *Hollanders* with the firſt appearance of Gain do, and muſt reaſſume, if they will continue to live in *Holland*; where all manner of foreign Trade ſince the erecting of the ſaid Companies, was neceſſitated to be driven, notwithſtanding the uncertainty of Gain, and fear of over-trading our ſelves.

While the Holland *Merchants being too narrowly confin'd in* Europe, *all cry out for more trafficking Countries or Colonies.*

And

And that the ſaid Companies neither have, nor do endeavour to make new Colonies for the benefit of the Lands, and the Inhabitants thereof, hath hitherto abundantly appeared, and we muſt not lightly believe that they will do otherwiſe for the future; which, I ſuppoſe, will alſo appear, if we conſider, that the Directors from whom this ſhould proceed, are advanc'd, and privately ſworn to promote the benefit of the Subſcribers of the reſpective Companies: So that if the Colonies ſhould not tend to the benefit of the Subſcribers in general, we cannot expect the Companies ſhould promote them; yea ſuppoſing ſuch Colonies ſhould tend to the greateſt profit of the ſaid Subſcribers in general, yet ſuch is the common Corruption of Man, that thoſe Plantations ſhould not be erected unleſs ſuch Directors or Governors can make their own Advantage by them.

But thoſe Companies encline not thereto, becauſe the Directors of them can thereby reap no Profit,

And ſeeing all new Colonies in unmanured Countries, muſt for ſome Years together have Neceſſaries carried to them till ſuch Plantations can maintain themſelves out of their own Product, begin to trade and go to Sea, and then there is ſome ſmall Duty impoſed on the Planters and their Traffick or Navigation, whereby the Undertakers may be reimburſed: Yet the Partners having expended ſo much, are not aſſured that their Grant or Leaſe of Years ſhall be prolonged and continued to them on the ſame Terms. Moreover, in regard of theſe new Colonies, the Directors ought therefore to have leſs Salary, ſeeing by this free Trade of the Planters and Inhabitants, they may be eaſed of the great pains they take about their general Traffick and Equippage of Ships, which

Nor yet the Participants.

concerns them much in particular, for many conſiderable Reaſons, not here to be mentioned.

And as concerning our People in the *Eaſt* and *Weſt*, they being hitherto of ſo looſe a Life, are ſo waſteful, expenſive, and lazy, that it may thence ſeem to be concluded, That the Nation of *Holland* is naturally and wholly unfit for new Colonies; yet I dare venture to ſay it is not ſo: but certain it is, that the Directors of the ſaid Companies, their Mariners and Souldiers, and likewiſe their other Servants are hired on ſuch ſtrait-lac'd and ſevere terms, and they require of them ſuch multitudes of Oaths, importing the Penalty of the loſs of all their Wages and Eſtate, that very few Inhabitants of *Holland*, unleſs out of mere Neceſſity, or ſome poor ignorant ſlaviſh-minded and debauched Foreigners, will offer themſelves to that hard ſervitude. It is alſo true, that all ſuch as are in the *Indies*, eſpecially the *Eaſt-Indies*, do find, that not only while they ſerve, but after they have ſerved their time for which they are bound, they are under an intolerable compulſive Slavery; inſomuch, that none can thrive there but their great Officers, who being placed over them, to exact the Oaths of the Mercenaries or Hirelings, and to put in execution the Companies Commands, and being without controul, to accuſe or check them, they commonly favour one another, and afterwards coming home with great Treaſures, are in fear that they will be ſeized and confiſcated by the Directors. He that will be further convinced hereof, let him but read the following Placaet, or Proclamation, which was, and is yearly to be publiſhed at *Batavia*.

The worſt ſort of Foreigners that yield to the hard Slavery of the ſaid Companies, are not fit for Colonies.

THE

By the yearly Placaet published at Batavia, *it is Ordered,*

THE *Governor General, and Council of* India, *to all that ſhall ſee, hear, or read theſe Preſents, Greeting. Know Ye, That whereas the Directors of the General* Netherlandiſh Eaſt-India *Company ſettled by Patent, at the Aſſembly of Seventeen, for divers good Conſiderations, have found it uſeful and neceſſary that the Orders and Proclamations which we do yearly publiſh, and affix to the uſual Place againſt the time of the Fleet's return to our Native Country, after having firſt explained the Points therein contained, and enlarged others, by ſome needful Additions contracted all into one Placaet, and ſo to publiſh it to the People, to the end that every one, whether in or out of the Companies Service, travelling to the* Netherlands, *may thereby the ſooner and better underſtand by what Rules he is to govern himſelf before he leaves this Country. We therefore, in purſuance of that Order, having contracted all the foreſaid Orders and Placaets (after previous Elucidation and Amplification, as aforeſaid) into one, have found it requiſite, now afreſh to ordain and appoint, and by theſe Preſents we do ordain and appoint, That all ſuch Perſons as intend to ſail to the* Netherlands, *of what State, Quality or Condition ſoever they be, and purpoſe to have any Claim or Pretence upon the ſaid Company, proceeding from what cauſe or thing ſoever, ſhall be obliged to make the ſame known, none excepted, or reſerved, before their Departure hence, unto Us, or our Committees; that ſo having heard and examined the ſame, they may take ſuch order about it as ſhall be found juſt and reaſonable, upon pain that all thoſe that ſhall have neglected or omitted the ſame, ſhall be taken and held to have had no Acti-*

That all Pretenſions on the Company muſt be firſt adjuſted by the Companies own Servants.

on or Pretence at all, and shall for ever be and remain void and of none effect. As likewise none arriving in the Netherlands *unto the seventeen Lords or their Particular Chambers, shall be heard concerning the same, unless they shew our special Act of Reference, which shall be granted if the matter be found of such a nature as is not proper to be decided and determined in this Country. Likewise those that have any Defect or Error in their Accounts, or may have lost the same, are to address themselves to the said Lords Commissioners; who after they have taken cognizance thereof, may provide therein as becometh. Likewise all such Companies Servants or Freemen that desire to receive any Salary here as due to them, are likewise to address to the Lords Commissioners, and declare it to them, that so it may be signified to the Lords our Principals, that we may desire and receive Authority for payment thereof.*

That none may buy or sell any Debt due by the Company.

No Persons being in or out of the Company's Service, of what State, Quality, or Condition soever he be, that either here in India, *or on their Voyage homeward, buy, or sell any Accounts proceeding of Salarys, or Monthly Wages, either for himself or others, or as a Pawn or Pledg of Friendship or Debt, to accept or engage, and make it over, on pain that the Buyers and Sellers, Transferrers and Transferrees, that renounce their Accounts, shall both of them, not only lose their Right and Title to the same, but also the Buyers and Transferrees shall be fined thrice as much as the Ballance of the Account so bought or pawn'd shall amount unto.*

Likewise no Person in or out of the Company's Service, departing out of India, *shall either for himself, or others, take with him any Silver or Gold, coined or uncoined, into his native Country,*

try, or keep it by him; much less may he conceal it, by delivering it to Seamen, Soldiers, or others, whether here on Shore, or upon the Voyage, or lend it out, or put it to Interest, upon forfeiture of all such Mony to the benefit of the Company, where, and with whomsoever the same shall be found. But such as have Mony to spare, may discharge themselves of it at the Chamber of Accounts, that in conformity to the Letter of Articles, they may receive Bills of Exchange for the same.

That none may carry away thence any Mony to the Netherlands, *but deliver it to the Company to receive it by Exchange in* Holland.

Every one is therefore hereby forewarned, That those that will make over any Mony to the Netherlands, *whether he remains in* India, *or travels thither, shall beware of taking other Ways, or Courses, than by the said Chamber of Accounts, to the end they may as aforesaid receive it by Exchange; that is to say, by Means or Assistance of any* European *Nation: and that none remit Mony over to* England, *or elsewhere, either directly or indirectly, on what Pretence soever, under the Penalty, that such who shall be found doing the same, shall besides the loss of his Imployment and Service, and loss of the Salary which then shall be due,* viz. *if he remains in the Company's Service, he shall further forfeit such Sum as shall be proved he paid, or privately made over to any other* European *Nation.*

That none may depart thence, unless they have twelve Months wages due to them.

Moreover it shall not be allowed for any Person, being in the Company's Service, to depart to the Netherlands, *unless he shall have at the least twelve full Months Salary due to him, and that by Original Account, unless he shall have paid the Contents thereof in ready Mony into the Chamber of Accounts here, upon Exchange, to be repaid him by the Company in the* Netherlands.

Those that go home, are to sell their immovable Estates,

Those that purpose to depart to the Netherlands, *shall before such departure from hence, sell all their moveable and immoveable Estates, as Houses, Gardens, Lands, and Pedakkens, none excepted; whether they were sold publickly, or privately; and pay the Proceed thereof into the Chamber of Accounts aforesaid, to be made good in the* Netherlands; *upon pain that the Offender shall immediately forfeit all his Right to the said Goods to the Company's use.*

Likewise those that are entrusted with the Administration and Disposal of any immoveable Estates, whereof the Proprietors are departed hence, shall be bound to sell the said Goods, and turn them into Mony before the departure of the next returning Ships, and to bring the Proceed thereof into the Chamber of Accounts, to receive the same by Exchange as aforesaid, upon pain as aforesaid.

And pay for the Freight of their Persons 300 Guilders.

The People that are free, and not in the Company's Service, and disposed to return to the Netherlands, *whether single, or with their Familys, shall before their departure from* Batavia, *pay for their Freight and Transportation Mony, at the General Chamber of Accounts as followeth,* viz. *For all Men and Women, being twelve years of Age and upwards, three hundred Guilders; and those under that Age, one hundred and fifty Guilders: And besides for their Diet, for Men that are accommodated in the Great Cabin, thirty Stivers; those in the Round House, eighteen Stivers; and those before the Mast, nine Stivers* per diem. *The Women that are above twelve years of Age, and eat in the Cabin, twenty Stivers; in the Round-house, twelve Stivers; and before the Mast, nine Stivers* per diem: *So that no Person, whether Man or Woman, being either above or under twelve years of Age, Children in-*

For their Diet in the Great Cabin, 30 Stivers per Diem.

For Diet in the Roundhouse 18 Stivers, and before the Mast 9.

included, shall pay any less than nine Stivers a day. The said Paiments shall be made for the time of six Months, and accordingly they shall have Receipts thereof. But yet under this Condition and Promise, that if any such Person should happen to die in the Voyage, there shall be restored at the East-India *Chamber in the* Netherlands, *whereunto that Ship goes consigned, to the right Heir, or Executor,* &c. *of the Deceased, so much of that Sum as shall be in proportion to the Mony paid, to be accounted from their departure hence to their death.*

And seeing that notwithstanding our repeated Prohibition, not only the said free People, but even the Company's Servants, with their Wives, Widows, and others that are of their Family, do carry over much Houshold-stuff, and other bulky Goods for their own Provision, and other uses, in the Company's Ships, and do thereby greatly pester them. All such Goods therefore that are no Merchandize (seeing they ought in no wise to be carried with them, and that they ought to be seized by the Company for their use without any favour shewn, whether they be found out in the Road, or on the Voyage, or discovered in the Netherlands) *shall be declared and mentioned by Inventory before their departure, and going on Board; that after they have been visited and valued by our Commissioners thereunto appointed, they may pay for Freight at the rate of two thousand Guilders for each Last, being estimated or rated by Bulk or Weight; which accordingly is to be paid at the Chamber of Accounts. Which Inventory being signed by our Commissioners, with the Receipt of having paid the Freight, and being shewed to the Lords our Principals in the* Netherlands, *such Goods being no Merchandize as aboveſaid, shall be delivered unto him; but upon*

That none may carry off any Merchandize; but for Freight of their Houshold-stuff, must pay 2000 Guilders per Last.

pain that all ſuch Goods not mentioned in the Inventory ſo taken with him, ſhall be, and remain confiſcate to the ſaid Company's Uſe. All this being intended and ſpoken of the Company's Servants for ſo much as pertains to the Merchandize of ſuch exceeding three months Wages, which they are allowed to carry with them by the Letter of Articles which they carry along with them.

None may carry any Indians *with them.*

And for as much as it hath ever been prohibited to carry hence into the Netherlands any Black native Indians, whether Free, or Bond, Men or Women, as the Lords States General have likewiſe by their Proclamation prohibited to bring the ſame into their Dominions: We have hereby once again thought fit to interdict, and prohibit all Perſons to tranſport any ſuch Native Blacks, whether Men or Women, from this Place, or to conceal them on board Ships, and that (for as much as it may concern the Servants of the Company) upon forfeiture of all the Wages which ſhall be due to them on their Voyage homeward; and for free People, upon pain of forfeiting one thouſand Guilders: and this, over and above the Tranſportation and Diet-mony of ſuch Blacks for the Sum beforementioned, which at their arrival in the Netherlands ſhall by the Maſter of ſuch Natives be made good to the Company in the ſaid Netherlands; with condition alſo, that beſides the former Sums, the ſaid Blacks being willing to return to the Indies, ſhall pay in the Netherlands the like Sum for Tranſportation and Diet-mony, as before is ſpecified. Provided nevertheleſs, That in caſe any one for good Reaſons ſhould deſire to take with them a Black Nurſe for his Child or Children, and it being granted, ſuch Perſon ſhall be bound to pay into the Chamber of Accounts her Diet-mony at 30 Stivers per diem for the time of ſix

Months,

Months, allowing her for the same to have her Passage back again gratis *out of the* Netherlands.

And to the end that none may pretend ignorance of any the Premises herein mentioned, we have published this our Ordinance after the Ringing of the Bell at the publick and usual Place. We therefore charge and command the Advocate Fiscal of India, *the Bailiff of this City, and all other Officers of Justice, to take care strictly to observe the same, and to proceed against all Offenders and Transgressors without favour, connivance, dissimulation, or forbearance; for we have found the same to tend to the Service of the said Company. Given at the Castle of* Batavia *upon the Island of* Java Major, *the* — &c.

By this account no Colonies can be made there.

So that it is no wonder that so few good, and so many ignorant, lazy, prodigal and vitious People take Service of the *East-India* Company. But it is doubly to be admired that any intelligent, frugal, diligent and vertuous People, especially *Hollanders*, unless driven by extreme necessity, should give up themselves to that slavish Servitude.

The Hollanders *are naturally inclined and fit to erect new Colonies.*

All which being true, let none think it strange, that the Scum of *Holland* and of most other Nations, having by their Service become Freemen there, and yet not permitted to drive any Trade by Sea, or with Foreign People, are very unfit, and have no inclination at all to those forced Colonies, and do always thirst after their own sweet and free Native Countrys of *Holland:* whereas notwithstanding on the contrary, the ingenious, frugal, industrious *Hollanders*, by those Virtues which are almost peculiar to them, are more

more fit than any Nation in the World to erect Colonies and to live on them, when they have the Liberty given them to manure them for their own Livelihoods. And thoſe that doubt hereof, let them pleaſe to obſerve, that the *Hollanders*, before and ſince theſe two Licenſed Companys, even under Foreign Princes, have made very many new Colonies, namely in *Lyfland*, *Pruſſia*, *Brandenburgh*, *Pomerania*, *Denmark*, *Sleſwick*, *France*, *England*, *Flanders*, &c. And moreover, have not only manured unfruitful unplanted Lands, but alſo undertaken the chargeable and hazardous task of draining of Fenlands. And it is obſervable, that in all the ſaid places, their Butter, Cheeſe, Fruits and Product of the Earth, are more deſired, and eſteemed than thoſe of their Neighbours. And if we farther obſerve, that no Countrys in the World, whether the Land be for breeding, or feeding, are ſo well ordered as thoſe of our plain Lands in *Holland*; and that no other Boors or Husbandmen do travel ſo many Countrys as ours do; we ſhall be convinced, that no Nation under Heaven is ſo fit for ſetting up of new Colonies, and manuring of Ground as our People are. And if in our Nation there is alſo to be found (which however is unjuſtly and unwiſely denied by the oppoſers of theſe new *Holland Colonies*) a very great aptneſs and inclination to Merchandiſing and Navigation, then we may in all reſpects believe, that we under our own free Government might erect very excellent Colonies when it ſhall pleaſe the State to begin and encourage the ſame on good Foundations, and to indulge them for a ſhort time with their Favour and Defence.

Fitter than any Nation of the World.

Having

Having ſpoken thus far of the true Political Maxims to be obſerved concerning the Inhabitants, I ſhall here conclude the Firſt Part of my Treatiſe.

The End of the Firſt Part.

The

The True Intereſt, and Political Maxims of the Republic of *Holland* and *Weſt-Friezland.*

PART II.

Of the Intereſt of Holland, *in relation to Foreign Princes and States.*

CHAP. I.

That an open and free Navigation ought carefully to be kept and defended, againſt all Pirats and Enemys. How this may be put in practice; and after what manner heretofore it has been done or omitted.

Moſt Merchandize being Imported and Exported from Holland *to Foreign Parts;*

HAVING in the Firſt Part of this Treatiſe ſeriouſly conſidered and repreſented the true Intereſt and Maxims of the Republic of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, relating to their Affairs at home, I ſhall now enquire how the Welfare of their Inhabitants may be ſecur'd with reference to Foreign Powers. And tho very many Particulars

culars do here again preſent themſelves to my Thoughts, which are of weight, and deſerve mention; yet I ſhall lay down but few, and thoſe the moſt important.

And whereas in the preceding Book I have ſhewn, that the far greater part of things neceſſary to our Manufacturers, Fiſhers and Traders, are imported from Foreign Parts, either upon Carts, and Rivers, or elſe by Sea in Ships let out to freight, and that they muſt again tranſport moſt of them, manufactur'd or unmanufactur'd, by the ſame means beyond the Seas: It neceſſarily follows, that the High-ways, Rivers, and Seas, muſt by all means be kept free and open, for the conſtant uſe and conveniency of the Inhabitants. Yet becauſe the High-ways and Rivers in this reſpect are of leaſt concernment, and ſo much in the Power of other Princes, that the ſecuring and clearing the ſame cannot be expected from the Governors of *Holland*, I ſhall therefore ſay nothing more of them. But ſeeing the Seas are of ſo great importance to this end, that the Council of State in their Requeſt for a Supply in the Year 1643. did repreſent, That the whole State of the *United Provinces* depends on the guarding and clearing of the Seas; that other things without this, would be but as a Body without a Soul, and a Land without Inhabitants, &c. And that the *Hollanders* alone do navigate the Seas more, and have more to loſe on them, than all their Allys and other People of *Europe* put together. And moreover, ſeeing the Seas are ſo common for all Men to navigate, that they are always infeſted by Pirats and Enemys, and may be and are alſo cleared by our

Aitzma's *Hiſt.* b. 22. p. 463.

Bentivoglio Relat. lib. 1. cap. 7.

our Governors, and free Paſſage given for Ships and Fiſhers, and ſo kept and maintained; I purpoſe therefore to treat largely and cloſely of this Matter.

And our Fiſhers trading there, and our Ships that ſail North-Eaſterly and Weſterly, being moſtly of no defence;

'Tis well known that our Fiſhers of Haddock, Doggers, Sailers of Buſſes, and *Greenland* Men, fiſhing at certain Times and Places, do always meet with Sea-Robbers, and Enemys Ships of War; and that they, and the *Northern* and *Eaſtland* Ships, yea, and our Salt and Wine-Ships, bringing bulky, cheap, and low-priz'd Goods, are not able to bear the Expence of well manning and arming their Ships to repel ſuch Robbers and Enemys. And tho it cannot be denied, that our *Spaniſh*, *Italian*, and *Levant* Ships, are often freighted with ſuch rich and profitable Goods, that they may well be ſo mann'd and arm'd as to defend themſelves againſt the ſmaller ſort of Pirats; yet the Riches which they carry, invite whole Fleets of ſuch Men of War to lie in wait for ſuch Ships; and this falls out the rather, and will always ſo happen, becauſe the Baſſas of *Tripoli*, *Tunis*, and *Algier*, muſt pay the *Turkiſh* Janiſaries under them out of their own Purſes; or if they failed, would certainly be ſtrangled by the mutinous Souldiery. So that to procure that neceſſary pay, they always collect by force of Arms, the fifth part of the growth of the Country, and permit them to go to Sea as Free-booters, with condition to allow them the Moiety of all the Ships, and the eighth part of all the Goods they take in the ſame.

And the Turkiſh *Pirats ever infeſting the* Straits Mouth, *and* Mediterranean;

This being certain, it follows naturally, that the *North*, *Belt*, and *North* Sea, as alſo

ſo the Channel being continually fiſhed and navigated by vaſt numbers of our unarm'd and undefenſible Ships, ought of neceſſity to be wholly freed from ſuch Robbers and Enemies by our Governours. And becauſe the great *Spaniſh* and *Mediterranean* Seas are likewiſe navigated by few rich Ships of Force, it is by all means adviſable to Convoy our ſaid Merchant Ships with Ships of War to defend them from thoſe *Turkiſh* Pirates; but it would by no means be convenient to free the *Mediterranean* of them, for we ſhould thereby reap no more Profit than the *Eaſt-landers*, *Engliſh*, *Spaniſh*, and *Italians* do, who by that means, and other Advantages, might eaſily deprive us of our Traffick and freight Ships, and poſſibly drive us out of our whole Navigation; becauſe the greateſt *Eaſtern* Traffick depends on the Conſumption of the *Eaſtern* Commodities in the *Weſtern* Parts: all which Nations nevertheleſs through want of ordinary Convoy-ſhips, do not traffick ſo much in thoſe Parts as we do, and would trade leſs if it were ordered that none of the Captains of our Convoy-Ships ſhould take Mony to protect and defend any foreign Merchant Ships under their Convoy, or ſuffer them to ſail in their Company: ſo that if we ſhould leave this thorn of the *Turkiſh* Pirates in their Sides, they will be ſufficiently diſtreſs'd both in that and all their other Trade, whilſt we by thoſe ordinary Convoy Ships of War, may wholly engroſs all the *European* Traffick and Navigation to *Holland*.

Therefore we muſt neceſſarily ſcour the North Sea from Pirates,

And keep the Mediterranean *clear by Convoys.*

Having thus repreſented how neceſſary it is to keep the Seas open and free for the Inhabitants of *Holland*, and endeavouring now to find

Which will be effected or not, as the Rulers employ'd are inclin'd to it.

find out the means whereby it may certainly be effected, this infallible political Maxim offers it ſelf to my Thoughts, *viz.* When Men would procure or hinder the doing of a thing, the matter muſt be ſo ordered, that ſuch People who are ſo reſolved, may have ſufficient Authority, Power, and Strength to effect or obſtruct the ſame. Whence it unanſwerably follows, that ſeeing our Inhabitants, who live by Manufactures, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Shipping let to Freight, and which are or may be taken at Sea by Enemies, are certainly willing to defend themſelves from ſuch Loſſes, they ought therefore to have ſuch Authority and Strength as may enable them to clear the ſaid Seas. But becauſe every one knows, that ſuch abſtracted Speculations, and general reaſonings in well grounded Political Governments, neither may nor can be practiſed, let the Reader therefore pleaſe to take notice, that I uſe this infallible political Maxim, only to build a ſecond upon it, namely, That ſuch Cities and Countries whoſe Rulers ought to be preſumed to be leſs or more inclined to clear the Seas, ought alſo to have more or leſs Authority and Power in the Polity, Treaſure, Juſtice, and Militia relating to the Seas. And ſeeing Kings, Princes, Courtiers, and Souldiers are frequently Gainers, but never loſers by Goods pirated at Sea, and reap the leaſt Advantages by an open and free Navigation: And on the contrary, moſt of the Inhabitants of the free Republick of *Holland*, whether Rulers or Subjects, may ſuffer great Loſſes by robberies at Sea, and ſubſiſt by the flouriſhing of Manufactures, Fiſheries, Trade, and Freight-ſhips; we may well conclude, that ſuch Governours

vernours muſt be preſumed to be well inclined to keep the Seas clear, and conſequently ought to be entruſted with all that Power and Authority which is neceſſary to effect it, either by themſelves or their Commiſſioners.

And tho in purſuance of this Poſition it ſeems requiſite to ſhew in what manner this ought to be done in every City of *Holland*, and jointly in a way ſuted to the States Aſſembly; I ſhall nevertheleſs (partly becauſe it requires more knowledg than I am maſter of, and partly becauſe I would avoid the great Labour and Odium which might enſue) only touch on the ſeveral ways by which Men formerly endeavoured in *Holland* to clear the Seas, and whether the Inhabitants by building on the ſaid Foundations, or by departing from them, have gained more or leſs.

Whereas before the Year of our Lord 1300, the Cities of *Holland* were few and ſmall, the Government, and conſequently the clearing of the Seas depending chiefly on the Earl and Gentry, who were little concern'd in things of this Nature, and if they had attempted it, muſt have done it at their own Coſt and Charges, we find little thereof in their antient Records; and therefore may ſafely believe, that the *Hollanders* at that time never undertook the guarding or clearing of the Seas.

This Maxim is confirmed, not only by Reaſon, but by Experience: for before 1300, our Earls and Gentry neglected Navigation.

But the Cities of *Holland* ſoon after, by the removal of the *Flemiſh* and *Braband* Manufactures, increaſing daily both in greatneſs and number, and the Inhabitants by that means growing to be much concerned in the free uſe of the Sea, and perceiving that the Earl and Gentry neglected to defend or protect them

But after the Cities were concern'd in it, they took it to Heart, under the mad Earl (ſo called.)

them from Piracy, they agreed with Duke *Albert* of *Bavaria*, as Stadtholder for *William* Earl of *Holland*, for leave to ſcour the Seas themſelves, and to lay that Charge on the Country. And in the Year 1408, when the Seas were infeſted by certain *Eaſt-Frieſland* Pyrates, thoſe of *Amſterdam*, and ſome of the Cities of *North-Holland*, with the Aſſiſtance of the *Lubeckers*, *Hamburgers*, and *Campeners*, ſuppreſſed thoſe Robbers.

M. Voſſius in Annalibus, lib. 15. pag. 126.

Soon after this the *Hollanders* being greatly annoyed by the *Flemiſh* Rovers, complained to Count *William*; yet we read not that he did any thing to prevent it, but ſent them away with this Anſwer, Go you to Sea too, and let others complain of you. The *Hollanders* accordingly went to Sea, and did more hurt to the *Flemings* than they had ſuffered by them; whereupon theſe Sea-robberies ſoon ceaſed. We read alſo that about 30 Years after, in the time of *Philip* of *Burgundy*, Earl of *Holland*, the *Hollanders* loſt to the Value of fifty thouſand Guilders by the *Eaſterlings* upon the Seas, and could obtain no Satisfaction or Compenſation; which cauſed the Cities of *Dort*, *Haerlem*, *Amſterdam*, *Gouda*, *Rotterdam*, *Horne*, *Enchuyſen*, *Middleburgh*, *Veer*, *Fluſhing*, and *Armuiden*, to ſet out many Ships to Sea; with which having beaten the *Eaſterlings* twice, and taken great Riches, they obtained of them in the Year 1441, a very advantageous Peace, and alſo of their Allies the *Spaniards*, *Venetians*, and *Pruſſians*; the other *Netherland* Provinces, who were alſo under the ſubjection of *Philip* of *Burgundy*, not concerning themſelves in theſe matters. And it is alſo true, that the *Hollanders* and *Zelanders* in the Year

The old written Chronicle.

Philip *of* Burgundy.

J. F. le Petit's Chronicle des Pais Bas.

Year 1464, endeavoured without *Philip*'s Consent, to surprize the famous Pirate *Rubempre*, who infested their Coast with his Robberies. And it is observable that no Convoy-mony was in those times ever required of the Merchant for clearing the Seas, but the Expence was born by the Country, or by the Earls themselves, and was constantly deducted from the Subsidies granted to him; nor were there any other except the ordinary Judges to determine of matters concerning Prizes and Goods taken. Phil. de Comines.

All which, except the last, remained constantly in use in the times of the Earls, who were of the House of *Austria*; for the *Eastern* Cities in the Year 1510, making War against the King of *Denmark*, prohibited the *Hollanders*, *Zelanders*, and *Frieslanders*, to trade in those Countries; who not complying, and the *Eastlanders* thereupon taking eight *Holland* Ships, the Province of *Holland* alone fell into an open War with them; which the other *Netherland* Provinces took so little notice of, that the *Easterlings* having at several times during the War taken fifty *Holland* Ships, went to sell some of their Prizes even in *Zeland* and *Flanders*. And tho they were sued there by the Owners, and the Goods restored by the Admiralties as unlawful Prizes, yet 'tis evident that this was obtained rather on the account of Favour than Justice. J. F. le Petit. Cronique.

The Emperor *Charles* the *5th*, in the Year 1531. having recommended Queen *Mary* of *Hungary* his Sister to the Government of the *Netherlands*, and chosen a good Council of State for her, caused these words to be inserted in their Instructions: "That they should *Emp.* Charles V. Borre, lib. 21. p. 7.

" continue to the Cities their former Cuſtoms,
" that in time of Need, and when matters
" can ſuffer no delay, they may ſet out Ships
" of War at the Charge of the Country,
" that ſo they may reſiſt all Pirates and ſuch
" like Enemies of the Commonwealth, and
" take and make prize of them, provided
" that the Puniſhment be left to the Judg-
" ment of the Admiralty. Whereupon in the Year 1532, it hapned, That the *Hollanders*, by Order of the ſaid Emperor, as Earl of *Holland*, put certain Ships into the hands of his Brother-in-law *Chriſtiernus* of *Denmark*, in order to recover his Kingdom, from which he had been expell'd. Upon this the *Eaſterlings* forbidding all *Holland* Ships to paſs the *Sound*, caus'd great Poverty in *Amſterdam*, and the Northern Quarter, without redreſs from the Emperor, or any other Province, till the *Lubeckers*, in the following Year, taking a Ship of *Edam* upon the Coaſt of *Zealand*, the *Amſterdammers*, to whom the Lading belonged, complained at the Court of *Bruſſels*, and obtained a general ſeizure of all the Ships and Goods belonging to the *Lubeckers* and *Hamburgers*, that were to be found in theſe *Netherlands*. For ſeeing, notwithſtanding the Wars with *Holland*, they continually kept their Traffick going in *Brabant* and *Flanders*, they by this ſeizure ſuffered ſo great a Loſs, that immediately a Peace was clap'd up, yet with this Condition, that the *Hollanders* ſhould not aſſiſt King *Chriſtiernus*, nor during the War uſe his Havens of *Norway*.

J. F. le Petit. *Ibid.*

By all this we may eaſily perceive how ſlenderly the free Navigation was then defended or ſecured; and things will never be better in

in *Holland* whilſt Courtiers have any Command there. On the other ſide, we may alſo ſee what ſingular Care the States of *Holland* took on the 26*th* of *Auguſt* 1547. and would always take for a free Navigation whenſoever that Matter ſhould be intruſted to them; for tho their Condition was then low, and the times peaceable, yet they fitted out eight Ships of War for the defence of our Herring Fiſhery, and for their paiment eſtabliſhed that Tax which is called the *Great Impoſt*. And even in the time of that Tyrant King *Philip* the 2*d*, it is evident by the Advice of the Provincial Court to thoſe of the Secret Council, relating to the Admiralty, " That " purſuant to the Privileges, Judgments, and " antient Cuſtoms, the Stadtholders of *Hol-* " *land* uſed to take cognizance of all Matters " pertaining to the Admiralty, and are ſub- " ject to no other Admiral; and that the " Placaet tranſmitted by *Adolph* of *Burgundy* " ought not to take place, till the Stadthol- " der and States of *Holland* were firſt heard " concerning it; and that all the Power gi- " ven by the ſame Placaet ought to be attri- " buted to the Stadtholder; and that Count " *Horn* being appointed Admiral-General " of the *Netherlands* by the King of *Spain*, an- " ſwered thereupon in the Year 1562. That " he deſired firſt to ſee the forenamed Pri- " vileges, and then would give his further " anſwer thereunto.

Semein's Herring Fiſhery.

King Philip 2*d*

But during the Troubles which ſoon after followed, this Affair took quite another courſe. For Count *Horn* the Admiral-General being beheaded, and Prince *William* of *Orange* as Stadtholder of *Holland*, *Zealand* and *Utrecht*,

Pr. William *took care to ſcour the Seas, becauſe he could could not ſubſiſt but by the* proſ-

proſperity of our Inhabitants.

P. C. Hoofd. *Hiſt. p.* 197. P. Borre, *Book 6. fol.* 282.

Utrecht, being in the Year 1568. baniſh'd the Country, and knowing no Expedient to raiſe Men and Mony in order to his return, made uſe of his own Authority, *Anno* 1569. and as Admiral-General gave out Commiſſions to take all *Spaniſh* and other Ships that ſailed without his Commiſſion: And afterwards in *July* 1572. obtained liberty of the States of *Holland* to appoint a Lieutenant Admiral, who by the Advice and Approbation of the Maritime Towns, ſhould make choice of the Captains of the Ships of War: And moreover obtained leave to conſtitute Commiſſioners to take cognizance of Maritime Affairs, who were to receive the 10*th* part of all the Prizes for the Commonwealth, and the 5*th* of that 10*th* part for the Admiral-General.

E. V. Reyd. Hiſt. pag. 15. *in Quarto.*

Whereupon in *October* that ſame Year, the firſt Dutys of Cuſtoms were introduced in *Zealand*; the Government there prohibiting, upon pain of Confiſcation, all tranſporting of Goods to and from the Enemys Countrys, unleſs they paid for each Species as much Duty as they could in any meaſure bear without the loſs of their Trade. In the next Year and Month of *April*, this was imitated, and practiſed by thoſe of *Holland*. And being thus begun, in order to diſtreſs the Enemy and weaken the *Antwerpers*, as well as to increaſe the Trade and Navigation of *Holland* and *Zealand*, it yielded in Cuſtom the firſt year eight hundred and fifty thouſand Guilders: And this pleaſed them ſo in that great neceſſity of Mony for their common and neceſſary Defence, that ſoon after they found it expedient to charge all Goods exported or imported to and from neutral places, ſailing out or com-

coming into theſe Countrys, with Convoy-mony. And tho this tended to the extreme prejudice of the Trade and Navigation of *Holland*, yet there was no Remedy, partly becauſe all *Holland* would otherwiſe have been conquered by the *Spaniſh* Forces; and partly becauſe by the Pacification of *Gent*, *Anno* 1576. Cuſtoms or Licence-mony was to ceaſe, whereby the *Antwerpers* were moſt of all burdened with Convoy-mony.

In the mean time Pr. *William* had on *July* 11, 1575. procured a Power of the States of *Holland* during the War with *Spain*, either in the King's Name, or his own, to command or prohibit any thing as he thought good, both in Polity, Contribution or War, by Water or Land: And on the 25*th* of *April* 1576. by the Union of *Holland* with *Zealand*, he there obtained the like Authority. On the 22*d* of *Sept.* in the Year 1576. the College of Admiralty of *Zealand* was erected, where one *Holland* and ſix *Zealand* Counſellors were to determine by the plurality of Voices all matters that might occur; yet ſo, that the Lieutenant Admiral of *Zealand* ſhould be obliged to obey the ſaid Prince or his Lieutenant Governour Count *Hohenlo* in all things. Which Orders were continued both in *Holland* and *Zealand* to the Year 1584. without any great prejudice to the Inhabitants. For tho the Proſperity of the Country, and clearing of the Seas from Enemies depended merely on the care and will of one only Perſon, and that there was no reaſon to expect they ſhould be employed to the Advantage of the People, but ſo long (and no longer) than it agreed with that Perſon's own Benefit, and tended to the augmen-

P. Borre, B. 8. *pag.* 119.

Book 9. *pag.* 138.

B. 9. *pag.* 164.

tation of his Power: Yet the People of *Holland* and *Zealand* were then very fortunate herein, all the *Netherlandiſh* Havens revolting from the King, we being ſtill permitted to drive our Trade with *Spain*, and very few Piracies being commited: And beſides, the ſaid Prince could not attend, ſupport, and augment his own private Intereſts and Grandeur againſt that great and formidable Power of *Spain*, but in conjunction with the Proſperity of thoſe deſpiſed ſmall Countrys, and their poor Inhabitants; which on that account he endeavoured to promote.

The clearing of the Seas entruſted to Count Maurice *and the E. of* Leiceſter *jointly.* P. Borre, 20. *p.* 85, 86.

Notwithſtanding which, after the death of the ſaid Prince *William*, the States of *Holland* and *Zealand* thought not fit that the proſperity of the Land, and clearing of the Seas, ſhould be wholly in the hands of one ſingle Perſon. For tho they did on the firſt of *November Anno* 1585. make his Son *Maurice* Stadtholder of *Holland* and *Zealand*, and conſequently alſo Admiral of the ſaid Countrys; yet they limited him by his Commiſſion and Inſtructions, commanding him to execute all Affairs relating to War and Polity with Advice and Conſent of the Gentry and Council of the ſaid Countrys, who were to aſſiſt his Excellency, and alſo to conſent to ſuch further Inſtructions as ſhould be given him. And beſides, on the firſt of *Febr.* 1586. they placed *Robert Dudly* Earl of *Leiceſter* above him, as Governour, Captain, and Admiral-General; to whom they added the Council of State, with Inſtructions importing among other things, Artic. 121. and 13. That,

Book 20. Folio 7.

" The Mony proceeding from Convoys " ſhall be every where equally levied, and

" the

" the Charges of ſuch Convoys firſt paid with " the coſt of equipping the Ships of War, " and all that belongs to them, as they were " deſign'd and originally appointed; and that " the ſaid Convoy-mony ſhall not be imploy- " ed to any other uſe than for paiment of the " ſaid Charge, and ſetting out the ſaid Ships " of War; for which end alſo ſhall be added " whatever Sums ſhall proceed from Prizes, " and Cuſtoms, in caſe his Excellency ſhall at " any time think fit, purſuant to the Act of " Conſent agreed on by the States General, " in relation to the matter of Contributi- " on.

" Nevertheleſs, the Citys have and ſhall " continue to have the liberty (as often as " ſhall be found neceſſary) and when the " Matter can bear no delay, to arm themſelves " for the Sea, and ſet out Ships of War at the " Coſt and Charge of the Country, againſt " Pirats and other Enemies of the Common- " wealth, to withſtand, take and ſeize them, " provided the Cognizance and Puniſhment " of ſuch Crimes, with the Ships and Goods ſo " taken, be left to the deciſion and diſpoſal " of the Admiralty, which his Excellency " ſhall chuſe and commiſſionate out of the " Provinces that ſubſiſt by Maritime Traf- " fick. *Placaet Book p. 530.*

Moreover the ſaid Governour and Captain-General declared on the 30*th* of *April* of the ſame Year by Placaet touching the paiment of Convoy and Cuſtom;

" That the States General of the *United* " *Provinces* of the *Netherlands*, to ſupport the " charge of ſetting out ſuch Ships of War " as are neceſſary for the defence and ſecurity " of

" of the foreſaid *United Provinces*, have con-
" ſented, given and put into his hands, the
" produce of certain Impoſitions, and publick
" Revenues, which they have conſented to
" be given, and received for Convoy, upon
" Goods imported into and exported out of
" theſe ſaid Countrys, according to the Book
" of Rates already made, or to be made;
" as alſo the Profits and Sums which we
" may levy upon Merchandize, that under
" the Title of Licence, or ſafe Conduct may
" be permitted to be carried to the Havens
" and Places of the Enemies Juriſdiction.

But the Earl of Leiceſter *neglected it, and greatly prohibited our Navigation.*

But the Earl of *Leiceſter* was not ſo irreconcilable to *Spain* as the Prince of *Orange*, and relying on the Power of the *Engliſh* deſigned to defend theſe Countrys againſt *Spain*, and then to divide and ſhare the whole 17 Provinces with the Prince of *Parma*, whom he had tempted to comply; well knowing that if the worſt ſhould happen, he could return to *England* and live upon his own Eſtate: ſo that the defects of this Order ſoon appeared, and that too great an Authority in Maritime Affairs was entruſted to a Perſon who was not ſufficiently concerned for the Proſperity of *Holland*'s Navigation, and who to eſtabliſh his Tyrannical Power with the *Engliſh* of his Faction about him, favoured Strangers and Foreigners, more than the Natives of *Holland*. For about two Months after, he prohibited by publick Proclamation, not only our Navigation to *Spain*, and all the Enemies Countrys, but even to carry to neutral places all Proviſions, and Ammunition of War, whatever is neceſſary for Shipping: he alſo ſtrictly prohibited the ſending of any kind of Merchandize out of

P. Borre, Hiſt. book 21. p. 47.

of theſe Countrys by the *Maze*, *Rhine*, &c. or by Sea, on this ſide of *Rouen* and *Bremen*; notwithſtanding the States of *Holland* and *Zealand* earneſtly repreſented to him how much this would tend to the Benefit of all adjacent Foreign Countrys, and in particular of *England*, and to the great detriment of our own Inhabitants. So that if this Earl of *Leiceſter* had not the next year after been neceſſitated to depart out of theſe Countrys to *England*, by the Courage and Reſolution of the States of *Holland*, and there, by Command of Queen *Elizabeth*, to deliver up his Commiſſion of Governour, Captain, and Admiral-General, theſe Countrys had been utterly ruined.

Prince *Maurice* had almoſt the ſame Powers conferred on him nominally, but the whole management was really in the States of the ſeveral Provinces, and Governours of the Maritim Citys during his Youth. In which time the Affairs of the Sea were ſo well look'd after, that in our Hiſtorys we read of very few, or no Sea-Robberys, till the Month of *June* in the Year 1595. when ſome *Holland* Ships of War that were lying on the Watch before *Dunkirk*, and about the *Maes*, were commanded away to *France* by the Prince (who was then at the Age of 28 years) to bring over the old Princeſs of *Orange*. The *Dunkirkers* taking that opportunity, took many of our Herring Buſſes, and Merchantmen, for the moſt part before our own Ports. And altho the Admiraltys, eſpecially thoſe of *Amſtredam* and *Horn*, complained of this ill Court-Government at the *Hague* to the Committee of Council and Deputys at their General Aſſem-

After his departure, that care, in regard of Pr. Maurice's *Minority, was devolv'd on the States and Cities concern'd therein.*

P. Borre, *book* 32. *fol.* 38.

In 1593. *we began, for the Princes Pleaſure, to neglect the Seafaring Inhabitants.*

ſembly, and above all others had the greateſt Reaſon to complain of Prince *Maurice*, at whoſe pleaſure our good People that live by Trade and Fiſhery, were left for a Prey; yet durſt they not blame him for it, but only deſired to have better Orders kept for the future. But the dread of this Prince, increaſing with his Years, was already become ſo great, that in lieu of better Orders, his Favorites under that Pretext obtain'd an Order whereby the Authority and Power of thoſe *Holland* Citys that had ſuffered moſt, and muſt ſtill ſuffer in time to come, were curb'd and broken; and on the other ſide, the Authority and Power of the *Generality*, and eſpecially of the Prince, who are little or not at all affected by Loſſes at Sea, was greatly increaſed. For in the year 1597. Prince *Maurice*, the States General, and the five Admiraltys agreed on an Order, which for the moſt part is ſtill in being, pretending it would be an Expedient for the better management and executing the Affairs of the Admiralty and its Dependances. But becauſe Kings and Princes, and Inland Provinces, never uſe to conſider the Guard of the Sea, but always to neglect it, unleſs they fear that for want of a free Navigation they cannot ſubſiſt on the Land, the miſchief of this Order was ſoon diſcovered; for by it Prince *Maurice* (being now at the Age of 30, and conceiving that theſe Countrys were brought into ſuch a Condition, that they could very well ſubſiſt againſt the Power of *Spain*) had Power to do all things, ſince no Perſons without his Commiſſion could ſet out any Ships of War againſt Pirates or other Enemys, and that he could make

Tiaſſen's Sea-Polity.

In 1597 Holland was bereft of much of its ſtrength by Sea, and how.

make choice of all Captains and Superior Officers to command the Ships of the States, out of a double List laid before him, and indeed without it; and besides, might sit as Admiral-General, and his Lieutenant-Admiral of *Holland* and *Zealand*, or *Friezland*, in all or any of those Admiraltys, and vote at the upper end of the Board to direct all Affairs relating to the Treasury, Justice and War, as well as the Sea.

The Prince of Orange, *and the Inland Provinces, tho little or nothing concern'd, were vested with a Power in Sea Affairs.*

And moreover the Inland Provinces, whom the Navigation concerned not at all, obtain'd nevertheless by that Order a right of Electing from among themselves; *viz. Guelderland* three, *Utrecht* two, and *Over-yssel* likewise two Commissioners for the Affairs of the Admiralty: And *Holland*, which alone frequents the Sea ten times more than *Zealand*, *Friesland*, and *Groningen*, must by that Rule permit in all their three Admiralties, that to their four Commissioners, three out of the other Provinces be added; *Holland* in lieu thereof only having the privilege of chusing one Commissioner to the Admiralty of *Friesland*; which Admiralty for want of ordinary Revenue doth not use to set out any Ships for clearing the Seas, even in time of the greatest general Necessity, and consequently could avail them nothing. For tho the Province of *Zealand* frequent the Sea more than *Friesland*, and therefore by its Revenue can set out Ships of War; and supposing *Holland* might send two Commissioners of Admiralty thither, yet would it not tend to the Benefit of *Holland*, seeing the States of *Zealand*, with whom Prince *Maurice* could do what he pleased, when he should in earnest advise them

them to it, cannot now be moved by the States of *Holland*, and of the other Provinces, to range themſelves in that Order with *Holland*. But the *Zealanders* will continually govern all Affairs at Land and Sea by their ſeven Commiſſioners, aſſuming the Name of *Commiſſioners of the Admiralty*, when two Commiſſioners out of *Holland*, one for *Utrecht*, and one for *Groningen* are joined with them. So that theſe ſeven Commiſſioners of *Zealand*, with the additional Power of the States of *Zealand*, as alſo by their former ſeparate Aſſembly and Deliberation, do often exclude the other Commiſſioners from all Matters; and thereby always ſo eaſily overvote them, that they can do no ſervice for the common Good and for *Holland*, but when it pleaſeth the *Zealanders*. And before they may ſerve, or take the Charge of their Offices in the reſpective Admiralties as Commiſſioners, thoſe that are ſo elected muſt receive their Commiſſions of the States General, and there make Oath, as well as the Receivers General of the reſpective Quarters, Fiſcals, Secretarys, Head-Commiſſioners, Collectors and Comptrollers; who nevertheleſs being nominated by the reſpective Admiralties, are choſen by the States General out of a double number. But the reſpective Admiralties do each in their Quarters abſolutely diſpoſe of the Offices of the Equipage-Maſter, and Vendu-Maſter, Doorkeepers, Meſſengers and Searchers, *&c.*

And tho Zealand *would not communicate thoſe Maritime Affairs to the other Provinces that concern'd themſelves*; Aitzma's *Hiſt. Book* 32. *p.* 724

And moreover by theſe new Orders, *Comptoirs* or Offices were erected, as well in the Inland Provinces, as in the other, and on the Rivers and Inlets of the Sea, in all thoſe Countrys that have no Vote to receive Mony for

for Convoy and Cuſtom of all Goods going to and from *Holland*, and other *United Provinces* ſituate on the Sea, and that by Officers and Licenſe-Maſters depending on the ſaid States General, or the reſpective Admiralties. So that tho the Inhabitants of *Holland* paid ſeven parts of eight of all Cuſtoms and Convoy-mony, which uſed to be imployed for the Service of *Holland*, or at leaſt at the Pleaſure of that Province alone; yet ſince that Order they are all nevertheleſs made ſubject to the Admiraltys, or to the States General, where *Holland* hath but one Vote; or to the other Provinces, where *Holland* hath no Vote. Of all which Revenues, and of extraordinary Subſidies, the Admiralties are not bound to give account to the States of the Provinces wherein they reſide, but to the States General, among whom there are ſo many Perſons unconcern'd; and beſides, conſidering the Deficiency of thoſe from whom they have their Commiſſions, in bringing in their Quota's or Shares of Mony, it muſt be preſumed that they will always keep none of the beſt Accounts againſt themſelves, and conſequently are unfit to keep other Colleges ſo under the Bridle; and eſpecially conſiſting of ſo few as ſeven Perſons, they may enrich themſelves with the Publick Mony, and be able to play at the Game of *hodie mihi cras tibi*.

Yet have they obtained a great Power of Direction about the Maritime Affairs of Holland.

On the other ſide, *Zealand* holding all its Adminiſtrative Power of Maritime Affairs within it ſelf, ſent nevertheleſs into all Admiralties one Commiſſioner, who was to continue there during Life, with the Triennial Commiſſioners of *Holland*, by that long continuance

tinuance or perpetuity, ſubtilly to encourage the *Hollanders* to aſſiſt them in managing all Maritime Affairs according to their particular Intereſt. Therefore that this new Order might not be too offenſive to *Holland*, it was propoſed by the States General, and Prince *Maurice* of *Orange*, that it ſhould take place but for a Year, without any intention of prejudicing the Provinces in general, or any of the Provinces, Citys, or Members in particular, or creating to themſelves any new Power; tho all Men might eaſily imagine, that the Power of the States General, and Prince of *Orange*, being ſufficient to introduce this Order for a Year, would be alſo ſufficient to continue the ſame ſo long as it tended to their profit.

And indeed we have found by the continuation of this Order, that the States General, or the other Provinces, together with the Admiralties that were out of *Holland*, have done very little towards the Guard of the Seas; but on the contrary have, to the Prejudice of *Holland*, and for the Benefit of their own Inhabitants, ſo managed their Courts and Admiralties, in order to draw the Trade to themſelves, or at leaſt the Paſſage of the Merchandizes of *Holland*, that they have ſuffered Goods coming in, or going out, to pay either none ſometimes, or at other times much leſs Duty of Convoy and Cuſtoms, than is expreſſed in the Book of Rates; and yet have given Inland Paſports and Diſcharges as if the Duty had been fully paid, that ſo they may by the way of *Bergen*, the *Sas van Gent*, *Sluys*, &c. and *Zealand*, without further queſtion, carry them into *Holland*.

All which is very detrimental to Holland.

Holland. Nay, we have often ſeen that when the States General, with the United Suffrages of our common Allys, have prohibited ſome certain Commoditys to be imported into, or exported out of the *United Provinces*; yet hath the Admiralty of *Zealand* by their own Authority, ſuffered ſuch Goods to be Imported and Exported, to the great Benefit of their Inhabitants, and the intolerable Burden of ours. And in like manner when the States General have thought fit to diſtreſs the Common Enemy, by tolerating Privateers, or Freebooting Ships; we have then always heard Complaints of the Judicature of the Admiralty of *Zealand*, *viz.* that not only the Goods of Strangers in Amity with us, but even the Goods of *Holland*, under pretence of having ſaved the Duty, are too ſlightly and unjuſtly ſeized, and confiſcated; partly in favour of their Privateering Inhabitants, and partly by ſuch Vexation and Trouble, to draw the Trade from *Holland* into *Zealand*.

L. V. Aitzm. Book 16. p. 301.

A remarkable Example of the perfidiouſneſs of the Zealand *Capers.* Aitzma, Book 42. p. 723.

And as to what relates to all the Colleges of the Generality, as well as the Admiralties reſiding in *Holland*, it is well known that the other Provinces, in order to obtain more Power and Authority to their reſpective Principals, tho to the prejudice of the common Freedom, and of *Holland* in particular, * do ſend and continue all their Commiſſioners for the moſt part during their Lives, or at leaſt for many Years: Whereby they being ſtrangers in *Holland*, do

Eſpecially when the Zealanders *or other ſtrangers are permitted to be the* Gecommitteerde Raeden ad vitam, *or for very many Years.*

* Libertatis enim intereſt ne magna Imperia diuturna ſint.

often carry things againſt our Triennial Commiſſioners of *Holland*, even in the diſpoſal of our own Affairs, conferring moſt of the Offices and Benefices depending on Colleges upon their Favorites, and often alſo upon Strangers.

Seeing they are too hard for our Holland Raeden, *which are ſettled but for three Years.*

And this is found to be moſt of all prejudicial to *Holland*, when the Fiſcals, Secretarys, Receivers, chief Cuſtomers, Commiſſioners of the Navy and Prizes, *&c.* belonging to the ſaid Colleges of the Admiralty, who ſerve in thoſe Offices for the moſt part during Life, and beſides are ſtrangers in *Holland*, through a natural love to themſelves, their own Country, or their own College, or by an innate Envy to the Welfare of *Holland*, uſe their Authority and Power to the utmoſt againſt the *Holland* Merchants, to the prejudice of our Trade, but very faintly againſt the Inhabitants of their own Province. Yea, tho the Advocate, Fiſcal, or chief Cuſtomer be a *Hollander*, yet if his Habitation lie on the *Maeſe*, or in the *Northern* Quarter; by the ſame evil Inclination and Envy he can ſo plague the Merchants of the rich City of *Amſterdam*, by ſeizing their Goods, and ſo greatly favour thoſe of the *Maeſe*, or the *Northern* Quarter, in the Entries of their imported and exported Goods, that they are compelled forthwith to tranſport their Trade, and paſſage of their Goods from the places where they are oppreſt, to thoſe Parts or Colleges of Admiralty where they may be juſtly dealt with.

Holland *and its Citys having ſo little Authority for ſcouring the Seas,*

And tho *Holland* at the beginning of theſe new Orders of the Year 1597. was ſo happy, that our Enemys had only two Havens on the

the North Sea, *Sluys* (lying between *Oſtend* and the Iſland *Walcheren*) and *Dunkirk*, at that time without the *Schaurtjen*, having ſo narrow and ſhallow a Haven, that our laden Flyboats and Buſſes which they took, or their very Gallys, could not lie in ſafety; ſo that both theſe Sea Ports could do us but little damage, when we would take care to lie before them, or pick up thoſe petty Capers in theſe Narrow Seas. And tho we happen'd to loſe *Oſtend*, yet in recompence we took from the Enemy the City of *Sluys*, and its miſchievous Gallys. Notwithſtanding all this, I ſay, the *Dunkirkers* did us continually much greater damage after theſe Admiralties were erected, than ever before. So that the Merchants in the Year 1599. complained, "That "they could not at all weaken the Enemy by "ſo many Ships of War, and ſo much Convoy-"Mony paid and raiſed for that end. That "the Sea-Captains were choſen more for "Favour than Fitneſs; and that in the Ad-"miralties men were placed who under-"ſtood nothing of Maritime Affairs, nor "valued them, as having nothing to loſe "that way.

The Dunkirkers *began to infeſt the Sea.* E. Reyd. *Hiſt. p.* 636.

And tho all theſe Accuſations might have been more juſtly laid to the Charge of the States General, and the Prince of *Orange*, than on theſe new Commiſſioners of the Admiralty; yet neither the Merchants, nor our Fiſhers, durſt make the leaſt complaint of his exceſſive Power, nor of their own Loſſes; tho in the Year 1600. many of their Ships and Buſſes were burnt and ſunk; and their 3 Convoys were by 14 *Dunkirk* Ships of War taken, or forced to fly. After which the

Ema. Meeteren, *Book* 21.

And ſome were not willing to make uſe of the States Power to defend our Traders, who prohibited Traffick beyond the Cape of Good-Hope.

States General, in lieu of better defending the trading Inhabitants of theſe Countrys, took upon them in the Year 1602. to prohibit them to traffick beyond the *Cape de Buona Eſperanca*, in any of thoſe incredibly great and rich *Aſiatick* Countrys, by granting that Commerce wholly to an *Eaſt-India* Company for the Term of one and twenty Years then next enſuing.

And as the States General in the Year 1603. ſeemed publickly to acknowledg the inſufficiency of theſe new Admiraltys, partly by making the firſt Ordinances for the arming and manning out of all Ships ſailing upon account of Merchandize or Fiſhing, together with the Admiraltys; and partly ſeeing the Inhabitants of theſe Countrys were by theſe new Ordinances unmeaſurably taxed, and yet no better defended than formerly againſt Piracy, and Enemys at Sea, they were neceſſitated to give ſuch Inhabitants as deſired it, Commiſſions to ſet out Ships of War to weaken the Enemy. In which it was obſerved, that the ſaid Privateers ſought rather for the Enemys Merchant-ſhips, where they might meet with great Prize, and few Blows, than their Ships of War and Pirats, where there was ſmall Prize and many Blows to be expected. And accordingly our own Merchant-ſhips and Fiſhers were little or nothing relieved thereby; and likewiſe our own Privateers moleſted and damaged, as well the good Inhabitants of the *United Provinces*, as the Subjects of Kings, Princes, and Republicks in Amity with us, both in their Perſons and Eſtates. Upon which the States General in the Year 1606. found it neceſſary to revoke and

See the Placaet Book of that Year.

And inveigl'd them to ſail on Free-booting.

See the Placaet Book.

and call in all ſuch Commiſſions, and to raiſe four hundred thouſand Guilders by an extraordinary Subſidy, to ſet to Sea more Ships of War againſt the Enemy; which notwithſtanding did not perform the deſigned work aimed at of ſcouring or clearing the Seas.

'Tis a Matter very worthy obſervation, that before the Year 1597. when the Sea was render'd ſafe and navigable by thoſe Governors who were moſt concerned, there was very little damage ſuffered; and the great Overplus of the Convoy and Cuſtom-Mony, was imployed in getting things neceſſary for the War by Land: And that ſince the erecting of theſe new Admiralties, we have not only continually ſuffer'd great Loſſes by Sea; but beſides the Convoy and Cuſtom-mony, very many extraordinary Subſidies have been levied upon the People for the Guard of the Sea.

The Hollanders *about the* Mediterranean *much plagued by Pirats.*

And thus the State of theſe Maritime Affairs continued till the Truce was made; at which time the States ſuppoſing that all robbing at Sea would ceaſe, greatly leſſened the Dutys upon imported and exported Goods, in favour of Trade and Navigation. And on the other ſide, by our ſecurity and want of Ships of War, the *Moors* of *Algier*, *Tunis*, and *Sally*, who had been expelled from *Spain* about that time, as well as our diſcharged Seamen, who then ſerved under *Simon den Danſer*, Capt. *Ward*, *Nicholas Campane*, and others, had great Opportunities of taking our richeſt Ships, in and about the *Mediterranean* Sea, both during and after the Truce. And becauſe this happen'd ſo very frequently, I ſhall not detain the Reader with

See the Netherlandiſh *Wars, by* D. H. D. *in* 1612. *printed at* Arnhem, p. 199.

the Relation of thoſe Accidents, but leave him to calculate how great and prejudicial thoſe Piracys were, ſince the *Algerines* in the Years 1620, and 1621. within the ſpace of thirteen Months took of *Holland* Ships alone 143 Sail; *Amſterdam* alone eſteemed their Loſs at 124 Tuns of Gold, and the whole was computed at 300 Tuns of Gold.

Baudart, *pag.* 116.

Our Whale-fiſhers much damaged by the Engliſh. Baudart. *Hiſt.*

And whereas during the Truce with *Spain*, our Whale-fiſhing increaſed much; it uſually hapned that the *Engliſh*, when they were ſtrongeſt to the Northward, drove away our Fiſhers, and took ſome of their Ships and Fiſh; and King *James* refuſed to give ſatisfaction for the ſame, inſiſting that his Subjects had the ſole Right of fiſhing in thoſe Seas. And on the contrary, when the *Hollanders* were ſtronger, tho firſt attacked, yet the *Engliſh* Ships taken by us, and brought into theſe Countrys, were by Order of the States General reſtored again to the *Engliſh*; which Diſorder, and taking our Whale-fiſhers, continued ſtill after the Truce, and was much increaſed by the King of *Denmark*, who pretending to the Right of thoſe *Northern* Seas, did great damage to that Fiſhery.

So that I ſhall think it worth while to ſhew the Means which the States General, the Pr. of *Orange*, and the Admiraltys uſed to free our Inhabitants, who ſubſiſted by the Sea, from thoſe Miſchiefs and Moleſtations. And firſt as to our Trade and Navigation in the *Mediterranean*: After *Simon Danſer*, *Nicholas Campane*, and others had taken and plunder'd great numbers of our Ships, and were grown weary of Pirating, it was found convenient to ſave the Expences of taking and puniſhing them;

To redreſs this, the deſperate Polity was uſed of pardoning criminal Pirats.

them; and on the contrary, to grant them Pardons, and to permit them to return to their own Country, where all the good People that had ſuſtained Loſſes by them, have ſeen thoſe Pirats with aking Hearts, and not without fear, that by ſuch impunity other debauched Perſons might be encouraged to the like villanous Attempts. And as to the *Turkiſh* Pirats, who could not be invited to come in, and leave their Piracys, it was found expedient, *Anno* 1612. to ſend *Haga* Ambaſſador to *Conſtantinople*; and in the Year 1622. to ſend *Pynaker* to *Algier* and *Tunis*. Which Ambaſſadors arriving with great Preſents, and Fleets of Ships of War, eaſily obtained Capitulations and Agreements of free Commerce; upon which our Inhabitants relying too much, the Pirats fell again to their uſual Trade, as ſoon as our Ships of War were ſailed away, and we ſuffered more Loſſes from time to time, than if there never had been any Peace or Accord made. Upon this the States General endeavoured by our Ambaſſadors in *France*, *Spain*, and *England*, to move thoſe Kings to ſuppreſs thoſe Pirats with ſome Ships of Force. But ſeeing thoſe Monarchs valued not their Subjects ſo much as to be at that Charge for them, and that the Freedom of the Seas from Piracy was not ſo much their Concern as ours; or that the *Turks* being not able, by reaſon of their inconſiderable Navigation, to depredate ſo much on their Subjects as they could on ours, and would much rather make Peace with *France* and *England*, and keep it better too than with us; the States General cauſed the Admiraltys ſucceſſively to ſet to Sea Ships of War to

Waſſenar's *Hiſtorical Relation.*

Several others of that Gang were pardon'd during this new Sea-Polity. Aitzma *on* 1637. *p.* 630.

Baudart, *Hiſt.* *p.* 182. *of* 1612. *and p.* 118. *of* 1623.

As alſo our abſurd Polity of rooting out the Turkiſh *Pirats.*

deſtroy the Pirats, in the Years 1614, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, *&c.*

But taking few Pirate Ships, becauſe moſt of them while our Men of War cruis'd in the *Mediterranean*, came not out of their Harbours; this anſwered not our ends, till finally after the Year 1650. during the free Government of *Holland*, it was obſerved that we could neither make any firm and durable Peace with thoſe Pirates, nor root them out; and that if we ſuppreſs'd them at our own charge, yet our Traffick and Navigation would not, according to our aim and deſire, be at all encreaſed, but rather diminiſh. Upon which the Admiralty of *Amſterdam*, and afterwards other Admiraltys, purſuing cloſely the true Intereſt of *Holland*, ſent out yearly a number of Ships of War to convoy our Merchant Ships (which according to certain Rules agreed on, were to be well mann'd and arm'd) through the *Straits* of *Gibralter*, and out and home from the *Levant*. So that the *Hollanders* ſince that time have ſuſtained very little loſs, and have very much increaſed their Navigation and Trade into thoſe Parts.

And to pray and entreat the Engliſh.

In the 2*d* place concerning the diſturbing of our Whale-Fiſhery, tis plain that the States General have done nothing more, than by their Ambaſſadors to pray the reſpective Kings, that ſuch Actions might ceaſe in time to come. And afterwards obſerving ſuch Addreſſes to prove ineffectual, they thought fit in the Year 1622. to grant a Patent to a *Greenland* Company, excluding all others from taking of Whale, that ſo the ſaid Company by their own Power and Strength might

See the Placaet book, and Tiaſſer's *Sea Polity.*

defend

defend themſelves againſt the Moleſtations and Robberys of Strangers. Which Grant continued till the Year 1643. when the *Engliſh* by reaſon of their Inteſtine Wars, and the *Danes*, either by reaſon of the growing Power of the *Swedes*, had more need of our Favour than formerly, or fearing our Arms, and conſequently being leſs dreaded by our Whale-fiſhers, all the Inhabitants of theſe Countrys were permitted to fiſh on the ſaid North Coaſt; and the ſaid Fiſhing by that freedom improved ſo incredibly, that the States General in the 2*d* War againſt *England*, being not able to defend them there, prohibited them to fiſh, principally for the uſe they had of Mariners to man out our Ships of War for the defence of our Country and free Navigation.

But Thirdly, of the many Robberies committed by the *Dunkirkers*, and the means uſed againſt them, it is neceſſary to ſpeak more largely.

In *Flanders* upon the expiration of the Truce, the *Spaniard* had built at the enterance into *Dunkirk* upon the Arm of the Sea, the Fort of *Mardike*, and alſo that which is called the *Houte Wambais*, or *Wooden-doublet*, ſo that great Ships might at all times ſail out and bring their Prizes in thither. The King of *Spain* cauſed likewiſe twelve Ships of War to be built in *Flanders*, and encouraged the *Flemings* to privateering againſt us by Sea. And beſides this till the Year 1625. he ſent ſuch powerful Armys into the Field, that *Gulick* and *Breda* were taken from us, to the eternal ſhame of the States General, or to ſay better, of the new and violently intruded Deputies of the

After Pr. Maurice *would allow of no Prolongation of the Truce, and the* Scans *of* Mardike *was built, the* Dunkirkers *endamag'd us greatly by Sea.*

the Generality, and of *Maurice* Prince of *Orange*, who, ſince they would admit of no prolongation of the Truce at the deſire of the *Spaniard*, or the Arch-Duke, ought not to have rejected their Offer ſo ſuddenly, but have hearkned to it, or at leaſt feign'd to have done ſo, that by this means they might have excited the Kings of *France* and *England*, who were then very jealous of the Power of *Spain*, and feared that by continuation of the Truce the *Spaniard* would fall upon them, to aſſiſt us with a yearly number of Men and a Sum of Mony, in caſe we had reingaged in a War againſt *Spain*. Or laſtly, Thoſe Deputies of the Generality, and the ſaid Prince ſhould have made uſe of that delay to put our Frontiers into a better ſtate of Defence, and to fall upon the Enemy when they would grant him no further Ceſſation: And no leſs prudence had been neceſſary to increaſe our Traffick, freedom of Navigation and Fiſherys. Whereas on the other ſide, they prohibited all our Inhabitants to trade in *America*, and *Africa*, by erecting a *Weſt-India* Company *Anno* 1621. under colour of diſtreſſing the Enemy more in thoſe parts. And in the ſaid Year they likewiſe prohibited our Inhabitants to ſail to the *Mediterranean*, or to *Cabo del Rey* in the *Weſt-Indies* for Salt, unleſs in Conſortſhip, promiſing them Ships of War to convoy and defend them back again. But this Promiſe was without effect: For to free the Admiraltys of thoſe Charges, and to favour the ſaid Company with that Salt-trade, the States Ceneral, Prince *Maurice*, and the Admiraltys very eaſily found it convenient to deprive the Inhabitants of theſe

Aitzma's *Hiſt. book* 1. *pag.* 88, 89.

And tho the States General ought to have protected our Inhabitants, they prohibited trading within the Tropick to the South and North, or to fetch Salt from thence. See the Placaet book. Waſſenar's *Hiſt.*

theſe Countrys of that moſt conſiderable Trade of Salt, in favour of the *Weſt-India* Company, where it continued only to the Year 1623. when the K. of *Spain*, fearing that the ſaid Company, by fortifying themſelves, and by their own Power, would engroſs thoſe Salt-pans, cauſed a Fort to be raiſed there himſelf. So that our Inhabitants by the Placaet of the States General, and our *Weſt-India* Company, and by means of that Fort, were utterly deprived of that Salt Trade.

And inſtead of protecting and defending our Navigation from Piracy, with better Order and more Strength, they again drew in the Inhabitants to fit out Privateers, reducing the wonted Duty out of the Prize Goods, to the Admiralty's and Admiral General, from 30 *per Cent.* to 18 *per Cent.* viz. 12 to the State, and ſix for the Admiral-General. Orders were alſo publiſhed, that none ſhould ſail to the Eaſt Country, and *Norway*, but in Fleets of 40 or more Ships with two Convoyers, or elſe with Ships of defence without Convoy. Yea, the States and the Prince of *Orange* thought it convenient to continue that miſchievous Grant or Charter to the *Eaſt-India* Company for 21 Years to come. So that the States General and the Admiralty's diſcharged themſelves of ſcouring the Seas, as far as concern'd *Aſia*, *Africa*, and *America*, and the Traffick of thoſe parts, together with the Northern Whale-fiſhing, upon ſuppoſition that all thoſe reſpective Companys were ſufficient to drive on their Trade without Convoys from the State, and to take care of their own Affairs. But on the contrary, they found that the Trade of theſe Societies was carried on

See the Placaet Book.

And the ſelect Eaſt-India *Company had their Charter prolonged.*

To the great detriment of all the Inhabitants of Holland *ſo excluded.*

on with ſo great prejudice to the reſt of the People, who were excluded, that if our Governours had then or ſhould now deal in the ſame manner with the Trade of *Europe*, by erecting Companys excluſive of all others; for example, one Company for the Dealers in the *Mediterranean*, a 2*d* of the *French* and *Spaniſh* Merchants, a 3*d* for the *Eaſtern* and *Northern* Merchants, a 4*th* for the *Britiſh* and *Iriſh* Traders, a 5*th* for the Haddock, Cod and Herring Fiſherys, *&c.* I ſay, if they had done this, one 10*th* part of our Inhabitants would not have been able to live, and earn their Bread. So that *Holland* would ſoon have been ruin'd, even tho the Trade of thoſe Companys had been carried on with ſo great induſtry, that notwithſtanding any Reſolutions taken by *France*, *England*, *Sweden*, and the States of *Italy*, to diſturb, prohibit, and prevent Foreign Manufactures, and conſequently thoſe of *Holland* to be brought into their Countrys, yet each of thoſe Companys in the ſmall compaſs of our *Europe* had driven a greater Trade than the whole *Eaſt-India* Company now drives to the incomparably greater, mightier and richer *Aſia*, both in Goods and Mony. For it cannot be denied, that the free *Eaſtern* Trade alone, the Herring-fiſhing alone, and the *French* Trade alone, produce ten times more profit to the State, and the Commonalty of *Holland*, than 12 or 16 Ships which yearly ſail from *Holland* to the *Eaſt-Indies* do now yield to the State, and the Inhabitants.

See Aitzma's *Hiſt.*

And as to the Adminiſtration and care of our Admiraltys with reſpect to the Sea, after the expiration of the Truce, and during the

Life

Life of Prince *Maurice*, a Million of Florens was raiſed for the Year 1623, and 600000 for 1624, by extraordinary Subſidies, with Admiralty and Convoy-mony, and product of Cuſtoms, which were again levied as in the Year 1603. With theſe Aids they fitted out Ships of War, ordering ſome to lie before the *Flemiſh* Havens, and others to convoy our Merchantmen to the Eaſtward and Weſtward: yet ſuch was the management, that our Ships of War came often ſo late before thoſe Havens, that the Enemies Ships were put out to Sea, before their Arrival; or elſe to avoid the uſual Storms of Autumn, or to be revictualled, left the *Flemiſh* Coaſt ſo early, that commonly before, or at leaſt in the Winter, the Enemy with many of their Ships of War, would go out ſometimes by Night, or even by Daylight in ſight of our Ships, and confidence of their better ſailing, or of our Captains Negligence or Cowardice; and not only got ten times more Booty from our Merchant Ships, than our Capers and Ships of War could take from the Enemy, but alſo ſometimes would take, or put to flight, our Ships that were appointed for Guards and Convoys.

And yet loaded the Commonalty of Holland *more than ever with extraordinary Subſidies for ſcouring the Seas, as much infeſted as before.*

See Waſſenar's *Hiſt.*

All which Loſſes were not attributed to the Deputies of the Generality, and the Admiral General, who after the death of the *Heer Opdam* Lieut. Admiral of *Holland*, which hapned *Sept.* 1623. till *June* 1625. when young *William* of *Naſſau* was choſen, had put all the Naval Power of *Holland* under the Command of the *Zealand* Lieut. Admiral *Hautain*; nor was it imputed to the Provinces who were deficient, or backward in bringing in the Mony they had conſented to give, by which means the

Aitzma, p. 780.

Ships

Ships deſigned for the Service were either delaid, or not fitted out at all; but the blame was wholly laid at the door of the Admiraltys diſorderly Management, and Negligence. So that thereupon a Regulation was made in the Year 1624. but with little ſucceſs; for Prince *Maurice* dying in *April* 1625. and Prince *Henry* being haſtily choſen Captain Admiral-General, and Stadtholder of *Holland*, *Zealand*, &c. we ſoon ſaw that he concerned himſelf little in husbanding the Treaſure, or providing for a free and open Navigation, in which the Welfare of *Holland* conſiſts.

This was more evident when Pr. Henry *had the Adminiſtration of theſe Lands.*

And now that the Reader may ſee what ground there was for that Aſſertion, which ſome of our Writers have delivered as a known Truth, *viz.* That the ſaid Prince *Henry* during the whole time of his Government, as much as in him lay, endeavoured to exhauſt the Treaſure of *Holland*, and by the burden of her Debts to break her back: It will not be amiſs to repreſent in ſhort from Authors of credit what was done and ſuffered in this matter to the Year 1632. and ſo forward to the time of our Peace with *Spain*, and the deceaſe of the ſaid Prince *Henry*. The Treaſure and Power of *Spain* was, by the chargeable Sieges of *Bergen op Zoom* and *Breda*, and eſpecially by our vigorous carrying on the War againſt him by our *Weſt-India* Company, who greatly annoyed him in thoſe parts, ſo broken and exhauſted, that ſince that time he has not been able to carry on an offenſive War againſt us; and therefore Year after Year ſeriouſly and really made offers to theſe *United Netherlands* of a Peace, very honourable for this State, and neceſſary for our Tra-

Stadtholders Government, p. 58.

See the Petition of the Weſt-India *Company of* 1668.

Trading Inhabitants, as well as desired by all the rest. But those Offers were as often rejected by the Deputies of the Generality at the instigation of the Prince of *Orange*, and in their room our Taxes were continually increased with Prince *Henry*'s Government, both by the Addition of Souldiery, and otherwise by his ill Husbandry, from 12 Millions 543840 Guilders, to 15 Millions 433800 Guilders, according to a Petition of the Council of State in the Year 1626, and were successively granted Year after Year, rather more than less.

Aitzma's *Treaty of Peace* Aitzma's *Hist.* *p.* 637.

Pr. Henry *obstinately continued the War beyond* Holland's *Ability.* Aitzma *pag.* 59.

And tho *Holland* alone bore of this Charge 58 *per* 100, and by these heavy burdens, and ill Husbandry, our Treasury from the expiration of the Truce to the Year 1632. was found to be 55 Millions in Arrear: Yet nothing at all was done for the benefit of the Inhabitants of that Province thus needlessly and purposely oppress'd beyond their Abilitys by their unnecessary offensive Field-Armies: Unless they could believe that it was very advantagious to them that *Oldensel* was taken that same Year, *Grol* in 1627. and in the Year 1628, many chargeable Fortifications were made about *Bergen op Zoom*, and *Steenbergen*: And that thereupon, in 1629, *Boisleduc* was taken for the State, and *Weesel* for the Elector of *Brandenburg*; for which our Country smarted severely, by the *Spaniards* falling in, and plundering in and about the *Veluwe*; add to this, that notwithstanding the continued high demands for Mony to carry on the War in the Year 1630. our Souldiery stirred not out of their Garisons, and that in the Year 1631. we got nothing by a chargeable Attempt upon *Flanders* but disgrace, which nevertheless was some-

So that Holland *was in the 7 Years after his Administration,* 51 *Millions in Arrears.*

ſomewhat leſſened by the unſucceſsful Shallop-deſign of the *Spaniard* upon *Zealand*. And laſtly, that in the Year 1632. *Ruremond*, *Venlo*, and *Maſtricht* were taken from the Enemy, more by Count *Henry Vanden Bergh*'s means, than the conduct of the Prince of *Orange*.

Aitzma, *Hiſt. pag.* 323.

In the mean time moſt of the Provinces except *Holland* were ſo backward in conſenting to contribute Mony, and the Charges were ſo enlarged above what was conſented to be given, that the Council of State in their Petition complained yearly on behalf of their honeſt Creditors, who had truſted them for 3 or 4 Years, that they became ſo troubleſom and importunate that thoſe Counſellors were hardly ſafe in their own Houſes; and that all things neceſſary for the publick Service, might be bought or made for the $\frac{1}{2}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$ part cheaper, if ready Mony were paid; and that alſo for want of Pay, the Captains, who had really $\frac{1}{7}$, yea $\frac{1}{5}$ leſs number of Souldiers in Service than were paid for, muſt be conniv'd at.

During all which Confuſions by Land, the Maritime Affairs were carried on after the following manner. Firſt, concerning the Treaſury; the Admiraltys did in the Year 1625. petition for 600000 Guilders; for the Year 1626. 800000 Guilders; for the Year 1627. 1000000 Guilders; and for the Years 1628, 1629, 1630, 1631, 1632. yearly and ſucceſſively, two Millions of Guilders extraordinary Subſidies for guarding the Seas. And moreover, the States General deviated ſo far in the Years 1625, and 1631. from the true Grounds and Maxims of maintaining Trade and Navigation, that they did not only conſiderably raiſe the Dutys of Convoy, and Cuſtoms

See thoſe particular Petitionary Demands in Aitzma's *Hiſt.*

And the Inhabitants paid their Subſidies.

See the particular Placaets in the Book of the States General.

toms, ordering the 4*th* part of them to be farm'd out to thoſe that bid moſt, and conſequently as much as in them lay made all Traffick and Navigation ſubject to thoſe innumerable and unimaginable Vexations of Farmers. But beſides, in the Front of their Placaet they roundly declared, That of all the Publick Revenues, the Convoy and Cuſtoms were the moſt tolerable and leaſt hurtful, that are laid on Goods imported and exported; whereas the Rates then impoſed, and yet in force, are known to be the moſt intolerable, and for the Country the moſt prejudicial of all the Revenues of *Holland*, as has been already ſhewn in our 23*d* Chapter of *Part I.*

All which Convoys and Cuſtoms ſo augmented, produced yearly, as by example in the year 1628,

	Guilders.
To the Admiralty of *Rotterdam*, —	330737
Amſterdam, — — — — — — —	803659
The Northern Quarter, — — —	125000
	1259396
Zealand, — — — — — — — —	329367
All Charges incident to thoſe Colleges and their Offices deducted --	1588763

But the Admiralty of *Frieſland*, bearing the yearly Charges of the College, and Watching, fell ſhort with all its Revenue twelve thouſand Guilders, which were to be made good out of the extraordinary Subſidies: and therefore they not ſending Ships to Sea, thoſe Provinces of *Frieſland*, and *Groeningen*, with the Inland Provinces, became very unwilling to conſent to the Subſidies, very backward

in bringing them in, and always very ſlowly.

See the Placaet Book of thoſe Years.

Moreover in the Year 1625. on the 24*th* of *June*, all Ships ſailing to the *Mediterranean*, were by Placaet commanded to pay 16 Stivers *per* Laſt every Voyage to the benefit of the Agents in the *Levant*,, which in the Year 1630. was raiſed to 20 Stivers; and ſucceſſively in the Years 1625, 1627, 1628, 1629, 1630, 1632. the arming and manning of Ships ſailing for Merchandize or Fiſhing was from time to time charged upon the Inhabitants of theſe Countrys by Placaets.

And yet the Seas never the more cleared.

But to look further, and enquire what hath been done with ſuch great Subſidies and Taxes (which oppreſſed all the Inhabitants of *Holland*, and eſpecially the Merchants) for the benefit of free Navigation: So ſoon as Prince *Henry* was made Admiral-General, he placed and appointed young *William* of *Naſſau Heer van de Lek* his Lieutenant Admiral of *Holland*; who was likewiſe obliged to ſerve as Colonel in the War by Land, and went very little to Sea, till in *Auguſt* 1627. when he was kill'd by a Shot before *Grol.* And in ſtead of defending our Merchantmen and Fiſhers, the Lieutenant-Admiral of *Zealand*, *Hautain* was ſent with 22 Sail of Ships *Anno* 1625. to reduce our Proteſtant Brethren of *Rochel* under the Obedience of the King of *France*; and at the ſame time two Ships of War only were allow'd to ſecure one thouſand Buſſes in their Fiſhing. Beſides as to Trade, the Seas were more infeſted than ever: For ſix *Dunkirk* Ships of War meeting our Fleet which came from the Northward in *June*, *Anno* 1625. without Convoy, drove them back to

Waſſenar *pag.* 87.

Ib. *p.* 86.

to *Norway*; and having taken two *Eaſtland*, and three other Ships, came all ſix to an Anchor before the *Texel*, and lay there along time, as our Ships uſed to lie before *Dunkirk*, taking all Veſſels that came in, or ſailed out; which cauſed ſuch a Conſternation among our People, that none durſt venture to Sea. And ſoon after the departure of theſe *Dunkirkers*, arrived happily eight Northern, and Eaſtland Merchant Ships, with one Convoy only.

Again, in the ſame Year 1625. after our Ships of War were withdrawn from the *Flemiſh* Coaſt, and come into Harbour, the *Dunkirk* Ships ſteered directly away to our Fiſhers, as knowing they were provided but with two Convoyers; and ſcattered our Buſſes, taking and ſinking many of them: by which accident thoſe of *Enchuyſen* alone loſt at the leaſt 100, and other Places in proportion; and at leaſt 150 Maſters and Mates of thoſe Buſſes were made Priſoners, and carried to *Flanders*. So that the Directors of that great Fiſhery obſerving from time to time how little the ſecuring of their Livelihood was regarded, ſoon after reſolved at their own charge, to ſet out ſeven great and well-armed Ships of War, and to put them all under their own Commander of the Buſſes, of which ſeven thoſe of *Enchuyſen* were to ſet out and pay 4, and the Buſs-Owners about the *Maeſe* three, that they might fiſh in more ſafety under their Guard, ſeeing the chief Trade of the Land, *viz.* Fiſhing, was neglected.

The Directors of the great Fiſhery neceſſitated to provide Convoys at their own charges.

And to the end the Deputies of the Generality and Prince *Henry* might not always ſeem

to neglect the Sea, it was reſolved that they would ſet forth for the Year 1626. thirty well appointed Ships of War, and ſet a reward for the taking and deſtroying of any Ship of War, belonging to the Enemy, being of 100 or more Laſt, the Sum of Guilders —— —— 30000

Aitzma *Hiſt.* p. 204.

From	70	to	100	20000
	50	to	70	15000
	50	to	30	10000
	30	to	20	8000
Mounted with four Guns of 20 Laſts or under,				4000

'Twas alſo reſolved to put the Law in execution, that commands the Men of *Dunkirk* to be thrown over-board. But thoſe Provinces that were leaſt concerned in ſecuring the Seas, remaining backward in bringing in the Mony neceſſary for the ſaid Equipage and Rewards, and the States General having deprived the Admiraltys of a great part of their Revenues, by prohibiting the Importation of ſome Goods, and yet on the other ſide requiring to ſet forth a greater Strength to Sea than ordinary, with the Profuſeneſs of Prince *Henry* as Captain and Admiral General, there aroſe in all the Colleges of the Generality, and eſpecially in the Admiraltys, an Arrear of two Millions five hundred and eight thouſand and fifteen Guilders running on at Intereſt, beſides three Millions nine hundred twenty and three thouſand two hundred ninety and five Guilders in debts; which cauſed the Seamen, who not getting their Wages, were neceſſitated to ſell their Debentures, at very low Rates, with many of our Mariners who were not able to live for want

Ibid. *p.* 96. *The States General, with the Prince of* Orange, *reſolv'd to caſt over-board all our Enemies at Sea.*

want of Pay, and therefore not willing to ſerve here any longer, to go over to the *Dunkirkers*, and ſail with them upon Free-booting. And our Fleet under the Admiral of *Zealand*, *Jonker Philips van Dorp*, came not before the *Schuurtjen* of *Dunkirk* upon the Watch till about the Month of *July*, when moſt of their Men of War were gone out to Sea, and according to their old cuſtom, had taken many of our Merchants Ships, and very many Buſſes which they ſunk and burnt; inſomuch that all that could eſcape, fled for ſafety to the *Engliſh* Harbours. And our Doggers of the *Maeſe* hearing that the *Dunkirk* Capers threw over-board all the Men of the Merchant Ships and Fiſhing-Veſſels which they took, in revenge of what we had done by their Men, durſt not go to Sea to follow their Occupations.

Which proved dangerous to our Fiſhers and Merchantmen.

And notwithſtanding *Van Dorp* lay with the Fleet before *Dunkirk*, many ſmall Frigats and Shallops ſailed out for Prize; ſo that at laſt in *October* that Year, young *William* of *Naſſaw* as Lieutenant-Admiral of *Holland*, was charged to keep that Poſt: Which he performed till *December* following, but no better than *Van Dorp* had done. And as to our Cruiſers and other Convoyers, it is obſervable that we do not know that they ever took any one of the twelve new built King's Ships of *Dunkirk*, pretending they were better Sailers; which is altogether incredible, for our Ships from time to time could take Ships of leſs Force, and better Sailers, and throw their Men over-board: Whereas on the other ſide the *Dunkirkers*, as well before as ſince, fighting ſeveral of our Ships of

The infeſting of the Sea proceeded from our ſelves.

War, forced our Captains, after Quarter promiſed, to ſurrender themſelves. So that it is rather to be believed, that our Admirals and Sea-Captains, fearing much more the *Dunkirk* Ships of War, and their requital of throwing them over-board, rather than our remiſs Juſtice for the neglect of their Dutys, ſought not out thoſe *Dunkirkers* but where they were not to be found. However it is true, that they did commonly, as well heretofore as afterwards, and particularly in this Year 1626. come to the Aſſiſtance of the Merchantmen and Fiſhers, when 'twas too late. Wherefore *John van de Sande* in his Hiſtory ſays, That the Sea-Captains kept themſelves uſually on the Rivers where no Enemy came, and fled from thoſe they met: So that the Council of State, in their petitionary demand of Supply for the following Year, declared, "That the poor People are "hence forward afraid to go to Sea to fol- "low their Callings, the throwing them "over-board making a great cry and altera- "tion among thoſe that earn their Bread ſo "hardly at Sea.

The Enemy on the other hand reſolved to caſt our Fiſhers and Merchantmen overboard, and give quarter to our Ships of War.

And tho it be true, that the greateſt part of all theſe Hardſhips of our Inhabitants was cauſed by the ill Government of the Deputys of the Generality, and the Prince of *Orange*, who uſed the Power of theſe Countrys to make new Conqueſts, not to defend Trade and Navigation; and yet as if we had bin the only Maſters at Sea, and had no unarmed Ships abroad, nor the *Dunkirkers* any Ships of defence, we followed thoſe incredibly fooliſh Councils, of reſolving to throw over-board all *Dunkirkers* taken at Sea in Ships of War: Whereas

on the contrary, the *Flemings* uſed very prudent Maxims about this Matter, namely to throw the Men of undefenſible Veſſels over-board, and to give Quarter to our armed Ships of War. Nevertheleſs none dared to complain of this evil Government of the States General, and the Prince of *Orange*, no not even of young *William* of *Naſſaw*. * But the Pigs were fain to pay for the Sow's Offence; and therefore upon the ill Conduct of the Admiraltys, and eſpecially of the College of *Roterdam*, the *Heeren Berk*, *Vander Maſt*, *Segwaars*, *Verheul*, *Nicolai*, *Vroeſen*, and *Duifhuyſen*, who had done no more than what was in mode during Prince *Henry*'s waſtful Adminiſtration in all the Colleges, eſpecially that of the Generality, were nevertheleſs declared Infamous by Judges delegated for that end, and condemned in great Fines to allay the Diſcontent of the Multitude. The States General alſo declared, That the following Year they would ſet out more Ships of War in order to clear the Seas; and would make the People to believe, that a competent number of Ships ſhould lie on the watch before *Dunkirk*, to prevent the coming out of thoſe Ships, while another number ſhould lie between *Dover* and *Calais*, and another at the *Schager Rif*, to watch and prevent all Sea-Robbers ſailing to the *Spaniſh* Sea, or to the Northward. And beſides all theſe, another number of our Ships of War ſhould cruiſe in the narrow part of the North-Sea; ſo that the Enemy ſhould not be able

See the Petition of the Council, 1629.

To quiet the Commonalty, ſome of the Admiralty were puniſh'd, and new Orders given out.

Aitzma *of that Year*, B. 6. p. 97.

* Dat veniam Corvis vexat cenſura Columbas.

by any means to interrupt or diſturb our Navigation.

But becauſe no better Order was ſettled about the Affairs of Juſtice, nor any thing determined about the Finances, from whence the paiment of the new appointed Rewards for taking of Enemys Ships ſhould proceed, nor any of our Maritime Affairs better managed than formerly; the hopes of the too credulous Commonalty ſoon vaniſhed, eſpecially when the *Durkirkers* in the Year 1627. infeſted us again before our Sea-port Towns, and took as many Prizes as formerly, ſeizing ſeveral Buſſes, and two of the Buſſes Convoyers, whilſt young *William* Admiral of *Holland* was killed before *Grol*, and *Jonker Philips van Dorp* Lieutenant Admiral of *Zealand* cruiſed at Sea, and none of our Ships before *Dunkirk* to keep in their Capers; who coming to lie on our Coaſt about the *Texel*, the *Maeſe*, and *Zealand*, ſwept away all, together with the Ship of Capt. *Bagyn*, who heretofore on many occaſions had behaved himſelf bravely and valiantly, and from a Cloth-worker was by degrees preferred to the Honour of having the Command of one of our beſt Ships of War: But now finding himſelf alone in the midſt of fourteen of the Enemys Ships of War, he yielded his new and well-appointed Ship without making one ſhot,

But without effect, becauſe they would not leave their ill Principles in Sea-Affairs.

Waſſenar, *p.* 31. *on that Year.*

The Politicians of thoſe Times judged, "That the Trade of theſe Countys was never ſince the Truce in ſo ill a condition: For *Spain* could do no good; *Portugal* was without Trade; *France* by the King's Edicts was ſhut up; *England* detained all Ships that paſſed the Channel, and ſeized

Whereby theſe Countrys were reduc'd lower than ever ſince the Truce.

"ſixty

" ſixty or eighty Tuns of Gold belonging to " the free *Netherlanders:* The Rivers of *We-* " *ſer* or *Elve*, *Trave*, *Oder*, and *Wiſſel*, were " ſo infeſted and block'd up by the *Daniſh* " and *Swediſh* Ships of War, that little or " no Trade could be driven with *Bremen*, " *Hamburgh*, *Lubeck*, *Stetin*, and *Dantzick*; " and the North Sea was render'd impra- " cticable by the *Dunkirkers*. By which means the Commonalty were as much diſſatisfied as ever, when our Ships of War came in and had done nothing; inſomuch that thoſe of *Fluſhing* fell into a Mutiny, and at *Terveer* threw ſtones at Lieutenant Admiral *Van Dorp*. So to pacify the People, they were neceſſitated to fine the Pigs once again; and ſome Sea-Captains were diſmiſs'd, and poor Capt. *Bagyn* having no Friends at Court, *ſummo jure* loſt his Head.

In the Year 1628. for the greater ſafety of our Navigation, three Vice-Admirals were created in *Holland*; who nevertheleſs were to be commanded by the Lieutenant-Admiral of *Zealand*. But the *Dunkirkers*, according to their old cuſtom, ſeized many *Straits* Ships, with other Merchant-men, and at two ſeveral times took 34 Buſſes, tho Lieut. Admiral *Van Dorp* with a Squadron of ten Ships had lain ten Weeks upon the Coaſt of *England* without hearing of an Enemy, and our Coaſt Ships and Cruiſers were likewiſe at Sea. Which the States of *Holland* took ſo ill, that they diſmiſſed *Philips van Dorp* at his return without a hearing. The Council of State had alſo ſent a Letter in *April* of the ſame Year to the Provinces, complaining of the Confuſions in the " Publick Revenues, which was the cauſe of " the

So the States of Zealand *depoſed their Admiral.* Aitzma's *Hiſt.* B. 9. p. 730.

Lib. 8. p. 627.

And the Council of State complained of this Confuſion of Affairs.

" the Arrears due to the Military Forces both " by Sea and Land; and that the Revenues " and Charges of the Country were not duly " conſidered and weighed one againſt the " other: That Diſorders increaſed more " and more; that the Credit of the Country " was daily ſinking; that the Souldiery was " mutinous and diſobedient, and that all Mi- " litary Diſcipline and Juſtice were trodden " under foot, *&c.*

Both which things Prince Henry *took very ill.*

Theſe Proceedings were taken very ill by the Deputys of the Generality and the Prince: and the *Heer van Dorp* was ſtill continued in the Land-Service. Strict enquiry was alſo made among the Counſellors of State, to know who they were that durſt be the chief Promoters of the complaining Letter before mentioned: And all this was done to deter others from complaining againſt the Government of the Deputys of the Generality, and eſpecially of the Cabinet Lords, who together with the Prince look'd after nothing more in this Confuſion, than their own Profit and Grandeur.

The Rulers of Amſterdam *would have ſcour'd the Seas with ten Ships of War, but it was denied them. See* Aitzma's *Hiſt.* B. 8. p. 679.

But upon the continual Complaints of the Merchants of *Amſterdam* to their Burgomaſters, of the unexpreſſible Damages which they ſuſtained in their Bodys and Goods by continual Piracys, and the little care taken for their redreſs; the ſaid Burgomaſters, and Council, made offer to the States General and Prince of *Orange* to ſet to Sea ten or twelve Men of War well mann'd and furniſhed, to ſecure their Shipping, which ſhould receive Inſtructions from the States General, and a Commiſſion from the Prince; provided the Mony diſburſed upon this Deſign might be defalked from the Contribution of that City;

City; and that no other Perſon might have any Power, or be any way concerned about that Equipage and Mony but themſelves. And tho formerly under the inſupportable Government of the Earls of *Holland*, all the Citys of that Province uſed by their own Authority to do the ſame, yet nevertheleſs this good and uſeful Offer was rejected under the preſent Stadtholder's Government, as if that City would by this means obtain too great a Power at Sea. Whereas on the contrary it appeared that the Sea became more and more unnavigated, becauſe the Country and Citys which were moſt concerned to keep the Sea uninfeſted, had no Authority put into their hands, as they had under the Government of their Earls.

And to the end that the Deputys of the Generality, and Prince of *Orange*, might ſhew their uſual Zeal in this Affair, the Articles for the War at Sea were *Anno* 1629. inſpected and made more ſevere. A Project alſo of an Inſurance Company was brought in; according to which all Ships outward and inward bound, ſhould pay for Inſurance, from one to thirteen *per Cent.* in proportion to the conveniency of the Sea-Ports to or from which Ships were to ſail; and the ſaid Company was to be bound to make good all Loſſes ſuſtained. After which *Peter Hein* was choſen Lieutenant Admiral of *Holland*, who for the redreſs of Maritime Affairs deſired many new Powers relating to the Militia, Juſtice, and Expences on board Ships; and did not only obtain thoſe, but alſo more Authority than had ever been given to any Lieutenant Admiral of *Holland*.

Aitzma's *Hiſt.* B. 9. p. 709.

But the Pr. of Orange, *and the Deputys of the Generality manifeſted their wonted Zeal.*

Ibid. p. 730.

But

But he being killed by a ſhot two Months after, whilſt with eight Ships he was in purſuit of three *Dunkirkers*; there can be no account given of the Fruits of this new Order, ſave that the Charges were increaſed, and yet the Seas remained as much infeſted as before.

But without any good iſſue.

'Tis uneaſy to me to enumerate the Loſſes ſuſtained by our poor Inhabitants, which were ſo exceeding great, that the States of *Holland*, on the 18*th* of *January* 1630. remonſtrated to the States General, "That the "Strength, Vigour, and Reputation of this "State by Sea was wholly decayed, and the "Navigation ſignally diminiſhed: That ma-"ny Mariners, for want of Care and due "Defence, were gone over to the Enemy, "and many more taken and kept in cloſe "Impriſonment, or cruelly thrown into the "Sea: And that the ſaid States of *Holland*, "to prevent ſuch Miſchiefs for the future, "had reſolved, and now ſignified to the o-"ther Provinces, That they would from this "time take as little care for the paiment of "the Land Forces that were gariſon'd in the "Frontier Citys out of their Province, as "they obſerved was taken about the Conduct "and Affairs of the Sea.

Airzma, *B.*10. *p.* 171.

So that the States of Holland *moved that they would poſtpone paying the unneceſſary Land Forces, the better to keep the Sea clear.*

But the States of *Holland* were under that awe and dread of the Prince of *Orange*, and the Deputys of the Generality, that they durſt not deny or detain their part of the Publick Contributions to be imployed in ſecuring the Seas; and ſo nothing was done but a little Duſt thrown into the Eyes of the poor innocent Inhabitants of *Holland*: For the States and the Prince ſent Letters with their Decrees about that Affair to the other Pro-

Provinces. But our want of paiment, and the Diſorders about the Mariners, and neglecting the Guard of the Seas ſtill continued, and increaſed in the Year 1631. For tho the States General had granted, that the Burgomaſters and Magiſtrates of the Citys of *Amſterdam*, *Horn*, *Enchuyſen*, *Edam*, *Medenblick*, *Harlingen*, &c. ſhould chuſe certain Directors, who might collect of all Ships and Goods ſailing to the Eaſtward or *Norway*, one half *per Cent.* and returning from the ſame, one *per Cent.* to enable them to ſet out ſome extraordinary Convoys to ſecure the Trade of the ſaid Countrys. Yet this Impoſition produc'd only a part of the expected Fruit, chiefly becauſe the Directors were in all weighty Matters of the Militia, Juſtice, and Prizes taken, to be wholly ſubject to the Prince of *Orange*, and the reſpective Admiraltys, depending on their Orders and Judgments. And the Deputys of the Generality continuing to advance the Prince's Grandure, and their own, more than the Welfare of *Holland*, reſolved in the Name of the States General, to equip over and above the uſual number, 35 Ships of War, and 10 Yachts to lie upon the *Flemiſh* Havens, and to cruiſe and keep the North-Sea clear of *Dunkirk* Robbers. And that they might with more certainty perform this (as they pretended) they brought all the ſaid Ships under one Head, and put them under the Direction and Orders of the Prince of *Orange*, without obliging them to obey the Commands of any other: They ordered them to be paid by him, and that all Mony neceſſary for Wages, Rewards, and Proviſions, ſhould be brought to the *Hague in ſpecie*. And to the

Aitzma, *B.* 11. *p.* 354.

Such Shipping as ſailed Northward and Eaſtward, had Convoys paid by themſelves, but not without hard Conditions.

Ibid. *p.* 350.

And the Deputys of the Generality devolv'd the Authority of clearing the Seas on Pr. Henry.

the end that during the Summer-ſeaſon theſe Ships might be kept in continual action, the reſpective Colleges of the Admiraltys of *Holland*, *Zealand* and *Frieſland*, ſhould by turns keep one of their Commiſſioners at *Helvoetſluys*, in order to hold a conſtant Correſpondence with the Prince, and the Prince's Commander on the Coaſt, as occaſion ſhould require, touching the victualling and repairing of the ſaid Ships; and the Commiſſioners of the Admiralty were not to intermeddle in the leaſt with the diſpoſal of the ſaid Ships.

Ibid. *p.* 360. And this went ſo far, that Vice Admiral *Lieſhebber* inſtead of going to cruiſe, having convoy'd ſome Merchant Ships out of the Channel, tho by order of the Admiralty of *Roterdam*, was threatned to be ſeverely puniſhed if for the future he followed any other Orders ſave thoſe of the States General and the Prince. By this means our Countrymen were oppreſſed, and the *Dunkirkers* ſo encouraged, that they ventured to take a Merchant Ship even from under the Cannon of *Fluſhing*, and in the North Sea two of our Ships of War; and afterwards falling in among our Doggers, took two Convoyers, beſides the Doggers. So that the Inſurances from *Rochel* and *Bourdeaux* riſing to 8 and 10 *per Cent*, the Sea became uſeleſs to the Inhabitants of theſe Countrys.

Ibid. *p.* 144.

But the Inhabitants never more expoſed to the Dunkirkers *than then.*

Hiſtorical Narration of 1632. *p.* 56. *Bernard Lamp*, having obſerved in his Hiſtory, "That formerly a ſmall number of our "Ships kept the Sea ſo clear againſt all the "Naval Power of the King of *Spain*, that till "the Year 1612 theſe Countrys had very "few Loſſes, wonders that all the States "Ships of War, being little leſs than an hun-"dred Sail, either could not or would not

"keep

" keep the Seas clear of the *Dunkirkers* only,
" for the King's Ships were not employed
" there in thoſe days, but ſome particular
" Owners ſet out for the moſt part ſmall Ships
" for Booty: and adds farther, That a few
" Years after that time, ſo many rich laden
" Merchant Ships were taken by the *Dunkirk-*
" *ers*, that the Loſs was valued at more than
" one hundred Tuns of Gold.

So that our Hiſtorys doubt whether the State was willing to ſcour the Seas, for the Prince was not to be ſpoken of.

But if we conſider how great the difference is, whether the care of ſcouring the Seas be entruſted to thoſe who are much concerned in having them kept clear, and who on that account will uſe the beſt of their Endeavours, or be devolved on ſuch as are not at all concerned in Navigation; we ſhall ceaſe to wonder, when ſo much Power was put into the hands of ſuch as were not intereſted at Sea, and were not a little ſuſpected to fear and envy the Proſperity and Power of *Holland*, that they did not guard the Seas againſt a few Pirats, who for their own Profit ſought their Booty where it was to be found.

In the mean time, to deceive the poor Innocent Commonalty once more, the Directors appointed to take care of the Shipping deſigned to the Eaſtward and *Norway*, were by Placaet continued, and Private Ships of War by great Rewards perſwaded to take and deſtroy the Enemys Ships. Upon which divers good Patriots fitted out Ships for that end; and this ſmall ſtrength being in the hands of thoſe who really intended to deſtroy the Enemys Ships, it was obſerved, eſpecially of two Ships of *Fluſhing*, the one called the *Samſon* mounted with 24 Guns, 100 Seamen, and 30 ſouldiers, and the other called the *Fluſhing*, mounted

But at laſt ſome Privateers being perſwaded by great Rewards, it appeared how eaſily the narrow Seas could be ſcour'd.

See the Placaet book 11 *of* March, 1632. Aitzma p. 145.

ed with 22 Guns, 100 Seamen, and 30 Souldiers, that they took ſo many of the Enemies Ships, and Priſoners, that by their means a general Releaſe was thrice made on both ſides, the *Dunkirkers* ſo diſcouraged and weakned, and the Seas ſo well cleared, that the Inſurances from *Rochel* and *Bourdeaux* fell to three in the hundred.

And by the ill paiment of ſo ſmall a Sum it was ſeen that the Pr. of Orange *and the Deputies would not keep the Seas uninfeſted.*

But becauſe theſe worthy Patriots, among whom *Adrian* and *Cornelis Lamſins* were the chief, for want of *Dunkirk* Privateers could fight for no more Booty, but chiefly by reaſon of the too ſlow, or refuſed paiments of the promiſed Rewards, they fitted out no more Ships, and the clearing of the Seas coming again to depend on the Deputies of the Generality and the Prince of *Orange*, the *Dunkirkers* returned again to Sea as ſtrong in the following Years as before, and made it equally dangerous; the Rates of Inſurance riſing as high as formerly. And it was very obſervable, that tho for the paiment of this ſo neceſſary and well deſerved Reward only two hundred thouſand Guilders were demanded yearly by the Council of State, yet the ſame Council, and the States of *Holland* and *Zealand* jointly, for the Year 1643. before Prince *Henry*'s doting old Age, could not obtain that Sum of the Generality to pay the promiſed Reward to the new Cruiſers, whilſt for the following Years, until our Peace with *Spain*, the ſame or greater Petitions for Mony by Land and Sea were granted to the Council of State, and conſented to, and born by the *Hollanders*. So that *Holland* from the Year 1632. to the Year 1647. was neceſſitated to take up ſixty nine Millions, making with the forementiond fifty

Aitzma *p.* 146.

Ibid. *p.* 512.

ty and one, one hundred and twenty Millions of Guilders at Intereſt, beſides thirteen Millions that were to be paid for currant Debts, that the Prince and the Deputies of the Generality might proceed in their Offenſive Wars by Land.

And their ill influence eſpecially appear'd about the Weſt-India *Company.*

And as if it were not enough that the good People of theſe Countrys, and the State of *Holland* it ſelf were every way oppreſt by Land with ſo many Impoſts, Taxes, and immenſe Sums of Mony taken up at Intereſt, as well as by continual and unexpreſſibly great Loſſes by Sea, the Deputies of the Generality and the Prince of *Orange* likewiſe deſired, and from time to time very ſubtilly, and with promiſes of Gratuities to the Directors of the *Weſt-India* Company, That they would deſiſt from their Trade which was driven for the common Benefit of the Subſcribers, and which according to their Oath might not ceaſe, and would employ that Mony for the indiſpenſible Service of the Country, by carrying on a more vigorous War againſt the King of *Spain*. And by ſuch powerful Solicitations, and artificial Promiſes, they were induced to make not a Merchant-like, but a Prince-like War, and to make thoſe Royal Conqueſts of *Brazil*, *Angola*, St. *Thomas*, &c. for the Benefit of the States General, and of the Prince, as indeed was * at firſt deſign'd.

See the Remonſtrance and Requeſt for continuing their Charter, 1668. *p.* 3, 4, &c.

By this means the greateſt part of their Capital Stock was conſumed and embezeled, and the honeſt Subſcribers with other Inhabitants concerned in that Company

* Tibi Roma ſubegerit Orbem.

They made the Participants poor, and then deſerted them.

J. de Laat's *ſhort Relation*, f. 25. Aitzma f. 198.

loſt above one hundred and eighteen Millions of Guilders: And when the ſaid Company afterwards were grown ſo weak that they could no longer keep thoſe vaſt Conqueſts by their own Power, the Deputies of the Generality, and the ſucceſſive Princes of *Orange*, for whoſe Benefit thoſe Lands were conquered, meanly abandoning their own Intereſt, ſuffered theſe excellent and vaſt Countrys to fall into and continue in the hands of the falſe and treacherous *Portugueſe*; whereby our Inhabitants loſt (beſides the foreſaid vaſt Sums) in Goods, Chattels, Houſes, Debts, *&c.* fifty Millions of Guilders more, and were alſo utterly excluded from that advantagious Trade and Navigation. But to return to the Government and Conduct of Publick Affairs in our *Netherlands*, I ſay, that tho *Holland* was thus intolerably oppreſt, and born down, yet in the Year 1633, *Rynberg* was taken; and in the Year 1634, *Breda* and *Maſtricht* were beſieged in vain, and our chargeable Army lay along time in the *Langeſtraat*. And in the Year 1635, with a very great Army, and more charge, we did nothing in the Field, only *Tienen* was plundered, and *Schenkenſchans* loſt. Likewiſe in the Year 1636, our Army with many Ships lay about the *Schans* of *Voorn*, and afterwards in the *Langſtraat* to no purpoſe. And in the Year 1637, *Breda* was taken with very great charges: and on the other ſide, *Venlo* and *Ruremonde* were loſt. As alſo in the following Year, after great Expence, we loſt much Reputation before *Calloo*, where the Enemy kill'd 2000 of our Souldiers, and took 1200 Priſoners, with all our Cannon, eighty Ships,

Chuſing rather to keep up the War by Land, to run the Treaſury of Holland 120 *Millions in debt.*

See Aitzma *upon the reſpective years.*

Ships, and much Baggage. And tho our Army that lay before *Gelder* was much ſtronger than the Enemy, yet we quitted the Siege, with the loſs of ſix Demicannon, and two Standards. In the Year 1639, our Army with 15 hundred Veſſels in *Flanders* effected nothing, and were again compelled to retreat from before *Gelder*, and march to *Rynberg*. The ſame Army did afterwards no better at *Hulſt*; nor in the following Year 1640, at which time Count *Henry* of *Frieſland* was there killed; and our Army tho intrench'd drew off a third time in a flying Poſture from *Gelder*, without daring to encounter a much weaker Enemy, the Prince of *Orange* having then the Conduct and Command in Perſon, who notwithſtanding many expenſive and fruitleſs Expeditions into *Flanders*, *Brabant*, and *Gelderland*, had by his exceſſive Power in theſe Countrys gained the Name of a very Wiſe and Valiant General. But in *Flanders* and *Burgundy* he was derided even in their Comedies for a Coward; in one of which he was anatomiz'd, and upon ſearch his Heart found in his Heels, the Rabble having nothing more frequently in their mouths than the following Rhyme, J. V. Veens *Rymes.*

* *Prince* Henry *has no Courage,*
Takes neither Town nor Village.

However in the Year 1641, with exceſſive Expences he took *Genniper*-houſe after a bloody Siege of ſeven weeks. And in the Year 1642,

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* Le Prince Heny eſt ſans Courage,
Il ne prend Ville ni Village.

as alſo in 1643, our Army was in the Field about 6 Months without effecting any thing; but in the year 1644, after ſix weeks Siege, and much Blood ſpilt, the *Sas van Gent* was taken. And finally in the Year 1645, after a long Campagn, and ſix weeks Siege, *Hulſt* was yielded. And tho our Army lay in the Year 1646 about *Antwerp*, and afterwards before *Venlo*, yet we got nothing but Diſhonour in thoſe Attempts.

All which Sums were moſtly employ'd to aggrandize France, *while the Sea was neglected.*

And it is obſervable, that all our chargeable Campagns, and Taxes for the Army, tended chiefly to increaſe the Power of the *French*, (who in the mean time took many Cities from the *Spaniard*) but not at all to the benefit of our own People, either by Sea or Land. For tho the Province of *Holland* contributed in extraordinary Subſidies two Millions yearly for ſcouring of the Seas, and continued ſo to do to the end of the War; yet the other *United Provinces* were not ſo forward. And tho for ſome Years paſt, the Governments of *Spain* and *Flanders* ſet not out any Ships for Booty againſt us, but left that work to be carried on by private Capers, yet the Sea remained ſtill infeſted in ſuch a manner, that the *Dunkirkers* in the Year 1635 took all the Buſs-Convoys, and many Buſſes, while moſt of our Ships of War for want of paiment lay by the Walls.

Aitzma.

And tho the Council of State, and the States of *Holland* complained of this neglect at Sea, and pray'd that ſome better Order might be ſettled for prompt paiment of the Premiums promiſed to the particular Privateers, by whom we had reaped great Advantage; yet the Deputys of the Generality, or rather

rather thoſe of the Princes Cabinet, according to their old way, found it convenient once more to delude the well meaning People; and to appeaſe them, *Anno* 1636, they accuſed and diſmiſs'd fourteen Sea Captains, with ſome further Puniſhment, making a new Regulation concerning the guarding of the *Flemiſh* Coaſt, and keeping the Narrow Seas uninfeſted by 22 Ships and ten Yachts, which were to be under the inſpection of the Prince of *Orange*, and ſuch Deputys of the Generality as he ſhould pleaſe to chuſe. Theſe depending on the Prince's favour, and making that their Aim and Intereſt more than the Service of their Native Country, labouring by all means tō augment the Prince's Authority, and leſſen that of the States, by this means had the Name of the *Cabinet Lords* given them by the Lovers of their Countrys Freedom; and ſo you will find them nam'd ſometimes in the following diſcourſe. And this was really * what *Tacitus* ſaid of *Auguſtus Ceſar*: "This Prince rais'd "himſelf by degrees, graſping into his own "hands the buſineſs of the Senate, of the "Magiſtrates, and of the Laws; while no "body dar'd to oppoſe him: For the ſtouteſt "were cut off, either by being ſent to the Ar-"my, or by Proſcription. The reſt of the "Nobility, by how much the more they were "ſlaviſh in temper, by ſo much the more were

Ibid. *p.* 344.

Polity of the Cabinet Lords was only to aggrandize the Prince, and to leſſen Holland.

* Princeps inſurgere paulatim, munia Senatus, Magiſtratuum, Legum in ſe trahere, nullo adverſante: cum ferociſſimi per acies, aut proſcriptione ceciderent. Cæteri nobilium quanto quis ſervitio promptior, opibus & honoribus extollerentur: ac novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & preſentia, quam vetera & periculoſa mallent. *Tacit. Annal.* l. 1. c. 1.

" they advanc'd to Wealth and Honours, " choſe rather to ſit down contented with " their preſent State of Security, than to ven- " ture the recovering of their antient Liber- " ty with running any hazard. The uſual way of all crafty and arbitrary Uſurpers.

So that to enlarge the Authority of the Prince of *Orange* over the Navigation of *Holland*, and to put it effectually under his Power, eleven hundred and eight thouſand eight hundred and ſeventy Guilders were yearly levied, and Superintendants appointed for that Service, with Purveyors or Victuallers, who were to be accountable to the Chamber of Accounts of the *Generality*. Alſo all Commanders and Captains were choſen by the ſaid Prince, who were to be puniſhed by a Council of War of his Nomination, and a narrow Scrutiny to be made into their Conduct. And to encourage them to do their Duties, their Wages were raiſed. So that according to this new Order, the reſpective Admiralties had nothing to tranſact, but to be Judges of the Prizes taken, to collect the Convoy and Cuſtom Revenues, with which, and with two Millions of Subſidies, they were to ſet out Ships of War, to be Convoys to the Weſtward.

So that Jonker Philips van Dorp *laid down his Commiſſion of Admiral.* Ibid. *B.* 7. *p.* 619.

But it ſoon appeared that this new Authority, which was put into the hands of thoſe who had nothing to loſe at Sea, produced worſe Effects than ever: For, before the Year 1637, there was ſo little Care taken, that *Jonker Philips van Dorp*, Lieutenant Admiral of *Holland*, going to Sea with this Princely Fleet very late, and his Proviſions being ſpent in a very ſhort time, was compelled to return home; and finding that the

Com-

Commonalty accuſed him, and not the Victuallers, nor the Prince of *Orange*, who really were in the Fault, and would poſſibly have puniſhed him rather than the Guilty, he laid down his Commiſſion. Ibid. *p.* 621.

In the mean time the *Engliſh* challenged the Sovereignty of the narrow Seas, alledging, That the Fiſhery belong'd ſolely to them. But their inteſtine Diviſions, and not our Sea Forces, put a ſtop to that work, and their Herring-fiſhing, then newly begun, ceaſed. It is obſervable, that when they had taken their Herring at one and the ſame time and place with the *Hollanders*, and ſent them to *Dantzick* in the Years 1637, and 1638, and found that the Herring taken and cured by the *Hollanders* was approved and good, and that the *Engliſh* Herring to the very laſt Barrel were eſteemed naught; they then chang'd their Claim upon the whole Fiſhery, into that of having the Tenth Herring, which the diligent and frugal Inhabitants of *Holland* reputed no leſs than to fiſh for, and pay Tribute to a ſlothful and prodigal People, for a Paſſage by the Coaſt of *England*, which yet muſt have been paid, had not the free Government of the States of *Holland*, in the Year 1667, brought thoſe Maritime Affairs into another State and Condition. Selden's Mare Clauſum. Airzma *B.* 16. *p.* 266. Ibid. *p.* 277. *Mr.* Semeins Harink. Viſſery

And the K. of England *pretended to the Dominion of the Narrow Seas.*

In the ſame Year 'twas publickly ſhewn, " That the Inhabitants of theſe Countries " could not poſſibly keep the Sea any longer after this manner, and amongſt others, " they brought the Example of *Maeſland-Sluice*, whence there uſed every harveſt Sea- " ſon about fifty Veſſels for Haddock to go " to Sea, which number was in the laſt Har- Airzma, *Book* 17. *p.* 622.

And when our ruined Inhabitants complained of their loſſes by Sea, and impriſonment of their Perſons,

" veſt 1636, diminiſhed to ten, out of which
" alſo two were taken. That their Dog-
" ger-fiſhing, which was not to be parallel'd
" in *Europe*, was now become ſo inconſider-
" able, that it was doubted whether in the
" Year 1637, ſo much as one Dogger would
" go to Sea for Salt Cod, ſeeing ſince the firſt
" of *January* 1631, there had been taken of
" the *Maeſland Sluice* Veſſels by the *Dunkirkers*
" alone, above two hundred Ships, each of
" them, one with the other, worth above
" 5000 Guilders: There having the like loſs
" hapned in other Havens, of Veſſels ſet out
" for Fiſhing; ſo that the general cry of the
" People of thoſe Places aſcended to the
" Heavens, and was ſufficient to melt a Heart
" of ſtone.

And ſeeing the Merchants who ſuſtained the Loſs, and the Wives, Children, Parents, and Relations of the impriſoned Seamen, and Fiſhers continually upbraided the Admiral, Vice-Admiral, and Captains of Ships, with their ill Conduct; Prince *Henry* ſeemed to lament their Caſe, more than that of the miſerable Commonalty, ſaying, That there is no Condition more wretched than that of the Admiral, and Sea-Captains, ſeeing that the meaneſt Fiſher-wife having loſt her Huſband, exclaimed, that the Admirals and Sea-Captains did not their Duty, *&c.* and yet to pacify the People, who fooliſhly conceiv'd that the Gentlemen *Opdam*, *Hautain*, *Naſſaw*, and *Dorp*, were ſucceſſively the ſole Cauſe of their paſt Calamitys, the Pr. of *Orange* choſe two Tarpaulins (as ſome call them) *Martin Harperſon Tromp*, and *Witte Corneliſſen de Witte*, for Admiral and Vice-Admiral. But it ſoon appeared,

It was little regarded by P. Henry. Aitzma *p.* 343. *on the Year* 1636.

To pacify thoſe innocent Perſons he placed Tarpaulins for Admirals inſtead of Yonkers or Gentlemen.

*

peared, that thoſe mentioned Loſſes were but ſorrily provided againſt by the continual ill Management of publick Affairs at Land, and the neglect of ſecuring the Seas. For tho the King of *Spain* and the Government of *Flanders*, had for a long time forborn to ſet out Ships of War to prey upon us in the narrow Seas, yet did not the Owners of Privateers at *Dunkirk* neglect to ſet out their Capers; but in the Year 1638, by reaſon of the Diſorders about our Coaſt-Ships, and clearing of the Seas according to the old practice, they did not only go to Sea, and take many Merchant-men, but alſo about the end of *October* diſpers'd all the Buſſes, which fled home very much diſabled, and ſome without their Nets; while Admiral *Tromp* coming on Shore himſelf to be revictualled, accuſed Vice-Admiral *Berkhem*, who came in likewiſe, without the leaſt Neceſſity, and for which he was diſmiſſed by the new Council of War, tho unheard, and the poor ſuffering Commonalty were with this Puniſhment once again appeaſed in ſome meaſure, but not ſo the States of *Holland*, who knowing that the Prince of *Orange*, and Deputies of the Generality had now, as often before, made uſe of the Product of the Convoys, Cuſtoms, and Subſidies, which were only to be applied to Maritime Affairs, for carrying on the War by Land, (by which means the guarding and clearing of the Seas came to be neglected) earneſtly deſired that all Sums of Mony which had formerly been appropriated to the Service of the Sea, might be effectually applied that way.

Aitzma, *Book* 18. *p.* 91. *and* Book 19. p. 172.

When yet the loſſes by Sea continued, the States of Holland *complained, that the Mony collected to clear the Seas was imploy'd for Land Service.*

And ſeveral Cities in *Holland*, together with the Province of *Utrecht*, taking notice of

of the Diſorder and ill Management of the Prince, and his aſſumed Cabinet-Council, in our Maritime Affairs, ſhewed their unwillingneſs to bring in their Portion of the 1108870 Guilders, which were yearly demanded by the Prince for that end; yet on account of his great Power, *Holland*, and divers other Provinces were obliged to bear the burden, to the Year 1647, and our Peace with *Spain*. And tho at the beginning of the Year 1639, in a Sea-Fight about *Dunkirk*, we got the Victory, in which the *Dunkirkers* loſt two Ships of War; yet did *Tromp* then with the Ships under his Command, very imprudently leave the Sea; ſo that the *Dunkirkers* came and brav'd us before our Harbours, where, by reaſon of our defective Management in refitting and victualling, they lay till mid-*June*, and took 13 of our Ships in a ſhort time.

It is no wonder that the Dunkirkers *took our Ships before our Ports.*

Aitzma, *Book* 14. *p.* 168.

And whilſt *Tromp* afterwards waited for the great *Spaniſh* Fleet, *Anno* 1639, between the two Peers of *Dover* and *Calais* and before *Dunkirk*, our Merchant-men and Fiſhers were abandoned, thirty or forty Privateers of *Dunkirk* lying at the Mouth of our Harbours, ſo that none of our Merchant Ships, or Buſſes durſt go to Sea. And upon this followed in *October* the Engagement about the *Downs*, where the *Spaniard* having loſt by ſinking, burning, ſtranding and taking, 40 Ships, moſt of ours came home; and having left the Sea, the *Dunkirkers* came again before our Harbours, and in few days took twenty ſeven Prizes, of which 11 in one day. And thus by continual Diſorders and Loſſes at Sea, the Trade of theſe Countries was ſo diminiſhed, that the Revenues of the Admiralties, in the Year 1628, having

Pag. 229.

Even after our Victory in the Downs.

having yielded about sixteen hundred thousand Guilders, those very Duties, to the 24*th* of *October* this Year, notwithstanding the new Impositions, produced to the State only twelve hundred thousand Guilders. And therefore it was thought necessary to erect a new Tax of Tonnage, which should amount to five hundred and ninety eight thousand five hundred and seventy five Guilders, and also another new Tax to clear the Seas, which might produce five hundred eighty one thousand and seventeen Guilders. Ibid. *p.* 230. *See the Placaet Book.*

However the Deputies of *Holland*, in the Assembly of the States-General, and Presence of the Prince of *Orange*, declared, "That "it was the Intention of their Princi- "pals, that the Cruisers or Privateers, by "whom the Country had been so signally "served, and who had only declined that "Service because they were not paid their "promised Rewards, should be invited to "return to Sea, and that a certain Fund "should be appointed for their immediate "payment. But this just and useful motion was neglected. Aitzma, *p.* 230.

Matters standing thus, Prince *Henry* and the Deputies of the Generality, endeavoured to persuade the States of *Holland*, and privately the Cities in an unwarrantable manner, that the Colledges and Orders of the Admiralties were not sufficient to clear the Seas from Enemies; and therefore moved the said Cities to consent, that the Equippage of Ships might be continued at *Helvoetsluce*, and for that end, that a new College of Admiralty might be erected to reside at the *Hague*, and that an Insurance Company might be esta- *Which the Deputies of the Generality, and P.* Henry *proposing to secure with many new Expedients*; Aitzma, *Book* 19. *p.* 230.

eſtabliſhed, as before mentioned, and ſettled by Patent. And moreover, that the Revenues of the Admiralties might be farmed to ſuch as ſhould bid moſt. And laſtly, that all Perſons being under Oath to the Generality, ſhould be tried for their Faults and Crimes by the Council of State, or the reſpective Admiralties.

The States of Holland, *and eſpecially the Magiſtrates of* Amſterdam, *ſet themſelves ſtoutly againſt it.*

In oppoſition to which the States of *Holland* ſhewed how prejudicial thoſe Equipments, or ſetting out Ships to Sea, had been by means of the Superintendants and Purveyors, or Victuallers at *Helvoetſluys*; and alſo that the Admiralties of *Zeland* and *Frieſland* reſpectively had never conſented to have any Equipments made there: That moſt of the Provinces, except *Holland*, in the payment of their proportion of 1108870 Guilders deſigned thereunto, were always ſlow and remiſs, as to the whole, or elſe deficient in part; and that the Admiralty's would and could better equip or ſet forth Ships to Sea than others; and that an Inſurance Company would ſo burden and clog our Trade, that our Inhabitants would not be able to ſell ſo cheap as our Neighbours: And that the Farmers would not have any regard to the durable Proſperity of Commerce, but to their preſent Profit, and poſſibly might value themſelves upon the ſeizure of Goods, whereby they might ſo plague the Merchants, that they would rather ceaſe trading, or leave the Country. And concerning the point of Juriſdiction to be granted to the Generality, and to the reſpective Admiralties, that 'tis a matter of ſo great Importance, that the whole Sovereignty of the Provinces would neceſſarily be thereby transferred to them.

But

But the Prince of *Orange* and the Deputies of the Generality were not well pleaſed with the Repreſentation made by the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, and ſtill reſolved to carry on their Deſign, and by their Greatneſs to overpower them, ſending notable Addreſſes, however illegal, for that end, to the particular Cities, and eſpecially to the Burgemaſters and Council of *Amſterdam*; by whoſe good Management, and firm Oppoſition, as alſo by Prince *Henry*'s ſmooth and eaſy Maxims which hitherto he had followed, that he might be thought unlike his hated Brother, together with a fear of being reputed as Arbitrary as *Maurice* had been, this Deſign failed, and went no further.

Aitzma, B. 19. p. 176.

So that they proceeded no further; the Sea in the interim being as much infeſted as before, tho the States of Holland *repreſented how eaſily it might be kept clear.*

And tho *Holland* was thus ſaved from ſudden Ruin, yet the uneaſineſs and loſſes of the Trading and Maritime Inhabitants ſtill continued: ſo that the Council of State, and the States of *Holland*, once more remonſtrated, that the private Capers of *Dunkirk* had done us much more Miſchief than ever the King's Ships had done; and that we on our ſide had ſeen that our Cruiſers fitted out by private Men, in hopes of the Reward promiſed for taking the Enemies Ships, had in a ſhort time purged the Seas from Depredations; and that thoſe Robbers were again abroad, perceiving our Capers, for want of ſuch payment, went out no more againſt the *Dunkirk* Robbers, but only againſt Merchant Ships; and therefore the ſaid States moſt inſtantly deſired to have the Placaet renewed, whereby the ſaid Rewards may certainly and immediately be paid. But this was not granted.

By

By means of all which Diſorders it was no wonder that little leſs than nineteen Millions was granted according to the Petitionary Requeſt of the Council of State for this Year, and yet nothing done. On the contrary, Lieutenant Admiral *Tromp*, on the 14th of *March* of the enſuing Year 1640, gave Advice, that the *Dunkirkers* had then 40 Sail of Ships at Sea, taking rich Prizes, and skimming the Seas by Squadrons: So that the very Convoys of this State were unſecure, and often taken; and that on our ſide Vice-Admiral *de Witte* was at Sea with 6 or 7 Sail only: So that the great Loſſes of the Merchants, which had continued ſo many Years, produced in the Years 1639, and 1640, in the Province of *Holland*, and chiefly at *Amſterdam*, more Bankrupts of the richeſt and worthieſt Traders than ever had been known or heard in theſe Countries. And for this reaſon thoſe of *Holland* propoſed to the Aſſembly of the States-General, in Preſence of the Prince of *Orange*, and concluded, That the reſpective Admiralties ſhould, as formerly, ſet out Ships for guard of the Coaſt, and Cruiſers; and that four Receivers ſhould be appointed to receive the Mony required to that end, that ſo it might not be mixed with other Monies, or employed to pay the Debts of the Admiralties.

All which Loſſes and Taxes occaſioned a vaſt number of Bankrupts.

Aitzma, *B.*22. *p.* 190.

And in regard every one could perceive that this Order was not effectual enough to clear the Seas, 159 of the principal Merchants of *Amſterdam*, in the beginning of the Year 1641, joined with the States of *Holland*, and beſought the States General, that better care might be taken to keep in the *Dunkirkers* than formerly;

The States of Holland *again threatned to defer paying the unneceſſary Land Forces, the better to clear the Seas, but for fear omitted it.*

formerly; adding, That in caſe it were not done, they would detain their Mony given for payment of 50 Companies of Souldiers, levied in the Year 1628, and clear the Seas themſelves. But at that time the Prince of *Orange*, and the Deputies of the Generality, who were ſupported and encouraged by him, were ſtill ſo much dreaded, that the States of *Holland* durſt not undertake to intermeddle with a matter ſo much for the Advantage of our Trade and Fiſhery. Wherefore the *Dunkirkers* continued going to Sea, and not only ſo, but took Prizes at the Mouth of our Harbours: Particularly in *April* 1642, with 22 Frigots they ſeized all they met with, and among others, eighteen Ships belonging to *Zierickzee*. And on the 5*th* of *November* 10 *Dunkirk* Frigots were ſo bold, that they fell upon the whole *Ruſſia* Fleet; and having taken of them eight Merchant Ships, and a Man of War, the other Convoy with eight *Ruſſia* Men more, hardly eſcaped.

Aitzma *Book* 22. *p.* 360.

So that the Dunkirkers *gain'd Ground upon us.* J. V. Sand. *Hiſt.*

And altho the Deputies of the great Fiſhery had complained in *June* to the Deputies of the Generality of their Loſſes, and deſired better Protection; yet we may eaſily perceive how little the Prince of *Orange*, and the Deputies, regarded the Loſs, and Complaints of the Seamen, and trading Inhabitants, ſince inſtead of redreſſing matters, they had not only in the foregoing Year employed the Mony granted for that end, in ſetting out a Fleet of twenty Ships for the Aſſiſtance of *Portugal*; but alſo, tho that Fleet had effected nothing for the Benefit of theſe Countries, nor could do it, yet nevertheleſs for the ſame end, the Generality made a new demand

And that in lieu of redreſſing our Merchants and Fiſhers, Complaints, their Mony was diverted to aſſiſt Portugal.

Aitzma, B. 21. p. 195. B. 22. p. 374.

mand of 600000 Guilders. So that we may juſtly ſay, that the Prince of *Orange*, with the Deputys of the Generality, and the Inland Provinces, made it their principal Buſineſs to pay their Land Army, and in caſe of any Deficiency, to connive at falſe Muſters; taking all poſſible care ſo to order matters, that the Taxes for the Army might be well paid, or elſe *Holland* was put to find Mony or Credit for that purpoſe. Yet for all this, when the States of *Holland* had freely and readily levied many and great Taxes to clear the Seas, they were forced to let them fall into the hands of thoſe who employed them to other Ends: The States of *Holland* continuing in ſuch an awful Reverence for the Prince; and ſome others who laboured more to advance his Intereſt, and get his Favour, than to procure the Proſperity of the Country, that they durſt not make uſe of their own Mony to clear the Sea. Only thoſe of *Holland* and *Zealand* conſulted together to ſcour the Seas at their own Charge, diſtinct from the other Provinces; but would not execute their Project for fear of offending the Prince. Yet thoſe of *Zealand* took a vigorous Reſolution to erect a *Weſtern* Society, to ſet out 24 Ships of War, out of the Produce of a Duty of one *per Cent.* upon all Goods inward, and one half *per Cent.* upon all Goods outward bound, to maintain Convoys for all Ships to the *Weſtward*, forwards and backwards.

And the Officers of the Army paid to the full, and liberally rewarded beſides.

New Taxes propoſed to defend the Weſtern Navigation, under direction of particular Perſons.

By all which it appears how much the Trade and Navigation of our People was at that time abandoned by the Government: For the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-India* Companys, together with the

the *Greenland* Company, prohibited them sailing into those Seas. The great Fishery Northward and Eastward, were forc'd to pay their own Convoys. The *Straits* Ships were to defend themselves against the *Turks* by their chargeable manning and arming, according to the new Regulation. And yet they deliberated to put the Charge of Convoying Westward upon the Merchants, as if all Dutys raised for Convoys, Customs, and Subsidys, as well as all other Imposts, were paid for nothing, and ought to be wrested from the trading Inhabitants, and other People of *Holland*, to the end that Province might not increase, but decay in Power and Riches.

As if all other Taxes were paid for nothing, and all the Inhabitants that used the Sea were perfectly abandoned of the State.

But the Western Society not going on, those of *Holland* and *Zealand* jointly remonstrated so earnestly the necessity of better clearing of the Seas, and the usefulness of private Ships of War, if care were taken that the Rewards so often promised might be readily paid, that at last in the Year 1643, out of certain new Imposts a Fund was raised of 200000 Guilders to pay the Reward promised for all the Enemys Ships of War that had been taken. So that by renewing the Placaet, the Inhabitants and Magistrates of the Citys of *Holland* were encouraged to set out Ships of War for that Service.

But at last the States of Holland *and* Zealand *procured a certain Fund for the Premium.* Aitzm. *P.* 578.

And tho the Commonalty during this long and ill Government of Publick Affairs, were made to believe that the Sea was so wide and vast, that it could not be cleared from the *Dunkirkers*; yet by these new Cruisers which were set out by the Magistrates of *Amsterdam* and *Roterdam*, the Citys of *North-Holland*,

land, and ſome particular Perſons of *Zealand*, it ſoon appeared, that not only the Narrow Seas, but the Ocean alſo could very well be freed of them: For ſo ſoon as the clearing of the Seas was effectually undertaken, and Men encouraged by the Reward, there were ſo many *Spaniſh* Men of War taken, and beaten out of the Seas, that in lieu of giving 8 or 10 *per Cent.* for Inſurance to *Rochel* or *Bourdeaux*, it fell to two or three only.

And tho by their free and open Navigation thus procured, and the Increaſe of Commerce both in *Holland* and *Zealand* which followed thereupon, thoſe Provinces were likely to grow ſo ſtrong, as to be too high to crouch to the Captain and Admiral-General; yet Prince *Henry* weakned with Age, could not remedy that growing Inconveniency, as he had formerly done. Which was ſo well known to the States, and particularly to thoſe of *Holland*, that in the Year 1645, the new Cruiſers were encouraged to continue their care of the Seas, by more advantagious Conditions than before: Till in the end a Peace with *Spain* was concluded in the Year 1648. which put an end to the War, and *Flemiſh* Privateering.

See the Placaet Book of the States General.

But whilſt the Prince of *Orange*, and his Cabinet-Council, the Deputys of the Generality, tranſported with Ambition, and jealouſy of *Holland*'s Greatneſs and Power, helpt to break the Ballance between *France* and *Spain* to the prejudice of all *Europe*, and of us in particular, making the Crown of *France* viſibly to preponderate the other, and too long favouring their Arms with ſo great Imprudence, that Admiral *Tromp* with his Princely

Princely Fleet of Coaſt-ſhips, holding in the Years 1644, 1645, and 1646 ſucceſſively, *Graveling*, *Mardike*, the *Schuurtien*, and *Dunkirk* it ſelf block'd up by Sea, cauſed them to fall into the hands of the *French*. In recompence of which they burden'd our Countrymen reſiding in *France* with higher Dutys than any other Nation paid. Beſides which they ſhew'd their thieviſh Nature, by ſeizing in the *Mediterranean* Seas as many as they could of our Merchant Ships, eſpecially the Richeſt; and manifeſted their Unfaithfulneſs againſt their even too faithful Allys. So that whereas in times paſt we had traded in ſome parts of *Italy* belonging to the King of *Spain* with freedom, and without ſearch, the *French* cauſed all our Ships to ſtrike; and having by Letters or Bills of Lading found any Enemys Goods on board, they did not only confiſcate them, but alſo all the *Holland* Goods with them: Whereby the Merchants of *Amſterdam* alone, as they have owned, loſt more than ten Millions of Guilders. Which added to the Revolt of the treacherous *Portugueſe* in *Brazil*, *Angola*, and *St. Thomas*, lay ſo heavy upon them, that in the Years 1646, and 1647, Bankrupts were become frequent and great; our Traffick and Exchange-Banks being at a ſtand for ſome time, no Man knowing whom to truſt. And indeed how great thoſe Loſſes muſt have been that were able to ruin ſo many rich and worthy Merchants, may appear, if we conſider that the *Engliſh*, during the War of the Years 1652, and 1653, having taken in the *Channel* and *North-Sea* an incredible number of our Merchants Ships, nevertheleſs very few Bankrupts were ſeen

See Aitzma *on thoſe reſpective Years.*

At laſt we had Peace with Spain, *but* France *began to prey upon us by Sea.*

Which cauſed a vaſt number of Bankrupts.

amongſt our Merchants, and almoſt none except among the Inſurers.

But how theſe *French* Depredations ceaſed after the death of the laſt Captain-General, ſhall be explained hereafter among the good Fruits of the free and eaſy Government of *Holland*. And now for concluſion, I ſhall deſire the Reader, if he doubt of the Truth here related concerning our Affairs of State and War by Sea and Land, to examine the ſame more amply and fully by the Books of *Lewis van Aitzma* (by the confeſſion of all an Authentick Hiſtorian) from whence theſe Particulars are for the moſt part extracted, and to conſider at the ſame time whether the increaſe of the Riches of the Inhabitants of *Holland* in general, during the Government of thoſe Cabinet Lords, and ſucceſſive Princes, be not very impertinently attributed to that Government, ſeeing that Increaſe, next to the Bleſſing of God, was cauſed by our good ſituation on the Sea, and Rivers, and, as is uſual, by the * deſtructive Wars which laſted very long in other parts, and eſpecially in the neighbouring Countrys: For in the time of old Prince *William*, the Ruin of *Brabant* and *Flanders*, and afterwards in the Times of the Princes *Maurice* and *Henry*, thoſe laſting Wars, and terrible Devaſtations of *Germany*, and many other adjacent Countrys, ſupported and ſupplied our Citys with Manufactures, Merchants and Mechanicks; who finding here the States manner of Government not quite

And theſe new Troubles by Sea laſted till after the death of Pr. William.

The Objection anſwered, That theſe Provinces were advanced under the Government of the ſaid Princes.

* Creſcit interea Roma Albæ ruinis. *Liv.*

over-

overthrown, have under those Remains of publick Freedom, erected many new Manufactures and Trades, and have been able to keep up the old Imployments and Traffick of *Holland*, especially through the Diligence, Vigilance, Valour, and Frugality, which are not only natural to the *Hollanders*, but by the Nature of our Country is communicated to all Foreigners that inhabit among us, according to the old Saying, * *There is a certain secret Virtue natural to the Country of* Holland. So that our Inhabitants by the said Qualifications for the promoting of Traffick and Navigation, having excelled all other neighbouring People, 'tis a wonder that by our beforementioned ill Government in Maritime Affairs, we were not utterly ruined.

Our thriving proceeds from the Wars of our Neighbours, our situation and shadow of Liberty, &c.

'Tis also to be well considered, whether the Inhabitants of *Holland* in such Cases, and indued with such Qualifications, would not have been much more happy under a Free Government by States, than under the Conduct of the three successive Princes beforementioned, and such Deputys of the Generality as continually sought to promote the Prince's Grandeur, and consequently their own, more than the Welfare of the Country.

And whether our own sad Experience hath not abundantly taught us the Truth of the Maxim proposed at the beginning of this Chapter, *viz.* That such Citys and Countrys, whose Rulers ought to be presumed to be more or less concerned to keep the Seas clear of Enemys, ought also to have more or less

* Occulta est Batavæ quædam vis insita terræ.

That Holland *ought not to intruſt the ſcouring of the Seas to any but themſelves.*

Authority and Power about Maritime Affairs, Treaſure, and Militia, by which the Seas are to be kept free and open: And conſequently that the Magiſtrates of the Cities, who are any ways concerned in the flouriſhing of the Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, Shipping, and Guard of the Seas, ought to be intruſted with them and no other Perſons in the World.

CHAP. II.

Above all things War, and chiefly by Sea, is moſt prejudicial; and Peace very beneficial for Holland.

Peace is very neceſſary for Holland.

BUT if the ſcouring of the Seas againſt Sea-Robbers or Enemys is ſo neceſſary for *Holland* during Peace, then much more Peace it ſelf. For beſides that all Sea-robbing is more frequent in War, it deprives our Inhabitants at once of all their Trade to the Enemys Country, and carrys it to the Inhabitants of neutral Nations; beſides which, all Ships, Goods and Debts of the *Hollanders* that are in the Enemys Country are confiſcated, which may give this People an incredible great Blow: For the *Hollanders* do not wait as other People till Men come to buy their Goods in their own Country, and give ready Mony for them, but they tranſport their Goods through the World, and keep them there in Warehouſes waiting for Chapmen; and that which is moſt grievous, when they ſell, in *Europe* they uſually give a Years time for paiment. And

And War detrimental.

more-

moreover, when in any Foreign Country the Growth and Manufactures of that Place are very plentiful and cheap, ſuch Commoditys are preſently bought up by our Merchants, paid with ready Mony, and kept in their Magazins there, till the Seaſon of Exportation and Shipping preſents for other Places, ſo that the Enemy may eaſily make ſeizure of many of our Goods, which we can by no means retaliate.

Becauſe our Debts are confiſcable in an Enemys Country,

And then it alſo commonly happens, that our Enemys either by whole Fleets do intirely obſtruct our Trade by Sea, or by Privateers may make incredible Depredations upon us. For by reaſon that our Fiſhery and Foreign Trade are ſo greatly diſperſed, *Holland* is not able to defend them in all places, and be Maſters at Sea at one and the ſame time; tho we had nothing elſe in charge but only to clear the Seas. Whereas we on the contrary can find little or no Booty at Sea, becauſe we are the only great Traders there.

And our Navigation obſtructed and diſturbed.

And for War by Land, tho it be not ſo prejudicial to *Holland* as by Sea, yet 'tis manifeſtly diſadvantagious to the Merchant, and greatly miſchievous to all the Inhabitants in general, but eſpecially to thoſe that drive a Foreign Trade. And whoſoever doubts of this, let him only conſult the Regiſters of the Admiraltys of *Amſterdam*, with thoſe of other Places, and he will ſee that ſince our Peace with *Spain* our Navigation and Commerce is increaſed one half. The Reader may alſo remember, that during the War, the Convoy and Cuſtoms together did at moſt amount to but 1588763 Guilders, yet when we had Peace, our Convoy-mony alone of all the Admiraltys

Aitzma, *Chap.* 3.

Thereby adding 400000 Guilders for the Revenue of the Admiralty of Zealand, *at which value it is yearly esteem'd here.*

did in the Year 1664, produce 3172898 Guilders, when by calculation it was concluded that the Admiralty of *Zealand* had yearly 400000 Guilders of Revenue, And that is not strange, for the War with *Spain* being carried on both by Sea and Land, our Merchants were put to great troubles and straits: And 'tis a great burden to our Inhabitants to bring into the Field so great and chargeable an Army as to gain fortified Citys from our Neighbours by long Sieges: But it is doubly ridiculous to endeavour to make Men of understanding believe that it tended to the Benefit of *Holland*, when an honourable Peace, or a long Truce was every year offered to us, as often to reject and refuse it, and yet *Holland* was forced to take up a vast Sum of Mony at Interest, and then to take up another Sum to pay those Interests, and all this to carry on an offensive War to gain Conquests and Victorys; which are not only useless, but must needs be very burdensom to a Country whose Frontiers, by means of the Sea and Rivers, are for the most part every where so easy to be fortified and kept, that by purely standing on its own defence, it would certainly be able to confound all Foreign Power that should attack it. Whereas on the other side it is certain, that generally all Republicks, especially those that subsist by Commerce, have been ruined by Offensive Wars and Conquests.

Because Land-Conquests would hasten Holland's *ruin.*

And that this was well known to those that sided with the Prince against those of *Barnavelt*'s Party in this State, the President *Jeannin* testified on the 29th of *August* 1608. in a Letter to Monsieur *Villeroy* Secretary of State in

France,

France, as follows: *It is certain that the States, how weak soever they are, do not lose their Courage, but rather chuse to return to War, than accept a Peace or Truce for many Years upon other Conditions than those formerly mentioned. They* (I conceive he means such as by all means desired a War, and those were, as is well known, of the Prince's Party) *say among themselves, If* France *abandons us, we must ruin, demolish, and abandon some Citys, and Parts of the remotest Provinces, which, by reason of the great charge of keeping 'em, will more weaken than strengthen us; and we must also dismantle some Places of least importance. And moreover they say, that all this being done, they should have wherewith to continue in service* 40000 *Foot and* 2500 *Horse, besides the Navy, thirty years longer: And that therewith they should be strong enough so to tire the King of* Spain, *and after such a manner to exhaust his Treasury, that he will be necessitated to grant the Conditions which now he rejects.*

Which formerly those that were of the Princes Party, as also

And that Prince *Maurice* himself knew very well that these Countrys might be better and with less Expence defended against the Enemy with few Frontier Places than many, appears by a Letter written about 2 months after, to the said Prince by the King of *France*: in which among other Particulars is this Passage. *The great Charge that the War requires you have experimented, and found that the States alone were not able to bear it, nay hardly with the help of Friends, who formerly contributed of their own to bear those Expences. And if it should happen that you by weakness, or want of Mony be necessitated to quit and leave some part of the Country to the Enemy, whereby to defend the rest the better, as the said* Lambert (*the Prince's Envoy*) *hath declared*

Prince Maurice *knew well enough.*

clared to me on your behalf, that you are resolved to do so rather than enter into the said Treaty unless it be first express'd in plain Terms, That the Sovereignty shall ever be and remain in the States, &c.

And yet many Citys have been taken since.

All which Particulars above mentioned being in those days agreed by Statesmen and experienced Souldiers, 'tis as certain that since that time by the Conduct of Prince *Henry*, very many remote Places about the *Scheld*, *Maese* and *Rhyne*, have been taken in and fortified, and that the Generality out of all the Lands and Citys situate out of the voting Provinces (for some of them are not allowed to have their Suffrages) about the Year 1664, had only one Million of Guilders annual Revenue, and yet the keeping of them cost more than 4 Millions yearly; so that those that are of the Prince's Party must in all respects acknowledg, That the States of *Holland* did in the Year 1640, very well represent the matter to Prince *Henry*, by telling him, That it deserv'd consideration, whether it were not better to make no more Conquests, or even to lose some that are already acquired, than by long Sieges, and consequently great Charge to the State, to suffer them suddenly to sink and fall in like an undermined Hill. Upon which there was nothing replied by the Prince, but only that he could not be well pleased to see the Conquests which had cost the Country so much Blood and Treasure, so little esteemed. From all which it is certain that *Holland*'s Interest is to seek after Peace, and not War.

Which altogether yield a Million yearly, and require four Millions.

So that all offensive Wars are to be forborn.

Aitzma *Hist.* p. 104.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

That Holland *hath antiently received theſe Maxims of Peace.*

The Maxims for Peace have antiently been well known in Holland.

AND that the Trading Provinces of the *Netherlands* have always followed theſe Maxims, manifeſtly appears in antient Hiſtory: For the Sovereigns of the Country were never ſuffered by their own Authority to make War, or lay any Impoſition for maintenance of Military Forces, nay not to do it in the meetings of the States, by plurality of Voices. For in theſe exceſſively prejudicial Affairs, they would not hazard their being over-voted. Whereof we have had very many Examples, not only in that rich Trading Province of *Flanders*, but alſo in *Holland*, eſpecially with relation to *England*; with which Country the *Netherlands* could formerly deal well enough. For before the Halls and Tumults had removed the Weaving Trade thither, the *Engliſh* were Shepherds, and Wool-Merchants, and their King receiv'd few other Impoſts than from Wool exported, no leſs depending on the *Netherlands* (the only Woolweavers of *Europe*) than the Weavers on them.

And amongſt others we read in the Year 1389, That Duke *Albert* of *Bavaria*, as Earl of *Holland* and *Zealand*, &c. having brought theſe Provinces, without the conſent of *Dort* and *Zierickzee*, into a War with *England*, the *Engliſh* took many Ships with Wine coming from *Rochel*; and not only releaſed all thoſe that belonged to *Dort* and *Zierickzee*, but

but came to those Places to sell their Prizes, because they had not consented to the War.

Which is demonstrated by the Intercursus Magnus,

And on this Foundation is built the great Intercourse (called *Intercursus Magnus*) between *England* and the *Netherlands*, containing expresly, *That the same Covenant is not only made between the Sovereign Lords of both sides, but between the Vassals, Cities, and Subjects also; so that those who had done the Injury, and not others, should be punished, the Peace and Covenant remaining in full force, for the Benefit of all others, who had not consented to the War, or Injury done. So that if a Ship had sailed out without the Prince's Commission, or the Commission of any City, that City was to make good the Damage done by that Ship.* And this Treaty (which is very observable) was not only signed by Plenipotentiaries, on the behalf of the King of *England*, and the Arch-Duke as Prince of these Lands, but also sealed and signed by the Burgo-masters of the Cities of *Gent*, *Bruges*, *Ipres*, *Dunkirk*, *Newport*, *Antwerp*, *Bergen*, *Dort*, *Delft*, *Leyden*, *Amsterdam*, *Middleburgh*, *Zierickzee*, *Veer*, *Mechelen*, *Brussels*, and *Brill*, An. 1495. All which those on both sides affirm to have been transacted for the greater security of Amity and Trade.

That was signed by all the trafficking Cities.

For the Council of the Cities did not use to be under Oath to the Lord or Prince who usurped, and acquired the nomination of their Magistrates only by means of differences arising among the Cities; but the Cities might of antient times, without Approbation of the Earls, entertain Souldiers in their own Service. On the other side, the Earls used in times of Peace to have no Garisons, Souldiers,

ers, Magazines, or Treasure, which, with the Divisions of the Cities of *Amiens* and *St. Quintin* formerly mortgag'd, were the Cause that they fell from the House of *Burgundy* into the hands of the King of *France*, their antient Lord, in 1470. of which *Philip de Comines* thus speaks: Charles *Duke of* Burgundy *holding an Assembly of the States in his Country*, (*viz.* these Provinces) *represented to them the great Prejudice he had suffered, by having no Souldiery in pay on his Frontiers, as the King had, and that the Frontiers could have been well kept with* 500 *Men at Arms, and might have continued in Peace. He farther acquainted them with the great Dangers which hung over their Heads, and pressed hard for a Supply to maintain* 800 *Lanceers. In the end, the States agreed to allow him* 120000 *Crowns annually, over and above what he received of his ordinary Revenues, not including* Burgundy. *But his Subjects scrupled much to take that Burden upon them, tho to distress* France *with this body of Horse: (for* Lewis *the* 11th, *King of* France, *was the first in* Europe, *who in a time of Peace kept armed Forces on foot). And indeed the States of the* Netherlands *scrupled it not without Reason: For hardly had the Duke rais'd* 5 *or* 600 *of his Horse, but his desire of encreasing their number, and of invading all his Neighbours, grew to that height, that in a short time he brought them to the payment of five hundred thousand Crowns, keeping in pay great numbers of Horse, so that his Subjects were thereby greatly oppress.* Thus far *Comines.*

And it appeared also by the Earls of Holland *having no standing Force, especially in Peace:*

As also by Philip de Comines.

D. Charles *of* Burgundy *the first who kept standing Forces.*

But at the Death of the Duke those standing Horse, in time of Peace, were disbanded till the Year 1547, when that formidable Empe-

Emperor, *Charles* the 5*th*, erected a certain number of ſtanding Troops, conſiſting of 4000 Horſe, commanded by Colonels and Captains, to be ready at all times, upon any Attempt, on the Frontiers, with their Horſes and Arms. But *Philip* the 2*d* of *Spain*, being jealous of theſe armed Inhabitants, neglected to pay and muſter them: ſo that theſe Regiments of the Militia coming to nothing, and he purpoſing in lieu of them, to maintain a ſtanding Army of *Spaniards* in theſe Countries, was oppoſed in that Attempt by the States of the *Netherlands*, which was one of the principal Occaſions of our Commotions and Wars that enſued.

And laſtly, by the Union of Utrecht *it appears how careful theſe* Netherlands *were to avoid a new War.*

And with the Union of *Utrecht*, *Holland* neglected not altogether its Intereſt in this Particular: For according to the 9*th* Article, no plurality of Votes takes place in Affairs of a new War, Contribution, and Peace. Which Freedom the particular Members of *Holland* have conſtantly kept, as well as in the Aſſembly of the States; and not without Reaſon: For ſeeing it is contrary to the Law of Nature, for Men to give another the Power of taking away their Lives, on Condition and Promiſe that he will uſe it wholly for their Benefit; but yet that if he makes an ill uſe of that Power, and will take away their Lives, they may not in Self-Defence uſe their natural Strength againſt him: It follows, that all Obligations which do ſo powerfully oppoſe and prejudice the Welfare of our Country, muſt be null and void, ſo long as we are maſters of our own Government.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Some Caſes laid down, in which it ſeems adviſable for Holland *to engage in a War; and yet thoſe being well weighed, it is concluded, that* Holland *nevertheleſs ought to ſeek for Peace.*

Enquiry made whether it be adviſable,

HAVING in the two laſt Chapters clearly ſhewed, what *Holland*'s Maxims ought to be, and have been of old, *viz.* Peace for her Inhabitants, to purſue the ſame by all convenient means, and decline War: Yet in ſeveral Caſes whereby our People might be incumbred, or vexed, or in danger to be ſo, and when it may be preſumed that our Free-State by Revolution of Time and Affairs, may run the Hazard of being ruined; it may be doubted, whether it would not be adviſable for *Holland* to begin an offenſive War.

To make no War, tho to free our ſelves from foreign Taxes?

I ſhall therefore give you my Thoughts about ſome of them, and do ſay, That we ought never to undertake a War by reaſon of any foreign Impoſition or Toll whatſoever upon Goods; for thoſe Remedies will always be worſe for *Holland* than the Diſeaſe. And the ſame ſeems to be with much more conveniency removed, by charging their Commodities as much here, as our Wares, Merchants, and Mariners are charged in thoſe Parts. In all ſuch Caſes we generally find, that either the high Impoſitions are prohibitions of themſelves, or that the Traffick in thoſe overburdened Commodities thrives as well as before: For if by thoſe Tolls the Commodities

modities burdened are prevented from being imported, he then that so charged them, immediately finds thereby so great a Loss, that of his own accord he usually takes off this Imposition.

And of this we have innumerable Examples; for Histories are filled with Wars which have been in vain carried on, by reason of the raising such Tolls, as the Erectors themselves have at last been glad to lessen, or take wholly away; as lately in *September* 1662, the Republick of *Venice* perceiving how much their Traffick by Sea was diminished, of their own Motion discharged two Tolls, the one named the 6 *per Cent.* and the other on Goods that came Westward from Sea.

Not to ballance the States of Europe?

On the other side, there occurs to my thoughts another great piece of Folly, *viz.* That the Merchants of *Holland* and the State it self being founded upon Traffick, should yet make use of it for a perpetual Maxim, and continue in their present unfortified Condition, in which often for fear of a future and sharper War, they will be contriving to ballance the States of *Europe*. For when we have impregnably fortified all our Cities and Frontiers, as we ought, we may then, according to the Interest of our State say to all People, *Give Peace in our days, O Lord.* And if the worst happens, by sitting still we shall so strengthen and improve our Land, Sea-forces, and Treasure, that no Power will be easily brought to attack us, but rather some weaker State. Whereas now on the contrary, we exhaust our Treasure, and weaken our selves every way, not knowing whether we shall ever overcome these Inconveniences, which either by want of

We must endeavour first to grow strong and healthful.

of Fortifications, or our obſtinacy, we pull down upon our own Heads: and being weaker by our own Negligence or Wantonneſs, we may, after having wreſtled with thoſe Difficulties, more eaſily fall from one weakneſs into another, and ſo be at laſt overpowered.

As all skilful Phyſicians hold it for a good Maxim, * That one means of preſerving Health, is to refrain from Health-drinking: So they always diſſuade from taking Phyſick in time of Health, for fear of future Sickneſs, becauſe thereby we frequently bring Sickneſs and Death upon our ſelves: Whereas by good Fortifications, and temporizing, we may eſcape, *Chi ha tempo ha vita.* And in all Caſes Phyſick weakens the Body, and the continual uſe of it ſhortens a Man's Life. And therefore we may well make uſe of that wholeſom Counſel, as moſt agreeable to our Provinces, *viz.* of uſing no Phyſician. For if *Holland* takes care to provide every thing neceſſary, and then ſtands in its own Defence; it is not to be overpowered by any Potentate on Earth. If we run to quench every Fire, for fear the War ſhould paſs over others, and kindle in our own Buildings, we ſhall certainly conſume our ſelves by degrees, and by our own Actions be ruined.

In ſhort, *Holland* taking due care of things, is ſo powerful as not to be conquered by any, except perhaps by *England*, if that Nation ſhall be willing to ruin it ſelf: So that we may truly ſay, That if *Holland*, for fear of a

Holland's *Intereſt, ſince the weakneſs of the* Spaniard, *is perfectly another thing.*

* Una ſalus ſanis nullam potare ſalutem.

War; shall begin a War, it must for fear of the Smoak leap into the Fire. And this Folly cannot be excused in any measure by that Maxim which we used here, in the beginning of our Troubles, * *War is better than uncertain Peace*. For seeing we then made War for our Freedom, or at least the shadow of it, against our own Prince, it is certain that all Peace, of what nature soever, would have disarmed the States of these Provinces, and depriv'd them of their Strength. And on the other side, the King of *Spain* remaining Prince of these Countries, and able to keep on foot some standing Forces in all his other Territories, might have made himself, at any time, absolute Lord of these Parts, without regard either to Promises, Oaths, or Seals; and then have punished all those at Will and Pleasure, who at any time had opposed him.

But now, God be praised, the States of *Holland* living in a time of Peace, are alone in possession of all the Strength of the Country, and are able to govern it better than in War, without the controul of any, according to their own Pleasures: so that the contrary is now true in *Holland*, † War is much worse than an uncertain Peace. And among all pernicious things, except the intolerable slavery of being govern'd by the Will of a single Person, nothing is more mischievous than a War: for if War be the very worst thing that can befal a Nation, then an uncertain Peace must be

Whether an uncertain Peace be worse than a War.

* Pace dubia Bellum potius.

† Bellum pace dubia pejus, & malorum omnium pessimum.

bad,

bad, becauſe a War is likely to enſue.

But ſome may further ask; ſeeing Peace is ſo neceſſary for *Holland*, whether out of a ſtrong deſire of a firm and laſting Peace, we ought not, when once engaged, to continue in War, till we have compell'd the Enemy to a well grounded Peace?

No ſuch thing as a certain Peace.

To this I anſwer; If we conſider the uncertainty of this World, eſpecially in *Europe*, and that we by Traffick and Navigation have occaſion to deal with all Nations, we ought to hold for a firm and general Maxim, that an aſſured Peace is, in relation to *Holland*, a mere Chimera, a Dream, a Fiction, uſed only by thoſe, who like Syrens or Mermaids, endeavour by their melodious ſinging of a pleaſant and firm Peace, to delude the credulous *Hollanders*, till they ſplit upon the Rocks.

Therefore it is, and will remain a Truth, That next to the Freedom of the Rulers and Inhabitants at home, nothing is more neceſſary to us than Peace with all Men, and in ſuch a time of Peace to make effectual proviſion for good Fortifications on the Frontiers of our Provinces; to keep a competent number of Men of War at Sea; to husband our Treaſure at home, and as ſoon as poſſibly we may, to take off thoſe Impoſts that are moſt burdenſom, eſpecially that of Convoys; holding our ſelves aſſured, that without theſe means, whereby to procure a firm Peace, and to preſerve our Country in Proſperity, as far as the wickedneſs of this World will admit, all other Expedients will be found prejudicial to *Holland*; and that we on the contrary, relying on theſe Maxims and Means, ought always to wait till others make War upon

us, directly and indeed; because by our diligent and continual preparation, they would soon understand, that there is more to be gotten by us in a time of Peace and good Trading, than by War, and the ruin of Trade.

That 'tis unadvisable to stand only on ones Defence, answer'd.

But because these Conclusions concerning the Prosperity of *Holland*, seem to oppose the known Rules of Polity; 1*st*, That a defensive War is a consumptive War; and 2*dly*, That no Rulers can subsist, unless they put on the Skin of a Lion, as well as that of the Fox; I shall give you my Thoughts upon these two Maxims. And truly if we may say of Subjects, as the *Italians*,

* *One half the Year they live by Fraud and Art,*
By Art and Fraud they live the other part:

We may with as good Reason say of those that govern,

† *One half the Year they live by Force and Art,*
By Art and Force they live the other part.

It is true of Monarchs and sovereign Lords, not of free Republicks,

But he who looks further into matters shall find, that in using these Maxims there is great distinction to be made. For tho it be true of

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* Con arte e con ingano,
Si vive mezzo l'anno.
Con ingano e con arte,
Si vive l'altra parte.

† Con forza e con ingauno
Si vive mezzo l'anno
Con forza e con arte
Si vive l'altra parte.

Mo-

Monarchs and Princes, who will ſuffer no Fortifications, that a defenſive is a conſumptive War; yet in Republicks which live by Traffick, and have fortified themſelves well, all offenſive War is prejudicial and conſuming: So that ſuch Countries can never ſubſiſt without good Fortifications in this World, where the lovers of Peace cannot always obtain their wiſh.

Becauſe they are ſingle, and do greatly oppreſs their Subjects.

The truth is, great Monarchs are juſtly compar'd to the Lion, who is King of Beaſts, never contented with the produce of their own Country; but living upon the Fleſh of their Enemies, I wiſh I could not ſay Subjects; conquering and plundering their Neighbours, and burdening their own People with Taxes and Contributions. Yet tho they appropriate to themſelves all the Advantages of the Country, they would ſtill be deficient in Strength, if by means of the Fox's Skin they could not ſometimes anſwer their Enemies, and even their own Subjects, and eſcape the Snares laid for them by others. Whereas Republicks governing with more Gentleneſs, Wiſdom, and Moderation, have naturally a more powerful and numberleſs train of Inhabitants adhering to them than Monarchs, and therefore ſtand not in need of ſuch Maxims, eſpecially thoſe that ſubſiſt by Trade, who ought in this matter to follow the commendable example of a Cat: For ſhe never converſes with ſtrange Beaſts, but either keeps at home, or accompanys thoſe of her own Species, meddling with none, but in order to defend her own; very vigilant to provide for Food, and preſerve her young ones: ſhe neither barks nor ſnarls at thoſe

Whereas the Rulers of a Republick are many, and govern more gently.

They muſt naturally be ſhy of a War.

that provoke or abuſe her; ſo ſhy and fearful, that being purſued, ſhe immediately takes her flight into ſome Hole or Place of natural Strength, where ſhe remains quiet till the noiſe be over. But if it happens that ſhe can by no means avoid the Combat, ſhe is more fierce than a Lion, defends her ſelf with Tooth and Nail, and better than any other Beaſt, making uſe of all her well-husbanded Strength, without the leaſt neglect or fainting in her Extremity. So that by theſe Arts that Species enjoy more quiet every where, live longer, are more acceptable, and in greater number than Lions, Tygers, Wolves, Foxes, Bears, or any other Beaſts of Prey, which often periſh by their own Strength, and are taken where they lie in wait for others.

Holland, *tho ſhe ſtoutly defended her ſelf againſt* Spain, *rather to be compar'd to a Cat than a Lion.*

A Cat indeed is outwardly like a Lion, yet ſhe is, and will remain but a Cat ſtill; and ſo we who are naturally Merchants, cannot be turned into Souldiers. But becauſe the Cat of *Holland* hath a great round Head, fiery Eyes, a dreadful Beard, ſharp Teeth, fierce Claws, a long Tail, and a thick hairy Coat, by means of our Merchants; our Stadtholder and Captain-General from time to time, and after him ſome of our Allies or Rulers, who had reaped Profit by War, have made uſe of all the ſaid Features, and the ſtout Defence which this Cat made when ſhe was ſtraitned and pinch'd by the *Spaniſh* Lion, as ſo many Reaſons to prove that ſhe was become a Lion; and have made her ſo far to believe it, againſt moſt manifeſt Truth, that they have prevail'd with her for fifty Years ſucceſſively to fall upon other Beaſts, and fight with them. But the ſad Experience of what is paſt, the Decay

 of

of all inward Strength, the death of the laſt Captain-General, and the free Government of the State, which by God's unſpeakable Goodneſs enſued, ought certainly to take off the Scales from the Eyes of the ſtupid *Hollander*, and ſo make him ſee and know, that *Holland* by ſo doing was no Lion, but a burden-bearing Aſs. For the Conqueſts obtained by her Labour and Blood, have not ſerved to feed her, but to break her back, and to make our former Captain-General, and the Stadtholders ſo to increaſe in Power, that they became formidable to their Maſters, the States of the reſpective Provinces, and eſpecially to the States of *Holland*; and ſtill ſerve to make ſome of the crafty Allies of our Union, and ſome few ſlaviſh Rulers to live voluptuouſly, knowing how to procure many military Employments and Profits for their Children and Friends, and are therefore continually adviſing *Holland* to proſecute the War.

Tho by bearing Impoſitions ſhe may be compared to an Aſs,

In times of our Stadtholders.

And tho *Holland*, ſince the laſt ſixteen Years ſeems very well to have apprehended the Miſchief received by the Lion's Skin, yet ſhe ſeems not to have diſcerned the fraudulent Damage of the Foxes, which will be found well nigh as miſchievous: For *Holland* hath very imprudently made uſe of the Fox's Skin in *Poland* and *Denmark*. Upon the whole matter, 'tis certainly beſt for *Holland* to ſtrengthen her Frontiers and inland Cities ſo ſoon as may be; and when they are impregnably fortified, let her not engage her ſelf with any but her next and oldeſt Allies, of the other *United Provinces*, and leave the reſt of the World to take their courſe: And this done, let us only concern our ſelves with our

And therefore muſt by degrees leave that ill Cuſtom.

own Affairs, according to the good Proverb, *That which burns you not, cool not.* And because it seems to me that such evident Truths make the deepest Impressions, and are best apprehended by Proverbs and Fables, I shall conclude this Chapter with the following Fables.

The First Fable.

Which is illustrated by certain Fables. First, Of the Lion and Huntsman.

The Lion, King of Beasts, having heard many Complaints of his Subjects concerning the cruel Persecution, and Murders committed by the Huntsmen, and fearing that if he should any longer bear such unrighteous Dealings, he should lose his Royal Honour and Respect among his Subjects, went in Person to fight the Huntsman, who first by his Shooting, afterwards by his Lance, and lastly with his Sword, so wounded the approaching Lion, that he was necessitated to fly; and having lost much of his strength by his Wounds, and more of his Honour and Esteem by his flight, said, with a lamentable Voice, To my sorrow I find the truth of this Proverb, * The strength of *Samson* is not sufficient for one that is resolv'd to revenge Evil with Evil: But he that can wait, and be patient, shall find his Enemy defeated to his hand. What need had I to streighten this crooked piece of Wood? It had been better for me to have left those Injuries to time, and

By gaining time many Evils may be overcome.

* Die al het quaat met quaat wil wreeken,
Samsons kragt sal hem ontbreeken,
Maer die can lyden en verdraagen
Vind hier syn Vyanden verslaagen.

* perhaps

perhaps ſome Tiger, Wolf, or Bear, having with like Imprudence ſought out the Huntſman, might have been ſtrong and fortunate enough to have killed him in the fight.

The Second Fable.

A certain ſtrong wiſe Man, meeting a ſtrong Fool, who had undertaken to force a Stiver from every Man he met, gave him a Stiver without a Blow or a Word. Whereupon ſome of his Acquaintance, young People, blam'd him for it, uſing theſe words: God hath given you at leaſt as much Strength, and more Wiſdom than to this lewd Fellow, whereby you would undoubtedly have had the Victory, and delivered the World from this Raskal; whereas contrarily, † you will be deſpiſed, if you do this. But the wiſe Man anſwered, They that buy their Peace do beſt: And beſides, I know it is ill fighting with a ſtrong Fool; but you know not the value of your own Peace, Welfare and Life, and much leſs the manner of the World. For tho I were not an old Merchant, but a prudent Soldier, yet I ſhall tell you, that he who will not beſtow a Stiver to keep Peace, muſt have his Sword always drawn. And he that will be always fighting, tho with the benefit of ten Advantages againſt one Danger, muſt certainly lay out more than ten Stivers to buy Arms: And as where there is hewing of Wood, there

A Fable of a wiſe Man and a Fool.

For Peace-ſake we ought to yield ſomewhat.

† Bonis nocet quiſquis pepercerit malis: & malum quod quis impedire potuit, nec impedit, feciſſe videtur; veterem ferendo injuriam invitas novam.

will

will be Splinters flying on every ſide; ſo after a Man hath ſuffered the ſmart, he muſt give a good Reward to the Chirurgeon and Phyſician, even when the beſt happens: The Bucket will come broken home at laſt. And the beſt Fighters at laſt find their Maſters; for the ſtouteſt *Hercules* is ſometimes ſooneſt beaten. Next ſaid he, time will inform you that I am not to ſtreigthen all the crooked Wood I ſhall meet in this World: For I aſſure you it will happen to this ſtrong Fool, as it did formerly with the fooliſh Frog, who finding a wiſe Crab ſwimming in the Water, threatned to kill him if he found him any more there. The good natur'd Crab thinking, as thoſe who willingly ſhun a mad Ox which they might kill with a Gun, that he would alſo ſhun this Creature, gave the Frog good words, ſwimming immediately backward according to its cuſtom, and giving place to him. But becauſe ſtupidity cauſes boldneſs and ſelf-conceit, the Frog concluded that he was ſtronger than the Crab, and ſo fell upon him. The Crab defended herſelf ſtoutly, and at laſt pinch'd the Frog immediately dead. And ſeeing the World is full of Fools, I tell you that this Coxcomb growing too confident by a few good Succeſſes, will ſoon find another Fool who will knock him o'the Head, and rid the World of him. It is certainly much better that a Fool, and not a wiſe Man, ſhould put his Life in the Ballance with this Fool. Which Prediction was ſoon after verified by experience; for a while after this Fool ſetting upon other People, found at laſt as fooliſh, croſs and ſtrong a Fellow as himſelf, that would rather fight than give him a Stiver, who

Confirm'd by the Fable of a Frog and a Crab.

who knock'd him down and kill'd him. Upon which the wiſe Man cauſed ſome Sayings to be engraven over him, among which were theſe: *The number of Fools is infinite*; and *to cure a Fool, requires one and a half*; for without blows it cannot be done. *And ſome old Proverbs.*

The Third Fable.

A certain Fox conceiting himſelf not able to ſubſiſt, if the Wolves and Bears lived in mutual Amity, ſtirred up the one againſt the other; and afterwards fearing leſt the Wolf which favoured him leſs, ſhould get the better, and then finding himſelf without Enemy, ſhould deſtroy him, reſolved to ſtrengthen the Bear privately with Food, which he had ſpared for himſelf, and to ſee the Fight between them, under pretence of being Mediator, but really to feed upon the Blood of the conquered; which when he taſted, he was ſo tranſported with the Reliſh, that rather than forbear the Blood, he let the Bear have ſo much of his other natural Food, that he was grown weak. But the two combating Beaſts, obſerving this ill Deſign of the pretended Mediator, and his Weakneſs together, deſtroyed this blood-thirſty Fox, the one premeditately, the other by the Fortune of the War; beſides, he fell unpitied. For ſuppoſe the Wolf and Bear had grown ſo weak by the Fox's Artifices, that they could not have hurt him; yet there were Lions, Tigers, and other Beaſts of Prey, which could as certainly and eaſily have devoured him, becauſe he had loſt his Strength, and could no longer in any extremity run to his Hole, and thereby ſave and defend himſelf. Thus *The Fable of a Fox, Wolf and Bear.*

Thus God and Nature puniſheth thoſe that abuſe their Strength, and takes the Crafty in their own Subtilty. * As falſe Self-love is the Root of all Miſchief, ſo Prudence and well-grounded Self-love is the only Cauſe of all good and virtuous Actions. Purſuant to which, as we ſay, *Do well, and look not backward*, is the greateſt Polity *Holland* can uſe. And the richeſt Bleſſing which God can pour down upon a Nation, is to unite the Intereſts thereof to Peace, and the Welfare of Mankind: According to the good Rule, † *He that loves himſelf aright, is a Friend to all the World.*

The Fourth Fable.

Of the Fox, Cat, and Huntſman.

A certain ſelf-conceited Fox in a deriding manner asking a well-meaning Cat, how ſhe could free her ſelf from all the ill Accidents of this World; The Cat anſwered, That ſhe was not offended when any thing was ſaid of her in a deriding way.

Small Buſineſs with uprightneſs is much better

In a word, ſaid ſhe, I ſhew thoſe that would hurt me the greateſt kindneſs, by which I avoid all Enmity: For my only Art of all Arts is, to avoid harm. Upon this the Fox flouted with the Cat, ſaying, ‖ This is indeed a very pretty Science becoming an unarmed

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* ——————————Semita certe
Tranquillæ per virtutem patet unica vitæ. *Juven.*
Il n' y a plus grande fineſſe que d' eſtre homme de bien.

† Qui ſibi vere amicus eſt, hunc omnibus ſcito amicum.

‖ Lepidum caput, ſed cerebrum non habes.

Round-

Roundhead; but I that am witty and crafty will lord it over others: and beſides that, I live without want and care, for in an inſtant I can ſhake out a Bag full of Artifices. But while he was thus braving it out, and negligent, a Huntſman with his Dogs was come ſo near him, that not being able to eſcape, he was taken in his ſubtilty by the Dogs, and killed, while the Cat with her only ſlight, and ever neceſſary Fortification, fled for her Life, running up a lofty Tree and ſo ſaved her ſelf: and from thence ſaw the Caſe of the Fox pull'd over his Ears, comforting her ſelf in the mean time with this Song,

Than much clutter with great craft.

Poca Brigata,
Vita Beata.
Caſa mia caſa mia
Pur Piccola che tu ſia
Tu mi pari un' abadia,

This therefore is the great and neceſſary Art for *Holland*, notwithſtanding the Maxims before objected, *viz.* to maintain Peace, and fortify our Frontiers, and never unneceſſarily to meddle with parting of Princes that are in War by our Ambaſſadors, and Arbitrations: for by theſe means we ſhall be certainly drawn into the charge of a War, and beſides, are like to gain the Reward of Parters, and bring the War or the hatred of both Parties upon our ſelves, beſides the Conſumption of our Treaſure in expenſive Embaſſys, even when the beſt happens. And tho the Troubles of this World cannot be avoided always either by Force or Art, yet we ought to keep out of them as much as we can with all our

It is again concluded, that Peace above all things is neceſſary for Holland.

our Strength, Prudence, and Polity. And if notwithſtanding all this, War ſhould be made upon *Holland*, ſhe will gain a double Reputation, when with the incouragement of her own Strength, long before provided, together with the Juſtice and Neceſſity of her Defence, ſhe ſhall overcome the Danger. Beſies, the Oppoſition we ſhould be able to make, as well as the juſt Hatred that always attends the Aggreſſor, and the Conſequences that might follow the Conqueſt of this Country, would alarm other Princes, and give them time to deliver us.

And tho I know theſe Maxims will always be rejected by moſt of the idle Gentry, Soldiers of Fortune, and the ſottiſh Rabble, as if we relying only on our impregnable Fortifications, and ſtanding on our defence, ſhould by that means loſe all that Name and Reputation we have acquired; to which I ſhall only ſay that all is not Gold that gliſters, and ruſty Silver is more valued by Men of Underſtanding than glittering Copper: So whatever is profitable to a Nation, brings alſo a good Reputation to perpetuity. 'Tis likewiſe certain, that whatever reduceth *Holland* to weakneſs, tho it were under the moſt glorious Title of the World, will really cauſe it to lie under an everlaſting Shame and Reproach. All which God grant may be rightly apprehended by the upright, and (now) really-free Magiſtrates of *Holland*, while this leaky Ship of the Commonwealth may yet by labour be kept above Water.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Enquiry is made, whether, and how the Welfare of any Country may be preſerved by Treatys of Peace.

BUT ſeeing it appears in the preceding Diſcourſe, that Treatys of Peace importing mutual Promiſes of not prejudicing one another, and allowance of Trade and Commerce reciprocally, are very neceſſary for *Holland*, and that the like Articles are by many intermixt with Treatys of Alliance, or Covenants among Neighbours, which nevertheleſs, as I conceive, have for the moſt part been pernicious to *Holland*, and will be found ſo; I find my ſelf therefore obliged to expreſs my thoughts on this Subject, and to ſay, That a Treaty of Peace is a mutual Promiſe of doing no hurt to each other; to which likewiſe Nature obligeth us. But on the contrary, an Alliance or Covenant obligeth to do ſomething, which often without ſuch Alliance men would not do, or omit ſomething which without ſuch Alliance they would not omit.

To comprehend what a Treaty of Peace, or

An Alliance is,

Since then all things paſt are ſo much beyond the Power and Conduct of Man, that human Actions and Force cannot make the leaſt alteration therein; it appears that all mens Thoughts ought to be imployed about the obtaining of ſomething that is good, or defending themſelves from future Evil, which eſpecially takes place in our Conſultations, and Tranſactions with other People. For even in

We ought to conſider, that all Actions look either at the future, or the preſent; as alſo

in a free and generous Gift, where all Neceſſity or Obligation of any thing to be done for the future ſeems to be excluded; yet is it evident, that it is done either out of hope of gaining ſome bodys Friendſhip, or Serviceableneſs, or obtaining the Name of being Kind and Liberal. But above all, thoſe Thoughts muſt take place for things future in mutual Covenants, ſeeing the Eſſence thereof conſiſts therein, and hath its eye upon it, as appears by all the Examples of it. I give or promiſe to give, becauſe you promiſe to give; I do or ſhall do, becauſe you promiſe to do; I give or ſhall give, that you ſhall not do; I do or ſhall do, that you may not do, *&c.* And when we are on both ſides ſubjected to one and the ſame Sovereign Power, thoſe Agreements are freely entered into; and here the Difficulty is not great, tho we perform the Covenants firſt, becauſe the other Party may be compelled by the Judg to perform his Engagements, tho no body would willingly be the Compeller, but every one would ride on the Forehorſe: Having is better than hoping; and what he hath before hand is the poor Mans Riches. And when the reſpective Covenanters are ſubjected to a different Supreme Power, then Diſtruſt begins to increaſe: but becauſe men know that he that is unfaithful may be puniſhed, they are unwilling to put it to the venture.

What care is to be taken in making of mutual obligatory Contracts, which ought to take place

With Particulars, and

With Sovereigns.

But all the difficulty lies here, and then appears, when Sovereign Powers enter into mutual Covenants and Alliances; ſeeing the ſtrongeſt Potentate always enjoys the Fruit of a Peace concluded, and likewiſe the benefit

fit covenanted; which *Ovid* * very ingeniouſly ſhew'd: So that tho there be ſometimes Peace, yet 'tis always neceſſary for the weakeſt to be ſo watchful, as if no true Peace were ever made by ſuch Powers, on which the weaker Party might rely. And if on the other ſide, in time of Peace each Party ſhould fortify and guard his Frontiers, and by Intelligencers endeavour to inform himſelf of his Neighbours Deſigns, in order to behave himſelf accordingly: It is then evident that all Treatys of Peace muſt be preſumed by all Sovereign Powers (who expect more Advantage by War than Peace, and conſequently are not founded upon Peace) to ſerve only for a breathing-time, and to wait an opportunity of attacking their Neighbour with more Advantage, and ſo to overpower him.

And when and how long thoſe Contracts are to be kept,

And ſo long as thoſe Opportunitys preſent not, the Peace laſteth among the Potentates of the World, not by virtue of Promiſes, Oaths or Seals which they can at all times eaſily infringe, without ſuffering any preſent Puniſhment, but by virtue of their fear, leſt ſome future Evil ſhould befal the Peace-breaker. So that a true and real Peace among Sovereign Princes, eſpecially for the weaker Party, is but a Fiction or a Dream, on which he muſt not rely.

Eſpecially with Monarchs.

For in this wicked World (God amend it) 'tis very evident, that moſt Men naturally are inclined by all imaginable induſtry to advance their Intereſt, without regard to Hand, Seal, Oath, or even to Eternity it ſelf;

* Pax licet interdum eſt, pacis fiducia nunquam.

and above all, ſuch Inclinations and Aims are principally found in Monarchs, Princes and great Lords: for we are taught that *Sanctitas, pietas, fides, privata bona ſunt; ad quæ juvant Reges eant:*

Abriles y Sennores
Los mas ſon Traydores.

Who ſeldom know what is juſt and fit,

For having never been private Perſons, nor educated or converſant with Men equal to themſelves, they learn nothing of Modeſty or Condeſcenſion: neither does the Authority of Judges imprint in them a Reverence to Sacred Juſtice. Which is quite contrary in all Republicks, where the Rulers and Magiſtrates being firſt educated as common Citizens, muſt daily converſe with their Equals or Superiours, and learn that which is juſt, otherwiſe they would be compelled to their Duty by the Judg, or other Virtuous and Powerful Civil Rulers; which inward motions of Modeſty, Diſcretion and Fear leave always ſome remains in them, when they come afterwards to be preferred to the Government and Magiſtracy, for * Cuſtom is a ſecond Nature, which is not eaſily altered.

As the Civil Rulers do.

In Treatys of Alliance Men are apter to be wrong'd, than by Treatys of Peace.

But in all Events, if in Treatys of Peace, when neither of the Covenanters do any thing but only reſtrain each other from all Hoſtil Acts, there is little certainty that the Covenants will on both ſides be kept; it is as certain, that in Alliances, wherein

* Adeo a teneris aſſueſcere multum eſt.
Quo ſemel eſt imbuta recens ſervabit odorem
Teſta diu.

there

there are Engagements on both ſides, for Aſſiſtance of Souldiery, Arms, or Mony, that there is a greater uncertainty of obtaining what is covenanted, and that there can be no Truſt repoſed in the Treatys of Sovereigns; all Advantages of Alliances conſiſting only in this, that one Part may poſſibly be drawn to perform what is covenanted before the other: And when this happens in Matters by which he that performeth is really weakened, and the other ſtrengthened, with bare hopes only of Advantages to accrue from him afterwards, he is then a Traitor to himſelf, becauſe he fooliſhly gives Things and Realitys, for Words, Hand, and Seal; which put all together hold no proportion to preponderate and reſiſt the Ambition and Covetouſneſs, Luſt, Rage, and Self-conceit of great Princes. *Dat pœnas laudata fides.* For becauſe Ambition exceeds all other Affections, and Monarchs order all Externals, and eſpecially the Publick Religion, which is ſtrengthened, or weakned according to the proſperity of their Government, it is therefore rightly ſaid, that the State has neither Blood nor Religion; and that Integrity is always deceived or circumvented. So that the beſt way is not to truſt them, and then we ſhall not be cheated.

And when moſt:

Eſpecially when they are made with Kings or Sovereigns.

Becauſe they have a Superintendency over Religious Worſhip, and value it little.

All which being moſt certain, it is ſtrange that any Supreme Powers ſhould imagine that they can oblige a formidable Sovereign Prince to gratitude for Benefits received without any preceding Promiſes, impoveriſhing themſelves by Liberalitys, in order to enrich and ſtrengthen thoſe they fear: For we ought always to preſume, that Kings will ever eſteem

themſelves obliged to any thing but their own Grandeur and Pleaſure, which they endeavour to obtain, without any regard to Love, Hatred, or Gratitude.

So that it is a madneſs to make Princes conſiderable Preſents.

Certainly if we affirm, that it is a curſed Religion which teacheth Men to ſacrifice to the Devil, that he may do them no Miſchief; we may likewiſe ſay, that nothing leſs than the utmoſt Deſpair can reaſonably induce a Government to diſcover its own Weakneſs to a dreaded Neighbour, and to make him ſtronger by giving him Mony to buy off a feared Evil, which ought to be reſiſted by the beſt Arms, and moſt vigorous Efforts; according to the *Spaniſh* Proverb, * To give to Kings is a Kingly, that is, a monſtrous great Folly: For the holy Wood, the blunt Croſs of Prayers and Remonſtrances, is of ſmall force among Men of Power; and the Mony ſacrificed to the Idol of Gratitude, is yet of leſs value. But he who in theſe horrid Diſorders, betakes himſelf for Refuge to the Iron, and ſharp two-edged Croſs, the Sword, makes uſe of the true Croſs of Miracles againſt Sovereign Princes; and this rightly applied, is only able to heal the King's-Evil, or State-Agues.

But to Favourites, tho ſeldom, it may be adviſable.

But if Kings, whilſt they follow their own Inclinations and Pleaſures, will ſuffer Favourites to govern their Kingdoms, it is then clear, that ſuch Favourites will by all means endeavour, during their uncertain Favour, to enrich themſelves: and therefore by private Bribes to ſuch Creatures, dangerous Reſolutions may be prevented; and if a dangerous War be at any time very much feared, may be well and profitably beſtowed. But

* Es nec edad real, dar a Reyes.

yet

yet this is not to be done till the utmoſt Extremity. For we are taught, that Courtiers may very well be reſembled to hungry biting Dogs, who as they will ſoon obſerve, when their Bread is given for ſnarling at or biting the Giver: So Courtiers who are always waſting their Eſtates, and always hungry, will, in hopes of obtaining new Preſents, be always moſt ready to threaten ſuch generous Givers, nay and bite them too, unleſs ſuch open-handed Perſons take a good Reſolution to arm themſelves, in order to reſiſt their Menaces and Attempts by Force, and by that means to obtain Peace.

Which the Fable of the hungry Dogs, to which Courtiers were reſembled, plainly teaches us.

And to expreſs my ſelf more amply in this particular, I ſhall ſay, that all Treaties and Capitulations between ſupreme Governors and States, ariſe by reaſon of a mutual Diffidence of one and the ſame Neighbour, or of ſeveral ſtronger Neighbours, and by a mutual deſire to be able to defend themſelves againſt one or more mighty Potentates.

The general Cauſes of all Contentions and Treaties, are Peace,

Or, ſecondly, Through a deſire of the ſame thing, appertaining to a third Perſon, and to enrich themſelves by an Alliance and Conjunction with another: Or thirdly, Through Arrogance, Vain-Glory, and Ambition.

Hope and Vainglory.

Yet it matters not much upon what Reaſon theſe Diſſenſions and Alliances ariſe, but whether the Covenanters and Allies do equally fear, or have need of one another; and whether they are equally concerned in that which they deſire to obtain or defend. For we learn, that * Damage parts Friendſhip,

* Idem velle idem noſſe, ea demum firma amicitia eſt. *Ter.*

and Complainers have no Friends.

In a word, all conſiſts in this, Whether they that enter into a League, have a common Intereſt to avoid or obtain that which they both have in their Eye. For where that is not, all Alliances and Covenants are made for the benefit of the ſtrongeſt, and to the prejudice of the weakeſt: So that if he cannot withſtand the ſtrongeſt, without entering into Capitulation with him, he will by ſuch Capitulation be the ſooner overthrown, if by virtue thereof he makes War upon a Neighbour that is ſtronger than he. For it is better to have many mighty Neighbours than one, according to the Fable, which ſays, That a Bear may eaſily be taken by one able Huntſman, but that his Hide or Skin cannot be divided among many before he be caught, and therefore he is ſuffered to live.

It is not adviſable to make Alliances with Greater than themſelves.

Whence it neceſſarily and irrefragably follows, that all States and Sovereigns ought not to enter into Alliances with thoſe who are ſtronger, but rather with ſuch as are inferior to themſelves in Power, by which means they may always covenant, that the Weaker ſhall firſt make good his Engagement; and in all doubtful Caſes, where mention is made of enjoining him to do any thing, he may interpret them to his Advantage, at leaſt afterwards, ſo as to do no more than he will: according to the *Italian* Proverb, * *Be quick to receive, ſlow to pay; for an Accident may happen whereby you may never pay any thing.* And ac-

No Alliance with a Greater is good, unleſs he firſt perform his Contract.

* Al pigliar pronto, al pagar tardo; perche puo naſcer inconveniente che non ſi paghi niente.

cording

cording to that, * *It is good riding on the fore Horſe, and being a Maſter; for you may always transfer, or give away as much of your Right as you will, and make your ſelf leſs.*

Secondly, From hence may be inferred, That when an Inferior Power treats with one ſuperior to him, he injures himſelf, if he do not contract, that the Stronger ſhall firſt perform that which he promiſes. And if the Alliance be grounded upon a common Intereſt, the Superior hath little reaſon to fear, that when he hath performed his Engagements, he ſhall be deceived by the Weaker: ſo that if he be not willing to do this, he gives great Cauſe to the Weakeſt not to truſt him, and ſo not to enter into ſuch a Treaty, which like a rotten Houſe is like to fall upon his Head.

CHAP. VI.

Some Conſiderations particularly relating to Alliances between Holland *and Inferior Powers.*

HAVING premiſed in the foregoing Chapter, that the Intereſt of *Holland* conſiſts in Peace, becauſe our Fiſheries, Trade, Navigation, and Manufactures will increaſe more by Peace than War, and that theſe are the Pillars on which our State is founded; it follows, that all Covenants and Alliances

All Alliances for Conqueſt detrimental to Holland,

† Præſtat prevenire quam preveniri. Il fait bon eſtre Maiſtre, car on eſt tousjours valet quand on veut.

founded upon Conqueſt and Glory, are prejudicial to *Holland*, ſince by ſuch Alliances the Peace is wilfully broken, and Wars made to the Ruin or Decay of the ſaid Pillars of our Country.

As alſo for advancing Trade, if made with Republicks.

2*ly*. It alſo naturally follows, that no Alliances, except ſuch as are grounded upon mutual Fear and Defence againſt a much ſuperior Power, can be profitable for *Holland*, becauſe by this means either the Peace will be more laſting, or the War that may happen will have a better and ſpeedier end.

3*ly*. If we conſider the States of *Europe* in their preſent Condition, 'tis true, all Republicks being founded on Peace and Trade, have the ſame Intereſt with *Holland*, to preſerve and maintain Peace on every ſide: But they by continual endeavours to draw our Trade, and its Dependencies to themſelves, always obſtruct our principal Deſign, which is the increaſe of Traffick. And conſidering alſo that they are of ſo little Power to aſſiſt *Holland*, when in Diſtreſs, againſt a greater Force, 'tis wholly unadviſable to enter into an Alliance with any of them for common Defence. For as to the defence by Land, relating to the *United Provinces* themſelves, we have found how fruitleſs a thing, and burdenſom a load the Union for our common Defence has always been (I will not ſay as it was made, but as that Union was formerly managed by our Captains-General and Stadtholders) to the Province of *Holland*.

The Union of Utrecht *has been miſuſed, to the prejudice of* Holland.

And tho during our free Commonwealth Government, all thoſe Abuſes of the ſaid Union which have been ſo prejudicial to us, and aroſe merely from fear of offending the

late Heads of our Republick, ought to have ceaſed; yet by long continuance they have ſo much tended to the Advantage of our ſeparate Allies, and their Deputies of the Generality, and taken ſo deep a root, that our Republick of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* can hardly compaſs or obtain any Reformation, or any new and profitable Orders for their own particular Benefit, tho with never ſo much Right demanded, without being ſubject to the undue Oppoſitions and Thwartings of the ſaid Allies of our Union, and their Deputies, with whom we are forced to be always contending. And of this I could give the Reader infinite Examples, particularly by means of *Zealand* and *Frieſland*, from that faithful and excellent Hiſtory of *L. V. Aitzma*, wherein the Debates about the Secluſion of the Prince of *Orange* in 1654, and about the Order made *Anno* 1663, concerning the publick Prayers for the ſuperior and inferior Magiſtracy, as alſo for the foreſaid Allies, and their Deputies in the Generality, and Council of State, are fully related.

See L. V. Aitzma's *Hiſt. on thoſe reſpective Years, and eſpecially the Conſiderations of the publick Prayers, and* Holland's *Deduction concerning the Secluſion*, &c.

And if we ſhould make Alliances with the remote *German* Republicks, we ſhould find them both chargeable and uſeleſs; for being weaker than we, they are the ſooner like to be attacked, and then we by their means ſhould be engaged in a War contrary to our own Intereſt.

And as for the Republicks of *Italy*, it is well known, that in our Wars by Land, they neither could, nor would give us the leaſt Aſſiſtance, which was formerly made evident by our Alliance with *Venice*. And except in the *Mediterranean*, they can give us leſs help by

Other Republicks, whether German *or* Italian, *would be much leſs ſerviceable to us.*

by Sea, being not at all intereſted therein. And for the *Hans* Republicks, it is certain that they are not only very weak and unfit to undertake a War for our ſakes againſt thoſe who are too ſtrong for us; but on the contrary, they always love to ſee us diſturbed and obſtructed at Sea, that in the mean time they may trade the more: ſo that we can be aſſiſted by no Republicks in a War againſt a ſtronger Power. And becauſe by covenanting with them for mutual Aſſiſtance, and common Defence, we may very eaſily fall into a War; we muſt never enter into any other Agreement with them, ſave of Friendſhip and Traffick; and in the mean while ſtand upon our Guard, as if we were to be aſſiſted by no Republicks in the whole World in our Neceſſity. For tho indeed thoſe Republican Allies and Friends, are good yet Wo to us if we ſtand in need of them, and ten times more Wo to us if we wilfully and deliberately order matters ſo, as at all times, and for ever to ſtand in need of our Neighbours and Allies.

What Alliances are to be held with leſſer Monarchs.

As for ſuch Monarchs and Princes, who by Alliances might have ſome Communication with us; I conceive that their true Intereſt carries them, as well as their Favorites and Courtiers, to hate all manner of Republicks, eſpecially ſuch as are lately eſtabliſhed, and are their Neighbours, becauſe they are a perpetual Reproof to them, and bring the ableſt and moſt diſcerning of their Subjects to diſlike Monarchical Government. And therefore if we will enter into an Alliance with any of the neighbouring Kings and Princes, or are already in League with them, we muſt ſtand much

much more on our Guard, than if we were to make an Alliance with a free Republick, or had done ſo: So that it is hardly adviſable to enter into any Alliance with Kings and Princes. Yet ſeeing things may ſo happen, that ſome ſuch Alliance might for ſome ſhort time be advantageous to us; 'tis neceſſary to ſpeak of ſuch Kings and Princes diſtinctly. And firſt, the Emperor and King of *Poland* are not conſiderable to us, and the Crown of *Denmark* ſo weak and unfit for War, that as we have nothing to fear from thence, ſo we cannot hope to be aſſiſted by them in our Troubles. *Sweden* and *Brandenburgh* are ſo deficient, that we ſhall never cauſe them to take Arms againſt our Enemies, unleſs we will furniſh them with great Sums by way of Advance: and as I ſaid before, all ſuch Alliances are unſteady and wavering, as we have lately learned by *Brandenburgh*, and *France* by *Sweden*; who after they had received the Mony advanced, applied it purely to their own Affairs, without any regard to their Contracts. Beſides, they are both of ſo ſmall Power, that if they ſhould become our Enemies, we might ruin them by prolonging the War, and always give them the Law by Sea.

Who hating Republicks, eſpecially ours, we muſt always be upon our Guard.

So that they would ſoon perceive, that they could gain nothing by us, that their Traffick would be ſpoiled, the War miſchievous to both ſides, and conſequently Peace and Friendſhip would be beſt for both. But in all Caſes, having made Alliances with Republicks or Monarchs that are weaker than our ſelves, which, by alteration of conjunctures of Time and Intereſts, would certainly tend to ruin the

We may more ſafely make Alliances with weaker, than with ſtronger.

the State, or our Native Country; ſufficient Reaſons may always be given to thoſe weaker Allies, why, with a ſaving to Honour, a Nation may depart from them, and neither may nor will either ruin themſelves or their Subjects by ſuch Leagues; and thereby make good the Proverb, * An ill Oath diſpleaſeth God: And he that deceives a Deceiver, merits a Chair in Heaven. And indeed all Alliances made and confirmed by Oath between Sovereign Powers, ought to have this tacit Condition, to continue ſo long as the Intereſt of the Nation will admit. So that if nevertheleſs a Prince would punctually obſerve ſuch Alliances to the ruin of his Country, he is no more to be eſteemed than a ſilly Child that knows nothing of the World, whilſt he ought to govern the Land as a Guardian to his Orphans; for according to the Rule in Law, † *Orphans muſt ſuffer no loſs.* On the other ſide, the Ally in ſuch a Caſe neither may, nor ought to perform his part, if it be againſt his firſt Oath and Duty as a Ruler and Guardian, and to the Ruin of his Subjects who are his Orphans; and therefore it muſt be underſtood, that he will not maintain it. A Regent or Guardian ought not to be ignorant of this; but if he be ſo, 'tis then evident that he ought to be governed himſelf, and be put under Wardſhip. Wo be to thoſe Countries, Cities, and Orphans that muſt nevertheleſs be governed by ſuch Rulers and Guardians!

It oppugns not the Honour and Oath of a Regent, but agrees well with it.

* Quod male juratur, pejus præſtatur.
Frangenti fidem, Fides frangatur eidem.

† Pupillus pati poſſe non intelligitur. Dig. l. 40. tit. 17. Reg. Jur. 110.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Some Conſiderations touching the Alliances which Holland *might enter into with mightier Potentates than themſelves. And firſt with* France.

What Alliances with mighty Monarchs are to be kept, viz. with France.

BUT touching the three great Powers of *France*, *Spain*, and *England*, is all the Difficulty, ſince each of them by their own Strength can always be armed; and knowing how much we are concerned for Peace, neither of them fear us, but we muſt fear them. And therefore it is very neceſſary that we behave our ſelves very prudently towards them, as to the point of Alliances; which to effect the better, I conceive it neceſſary, as formerly, particularly to conſider how much Good and Evil thoſe three Kingdoms may receive or ſuffer from the *Hollanders*, and likewiſe what Good or Evil can befal *Holland* by each of them.

France *did wholly ſubſiſt by Agriculture, not ſo now.*

As to *France*, we are to obſerve, that formerly that Country ſubſiſted wholly by Tillage, and therefore could ſuffer little damage by a War at Sea. But ſince the Reign of *Henry* the 4*th*, many heavy Impoſitions have been laid upon all imported and exported Manufactures; and the weaving of Silk, Wool, and Linen, with many other Mechanick Works, is ſo conſiderably improved there, that the *French* can ſupply others with more made Stuffs, and other Manufactures, than Foreigners take off. So that a War againſt us, would be more prejudicial to them than to us.

But

But becauſe this firſt Point is of extraordinary weight, and perhaps not ſo well underſtood by others, I find my ſelf obliged to draw up a Liſt of Manufactures and Commodities exported out of *France* into Foreign Parts, eſpecially into *Holland*, according to a Scheme preſented to the King of *France* by the Society of Merchants at *Paris*, when a new and very high Impoſition was laid upon all foreign imported Goods, and eſpecially Manufactures, fearing leſt the like Impoſition would be laid by *Holland* and *England* upon all *French* Goods: And alſo from an Information exhibited by the Lord Ambaſſador *Boreel* in 1658. to the Lords States General of the *United Provinces*.

Which appears by this Liſt or Account.

See L. V. Aitzma *on the ſame Year.*

1. In the firſt place great quantities of Velvet, Pluſhes, Satins, Cloth of Gold and Silver, Taffaties, and other ſilk Wares, made at *Lions* and *Tours*, which amount to above ſix Millions.

2. In ſilk Ribbands, Laces, Paſſements, Buttons, Loops, made about *Paris*, *Roan*, and thoſe parts, to the value of two Millions.

3. Bever-Hats, Caſtors, Hats of Wool and Hair, which are made in and about *Paris* and *Roan*, to the value of one Million and a half.

4. Feathers, Belts, Fans, Hoods, Masks, gilt and wrought Looking-glaſſes, Watches, and other ſmall Wares, to the value of above two Millions.

5. Gloves made at *Paris*, *Roan*, *Vendome*, and *Clermont*, to the value of above a Million and a half.

6. Woollen

6. Woollen Yarn ſpun in all parts of *Piccardy*, worth more than one Million and a half.

7. Paper of all ſorts, made in *Auvergne*, *Poitou*, *Limouſin*, *Champagne* and *Normandy*, for upwards of two Millions.

8. Pins and Needles made at *Paris* and *Normandy*, and Combs of Box, Horn, and Ivory, for a Million and a half.

9. Childrens Toys, and ſuch as *Nuremburg* Ware, or as the *French* call them, *Quincaillerie*, made in *Auvergne*, for upwards of ſix hundred thouſand Florins.

10. Linen Sail-cloth made in *Brittany* and *Normandy*, for upwards of five Millions of Florins.

11. Houſhold-goods, Beds, Matraſſes, Hangings, Coverlids, Quilts, Creſpines, Fringes and Molets of Silk, above five Millions of Florins.

12. Wines from *Gaſcony*, *Xaintoigne*, *Nantois*, and other places, for above five Millions.

13. Brandys, Vinegars, and Sider, for fifteen hundred thouſand Livers.

14. Saffron, Woad, Soap, Hony, Almonds, Olives, Capers, Prunes, Prunellas, for above two Millions.

15. Salt, yearly the lading of five or 600 Ships, exported from *Rochel*, *Maran*, *Brouage*, the Iſlands of *Oleron* and *Ree*.

Of theſe Goods there are yearly tranſported above 30 Millions, whereof Holland *takes off the greateſt part.*

And if we add to this the *French* Companys of Train and Whale-fins, of Cod and Pickled-Herrings, of Refining and fine Sugars, of all Spices and *Indian*-Wares, with prohibition to all that are not of the Company to import any into *France*; every one may

may then obſerve, that by a *French* War againſt us, the Inhabitants of *France* will be much more prejudiced than thoſe of *Holland* in their Navigation and Traffick.

Secondly, It is apparent, That the *French* have very few of their own Ships and Mariners; ſo that all their Traffick is driven (ſome few *Engliſh* Ships and Traffick excepted) by *Holland* Ships to *Holland*, or at leaſt unlading there. And moreover, when any Goods are to be tranſported from one *French* Harbour to another, they are put on board *Holland* Veſſels.

Holland *takes off moſt of the Goods which* France *produces.*

Thirdly, It is clear, That the *Hollanders* do buy up moſt of the *French* Wines and Salt that are exported; and that Salt might be had in other Countrys, and particularly in *Portugal*, *Spain*, and *Punto del Rey*. As it is likewiſe true, that we can better forbear thoſe Wines in *Holland*, than the *French* Nobility and Eccleſiaſticks (to whom moſt of the Wines belong) can forbear our Mony. And beſides, by reaſon of the Peace in *Germany*, in caſe of War with *France*, the greateſt part of that Trade may be ſupplied with Rheniſh Wines, and poſſibly continue ſo alienated, altho the ſame were not ſo profitable for *Holland*, as the Trade by Sea in *French* Wines would be.

France *formerly took off many* Holland *Goods, but not now.*

Fourthly, 'Tis well known, That in *France* very many *Dutch* Cloths, Says, Linen, Herrings, Cod, and other Wares, tranſported thither by our Ships, were formerly ſpent there; which now by new Impoſitions is much leſſened, or wholly prohibited.

Cannot hurt us by Land, and by Sea is not conſiderable.

Fifthly, It is evident that *France* cannot attack us by Land, nor by Sea, for want of good

good Shipping, and on account of the danger of our Coaſt: So that if they ſeize our Goods, Debts, and Ships, they can do us no further miſchief, except by ſmall Capers at Sea, which we may eaſily prevent by keeping Convoy-ſhips about *Uſhant*, and ſending ſome few Cruiſers to pick up the Privateers that ply about the *Garonne*, and the *Loire*, and clear the North Sea of them. But the greateſt harm that the *French* can do the *Hollanders*, would be in the *Mediterranean* Seas, where, by reaſon of our remote ſituation, we cannot without great expence overpower them in Shipping. But our good Orders, according to which our Ships muſt be armed and manned, would preſerve them from many Depredations.

But in the Mediterranean.

Sixthly, It cannot on the other ſide be denied, that *Holland* with its great ſtrength of Shipping, would be able to plunder all that far extended *French* Sea-Coaſt from the North-Sea to *Italy*, and take thoſe weak Towns and burn them, unleſs they were prevented by an extraordinary Force of Soldiery by Land; there being in *France* on the Sea-ſide very many weak Towns and Villages, and no Ships of War that dare keep the Sea againſt ours. Beſides which, we ſhould deſtroy all their Trade to the *Eaſt* and *Weſt-Indies*, and indeed thorow all *Europe*; which is at preſent of ſo much importance to *France*, as hath been formerly declared. And when we further conſider, that in all Governments of a Single Perſon, the Treaſure in a time of War is miſerably waſted, as ſhall be farther demonſtrated when we come to ſpeak of *England*; we ſhall have reaſon to believe, that

Our Naval and Land Forces may keep France in a continual Alarm.

So that Holland *is able to compel the* French *to a Peace.*

we ſhould be able either to ruin the *French*, or compel them to a Peace.

By all which it clearly appears, that a King of *France* may not make War upon us, for fear of receiving great damage from us, or others in our behalf, nor in hope of conquering us, nor yet through vain Glory: But that on the contrary a War againſt us would immediately cauſe all *French* Traffick and Navigation to be at a ſtand, and endanger the loſs of it for the future.

And therefore we may purſue our own Intereſt againſt France.

And moreover, if we obſerve that *Spain* in ſome meaſure, and *England* yet more, uſed to be formidable to *France*, it will further appear, that we never ought, by any Threatnings of *France* to make War againſt us, to ſuffer our ſelves to be drawn in to make any League with *France*, which we conceive would be prejudicial to us. And much leſs ought we, to pleaſe *France*, to ſuffer our ſelves to be brought into any War, by which the Strength of *Spain* or *England* ſhould be impaired by the *French*: For having once done ſo, we ſhould meet with more bold and troubleſom Rencounters from them, and expect at laſt a more ſevere War from that Kingdom.

CHAP. VIII.

Considerations concerning Holland's *entring into Alliance with* Spain.

AS to *Spain*, it is very observable, that all the Welfare of that Kingdom depends on their Trade to the *West-Indies*: And that *Spain* affords only Wool, Fruit and Iron; and in lieu of this, requires so many *Holland* Manufactures and Commodities, that all the *Spanish* and *West-Indian* Wares are not sufficient to make returns for them.

Spain subsists by its Commerce with the West-Indies.

Yields Wool; and takes off more of our Manufacture.

So that the *Holland* Merchants, who carry Mony to most parts of the World to buy Commodities, must out of this single Country of all *Europe* carry home Mony, which they receive in paiment for their Goods, without benefit and by stealth, over that raging and boisterous Sea.

2. It is well known that *Spain* during our Wars, lost most of their Naval Forces; and that we during our Peace, have for the most part beat the *Eastern* Merchants and *English* out of that Trade. So that it is now certain, that in *Spain* all the Coast is navigated with few other than *Holland* Ships; and that their Ships and Seamen are so few, that since the Peace they have publickly begun to hire our Ships to sail to the *Indies*, whereas they were formerly so careful to exclude all Foreigners thence.

Has no Ships nor Mariners.

3. It is manifest, that the *West-Indies*, being as the Stomach in the Body to *Spain*, must be joined to the *Spanish* Head by a Sea-force:

Its Dominions much disperst.

And that the Kingdom of *Naples* with the *Netherlands*, being like two Arms, they cannot lay out their Strength and Vigour for *Spain*, nor receive any from thence but by ſhipping. All which may be very eaſily done by our Naval Power in a time of Peace, and may as well be obſtructed in a time of War.

And therefore our Naval Power can hinder their mutual Communication.

4. It is likewiſe certain, that *Holland* by its naval Strength, is able wonderfully to encumber and perplex this whole diſpers'd Body in time of War, and accordingly put them to the charge of maintaining an incredible number of Land Forces in Gariſons.

But on the other ſide it is likewiſe true,

Spain *ſtands in fear of* France.

1. That the King of *Spain* muſt continually maintain a great Military Strength againſt the mighty Kingdom of *France*, and in thoſe great and jealous *Netherlandiſh* Citys, or elſe loſe his Countrys.

Hath had pretenſions upon Holland.

2. It is known, That the ſaid King has Pretenſions to *Holland*, and a very powerful adherence of the *Roman*-Catholicks; tho the ſtrength of both theſe ſince our Peace, and his laying down all Pretenſions to our Country, and eſpecially by the expiration of ſo many Years, and our own confirmed and improved Government, is very much diminiſhed, and almoſt annihilated.

It bounds upon Holland.

3. It is likewiſe evident that *Spain*, by *Brabant*'s bordering on *Holland*, and by means of the *Flemiſh* Sea-Havens, is able to diſturb our Fiſherys, and Traffick, in this ſmall North Sea.

Offenſive Wars hurtful to Holland.

4. It is certain, That this State of Free-Government will not think it adviſable, tho they ſhould fall into a War with *Spain*, to take

take any more *Netherlandiſh* Cities by exceeding chargeable Sieges.

5. It is manifeſt that all the Frontiers of the *United Netherlands* are ſo well fortified, that we are not likely to loſe any of them unleſs by their great number; and yet if they are in any wiſe well defended, they would hardly pay the damage to *Spain*. *We are in a good condition for a defenſive War.*

Moreover, *Spain* would then have Reaſon to expect that we ſhould excite *France*, according to the Intereſt of the Kingdom, to prevent any additional Increaſe of *Spain* by making War on his Frontiers, which would always in ſuch Caſes be very terrible to *Spain*.

So that by all that hath been ſaid, it is manifeſt, that *Spain* may receive many great Advantages by *Holland* in time of Peace; and that a War is very prejudicial for both ſides: yet ſo, that there is much more appearance for the King of *Spain* to gain upon us by Land, than for us upon him, unleſs we ſhould reckon the plundering and burning of his Citys in *Spain*, and the loſing his Gallions at Sea to ballance it. Becauſe, as we have ſaid before, our free Rulers having their eye upon Trade do always decline an Offenſive War, and will carry on none but what is neceſſary and defenſive only. *Whereby we may purſue our Intereſt againſt* Spain.

Whence we may alſo infer, that out of fear of a War we ought never, againſt the intereſt of this State in it ſelf conſidered, to make Alliances with *Spain*; and much leſs ſhould we ſuffer our ſelves to be led away to make the leaſt War againſt any of our Neighbours who are formidable to him; ſince the greateſt quiet of this State conſiſts in this, That *France* be formidable to *Spain*, and *England* a Friend to us.

CHAP. IX.

Considerations touching Holland's *entring into Alliance with* England.

England subsisted formerly by Husbandry, without Naval strength.

AS for *England*, we are to know, that heretofore it wholly subsisted by Husbandry, and was wont to be so naked of any Naval Power, that the Hans-Towns being at War with *England*, they compelled King *Edward* in the Year 1470, to make Peace upon Terms of Advantage to them. And so long as the *English* used to transport nothing but a few Minerals, and much Wool, which they carried to *Calais* by a small number of their own Ships, and sold only to *Netherlandish* Clothiers, it would have been so prejudicial for the King to forbear his Customs of Wool (which at *Calais* alone amounted to 50000 Crowns *per Annum*) and likewise to the Subject, in case he had made War upon the *Netherlands*, That we read not that these trading Provinces ever broke out into a perfect open War against *England*. For tho sometimes War hapned between the Princes of the respective Countrys, nevertheless most of the Citys concerned in Traffick and Drapery, continued in Amity. In so much that all the Wars of that rich and plentiful Country broke out against *France*, and consequently against *Scotland*, or else against *Wales* and *Ireland*, and sometimes against *Spain*.

See Phil. de Comines.

And in some measure depended on the Drapery of the Netherlands.

But now not at all; and why.

But afterwards, when the compulsive Laws of the *Netherlandish* Halls, and the tumultuous rising against them which followed, together

ther with our Inland and Foreign Wars, had first driven the Cloth-weaving into our Villages, and thence into *England*, and by the Cruelty of the Duke of *Alva* the Say-weaving went also after it; the *English* by degrees fell to vend their Manufactures throughout *Europe*, became potent at Sea, and began no longer to depend on these *Netherlands*. Then by the discovery of that unexpressible rich Cod-bank of *Newfoundland*, those of *Bristol* in particular made use of that advantage; and ballasting their Ships with *English* Lead, Tin, and other Wares, when they had compleated their Fishing of Cod on the said Bank, they sailed with it to *Spain*, and throughout the *Mediterranean*, to vend their *English* Wares with their *Baccaleau*, or *Poor-John*, in all those parts, and in return carried other Goods of those Lands to *England*.

Finally, we may add the long Persecution of the Puritans in *England*, which causing the planting of many *English* Colonies in *America*, hath given *England* a very great conveniency to drive a mighty Foreign Trade with the *Indies* and the said Colonies.

Is become formidable to all the Princes of Europe, *and why.*

So that this mighty Island, united with the Kingdom of *Ireland* under the Government of one King, seems not to have need of any Garisons to repel a Foreign Enemy, is situated in the midst of *Europe*, having a clean deep Coast, furnished with good Harbours and Bays, in so narrow a Sea, that all Foreign Ships that sail to the Eastward or Westward, are necessitated even in fair Weather to shun the dangerous *French* Coast, and sail along that of *England*, and in stormy Weather to run in and preserve their Lives, Ships, and

Goods, in its Bays. So that it is easy to judg, that the said King having acquired a considerable Naval Power, and being independent on all his Neighbours as to Trade, is very considerable to all that are concerned in navigating the said Narrow Seas.

For its exceeding convenient Situation, to have the Dominion of the Sea.

For according to the Proverb, * A Master at Sea is a Lord at Land, and especially a King of *England*, seeing he is able both by whole Fleets of Ships, and private Ships of War, at all times to seize Ships that sail by that Coast; the Westerly Winds which blow for the most part on this side the *Tropick*, giving the *English* great Opportunitys to sail out of their numerous Bays and Harbours at pleasure, to infest our Navigation. And if this Commerce to the Eastward and Westward were stopt, or prevented, it would certainly prove the ruin of *Holland*.

Which formidable Power of the Kingdom of *England*, King *Henry* the 8*th* was so sensible of, that he dared to use this Device, † He whom I assist shall be Master: And accordingly made War as he listed, sometimes against *France*, sometimes against *Spain*; which was then strengthened with the *German* Empire, and these *Netherlands*; making peace at his own pleasure both with *Francis* the First, and *Charles* the Fifth, whom he durst so horribly despise, as to repudiate his Aunt.

So that *England* now by a conjunction with *Scotland* being much increased in Strength, as well as by Manufactures, and a great Na-

* Imperator Maris, Terræ Dominus.

† Cui adhæreo præst.

viga-

vigation, will in all reſpects be formidable to all *Europe*, ſo ſoon as an Abſolute King ſhall make uſe of that Power againſt his Neighbours, without the check and control of a Parliament.

How much England *may be benefited by a Peace with* Holland, *or damaged by a War.*

But on the other ſide, it is alſo certain that *England* in a time of Peace has great advantages by the *Hollanders*, who in their paſſage are neceſſitated to frequent their Havens. And there are now in *Holland* many more *Engliſh* Commoditys, which we could very well ſpare, that are tranſported and uſed by us, than *Holland* hath Wares in *England*, becauſe the *Holland* and other Foreign Manufactures have for the moſt part long ſince been prohibited. And ſince the Prohibition in *England* of importing any Goods, ſave thoſe of the Growth and Manufacture of the Country, by Foreign Ships into *England*, all our Navigation to that Kingdom is at a ſtand.

2. It is evident, that the Rivers in *England* are very ſmall, and remote from one another; ſo that all mutual Traffick, and tranſporting of Goods there, being neceſſarily done upon the open Sea, the *Engliſh* may ſuffer great Loſſes by our private Ships of War.

By our great Naval Power.

3. It is certain that the *Engliſh* Traffick by Sea being ſo great, and remote, may be moſt prejudiced in the *Mediterranean* Sea, and the *Eaſt-Indies*, by the *Holland* Ships, which during our free Government are much augmented, and muſt and will be increaſed more and more.

4. It is clear, that conſidering our ſmall and dangerous Coaſt, the *Engliſh* by Land can make no Conqueſt upon *Holland*, unleſs they can

can get footing by means of our inteſtine Diviſions; nor we on them, for another reaſon. Beſides, Kings will ever be conquering of Lands; and prudent Republicks which thrive beſt by Peace, will never do ſo, but rather erect Colonys.

A War by Sea too chargeable for England, *when we have a great Naval Strength.*

5. It is therefore conſequently true, That the *Engliſh* cannot make War upon us but by Sea. And ſince thoſe Wars muſt be carried on purely with Mony, becauſe Naval Power cannot ſubſiſt by plundering, and quartering in an Enemys Country, and that the King of *England* cannot employ his Revenue for that end, having occaſion for that and more to maintain his Court; It alſo follows that he would have need of another ſtanding Revenue or Fund, to be enabled to carry on the ſaid War by Sea.

Becauſe that King can carry on that War no other way than by Taxes.

6. It will be granted, That the ſaid King having a new ſtanding Revenue to maintain thoſe Wars, he would never after call a Parliament to deſire Subſidies from them, and conſequently the Parliament will never ſuffer that any perpetual important Tax be eſtabliſhed in that Kingdom; becauſe the eſtabliſhment of ſuch a Tax would utterly deveſt them of ſo weighty a Privilege, as is the aſſembling of Parliaments, in which all Abuſes are to be redreſs'd, and the Extortions, Briberies, and other Oppreſſions of Miniſters and Courtiers prevented or puniſhed, and Right done to the People, before they will engage by an Act of Parliament to pay thoſe heavy Subſidies.

Which would be intolerable to the Engliſh.

7. It is evident, That ſo long as we effectually take care of our Naval Power, and increaſe it as Opportunitys offer, a War with us would require ſo great and chargeable Fleets, that

that they could not be ſet to Sea, and maintained by Subſidies or Taxes only, becauſe the Burden would be ſo great, ſo unexpected, and ſo uneaſily born by the Inhabitants, that the King would be in continual apprehenſion and fear of an Inſurrection of his Subjects, if he ſhould obſtinately perſiſt to make War againſt us.

And a War by Sea is very unſerviceable to the Courtiers.

8. It is certain, that the Courtiers and Favourites who poſſeſs the King's Ear, may make great Profits by this War at Sea, by Prizes taken, and Subſidies granted, as long as they continue on ſhore to manage the ſame. But if they go to Sea themſelves to command in the Fleet, they put themſelves in as much danger of their Lives as the leaſt Perſon there, by Storms, Shipwracks, Fireſhips, Bullets; and moreover, run the Hazard of having all their endeavours during their abſence from Court miſconſtrued, and miſrepreſented to the King by other Courtiers. In a word, if thoſe Favourites, and Courtiers, remain on ſhore during the War againſt *Holland*, they will be neceſſitated to ſee the Admiral carry away all the honour of good Succeſſes, and they the blame of the bad; whilſt inſtead of carefully providing all things neceſſary, they ſtudy to enrich themſelves by the Subſidies and Prizes; and the Nation would gain little Honour or Profit by ſuch a chargeable Naval War. And on the other ſide, if they go to Sea to command the Fleets, they muſt neceſſarily part from the Court, and be abſent from the King, and conſequently run a great Hazard; leſt in the mean time ſome malevolent private Enemy, who hath the King's Ear, may ſo manage the matter, that tho they went

went to Sea in the King's Favour, yet they may be called home with Disgrace.

Besides, England *may be plundered landward, and compelled to redeem their Towns from firing, but* Holland *not.*

9. It is certain, that *England*, *Scotland*, and *Ireland*, having in all parts a deep and bold Coast, their Cities, Towns, and Villages in the Country being weak, or without Walls and Fortifications, they may in all Places be attacked, and our Men may be landed under the shelter of our Cannon, and so plunder and burn those Places. Whereas the *English* cannot do the like in *Holland*, because our small Coast can easily be guarded and secured by our own Forces, and is so foul and shallow, that the Enemies Ships of War cannot reach our Strand with their Cannon; and in case they should attempt to land with their Boats, they would soon be overset by the high Surges of the Sea, or at least have their Powder spoil'd. So that what we should fall short of in our Privateering by Sea, we should ballance by our plundering by Land, and burning of Towns, and thereby be richly recompensed. Besides, such plundering and burning will strike a greater Terror and Consternation into the Inhabitants there, than any Losses at Sea would operate amongst us.

All Monarchs, especially the English, *are very lavish of their Treasure, and withal Thievish.*

10. It cannot be denied, but that in all Monarchical Governments during a War, especially by Sea, vast Sums of Mony are ill laid out, and embezel'd by Courtiers, Sea Officers, and Souldiers, and the Stores provided for the Navy frequently misimployed and wasted; so that in a little time the Mony raised will fall short; more especially in *England*, where the Subsidies granted by the Parliament, being always limited to a certain Sum, are indeed sufficient but not superfluous; and

and an *Engliſh* Court, above all others, is prodigal and thieviſh. Whereas on the other ſide, in a free Commonwealth, and in a time of War by Sea, ſuch exact Accounts are kept, and Regulation uſed, that neither thoſe that are entruſted to provide things neceſſary, nor thoſe that make uſe of them, can either miſpend or embezel the publick Mony or Proviſions; and this may in a particular manner be expected from the *Hollanders*, who have always been famous for Frugality and Parſimony. And it is obſervable, that this Prodigality of the one Nation, and the Frugality of the other, is not only viſible in the publick Treaſure, but is alſo diſcerned in the private way of living, both of the *Engliſh* and *Hollanders*: ſo that by a War at Sea the Taxes upon the Commonalty of both ſides increaſing, and the Profits decreaſing, *Holland*, in proportion to the Country and Purſe of the Inhabitants, by well husbanding the publick Treaſure, would eaſily hold out longer than *England*, as appeared manifeſtly in the Year 1667.

But all Republicks, eſpecially Holland, *are Frugal.*

All which Particulars being true, it naturally follows, that a War is for both Nations very miſchievous; yet ſo, that *England* will be able to take many Prizes from us by Sea, and little by Land; We on the other ſide, few Prizes of the *Engliſh* by Sea, but great Booty by Land. But we ſhould be ſufficiently prejudiced by them, if we had not a competent number of Ships of War to match their Naval Strength, and by that means ſhould be forced to quit the Sea to the *Engliſh*, eſpecially if their Kings and Parliament would not laviſh the ſtrength of that Iſland on their Luxury and Favourites, but rather in Ships and Mariners.

A War with England *will be detrimental both to us and them.*

So

So that our only Safety is grounded upon the increase of our Naval Strength to such a Degree, that the *English* Fleets may either be over-ballanced by ours, or not able to hurt us, as likewise upon those Accidents to which a Monarchical Government is always subject, and that a War with us would be extremely pernicious to the Subjects of *England*; and likewise that *London*, by means of greater Traffick and Navigation, would be more formidable to the Kings of *England*, than any of his foreign Neighbours.

So that we ought to give the English *good words,*

So that in order to avoid a War, we must in all our Differences give them good words, and gain time, in hopes that in these Monarchical Governments the Kings will either follow their Pleasures, or through excess of Luxury, and Court-robbery, waste all their Revenues, and run themselves into Debts, or die, or perhaps fall into a foreign or intestine War.

But we are to take care, that we do not suffer our selves, for fear of a War with *England*, to be inveigled into an Alliance, jointly to carry on an offensive War against any Nation, which may be very formidable to that Country, and not so much to us. For in so doing we should make our selves considerably weaker, and *England* stronger; who having that Thorn pull'd out of their Foot, might afterwards with less fear oppress and trample upon us, while we remain deprived of that Refuge by our own Folly. The truth is, since *England* is more formidable to us than any Country in the whole Universe, it were an unpardonable Fault in us, to make them yet more formidable to our selves.

Notwithstanding a War threatned.

And

And above all, we are to obſerve, that in order to ſhun or avoid a War with *England*, we muſt not ſuffer our ſelves to be ſeduced to alter the Commonwealth for a Monarchical Government; for * *The free Lion will not be bound again*, was uſed to be *Holland*'s Device and Senſe. And if now under a free Government, we ſhould be neceſſitated to make ſome ſteps that way to pleaſe the King of *England*; I would then ask how we ſhould be able to make the leaſt Reſiſtance againſt ſuch a Head, as would in a manner become Lord of the Country, through our Weakneſs and Chains, when he ſhall by an innate Hatred (which all Monarchs bear to Republicks) attempt to ruin our formidable Naval Strength and Trade, and deprive us of our Navigation, under colour of favouring a Prince related to him, and a Head of his own making, whilſt he deſigns the ſupreme Power for himſelf: he would, I ſay, by this means make us the moſt miſerable Nation that ever was governed by any Monarch; for ſuch a Government would infallibly ſtrip us of all our natural Advantages proceeding from the Seas and Rivers, and not only leave us charged with intolerable Taxes, but oppreſs us alſo with an expenſive and luxurious way of Living, together with thoſe other infinite Miſchiefs which are found ever in thoſe Governments. From whence it evidently follows, that we muſt defend our free Government, tho it ſhould be by a War againſt *England*: For 'tis better and more commendable

Above all we ought not to pleaſe England *by altering our free Government.*

* Leo revinciri liber pernegat.

to

But to preserve the same sound, whole, and intire.

to fight for our Lives, tho with the utmost hazard of perishing, than to hang our selves like *Judas*, for fear of receiving some smarting wounds in the Battel, and to murder our selves by a double Death of Soul and Body, without hopes of a Resurrection; seeing if the worst befal us, and we be weakned by an *English* War, yet still living under a free Government, we might wait for Accidents and Alterations, and hope to have better Success at another time: Whereas on the contrary, by a Monarchical Government we should for ever be deprived of our Fisheries, Manufactures, and Trade, to the Ruin of our selves and our Posterity, who might justly curse such base and cowardly Parents.

And to have no offensive Alliances with England.

In all Events it is evident, that *England* fearing no Potentate of *Europe*, except the King of *France*, can make no Alliance with us grounded upon a common Fear; but that only, and consequently all other Alliances with that Kingdom, will be prejudicial to us.

Because such Conquests would be pernicious to us.

'Tis also as evident, that we are not to make any Alliance with *England*, out of a desire of Conquest; for at the best, when we have employ'd our utmost Strength in pursuit of their Game, we should at last most certainly differ with the *English* Lion about dividing the Prey; who taking the whole to himself, might soon after devour the wretched *Holland* Ass; or at most we should only be like Jackals, or Ferrets, to drive the Game into the *English* Net.

It were therefore in truth much better, that *Holland* in her Actions should imitate, not those two silly and unhappy Beasts, but rather the shy and wary Cat, that hunts only for her self.

Since

Since then we can make no advantageous Alliances with *England*, neither for common Conqueſt, nor common Defence, except againſt *France* only, we may rationally conclude, that all Alliances with that Kingdom, unleſs defenſive againſt *France*, are uſeleſs to *Holland*, even thoſe which might proceed from fear of a War with *England*: for it is evident, that whatever advantageous Conditions that King acquires from us, we muſt immediately make them good; and yet expect that he will nevertheleſs threaten us with a War, unleſs we will do many harder things for him.

But a defenſive Alliance with them againſt France *may be very proper.*

And indeed he that will not defend his Subjects in their Lives and Liberties, tho by troubleſom and dangerous Wars, is ſo unworthy of Government, Liberty, and Life, that in all reſpects he ought to be eſteemed the Off-ſcouring of the World, and his Poſterity never to be named by ſucceeding Generations, without Curſes and Deteſtation.

CHAP. X.

Some General and Particular Inferences drawn from the foregoing Conſiderations, touching all our Allies.

OUT of all which foregoing Particulars, I conceive we may draw the following Corollaries.

Firſt, That all Alliances which *Holland* might make in a time of Peace with any

General Maxims againſt the three moſt potent Monarchs,

Neighbouring Princes of *Europe*, are wholly unſerviceable to us; ſince in our Neceſſity we ſhall never receive Aid from them, but rather be drawn into a War. But in times of War and Trouble we ſhould conſider, according to what I formerly mentioned, whether *Holland* were able to defend it ſelf, and continue to do againſt its moſt potent Neighbours, *France*, *Spain*, and *England*, without any Aſſiſtance from abroad. And ſeeing I ſuppoſe we can, it then follows, that if we are attacked by a weaker Power, we muſt not ſeek help from thoſe great Potentates mentioned, becauſe they would thereby become greater and mightier. And on the contrary, a good Patriot of *Holland* ought to wiſh, that *France* and *England* may decreaſe, and that *Spain* may not increaſe in Strength.

And if it ſhould ſo fall out, that one of the three abovementioned Kingdoms ſhould make War upon us, it is not at all needful that we therefore ſhould ſeek Aid from abroad againſt them by Alliances, unleſs they of their own accord, and decently offer themſelves; for otherwiſe we ſhall get nothing but a number of good Words; and if we rely on them, we ſhall be much hindered, as we lately found in our *Engliſh* War, when we were allied with *France*, and have learned from that inferior and ungrateful *Denmark*. But when thoſe Alliances fall into our Laps, then, I ſay;

France.

England.

2. When *Holland* is fallen into a War with *England*, all Alliances with other Potentates are good, in order to eſcape, provided our Allies firſt perform their Engagements.

Spain.

3. When *Spain* makes War with us, an offenſive Alliance with *France* is good, provided

vided the *French* comply first with their Engagements; and if they will not, it is better to stand upon our own bottom, and to labour that we run not aground: And seeing we must run the Adventure, it is better to endeavour with full Sail to pass over the Flats, than in expectation of foreign Pilots, who all may promise to assist us with their Skill, to let our Vessel drive slowly, but certainly on the Sands, and perish.

That in matters of Polity, relating to an Enemy, none ought to be fainthearted.

It is always more decent and honourable for Men to shew that Courage they have, and effectually to exert their utmost Strength against an Enemy, in order to preserve their Rights, than to surrender all through Cowardice and Fear. For tho they may lose by the War, yet they sell every Advantage so dear to the Enemy, that afterwards neither he nor any other will rashly come on again. But he who for Fear, and want of Courage, gives up any part of his Estate and Right, invites and pulls down upon his own Head all that a covetous Enemy can desire, and is despised by all Men.

Contracts with lesser States are the best.

4. All these Disturbances and Wars, whether against *France* (unless that Kingdom were strengthned by devouring the *Spanish Netherlands*, and so become our Neighbour) or against any other Potentates, may more easily be overcome without any Alliance; tho in such a Case the lesser Republicks and Potentates may, in favour of *Holland*, be drawn into the War by some preceding Alliance, because we having gotten what we aimed at, will ever interpret the Alliance made to our best Advantage.

5. It is *cæteris paribus* more uſeful either for *Holland*, or other Potentates, to have Alliances with a Republick, than with a Prince or King, becauſe ſuch Alliances being grounded upon a common Intereſt, they may aſſure themſelves that they will always be ſo underſtood by the Governors of a Commonwealth, who beſides are Immortal and Perpetual. Whereas on the other ſide, ſingle Perſons have ſeldom ſo much underſtanding and knowledg, as to apprehend their own Intereſt, much leſs will they take the pains to govern by that Rule; and beſides, they are very inconſtant and mortal, and naturally hate all Republicks.

And a good Alliance with a Republick, is better than with a King.

6. It is, and always will be dangerous for *Holland*, to make Alliances with *France*, *Spain*, or *England*, becauſe 'tis probable that they who are more eſteemed only becauſe they are Kings, and poſſeſs larger Territories than we, will always oblige us to perform our Engagements firſt, and expound all ambiguous Points to their own advantage. But ſo long as we are in the leaſt fear of *France*, that is, ſo long as *Spain* can keep the *Netherlands*, we may beſt enter into Alliance with that Kingdom for common defence, againſt thoſe that might wrong, or make War againſt the one or the other. But when *France* is like to be Maſter of the *Netherlands*, and become our Neighbour, it is not only neceſſary for *Holland* to prevent that potent, and always bold and inſolent Neighbour, and to take great care not to make any League, by which *France* may in any meaſure increaſe in Power; but all the Potentates and States of *Europe* ought to combine together to hinder

But Alliances with France, Spain, *and* England, *are dangerous.*

Yet that we may not have France *for our Neighbour, almoſt all Alliances are good.*

der the further growth of that Kingdom, which hath already overgrown all its Neighbours.

Above all things we ought to make no Alliance with England *save against* France.

Likewise so long as we must dread *England* in the highest degree, it is perfectly useless to make the least Alliance with that Kingdom, save such as is grounded upon a common fear of a greater Power, as now *France* is; seeing all written Alliances, without common Necessity, are interpreted in favour of the greatest, as happens in all doubtful Cases: Besides that *England* will thus find more cause with appearance of Right to make War against us. For if that be found true, which mean Persons conclude, That all that are in Partnership have a Master; and that all such Partnerships begin *In the Name of God*, but use to end in that of the Devil: 'Tis much more true of Kings and Princes, who have outgrown all Justice; and consequently as true, that so long as *England* intends to have the Quiet or Disquiet of *Holland* at their own disposal, she would be the worst and most tyrannical Ally for us that were to be found in the whole World, unless the dread of a more powerful Neighbour should curb that pernicious Inclination.

To sum up all: So long as *Holland* can stand on its own Legs, it is utterly unadvisable to make any Alliance with those who are more potent; and especially it is not good to perform any thing first, or be beforehand with those unconstant Monarchs and Princes, in hope that they will perform with us afterwards, according to the old saying, They that eat Cherrys with great Men, must pay for them themselves; and besides, suffer

them to chuſe the faireſt, and expect at laſt to be pelted with the Stones, inſtead of Thanks for the Favour received.

Benefit of Alliances conſiſts in never performing Firſt.

7. And conſequently it is certain, That all the Advantage in Articles of an Alliance conſiſts in this, that *Holland* do always covenant that the other Allys ſhall firſt perform their Engagements. All other ſort of Alliances are very prejudicial to us: For by the proper Conſtitution, or antient Cuſtom of our Government, the Deputys of the Provinces upon all occaſion will, where they can expect any private Benefit, ſuffer themſelves to be moved by Foreign Ambaſſadors to draw in *Holland* to their Party, when they can ſee no detriment to accrue thereby to their particular Provinces.

Eſpecially becauſe our Generalitys Colleges are not ſettled according to our Intereſt.

And the following Proverb takes place with thoſe eſpecially (whoſe Commiſſioners for the Generality are not concerned for the Publick, ſo long as their Provinces remain unburdened) *That it is very eaſy to lie in the Aſhes with another Man's Garment, and be warm.* So alſo 'tis not difficult to take generous Reſolutions at the coſt of another, to keep Promiſe, to be liberal and merciful towards our Neighbours, while all other Potentates and States continue to deal openly and fairly with us. But ſuppoſing the other Provinces might be ſomewhat concerned therein, yet is their Intereſt ſo inconſiderable, that among their Deputys we ever find that a general Evil is weighed according to the Weigher's particular Intereſt and no otherwiſe, how heavily ſoever another may be oppreſſed thereby; eſpecially here, becauſe they are ſeldom called to account by their Superiors for their Tranſactions.

And if any one doubts of the Truth of theſe Inferences, *viz.* That all Superior Powers, eſpecially the Monarchs and Princes of *Europe*, play with their Allys as Children do with Nine-pins, which they ſet up, and immediately beat down again as they pleaſe; and that he that firſt performs is ever the loſer, and ſuffers ſhame, let him read the Hiſtorys of *Franciſco Guicciardino*, and *Philip de Commines*. And if theſe two famous Politicians, the one an *Italian*, the other a *Netherlander*, writing of Matters in which they had the profoundeſt skill, and in which they were very often imploy'd; if they, I ſay, do not remove theſe Doubts, much leſs will it be effected by any reaſoning from me.

For Potentates trifle with Oaths.

In the mean time, to conclude what hath been alledged above (*viz.* ſeeking our Preſervation by Alliances) I ſhall lay before you that which the Antients have figured out by the enſuing Fable.

The general Concluſion illuſtrated by a Fable of an old and rich Man, and a young Country Fellow.

" A rich but weak Countryman, obſerving " that his poor and ſtrong Neighbour, con- " trary to preceding Promiſes made of aſſiſt- " ing each other, did notwithſtanding ſteal " his Apples, and rob'd his Orchard; told " him of the Injuſtice and Perfidiouſneſs of " the thing, deſiring that he would be ſatiſ- " fied with what he had. To this the ſtrong " Boor anſwered, that this Sermon very well " became a rich unarmed Man; but that he " being hungry, could not fill his empty Belly " with ſuch Food. And as to his former Pro- " miſes and Engagements for mutual de- " fence, ſuch kind of neceſſity is ever excep- " ted, and that he could not comply there- " with. Upon this the other weak and old

" Boor having gathered a Noſegay of ſweet " Herbs and beautiful Flowers, threw them " to the Plunderer, ſaying, I preſent you " with theſe Fruits, that you may not rob " my Orchard, which I uſe to ſow and plant " for the uſe and refreſhment of Friends. " The impudent young Fellow thinking with " himſelf, that he muſt needs be very ſilly, " who being able to take all, will be content " with ſo ſmall a matter, rob'd him more and " more of all that came to hand; inſomuch " that the Owner became impatient, and in " great haſt gathered up ſome Stones, and " threw them at the Plunderer; who being " grievouſly hurt, was neceſſitated to leap " down from the Tree and fly. The old " weak Boor finding himſelf alone, broke " out into theſe words, Formerly we uſed to " ſay, In Words, Herbs and Stones, there " are great Virtues: But now I really find " the weakneſs of Words and Herbs, *i. e.* " Alliances, and Gifts to knaviſh Men. For " all Gifts and Receipts are good for the Phy- " ſician, and the true Antidote in all Poli- " tick Diſtempers, is good Arms and Trea- " ſure: So that to make an end, I ſay, that " no body can defend his Goods againſt " wicked Men, but by Stones, that is, good " Arms, which are the only things left us, " whereby we can bravely defend our " Lives and Eſtates.

Weak States improving their natural ſtrength, do commonly defend themſelves againſt a bold aggreſſing Neighbour.

But ſeeing theſe Concluſions do affirm, that *Holland* is able to defend it ſelf againſt all Foreign Power, and yet the ſame is not ſufficiently proved; therefore I ſhall do it in the following Chapters more fully, with this reſerve, that *Holland* notwithſtanding ought for

for its own Intereſt always to maintain the Union of *Utrecht*, ſo long as the other Provinces forſake not *Holland*, nor aſſault it in a hoſtile manner.

CHAP. XI.

That Holland *heretofore, under the Government of a ſingle Perſon, was in continual Tumults and Broils. And that under a Free Government it ought, and can defend it ſelf againſt all Foreign Power better than formerly.*

Adviſedly to conſider whether Holland *can ſubſiſt againſt all Potentates,*

BEcauſe in the foregoing Chapters, which treat of *Holland*'s making or not making Alliances with its Neighbours, it could be ſhewn only in part and by accident, that *Holland* effectually minding its own Intereſt, can make a State in *Europe* independent of any other, and not to be overpowered by any Foreign Force: And that on the other ſide, there are many Magiſtrates of Opinion, or at leaſt have been ſo, that *Holland* ought not only to be joined by the Union of *Utrecht*, but alſo by a Governor or Captain General, to all the other *United Provinces*; becauſe if that Province ſhould happen to be abandoned by the reſt, they ſay, it would by no means defend it ſelf in time of War againſt a powerful Enemy: To whom we may add the Courtiers, and other Flatterers of the Stadtholders Court, who have for a long time made the common Inhabitants of the *United Provinces* believe,

We muſt not regard what flattering Courtiers have given out; but

believe, that all those Countrys united would not be able to repel the Force of *Spain* with their own Strength; and that therefore one permanent Illustrious Captain-General and Stadtholder is very necessary for us, that by his Interest and Favour we may be able to obtain Succours of *France*, *England*, or *Germany*, against *Spain*. For these Reasons, and on account of the weight of the Subject, upon which most of all that is here treated, or shall be said hereafter, depends, I find my self obliged to represent the same more at large, and that effectually.

A Ruler that governs as if his State could not be secure, acts like a Monster;

In the first place it is evident, that there can be nothing more shameful nor prejudicial for a Sovereign Free Government, than to hold for a Maxim in the publick management of their Affairs, That in a time of War they are not able to subsist against all their Neighbours and States, whoever they be: For such Governors do thereby make the Welfare of their Native Country dependent upon those more powerful States, and content themselves of Rulers to become Subjects: Which is the most miserable condition that any Country can fall into by unsuccessful War.

Because he not only neglects himself, but also his innocent Subjects.

And indeed if we may justly blame a sick Person, who because he thinks he is mortally sick, will therefore use no Physician; we ought much more to blame those Rulers, who by base and degenerate Maxims lay aside the use of all Wisdom, Care, and Power, to strengthen and defend their Country to the utmost Extremity: for we might excuse the Folly of a sick Person, because what he does is at his own peril. And because every one is Lord of his own, neither can it be simply said

that

that he increaſes his Diſtemper by neglecting the uſe of Phyſick. But a Magiſtrate, who is by Nature and by his Oath to provide for the Welfare of his Subjects, and to defend them againſt all Force, ought to be accounted the moſt infamous of Men if he neglects that Duty.

If then by ſuch ill Maxims he uſes the ſtrength of his own Country and Subjects to give advantages to another, and is not only careleſs of his own, but of the Welfare of his innocent People, he tempts his inſolent Neighbours, and perfidious Allys, to attack and ruin his Country in that unarmed condition: Wheras if he had made ſuch proviſion for the publick Defence as he ought, they would have been deterred from any attempt, and have continued peaceable and quiet. For as occaſion makes the Thief, and every one will climb over into the Garden where the Wall is loweſt; ſo likewiſe the Goods of unarmed People are ever common: but one Sword keeps another in the Scabbard; and two curſt Dogs ſeldom bite one another.

But to come nearer to the matter in hand, I ſhall premiſe in the general, from the Credit of undoubted Hiſtory, that moſt of theſe *Netherlandiſh* Provinces, eſpecially *Holland*, whilſt for many Ages they were governed by Earls and Captains General, not only lived in continual Diſſenſion and Diviſion, but were in perpetual War one againſt the other, as well as againſt their Lords, and thoſe that depended on them, unchriſtianly ſhedding one anothers Blood: And the reaſon of it is very evident; for tho the Intereſt of ſuch Lords is often different from that of the State, and con-

Deduction, *Part* 2. *ch.* 3. *fol.* 6. Holland *hath ſtood of it ſelf* 700 *Years together.*

It had Breaches and Tumults during the Government of the Earls and Capt. Generals.

contrary to the common Good of the People, yet have they very many Persons that depend on them, and are of great Power in the Government; by which means it infallibly happens (unless such Lords could be devested of human Nature) that they will endeavour many times to advance their own particular Interests, with the assistance of their Favorites and Dependents: Against which all good Magistrates, who value the common Happiness above all things, and esteem the Welfare of the People to be the Supreme Law, are necessitated, in discharge of their Duty, to exert themselves vigorously against such Persons, without fear of their displeasure; and by this means the Community falls into great Divisions. For on the one side, the Lord will not, and according to the Rules of the World may not bow or comply, because his Honour and Authority stands engaged. And on the other side, the honest Magistrates, relying on their Consciences as on a Wall of Brass, will not be drawn from their necessary Resolution; and if in so dangerous a Conjuncture the Lord happen to be of a violent Temper, or apt to be seduced by violent Counsels, that Country is often brought to great Extremitys.

Because in those Divisions they sought their own Advantage.

And yet we know that notwithstanding these intestine Disorders, Suspicions and Animositys, the *Hollanders* preserved and defended themselves against all Foreign Force. And it appears by the Negotiations of the President *Jeannin*, that Prince *Maurice*, and his Partisans, in the Year 1608, was of opinion, that *Zealand* alone, parted from the other *United Provinces*, was able to defend it self against all

all the Power of *Spain*; upon which the other Provinces declared not to agree to a Truce, but to continue the War.

This being premiſed in general, I come now to the matter in particular. In the firſt place, Antient Hiſtorys inform us, that *Holland* before the breaking in of the Inlet to the *Texel*, about the Year 1170, according to *Goederd Pantalcon*, publiſhed by *M. Voſſius*, or as others ſay, about the Year 1400, being deſtitute of the *Zuyder-Sea*, lay joined to *Frieſland*, *Overyſſel* and *Guelderland*, or at moſt was parted by the *Rhine* and *Vlie*, as before the Year 1421; and before the Land near *Dort* was overflown, *Holland* on that ſide lay joined to *Brabant*, and conſequently had many more Frontiers than now. And moreover it is evident, that theſe Inland Provinces had fewer Citys, and leſs Populous, and was therefore in reſpect of their Neighbours every way weaker and poorer than at preſent.

Holland antiently much weaker than at preſent.

And yet the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, from the unanimous conſent of all our antient Hiſtorians, inform us in their Remonſtrance to the Earl of *Leiceſter* in 1587. *That theſe Lands* (their Lordſhips ſpeaking there of *Holland* with *Weſt-Frieſland*, and *Zealand*) *have for the moſt part bin victorious againſt all their Enemys, and have ſo well defended their Frontiers againſt their Adverſaries, however powerful, that they have always had a good eſteem and reputation among their Neighbours: At leaſt we may ſay with truth, that the Countrys of* Holland *and* Zealand *for the ſpace of* 800 *Years have never been conquered by the Sword, or ſubdued either by Foreign or Inteſtine Wars. Which cannot*

Yet hath at all times defended it ſelf well. P. Borre, *Book* 23. *fol.* 56.

not be ſaid of any other Dominions, unleſs of the Republick of Venice. Thus far the ſaid States.

Even againſt the King of Spain, *heretofore very formidable.*

2. It is notorious that the Provinces of *Holland* and *Weſtfreiſland* never had more powerful Neighbours than the Kings of *Spain*, who having been Earls of *Holland* and *Zealand*, and ſtill claiming a Right to that Dominion, had an incredible advantage above all other Neighbours to reduce theſe Countrys under their Power, which were very much divided by many Differences about Religion and other Matters; and yet *Holland* and *Zealand* alone, after they had ſupported a few Sieges with reſolution, ſo broke the formidable Power of that wiſe and abſolute Monarch *Philip* the 2*d* of *Spain*, that other Provinces afterwards by their Example dared to reſiſt him.

So that the other *United Provinces* have not brought *Holland* and *Zealand* into a condition of Freedom, but *Holland* and *Zealand* them. And it is to be conſidered, that the other Provinces (*Utrecht* excepted) have added nothing to ſtrengthen and fortify the free Government of *Holland*, or to free that Province from any Inconvenience to this day. But on the contrary, *Holland* alone erected the Commonwealth-Government for the benefit of the other Provinces, and has done ſo much for the other Provinces, that every one of them (except *Utrecht* which has always run the ſame adventure with us) is now provided with well fortified Citys, Magazines, Ammunition of War, Proviſion, and Souldiers in Gariſon; or to ſay better, Inhabitants, who daily receive their Pay out of *Holland*. And moreover, divers Citys and Forts in *Brabant*, *Flanders*, *Cleve*, *Eaſt-Frieſland*, *Drente*, and *Nether-*

Who was not only beat off, but other United Provinces *in the mean time fortified by* Holland;

Netherland, have been conquered, fortified, and provided with Souldiers, Proviſions, and Ammunition of War neceſſary for their defence at the expence of *Holland*.

Againſt this, if any will object that *Holland* in the diſtribution of Taxes pays no more than 58 Guilders 6 Stivers 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ pence in the hundred for their ſhare, and conſequently the other *United Provinces* have in ſome meaſure helped to bear the charge of the War: We might truly anſwer, that *Guelderland* and *Overyſſel* contributed nothing to the charge of the Army to the time of the Truce; and that to the Year 1607, we were neceſſitated at our own charge to compel *Groeningen* to bring in its proportion for the War by means of a Caſtle and Gariſon. And it is certain that afterwards the yearly Demand, or Requeſt of the Council of State for Taxes to pay the Armys in the time of *Frederick Hendrick* Prince of *Orange*, was purpoſely raiſed ſo high, that half the Sum would very near defray that charge. So that when the ſaid Captain General had once obliged the Province of *Holland* to give their conſent to the Sum required, he uſed not much to trouble himſelf for that of the other Provinces. And we have often ſeen, that in the hotteſt of the War againſt *Spain*, and in the former War againſt *England*, together with the Eaſtern and Northern War, as well as in the laſt *Engliſh* War, they have often refuſed to conſent to the publick Supplies; and more often have only given their Conſent for form-ſake, in order to induce the Province of *Holland* to conſent to the Charge; and having done ſo, becauſe they dared not to deny their Conſents for fear

In compariſon whereof what the other Provinces contributed was of little value.

Aitzma's *Hiſt.* lib. 32. *pag.* 774.

fear of incurring the Prince's displeasure, they remained in default of paiment without being compelled to bring in their promised Proportions; because our Captain-General had rather by such Favours keep the other Provinces at his devotion, and especially their Deputys of the Generality (amongst whom were several who with good reason were called the *Cabinet Lords*) that by them he might be able perpetually to overvote the Province of *Holland*, and make them dance to his Pipe. And this is the true reason of the many Arrears of Taxes which those Provinces consented to raise, but have not brought in to this day. Tho (if we relapse not again under a new Captain-General) Expedients may be found and put in execution for recovery of them, and for prevention of the like for the future.

See in the Year 1662. Sept. 26. *Resolution of the States of* Holland *by* L. V. Aitzma, *B.* 42. *p.* 481.

3. It is to be observ'd that *Holland* during all these Broils and Hardships, was under the Government of Earls and Stadtholders or Captain-Generals, who have ever sought their own private Interest to the prejudice of these Countrys, and have from time to time raised and fomented those endless intestine Divisions, in order to make a Conquest of the Estates and Rights of the Gentry and Citys of *Holland* and *Westfriesland*; so that it remains abundantly evident that all Foreign Wars have been carried on and finished only by a part, or divided Power of this Province.

Holland *in the interim compelled to bow and groan under the Yoke of the Captain Generals.*

4. It is likewise observable, that almost all the *United Provinces* have continually lived upon *Holland*, not only by their Deputys in some College of the Generality and other Offices of Judicature, Polity, and the Revenues; but also by great numbers of their Gentry, and

Most of the Provinces inriched with the Mony of Holland.

and other Inhabitants, who by favour of the Captain-General have found means to get into the moſt profitable Commands in the Army, and are to be paid by the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*; and for that reaſon, even after the Peace was concluded, kept thoſe Land-Forces long in great pay againſt the will of *Holland*, tho they had during the War endleſly multiplied thoſe Offices, and Profits. And 'tis yet more remarkable, that almoſt all the *United Provinces* have continually prey'd upon *Holland*, by bringing in very many mere Provincial Charges to the account of the Generality, in the annual Petition of the Council of State, that under this pretext they might make *Holland* pay yearly more than 58 *per Cent.* of divers Sums, of which in truth *Holland* owed not one Penny.

See Catalogue of the Generalitys Officers, in Aitzma *B.* 41. *p.* 232.

Deduct. 1 *part. c.* 9. §. 15. 2 *part. c.* 6. §. 17, *to* 26.

So that I ſhall finiſh all theſe Conſiderations with concluding, that the ſtout and powerful Lion of *Holland* had formerly ſtrength enough to repel all his Foreign Enemys, and thoſe of his Allies, *viz.* of the other *United Provinces*: But (God amend it) I muſt add, that this ſtrong and victorious Creature, to the Year 1650, had not the foreſight, or fortune to eſcape the Snares which were laid by his own Miniſters and Servants. For our Hiſtorys tell us, that the Earls of the Houſe of *Burgundy* and *Auſtria*, did by degrees more and more bridle and curb the *Holland* Lion; and it is alſo as evident that our former Stadtholders and Captain-Generals have very well been acquainted with the Politick Maxim of Lording it over a Country, and bringing it under ſubjection: That the moſt powerful Provinces and the ſtrongeſt Citys, together with the beſt

Holland *has caſt of the Yoke of all its Enemys, but that of her own Miniſters.*

and moſt venerable Magiſtrates, were moſt inſulted and brought into the greateſt ſlavery.

So that every one may judg, whether the ſaid Stadtholders, and Captain-Generals might not without difficulty leſſen and depreſs *Holland*, with its antient and conſiderable Gentry, ſtrong Citys, and venerable Magiſtrates, and by that means increaſe their own Power, ſince in all Colleges of the common Union or Generality they could very eaſily engage the moſt Voices, to over-vote and compel the Province of *Holland*, even in ſuch Matters wherein plurality of Votes ſhould have no place, neither by the right of Nature, Right of Juſtice, or the Common Union.

And let the Reader enquire, weigh, and conſider whether the Stadtholders and Captain-Generals following the ſame Maxims, have not in all the Provinces, and eſpecially in *Holland*, very often taken off the meaneſt and moſt indigent Magiſtrates from ſeeking the Countrys Welfare, and drawn them to their Party; that in conjunction with others like themſelves, they may either over-vote thoſe who are more able, and more affectionate to the lawful Government, or by force of Arms turn them out of their Magiſtracy, and introduce other needy Perſons, and ſometimes ſuch as fly from Juſtice, to ſerve in their Places.

Beſides which, our Stadtholders and Captain-Generals have left our Lion undefended againſt the new invented Military Arts; or to ſpeak clearer, have left the Citys without any more than their old Fortifications,

ons, ſo that they are not tenable againſt the new invented Art of taking Towns. They have alſo fettered and manacled theſe Countrys, by means of Gariſons and Citadels placed in the conquered Citys; and have ſo order'd matters, that moſt of the Governments and chief Military Offices in *Holland* have been put into the hands of Strangers, but ever of their Relations, or Creatures, and very ſeldom intruſted with the Gentry of *Holland*, and Lovers of their Country.

The States of Holland *never ſo much oppreſt under the Earls of* Burgundy *or of* Auſtria,

So that the Power of the Captain-Generals was even in the Year 1618, grown ſo far above the former Power of the antient Earls; and on the other ſide the Power of our Nobility and Citys ſo much diminiſhed, that tho many of them for very ſmall Uſurpations and Encroachments of their Earls, dared to exclude them out of their Caſtles and Citys, yet there was not one City of *Holland* (tho they knew that Prince *Maurice* as Captain-General came to put out of Office all Magiſtrates that were Lovers of their Common Freedom, and to remove them from their Benches) that durſt ſhut their Gates, much leſs make head againſt, and drive him from their Walls. So that about the Year 1650, it might ſtill be asked, * Whether theſe Countrys by their Servants of the Houſe of *Naſſau*, or their Lords of that of *Auſtria*, were in greater ſervitude. And farther, it is well known to all, that ſome Miniſters of this unhappy Lion of *Holland* have endeavoured to break and deſtroy

As under the Stadtholders and Captain-Generals of the Houſe of Orange.

Aitzma *b.* 33. *pag.* 809.

* Servire Auriacis Famulis, Dominiſque Philippis,
Dic mihi conditio durior utra fuit?

all its inward Power, by cauſing the Union made for general Defence to be ſo order'd, that in reality it had the ſame effect in the State as a continual Hectick Fever in the Body, cauſing us to take up ſo much Mony yearly at Intereſt, and for paiment of yearly Intereſt already due, that in very few Years it would have proved as a Canker, and have conſumed all its vital Strength.

Holland *now is better ſurrounded by the Sea and Rivers.*

And on the other ſide it is remarkable what advantage time hath ſince given us, *viz. Firſt*, That *Holland* is wholly ſurrounded with Seas, or mighty Rivers: in particular to the Eaſtward by the North-Sea; to the Southward by many Iſlands, and great Rivers, as the *Maeſe*, the *Rhyne* and *Iſſell*, in part begirting *Holland*; to the Weſtward, and to the Northward by the mighty Inlets of the *Texel*, and the *Vlie*, and likewiſe the *Zuider-Sea*, and the *Vecht* encompaſſing this Country in part towards the Weſt: So that *Holland* is now in all reſpects inacceſſible, or would be in time of War, unleſs to one that is Maſter at Sea. At leaſt it is evident that *Holland* hath no community at all with the Frontiers or Limits of the Land, ſave with ſome few conquered Citys in *Brabant*, with a very ſmall part of *Guelderland*, as alſo and eſpecially with the Province of *Utrecht*.

And provided with great and Populous Citys.

Secondly, It is clear, that *Holland* is now more than ever furniſhed with many great and populous Citys and Towns, whoſe Inhabitants by trading in all the Commoditys of the World, have incredibly enriched themſelves; while on the other ſide *Brabant* and *Flanders* are become poorer and weaker. And it muſt be confeſſed, that the ſaid Traf-

See Bentivoglio Relat. *B.* 1. *c.* 7.

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ſick by Sea hath improved *Holland*'s Strength of Shipping to a higher degree than ever it was formerly.

Thirdly, It muſt be acknowledged, that *Holland* is now governed after a free Republican manner; and therefore its Inhabitants are able to purſue their own Intereſt with an undivided and unbroken Power, and not to be terrified or conſtrained in time to come by any one eminent Servant of the State with his Adherents, or by any ill practiſed Union or miſled Allys, to be over voted, enſnared, and depreſſed to its own ruin. *And with a free Government.*

Fourthly, It is obſervable, that the formidable *Burgundian* and *Auſtrian* Power, which formerly was ſo grievous to us, is now fixed in *Spain*, to govern from ſo great a diſtance thoſe *Netherlands* that join to our Frontiers, by delegated Governours, and appointed Captain-Generals, officiating in their reſpective Employments for a very ſhort time. Since therefore they with ſlow and limited Inſtructions, and tied up hands, cannot perform that Service to thoſe extreme jealous Kings and Councils of *Spain* to the prejudice of us, we in that reſpect need not to fear them. *While the* Burgundian *and* Spaniſh *Princes remain in* Spain.

Fifthly, It is evident that the King of *Spain*, heretofore our old and moſt formidable Neighbour by Land, is not only weakned in his Dominions. by the defection of *Portugal*; but by his manifold loſſes of Territorys, and Citys ſituate in *Brabant*, *Flanders*, *Artois*, &c. is become ſo inconſiderable, that to obtain a Peace of us, he in the Year 1648 found it his beſt courſe to reſign up his Right to the *United Provinces*, and eſpecially to that of *And their Power is every way diminiſhed.*

Holland, with whatever he might any way pretend to; ſo that we are now wholly fearleſs from that ſide.

So that Holland *is now better able than ever to defend it ſelf.*

All which paſt Miſchiefs, and preſent Advantages of *Holland*, being thus well weighed, methinks I might generally infer, that *Holland* is much abler now than ever 'twas formerly to defend it ſelf againſt all Foreign Enemys.

Againſt which it is objected, that Holland *Land-ward is worſe fortified than ever, and the adjacent Provinces and Citys are very ſtrong.*

But ſome may object, that *Holland* for fifty Years paſt having abandoned its own Defence, and reverſed all good Maxims, has ſo contrived and conſtituted matters, that we cannot be ſafe unleſs by means of the other Provinces; and that all our great Advantages of good Situation, Populouſneſs, and God's unſpeakable Bleſſings upon the Diligence and Frugality of the *Hollanders*, have only ſerved to ſtrengthen the other Provinces and conquered Citys, ſo as to render them impregnable: Inſomuch that they now have no more need of us, unleſs to draw Mony from us; and that on the other ſide, we have left our ſelves naked of all means, both of Defence and Offence.

Deduct. Milit. §. 75.

And hath not kept its Right of giving Commiſſions to her own Officers without the Province of Holland.

They may alſo ſay, that at the great Aſſembly held in the *Hague* in the Year 1651, *Holland* granted to the Generality, and the other Provinces, the Right of giving Patents or Commiſſions to all the Military Officers of the reſpective Allys: So that it may be affirm'd, that this Province hath utterly deveſted themſelves of all kind of Reſpect or Eſteem from the Soldiery, who yet are paid out of our Purſe; tho they are for the moſt part in Gariſons out of the Province of *Holland*, and that we have not preſerved that

 natu-

natural Right which we have over them. So that if we ſhould want any Companys for the Service of our Province, we ſhould be forced as it were to petition to have them of our ſaid Allys.

To which may be added, that we have been burdened with ſo many Impoſitions, that it is impoſſible they can be long born by a Country that ſubſiſts not of its own Fund, but of Manufactures, Fiſhing, Trade and Shipping, whilſt we are burden'd with endleſs incankering Sums taken up at Intereſt. So that we might hence conclude, that *Holland* is not indeed eſteemed conſiderable by any of her Neighbours, or Allys by Land; and that we on the contrary muſt ſtand in fear of all our neareſt Neighbours that are well armed. And he that doubts of this, let him but conſider that divers Provinces during the firſt and ſecond War, dared roundly to declare, That they would not bear the Charge of any War by Sea whatſoever it were. Let them likewiſe take notice that the Province of *Holland* to this day could never find any Means to compel the Provinces that are in Arrear of their Quota's, to bring in their multiplied Arrears, to which they gave their Conſent; And therefore *Holland* in reſpect of all its adjacent Neighbours by Land, ſeems in all regards to be weaker than ever it formerly was.

Aitzma, *Hiſt. of* 1654. *p.* 144, 357, 358.

And in truth, if the Province of *Holland* had not heretofore been compell'd by a Captain-General and Stadtholder, to ſuffer the things beforementioned, I ſhould much wonder that we have continued ſo long in ſuch an ill ſtate of Government: For it has always

How this happened againſt all Rules of good Government.

been a Custom in the World, that the Weak, to the end they might be assisted in their distress against their Enemys, should enrich the Strong in a time of Peace by a yearly Paiment of Mony; and that the Strong having receiv'd much Mony and Tribute, whether in times of Peace or War, should for all that never assist their weak Allys in their necessity, farther than might agree with their own Interest: And certainly he is a Fool in grain, who carrys Water to his Neighbour's House, whilst his own is burning. Moreover *Holland* hath been for more than fifty Years successively either made, or left disarmed, to strengthen its Neighbours, and to make them rather than themselves considerable: So that in case of a War with them, we might fear lest our small unfortified, and unprovided Frontier Citys, and possibly the other great Citys too, because of their want of Fortifications, and exercise of Arms, tho they are stronger inwardly, might be surprized, and fall into our Neighbours hands.

While our Fishers and Merchants are taken at Sea.

For, to speak truly, tho we have been like good Wrestlers and Fencers, able to defend our selves with our own Strength, yet we have suffered our selves to be deluded into a belief, that we should be better defended in case we gave up our Arms to certain famous Fencers, or to Neighbours that boast themselves to be better able to wrestle and fence than we, and consequently to expel an Enemy; whereas they are visibly weaker of Body than our selves. So that we having for so long a time delivered up, and lent out our Arms, are, for want of exercise and using the Sword, really become totally disarmed and

weak;

weak; inſomuch that in caſe our weak Champions ſhould come to a Battel, not only they but we alſo ſhould fall by the Sword: and beſides, our weak neighbouring Champions who have borrowed our Swords, are no leſs miſchievous than any other People. And therefore we are to expect, that they not only deſign their own Advantage, and neglect ours, but alſo will conceive and eſteem their own Burdens very heavy, and ours very light; for I would not ſay, they will uſe the Arms and Power they have borrowed of us to our Ruin, whenever they can effect it to their Advantage. By all which it appears, that *Holland* is now leſs defenſible than ever.

But he that examines this general Poſition on both ſides, muſt acknowledg, that as this weakneſs of *Holland* was cauſed by their own Stadtholder and Captain-General: And on the other ſide, *Holland* by the preſent free Government is enabled to make uſe of all its abundant inward Strength, for its own preſervation, and with more eaſe than ever to repel all inteſtine and foreign Force whatſoever. Now to the end this Concluſion may the better appear, I ſhall in the next Chapter endeavour to ſhew, that *Holland* diſtinctly, and in regard of all her Neighbours, not comparatively, but effectually, may very well defend it ſelf againſt all inward and outward Force whatſoever.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

That Holland *during its Free Government, cannot be ruined by any Inteſtine Power.*

An enquiry whether Holland *may be ruin'd by Factions.*

'TIS evident that no Domeſtick Power can ſubvert the Republic of *Holland*, nor deſtroy the Welfare of the Inhabitants, except by a general Conſpiracy, Sedition, Inſurrection, and Civil War of the People and Citys of *Holland* againſt one another, becauſe they are ſo wonderfully linked together by a common Good, that thoſe homebred Tumults and Wars are not to be ſuppoſed able to be raiſed, except by Inhabitants of ſuch eminent Strength, as is able to force the Magiſtracy of the Country to the execution of ſuch deſtructive Counſels. And ſeeing now in *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* there is no Captain-General or Stadtholder, nor any Illuſtrious Perſon except the Prince of *Orange*; therefore we will conſider, whether if the ſaid Prince who is in no Office of the Generality, continuing in theſe Provinces, might be able to cauſe or effect ſuch ruinous and deſtructive Diviſions in *Holland*.

In caſe one Province ſhould take the Prince of Orange *for their Head.*

And indeed as I have a Proſpect, that if he ſhould happen to get into any Adminiſtration, he might occaſion ſuch Diviſions and Breaches: Yet on the other ſide, I cannot ſee how without imployment, either from the Generality, or this Province, he could obtain ſo great an Intereſt in the Government of theſe Countrys, as to be able to cauſe a Civil War, and make himſelf Maſter of them, either

either with the old or a new Title: For he being no General, nor having any Military Dependents, and out of all Command, tho he might by ſeditious Preachers cauſe a few of the Rabble to riſe againſt their lawful Rulers; yet this would not be like to happen at one time, and in ſo many places together, as to make an Alteration in the Provincial Government. And that Free Government remaining intire, the new Magiſtrates obtruded on the People upon this riſing, would be turn'd out, and the Seditious every time ſignally puniſhed. And this would alſo tend to the great prejudice of the Honour of the Prince of *Orange*; beſides, that by this means he would loſe all hopes and appearances of ever being imployed in the Country's Service; and on the other ſide might fear, that he and his Poſterity ſhould for ever be excluded from all Government and Service in theſe *United Netherlands* by a perpetual Law.

It is anſwered in the affirmative, but elſe not.

And if the Prince of *Orange* be not able to cauſe ſuch Seditions and Diviſions, I ſuppoſe it could leſs be done by any College of the Generality: For I would fain know in which of the Citys of *Holland* would the States General, or the Council of State, without a Military Head, be now able to alter the preſent free Government by Force or Faction? Aſſuredly not in any one City. And from the leſſer Colleges of the Generality ſuch Miſchiefs are leſs to be feared.

Much leſs could the Deputys of the Generality, depriv'd of ſuch a Head, be able to cauſe Commotions.

But perhaps ſome may ſay, that the Rulers or States of this Province, of their own accord, or ſeduced by Promiſes and Gifts, forget that warning, Fear thoſe who are ac-

accuſtomed to do ill, eſpecially when they make Preſents *; and will bring in the *Trojan* Horſe. But yet the arm'd Men conceal'd in his Belly, will never be able, by the Conſpiracy of ſome Magiſtrates, to deſtroy our Province, and to ſubdue and burn our Citys by Uproars againſt the Rulers; but poſſibly they may by bringing in the Horſe, weaken our lawful Governors, and leave our Citys without defence, and then the Horſe may be drawn into the inward Court, and into the feeble and weak Aſſembly of the States. As *Ruy Gomaz de Silva* ſays of the *Netherlands* in general; "That they are more fiery than they "ſhould be for the preſervation of their Li-"bertys, when by force they are attempted "to be taken from them; and yet never any "People have been ſo eaſy almoſt wholly to "reſign them. And the Emperor *Charles* "the Fifth uſed to ſay, That no People were "ſo averſe from Servitude as the *Nether-"landers*, and yet in the World no People "ſuffered the Yoke to be ſo eaſily laid on "them, when they were gently treated. Beſides which Cardinal *Bentivoglio* endeavours to ſhew by many Reaſons, That the *United Netherland Provinces* cannot long preſerve their free Government; but ſeeing the *Netherlanders* have never before been in the quiet poſſeſſion of a Free Republick, at leaſt not the *Hollanders*, there can be no Example given of their neglecting their own Freedom, or of corrupting them with Mony for that end. For when formerly it happened in *Holland* by unavoidable ſad Accidents,

Whether the free Holland *Rulers are likely to bring in the* Trojan *Horſe.*

See F. Strada. lib. 6.

See Bentivoglio, *Relat.* lib. 3. *ch.* 7,8.

* Timeo Danaos, & dona ferentes.

that

that we were neceſſitated to draw the *Trojan* Horſe into the inward Court, we ſaw the Fire and Flame, ſnorting, neighing, and armed Men ſpring from his Body at pleaſure, without regard either to the Benefit or Damage of the Inhabitants. So we ſhall always find it true, in all chargeable and neceſſitous Countrys, governed by a few Ariſtocratical Rulers, and provided with but few unrewarded annual Magiſtrates, That a great Perſon obtaining there any Power in the Government or Militia, will eaſily draw to his Party all Rulers and Magiſtrates by the moſt conſiderable and profitable Offices and Benefices which he can confer; or if any dare to ſtand it out againſt him, he would keep him out of employment, or deter him from maintaining the Publick Liberty: So that every one to obtain thoſe Advantages, or to evade thoſe Hardſhips, will be tempted to give up the Freedom of his Country; and it is no wonder that we have ſeen ſuch dealings ſo often practiſed in theſe Parts.

Why this happened in part in theſe Netherlands.

But it is alſo true, that when the Princes of theſe Countrys were raiſed to ſuch a degree, that they conceiv'd it was no longer needful for them to oblige the Rulers and Magiſtrates of the Gentry, and Citys, not doubting to bear them down by their great Popularity among the Inhabitants, or to ſuppreſs them by their Military Authority; it hath often appeared, that beyond expectation many good Patriots, and lovers of Liberty, eſpecially many prudent, antient, and experienced Merchants, have then evidenced their Zeal for the defence of their Privileges, well knowing they ſhould be forced to part with them

Viz. *Becauſe the Earls, Stadtholders, &c. were to be flattered, not contradicted.*

them under a Monarchical Government; and therefore joined with ſuch Rulers and Magiſtrates as encourag'd them to maintain their Freedom, as far as they poſſibly could, nay even the ſhadow of Liberty, with their Lives and Fortunes.

It is not probable it will now happen ſo in Holland.

All which ought to perſwade us, that the Aſſembly of the States of *Holland*, and the ſubordinate Magiſtrates of this preſent Free State, having in their own Power the beſtowing of all honourable and profitable Employments; and which is more, not needing now to fear their own Military Power, and being able without ſcruple to command them, and by them to reduce other mutinous and ſeditious Inhabitants to obedience, will not now be inclined to call in, or ſet up a Head, which they would immediately fear no leſs than Idolaters do the Idols of their own making; and not only ſo, but they muſt reverence his Courtiers too, and beſeech them that they would pleaſe to ſuffer themſelves to be choſen and continued in the yearly Magiſtracys, and beſtow ſome Offices and Employments on them and their Friends, changing the Liberty they now enjoy as Magiſtrates of a Free State, into a baſe and ſlaviſh dependance. Which things well conſidered, we ought to believe that the *Hollanders* will rather chuſe to hazard their Lives and Eſtates for the preſervation of this preſent free Government.

Becauſe all worthy Rulers may perceive it would be their ruin.

As the States of Holland *have plainly expreſſed it in* Deduct. *Part* 2. *c.* 1. §. 9, &c.

But if any one ſhould yet doubt of this, let him hear the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* ſpeak in that famous *Deduction* now in print, where their Lordſhips have publiſhed their Sentiment in this Matter: For having

ing been accuſed by ſome of the Provinces to have done ſomething repugnant to their dear-bought Freedom, they very roundly and plainly declared; "That they are as ſenſible "of thoſe Allegations as any others; and "that they purpoſe, and are reſolved to pre-"ſerve and maintain the ſaid Freedom, as "well in reſpect of the State in general, as "of their Province in particular, even as "the Apple of their Eye. And that as they "were the firſt and chief procurers of Free-"dom both for themſelves and their Allys, ſo "they will never ſuffer it to be ſaid with "truth, that any others ſhould out-do them "in Zeal for preſerving and defending the "Common Liberty.

"§. 9. Nay, that it can hardly enter in-"to the head of any Man, according to the "Judgment of all Political Writers, who "have ſound Underſtanding, That in a Re-"publick, ſuch great Offices of Captain-Ge-"neral, and Stadtholder, can without ſignal "danger of the common Freedom be confer-"red upon thoſe, whoſe Anceſtors were "cloth'd with the ſame Imployments.

"§. 10. Laying it down as unqueſtionable, "and well known to all thoſe that have in "any meaſure been converſant with ſuch "Authors as treat of the Riſe, Conſtituti-"on, and Alteration of Kingdoms, States, "and Countrys, together with the Form of "their Governments, That all the Repub-"licks of the World, without exception, "which departed from ſuch Maxims and "Cuſtoms, more particularly thoſe who "have entruſted the whole Strength of their "Arms to a ſingle Perſon during Life, with

"ſuch

" ſuch others as continued them too long in
" their Commands, have been by that means
" brought under ſubjection, and reduced to a
" Monarchical State. And after very many
" Examples produced for confirmation of
" what is alledged, their Lorſhips further
" add:

They will not eaſily forget the Violence of their own Stadtholder and Captain-General.

" §. 22. And have we not ſeen with our
" own Eyes, that the laſt deceaſed Captain-
" General of this State endeavoured to ſur-
" prize the Capital and moſt powerful City
" of the Land, with thoſe very Arms which
" the States entruſted to him? And more-
" over, that he dared ſo unſpeakably to
" wrong the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-*
" *Frieſland*, whoſe Perſons he, as a ſworn
" Miniſter and natural Subject, was bound to
" revere? that he ſeized ſix of the principal
" Lords, whilſt they were ſitting in their So-
" vereign Aſſembly, and carried them away
" Priſoners? And hath not God Almighty
" viſibly oppoſed, broken and fruſtrated the
" ſecret Deſigns concealed under that per-
" nicious Attempt, by ſending out of Hea-
" ven a thick Darkneſs, with a great and
" ſudden ſtorm of Rain, by which we were
" preſerved?

" §. 23. And all things well conſidered,
" it might be queſtioned, according to the
" Judgment of the ſaid Politicians, whether
" by advancing the preſent Prince of *Orange*
" to that Dignity, and thoſe high Offices
" in which his Anceſtors were placed, the
" Freedom of this State would not be re-
" markably endangered: For God does not
" always Miracles, neither are we to flatter
" our ſelves that theſe Countrys ſhall always

" eſcape

" eſcape that Deſtruction which has ever at-
" tended all thoſe Nations that have taken
" the ſame courſe without exception.

" And laſtly, the States of *Holland* and
" *Weſt-Frieſland* do thus expreſs their unal-
" terable Reſolution upon the laſt Article.
" At leaſt their Lordſhips will on their own
" behalf declare, and do hereby declare,
" that they are firmly reſolved to ſtrengthen
" the foreſaid Union, *viz.* of *Utrecht*, for
" the Conſervation of the State in general,
" and for maintaining the Publick Liberty,
" together with the Supremacy, and Rights
" of the reſpective Provinces, according to
" the Grounds here expreſſed; and at all
" times, and upon all occaſions, will contribute
" their help, even to the utmoſt, towards
" the preſervation and defence of their dear-
" bought Liberty, and the Privileges of theſe
" Countrys, which are ſo dear, and of ſuch
" ineſtimable value to them, that they will
" not ſuffer themſelves to be diverted from
" their Reſolution by any Inconveniences or
" Extremities; nor will lay down their good
" Intentions but with their Lives, truſting
" that they ſhall be duly ſeconded herein up-
" on all Occaſions by our other Allys; for
" which the ſaid States will ſend up their
" fervent Prayers to Almighty God. *Amen.*

Toey will not loſe their free Government but with the loſs of their Lives.

This done and concluded by the ſaid States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* in the *Hague*, the 25*th* of *July* 1654. by Command of the ſaid States, was ſigned

Herbert van Beaumont.

To which we ſhall add the Perpetual Edict of the 5*th* of *Auguſt* 1667. containing as follows.

" The States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, " after ſeveral Adjournments, and mature " deliberation, and communication with the " Knights and Gentlemen, and likewiſe with " the Councils of the Citys, unanimouſly, " and with the general Concurrence of all " the Members, for a perpetual Edict, and " everlaſting Law, in order to preſerve the " Publick Freedom, together with the Uni- " on and Common Peace, have Enacted, " as they do hereby Enact and Decree, the " Points and Articles following.

In 1667, they made a perpetual Law to preſerve their free Government.

" 1. That the Power of Electing and Sum- " moning in the Order of the Knighthood " and Nobles, together with the Nominati- " on and Choice of Burgomaſters, Common- " Council, Judges, and all other Offices of " the Magiſtracy in Citys, ſhall remain in the " Power of the ſummoned Knighthood and " Gentry, together with the Citys reſpec- " tively, as by antient Cuſtom, Privileges and " Grants is confirmed or granted to them, or " might ſtill be confirmed or granted, with " the free Exerciſe of the ſame, according " to the Laws and Privileges. And that the " forementioned Nomination, or Election, " or any part thereof, ſhall not for ever be " convey'd or given away.

Prohibiting the electing of any Magiſtrates,

" 2. That all Offices, Charges, Services, " or Benefices, which are at preſent in the " diſpoſal of the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-* " *Frieſland*, ſhall be, and continue in them,

Or conferring any Imployments, or admitting the ſame.

" with-

" without any alteration or diminution, ex-
" cepting only the Military Employments
" and Offices which may become vacant in
" the Field, and during any Expedition by
" Sea or Land, concerning which the States
" of *Holland* will by a further Order deter-
" mine, not only of the proviſional Settle-
" ment, but alſo principally of the diſpoſal
" thereof, ſo as ſhall be moſt for the Service
" and Benefit of the Land.

' 3. That the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-*
" *Frieſland*, ſhall not only deny their Suffra-
" ges to the contrary, but alſo move the
" Generality with all poſſible efficacy, that
" it may be enacted and eſtabliſhed with the
" unanimous Conſent and Concurrence of our
" Allys, and by a Reſolution of the States
" General; That whatever Perſon ſhall be
" hereafter made Captain or Admiral-Ge-
" neral, or have both the ſaid Offices; or
" whoever ſhall among any other Titles have
" the chief Command over the Forces by
" Sea or Land, ſhall not be, or remain Stadt-
" holder of any Province, or Provinces. And
" foraſmuch as concerns the Province of
" *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, not only ſuch
" Perſon who ſhall be entruſted with the
" chief Command over the Forces by Sea or
" Land, but alſo no other Perſon whatever
" ſhall be made Stadtholder of that Province;
" but the aforeſaid Office ſhall be, and re-
" main ſuppreſſed, mortified, and void in all
" reſpects. And the Lords Commiſſioners
" of the Council, in their reſpective Quar-
" ters, have it recommended to them accord-
" to their Inſtructions, to give all neceſſary
" Orders, and to uſe ſuch Circumſpection

And ſecluding all Stadtholders of any of the Provinces from being Capt. General.

" and Prudence, as is requiſite in Affairs that
" may happen in the abſence of the States
" of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, wherein
" ſpeedy Orders might be abſolutely need-
" ful.

And alſo ſwearing never to ſuffer any thing repugnant hereto.

" 4. That for the greater ſtability of theſe
" Reſolutions, and for the mutual eaſe and
" quiet of the Gentry and Citys, all thoſe
" who are at preſent elected into the Order of
" Knighthood, or that may hereafter be e-
" lected, together with all ſuch as may be
" hereafter choſen in the Great Council of
" the Citys, ſhall by their ſolemn Oath de-
" clare, That they will maintain the fore-
" ſaid Points religiouſly and uprightly, and
" by no means ſuffer that there be any in-
" croachment or infraction made againſt the
" ſame; much leſs at any time to make, or
" cauſe to be made, any Propoſition which
" might in any wiſe be repugnant thereunto.
" Likewiſe the Oath of the Lords that ſhall
" appear at the Aſſembly of the States of
" *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, ſhall be en-
" larged in the fulleſt and moſt effectual
" Form. And the Counſellor-Penſionary for
" the time being, ſhall alſo be obliged by Oath
" to preſerve and maintain as much as in him
" lies, all the ſaid Points, without ever
" making any Propoſal to the contrary, or
" putting it to the queſtion, either directly
" or indirectly, much leſs to form a Conclu-
" ſion.

And that all Captain Generals muſt ſwear to maintain all above-written, &c.

" 5. That moreover for the further ſtability
" of the ſaid third Point, the ſame ſhall be ex-
" preſly inſerted in the Inſtructions to be gi-
" ven to a Captain or Admiral-General;
" and he that is ſo elected, ſhall be obliged
" by

" by Oath, not only not to ſeek it at any " time directly or indirectly, much leſs to " form a Deſign to obtain it directly or in- " directly; but on the contrary, in caſe any " other ſhould do it beyond Expectation, " that he ſhall withſtand and oppoſe it: And " if the Dignity of Stadtholder ſhould at any " time be offer'd to him by any of the Pro- " vinces, that he will refuſe and decline the " ſame.

And truly this ſolemn Declaration, and perpetual Edict of our lawful Sovereigns, which paſſed with the unanimous Conſent of all the Members of the Aſſembly, who were in perfect freedom to form their own Reſolutions touching the preſervation of their Libertys, ought to be of greater weight with every one, and eſpecially with us, than any other Declaration made by the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, when they were under the ſervitude of a haughty Governour; or than the Declaration of that formidable Emperor *Charles* the 5*th* made to his own advantage, even tho we ſhould add the Foreign Teſtimony of *Ruy Gomez de Silva*, or that of Cardinal *Bentivoglio*, ſince they were not capable of experiencing or feeling how intolerably thoſe Shoes pinch'd us; much leſs could they be ſenſible how well pleaſed the underſtanding *Netherlanders* are, whether Rulers or Subjects, to find * themſelves in a condition to declare with freedom their Senti-

All good Patriots admire and value this Liberty.

* Nunc pede libero
Pulſanda Tellus. *Hor.*

ments concerning the Welfare of the Nation; and living by the Laws of the Country, need to fear no Man, as before they did. But above all other Inhabitants, our Vigilant Rulers, who heretofore durſt not open their Mouths for the Privileges of the Land, the Lawful Government, and Liberty of the People, without incurring the danger of being ſent Priſoners to *Loveſtein* Caſtle, may conſider with themſelves, that they can now freely ſpeak their Minds for the benefit of their Country, and themſelves: And let this be well weighed by every one that has but one drop of free *Netherland* Blood in his Veins.

Whether our free Citys, if at variance, could ruin each other.

Laſtly, It is to be conſidered, whether the Proſperity and free Government of *Holland* would not probably be deſtroyed, unleſs they have an Illuſtrious Head for Life, even by the freedom which the Members of *Holland* do now actually uſe, in giving their Voices with the States of *Holland*, at the pleaſure, and for the benefit of their reſpective Principals, and by croſs and contrary Intereſts, Diſſenſions, and Wars of the Citys among themſelves; which ſome great Men ſay, cannot be well prevented or quieted without ſuch an Illuſtrious Head.

All Republicks that have ſuch a Head, will come to ruin.

To which I anſwer; That indeed all Republicks, without exception, which have conſtituted Chief Governours for Life, veſted with any conſiderable Power in Civil, and eſpecially in Military Affairs, have been ſubject to continual Inteſtine Diſſenſions and Wars, and have fallen for the moſt part into Monarchical Governments. This was the fate of all the *Italian* Republicks, except ſome few

that

that by thoſe Diviſions and Tumults had the good fortune to expel their Tyrants, and by that means an opportunity of introducing a better Form of Government without the controul of ſuch an inſolent Maſter. This was alſo the fate of all the Republicks in *Germany*, and theſe *Netherlands*, under their Dukes, Earls, Stadtholders, Biſhops and Captain-Generals. Which is not ſtrange; for *Divide and Reign* being the Political Maxim of ſuch Heads, they will uſe all their Art and Power to raiſe and foment Diviſions in their Territories, and fiſh ſo long in thoſe troubled Waters, till they overcome both Partys; as all Ages can witneſs.

See Deduct. *Part* 2. *ch.* 3. §. 6.

2. I have conſidered, but cannot remember ſo much as one Example of a Republick without ſuch a Head, which ever fell into any miſchievous inteſtine Commotions that laſted long; but on the contrary, we ought to take notice, that the free Imperial Citys, or Republicks in *Germany*, never make War againſt one another; and that the *Cantons* of *Switzerland* being mutually bound to a common defence (even as we are by the Union of *Utrecht*) do very ſeldom contend among themſelves, and if they do happen to take Arms, very little Blood is ſhed; and in a ſhort time, without prejudice to their free Government, they are reconciled by the Mediation of the other *Cantons*: So that their Republicks have now ſtood near 400 years. Which can be attributed to no other cauſe than that the differing Parties, mutually ſenſible of the miſchiefs they felt, were not neceſſitated by any ſuch chief Head or Governor to continue a prejudicial and deſtructive War:

But Republicks without a Head never will;

As appears in Germany *and* Switzerland.

Who are cautious of chuſing a Political or Military Head.

For thoſe *Cantons* have been always careful not to elect any Commander or General during Life over the Confederated Forces of the Union. Neither have any of the ſaid *Cantons* ever thought fit to place a perpetual Commander in Chief over their own Souldiers in the Field, but always for the Deſign in hand only; tho after their revolt from their Lords of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, they were neceſſitated to ſupport a War, as long and dangerous as that we had againſt thoſe of the ſame Family. And for ſo much as concerns theſe *United Provinces*, let the Reader pleaſe to hear the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, who after many ſtrong and weighty Reaſons add,

Deduct. *Part* 2. *c.* 3. §. 14.

" So that their Lordſhips conceive they may " firmly conclude, that in theſe Lands hard- " ly any other Differences and Diviſions have " ever exiſted, at leaſt not of great impor- " tance, but ſuch as have been formed on " the account of thoſe Heads, or by their " Means.

While our Political and Military Head has cauſed well nigh all our Diviſions, which can no more happen in our Republicks, and why.

3. The Citys of *Holland* by inteſtine Wars would on both ſides ſuffer infinitely more loſs than the *Swiſs-Cantons*, or any other Citys far remote from one another. For all the Inland Citys of *Holland*, hardly one excepted, do as well ſubſiſt by Trade, as thoſe that are nearer to the Sea; and the leaſt Sea-City would by that means be able to make the greateſt Booty of the ſtrongeſt: As it is alſo known, that the leaſt City of *Holland* may in a ſhort time ſo well fortify it ſelf, that it could not be taken by the greater. So that our Citys lying ſo cloſe together, the adjacent Lands would in caſe of War be immediately ruined, and all the ways by Land or Water that lead towards

wards the Citys, would be ſo infeſted, that all Trading would immediately ceaſe. Wherefore both Parties would forthwith be moved by the other diſintereſted Citys to chuſe a more profitable Peace, in lieu of ſuch an unprofitable and pernicious War.

Laſtly, I obſerve, that all the Citys in *Holland* are governed by few ſtanding Magiſtrates or City-Councils, but rather by annual Magiſtrates; and that ſo few Perſons as ſerve for Magiſtrates ſo little a time, could not make ſo great and miſchievous a War upon their Neighbouring Citys, and maintain themſelves in their obſtinacy, without being turn'd out of the Government by their own Inhabitants, who would not ſuffer ſuch a Temper to their prejudice to continue amongſt them; at leaſt they would be kept out of the Magiſtracy by their Competitors. And I believe no Example can be brought of a few Ariſtocratical Rulers of a City, or Republick purely ſubſiſting by Trade, who have ever long maintain'd an Offenſive War, without cauſing at the ſame time their own Subjects to mutiny on that account, and to turn them out of the Government.

Holland without a Head can never be inwardly raviſh'd.

And accordingly I ſhall not only conclude, That *Holland* during its free Government ſhall never be more ſubject to any durable, deſtructive, inteſtine Diſſenſion, much leſs to Inteſtine Wars, than the *Switzer* and *German* Republicks: But I will add, that as the perpetual and true Maxim of a Government by a ſingle Perſon, is *Divide & Impera*, by raiſing and fomenting Diviſions among the Rulers, Magiſtrates, and Inhabitants, to make one Party by degrees Maſter of the other, and

and then to rule both: So it is alſo the true and ſteddy Maxim of all Republicks, * to create a good Underſtanding and mutual Affection between the Magiſtrates and People, by a mild and gentle Government, becauſe the Welfare of all Commonwealths depends upon it, and is deſtroyed by the contrary. Accordingly I ſhall finiſh this Chapter by ſaying, That we ſhould have reaſon to wonder, if any wiſe Man ever believed that it is the intereſt of free Republicks to chuſe an Illuſtrious Head, veſted with Authority for Life, in order to compoſe the Differences that may ariſe amongſt them: For I think we have already proved, that no ſurer way can be taken to introduce perpetual Diviſions into Republicks, with Foreign and Domeſtick Wars, and at laſt a Monarchical Government, than by ſetting up ſuch an eminent commanding Head.

CHAP. XIII.

That Holland *during its free Government is very well able to reſiſt all Foreign Power.*

What muſt be ſuppoſed, that Holland *may repel all Force from without.*

I Shall now endeavour to ſhew that the Republick of *Holland*, while an intire Free Government, can very well defend it ſelf againſt any Foreign Force whatever. But firſt

* Concordia res parvæ creſcunt, diſcordia maximè dilabuntur.

I muſt premiſe and ſuppoſe, that this is a ſure effect of a free Government, *viz.* That all the great Citys of *Holland* muſt fortify themſelves, and be provided with all things neceſſary for their defence; as alſo that the States of *Holland* muſt out of the common Stock ſtrengthen all the Avenues and Frontier Citys of the Provinces, which of themſelves are too weak effectually to repel an Enemy. For otherwiſe we may well be of opinion, that *Holland* will not be able to deal with the Force of *Spain* by Land; and that it might by ſurprize be overrun by the Power of ſome other of the *United Provinces*; yea, that it might be eaſily plundered by its own conquered Citys. But not to cut out more Work, I ſhall in purſuance of that Poſition, look upon *Holland*, and all the other Provinces, as being without Union, League, or Alliance with its Neighbours: For as other Countrys may join in making War upon *Holland*, ſo *Holland* may make Leagues with Foreign Powers to make War upon others: Which Caſes would cauſe endleſs Thoughts and Conſiderations; and therefore I will preſuppoſe, that when *Holland* ſhall have Difference, or Wars with any one of its Neighbours, all the reſt ſhall be Neuter.

Therefore to come to the Point, I ſay, that it ſeems needleſs for me to ſhew that *Holland* can very well ſubſiſt and endure all the Force of *France*, *Spain*, *England*, and other leſſer remote Countrys, ſince I think I have done it ſufficiently in the foregoing Chapters, when I treated of *Holland*'s Alliances. So it remains only to be conſidered, whether *Holland* be ſtrong enough to defend it ſelf againſt

againſt the Power of the neighbouring *United Provinces*, and of the aſſociated or conquered Lands and Citys?

Holland *can eaſily ſtand againſt the other* United Provinces.

Upon which I ſhall premiſe in the general, That *Holland* being ſo well ſurrounded by the Seas and Rivers, and broken by Waters; ſo populous, ſo full of great, well fortified (for this muſt be ſuppoſed) and impregnable Citys lying near one another, every one of which can produce an Army; this being conſidered, I ſay no Potentate in the World could invade us with an Army: Or ſuppoſe he were entred the Country, it is clear that the ſaid Enemy, by the continual unexpected Attacks of the adjacent Citys, and by the beating of his Convoys, or ſuch as bring in Forage, would in a ſhort time be neceſſitated, by the continual leſſening of his Forces, ſhamefully to relinquiſh the Attempt and march away. All which they ought to foreſee and expect, and much more of the Forces and Incurſions of our neighbouring *Netherlands*, and conquered Citys.

Becauſe thoſe Provinces gain more by Peace, and ſuffer more by War than Holland.

Again, I muſt ſay, that all the ſaid Provinces do receive incomparably more advantage by *Holland*, than *Holland* does from them; which Benefits would all ceaſe by a War, namely, by virtue of the Union, which as it has been practiſed, the Rulers and Inhabitants of the other Provinces draw Profits from *Holland*; namely by Embaſſys Ordinary and Extraordinary, by Commiſſions and Deputations in the Colleges of the joint Allys; or by Offices or Benefices in and about the Government; in the Courts of Judicature, Treaſurys, and Affairs of War depending on the Generality, which are paid by the joint Allys,

See a general Catalogue of Offices. Aitzma *Book* 41. *p* 231.

Allys, by which they accordingly receive above 58 *per Cent.* of all that they enjoy. To which we may add the Profits they reap by Administration, or Offices about Regulation of Trade, and Maritime Affairs, whether at home depending on the Admiraltys, or abroad by being Residents and Consuls, *&c.* So that it is evident enough that all Rewards must proceed from *Holland* alone; and by the Traffick of *Holland*, and its wonderful populousness and vicinity, they consume all the Manufactures and superfluous Products of the Inhabitants of the other Provinces at high Rates, and they receive out of *Holland* all that they want at easy Rates: Whereas *Holland* on the other side, in case of a War with this or that Province, would not be sensible, or suffer in its Traffick or Consumption. And besides we see, that from the Provinces of *Guelderland*, *Friesland*, *Overyssel*, &c. the poor young Men and Maids that are not able to live there by their Trades and Service, subsist in *Holland* very well. So that all the Provinces are sensible, that a good and firm Peace is at least as much necessary for them as for us, to maintain the Prosperity of both. And yet it might happen, that some Provinces may be so ill advised as to be drawn aside to make War against *Holland*; and therefore I must consider, and take a view of all the *United Provinces* in particular, *viz.*

Groningen and *Friesland*, with the conquered Places of the Generality, *Bourtange*, *Bellingwolde*, *Langakkerschans*, and *Coeverden*; which they have found means to bring under their particular Power. Now seeing they appoint or chuse their Commanders there, remove

Groningen *and* Friesland *are now both by Interest of Government and Situation, separated from* Holland.

move or change their Garisons, and give Commissions to their Military Officers, whereby it appears they need nothing of ours; and that they can sufficiently defend themselves against all Foreign Force. So that if they have a Governor in Chief, which in time might induce them to take mischievous Resolutions, we might expect a destructive War to both Partys most from that Quarter, if it had not pleased God to divide us by the *Zuyder-Sea*, and the Provinces of *Utrecht*, *Guelderland*, and *Over-Yssel*. So that from that side we need expect no hurt, and the rather, seeing by our strength of Navigation we may presently stop all the Commerce and Navigation of *Groningen* and *Friesland*.

Over-Yssel being without a Head, can never make War upon Holland.

As to *Over-Yssel*, it is well known that it is divided from *Holland* by *Guelderland*, and has no communication with us but by the *Zuyder-Sea*: And moreover the strength of *Over-Yssel* is so inconsiderable, and their Land behind lys so open, that they cannot make War against us but by Sea; nor so neither, without hazarding their sudden ruin by the loss and want of all their Traffick. So that while they have a free Government, we are not to expect it. And if they duly consider the horrid Intestine and Foreign Wars and Discords, which they suffered in the times of their Bishops, and Governors of their Republicks, and likewise the violent Usurpation that they suffered afterwards under their Lords and Stadtholders, there is not the least appearance that they will ever consent to the choice of such a Head or Ruler; but if it should so happen, and they be prest by a contentious Governor to War against us, it would be

And being now a free Republick, will probably never chuse a Head.

be ſtrange if ſuch a War ſhould be long-liv'd; for it is evident they could endamage *Holland* but little, if *Holland* would uſe its Force againſt them.

As for *Guelderland*, it is manifeſt it hath much more communion with *Holland* than any of the foreſaid Provinces, for it joins to *Holland* about *Aſperen*, and *Gorcum*, and towards *Bommelar* is divided only by the *Maeſe* from the Land of *Heuſden* and *Altena*. Moreover it joins to the *Zuyder-Sea*, and hath under its Power the mighty Rivers of the *Yſſel*, *Rhyne*, *Waal*, and *Maeſe*; whereby it ſhould ſeem thoſe of *Guelderland* are able to infeſt the Traffick of *Holland* through the *Zuyder-Sea*, and by means of the ſaid Rivers to ſtop all Traffick from above: And beſides, the Men of *Guelderland* were of old famous for their Soldiery, eſpecially for Horſemen. So that it ſeems to lie conveniently for gaining of great Booty from *Holland* by ſudden Incurſions, and to make War upon us. *Guelderland may make War upon us.*

But on the other ſide it is as evident, that *Holland* having all the Paſſages into the Sea from the ſaid Rivers under their Power, would ſtraiten *Guelderland* more in all its Traffick; for *Holland* could carry all its fine Goods in Carts above the Confines of *Guelderland* towards the *Maeſe* and *Rhyne*, and there likewiſe receive the fine upland Goods. And conſidering *Harderwyk* and *Elburg* are the only Sea-Ports of *Guelderland*, which notwithſtanding are without Havens, their Robberys at Sea would ſignify little, and beſides be eaſily overpowered by *Holland's* great Maritime Strength. As to their Incurſions by Land, whether with Horſe, or Foot; it is clearly *But not without greater damage to it ſelf.*

im-

impracticable by reason of *Holland*'s Populousness, and being so full of Canals, which would easily put a stop to the *Guelderlanders*.

Their bold presumption of plundering the *Hague*, and carrying away the Booty thereof in the Year 1528, does not contradict what I say. For tho the Duke of *Guelder* gave those of *Utrecht* assistance against their Bishop, and for that end sent his General, *Martin van Rossem*, with armed Men into that Town; and that on the other side, the Emperor *Charles* assisted the Bishop against *Utrecht*; yet was there no open War between *Guelderland* and *Holland*: But the Duke found it good to begin the first Hostility, or be the Aggressor, by *Martin van Rossem*, and to cause 1300 Soldiers out of that Garison to fall suddenly into *Holland*, and having gotten a rich Booty declared War against it. So that the *Guelderlanders* were then to be accounted to have made an unexpected treacherous Incursion upon *Holland* from that Bishoprick, when *Holland* had but few Inhabitants, and was weakned by the *Hoekschе* and *Cabbeljeauschе* Factions, nay was indeed indefensible by reason the Emperor *Charles* employed only the Gentry and Soldiery of *Holland* in his *Italian*, and other Foreign Wars. Besides it may be said, and not without Reason, that *Martin van Rossem* did this by the Privity of the Emperor *Charles* the Fifth Earl of *Holland*, or the connivance of *Margaret*, because the States would not at that time consent to the Mony she would have *Holland* to raise: for the said Emperor, or his Governess *Margaret*, would send no Soldiery to suppress the said *Guelderlanders*, nor suffer the *Hollanders* to pursue them.

Which cannot be confuted by the Incursion of Martin van Rossem, *and the Booty he made in* Holland.

See MeerBeck *Hist. p.*78. *and* Lamb. Hortens, *p.*140.

Besides,

Besides, *Martin van Rossem* did not the least prejudice to the Ministers of the Court, nor to the Officers of the Earldom.

Guelderland lies perfectly open to Holland.

And on the contraty it is well known, that all *Guelderland*, except the City of *Zutphen*, and the District of *Nimeguen*, lies wholly open to *Holland*; so that from *Lovestein* one might plunder the whole *Bommelerwaard*, yea and cut down its Banks; and it would be the same with the *Tielerwaard*, and *Betuwe*, and that quarter of the *Veluwe* must always expect Incursions, and Plunderings by our Shipping. So that this War, which would be more prejudicial to *Guelderland* than *Holland*, would soon be ended by a firm Peace on both sides, while they continue under a free Government, and while the respective Citys of *Guelderland*, especially *Nimeguen* the chief City of that Province, do now find the Sweetness of their own Government, after having felt the weight of the late Yoke of the Stadtholders, or that of Captain-Generals, and must again suffer their legally elected Magistrates to be violently turn'd out. Therefore 'tis to be believed that they will not precipitately elect a Tyrannical Head over them.

The Province of Utrecht *wholly indefensible.*

As to the Province of *Utrecht*, it is well known that it lies wholly open, and jetting into *Holland*, and subsists purely by Husbandry; and in that it bounds upon the *Lek* and *Zuyder-Sea*, seems in some measure to be able to disturb the Trade of *Holland*, and for a great way to disturb the Champion Country. But he that will take notice of the great strength of *Holland*'s Shipping, may easily conceive that the *Lek*, and *Zuyder-Sea*, lying before the Province, might be made useless

to them by our Soldiers ravaging those Parts by their sudden Incursions and Shipping. And that *Holland* being a broken Country, by reason of its many Waters, might not only plunder their open Country much more, but also because it runs or jets so far into *Holland*, it may be absolutely seiz'd and kept by them, by which means those of *Utrecht* will be deprived of their best Champion Country.

Besides it is very observable, that all the Citys of that Province are wholly undefensible, without any appearance that they shall ever be fortified: For *Amersfort*, *Reenen*, *Wyk*, and *Montfort*, are not only unable to bear the Charge of it; and the City of *Utrecht* will not bestow their Mony to fortify Citys, which afterwards will have less dependance on them; nay possibly they might injure that undefensible City the sooner: For we ought to know that that long Square inland City being deprived of the Sea, and all great Rivers, will be ever chargeable to fortify and keep. And as if this were not enough to bridle that great City, their Bishops of old suffered Houses to be built without the Gates; whence came those four very great Suburbs upon all their considerable Avenues, by which their Fortifications are made of no use. And tho every one may see that this is the usual Polity of the Heads of a Republick to weaken Citys that are too strong for their purpose; yet afterwards when Men have the good luck of having a compleat free Government, it continues remediless. And accordingly I shall conclude, that the Province of *Utrecht* being wholly undefensible, will never make War against *Holland*. And seeing it is the Interest

And so will always continue.

It will never make War upon Holland, *nor endanger her Liberty by such a Head.*

Intereſt of *Holland* ever to ſeek after Peace, and that all Sparks of War ſo ſoon as they ariſe may be ſuppreſt during a free Government: And ſeeing the mighty City of *Utrecht* of old, in the time of its Epiſcopal Government, and in the time of the laſt Wars againſt the King of *Spain*, felt more than any Town in the *Netherlands*, the manifold Tumults and Miſchiefs cauſed by their Biſhops of the Houſe of *Burgundy*, and other great Familys, and afterwards by the Uſurpation of the Captain Generals, or Stadtholders, over their lawful Government: It is therefore moſt unlikely that they will eaſily diſſolve their free Government by electing ſuch a Ruler over them.

As for *Zealand*, it is known to conſiſt in very fruitful populous Iſlands, ſeparated by mighty Streams of the Sea from all its Neighbours; and beſides it hath acquired by its Power, divers Citys and ſtrong Places, lying on the Land of the Generalitys in *Flanders* and *Brabant*: So that the Lords of *Zealand* have the diſpoſal of the Commands, and changing of the Gariſons of *Lillo*, *Liefkenſhoek*, *Axel*, *ter Neuſe*, and *Biervliet*. Inſomuch that *Zealand* ſeems to be able to defend it ſelf very well againſt all its Neighbours with its own Strength: Beſides which, the two good Havens of *Walcheren*, *Fluſhing* and *Veer* lie very commodiouſly to annoy the Trade of *Holland* to the Weſtward with their Men of War.

If the two Vaſſal Citys in Zealand *depend on the firſt Noble, then is* Holland *not only by Situation but Intereſt, almoſt divided from* Zealand.

On the other hand it is alſo true, that the Inhabitants of *Middleburgh* and *Fluſhing* drive a great Trade by Sea; and that thoſe of *Zierickzee* and *Veer* do ſubſiſt moſt by their Fiſhing; all which would be immediately ruined

However it could not make War upon us but to its own ruin.

by the great Naval Power of *Holland*, which would be far more conſiderable againſt them, than their Ships of War againſt us. And it is as certain, that the Traffick of *Zealand* will produce them greater and more certain Profit than any Privateering at Sea can do. Moreover, *Holland* hath by *Bommene* ſure footing on *Schouwen*, whereby they might ruin all the rich Husbandry of that Iſland. *Goes* would at leaſt have no Benefit by that War, and is not able to reſiſt the Naval Power of *Holland* in caſe they came to plunder it, or to burn their Harveſt. And on the other ſide, the *Zealand* Iſlands have not ſtrength of Shipping ſufficient to land and plunder *Holland*: Wherefore I conceive that under their Free Government, every one would be ready to cry out, in caſe of a War, *Nulla ſalus Bello*, Peace is beſt for both Partys.

Which by means of a chief Lord might happen.

But ſome may perhaps ſay, That the Prince of *Orange* might, by means of the Citys of *Fluſhing* and *Veer*, and poſſibly hereafter, by being the chief Lord, and giving his Vote firſt, in name of all the Gentry in all the Aſſemblys of the States, and in all Colleges of the Provincial Government, having the firſt and the two laſt Voices: So that having Three of the Seven, he muſt be thought ſufficient to over-rule that whole Province; and therefore the Welfare or Adverſity of the People of that Province, whether in Peace or War, will not come ſo much into conſideration as the Intereſt of ſome Court Sycophants, and of ſuch a powerful Lord, who having ſo great a Stroke in the Government of *Zealand*, would be able to carry on very miſchievous Reſolutions. I ſhall not need anſwer any thing

Tho come which will, Holland *can eaſily repel* Zealand's *Force.*

thing to this, ſave that from what has been ſaid already it appears, that *Zealand* would not really have more, but much leſs Power by ſuch a Supreme Governour, than by a free Republican Government; and that accordingly it would ſoon appear, *Vana ſine viribus ira*, that *Zealand* could not repel the Power of *Holland*, but *Holland* could very well repel the Power of *Zealand*.

And the conquered Citys being on the Generalitys Fund, are leſs able to make War againſt Holland.

As to the conquered Lands in *Flanders*, and about the *Rhyne* and the *Maeſe*, it is evident that they are ſo far diſtant from *Holland*, and ſo divided from one another, that they cannot hurt *Holland*. But *Holland* is much concerned in the conquered Citys of *Brabant*, which are very ſtrong: And altho *Holland* hath born moſt of all the Charges to ſubdue and fortify them, yet during the former Government of the Captain-Generals or Stadtholders, they would and could keep *Holland* ſo low, that this Province which bears moſt of the Charges of the common Union, was not allowed in any one Place of the Generality any ſeparate Power; whereas nevertheleſs thoſe Provinces that contribute ſo little in reſpect of *Holland*, as *Zealand* and *Frieſland* do, have ſo many fortified Places belonging to the Generality, to diſpoſe of ſeparately, and whereof the other Allys have no Power to take cognizance. But God be praiſed that our Frontiers are ſo well fortified againſt *Brabant*, that they cannot be taken by the Towns of the Generality any otherwiſe than by Treachery: And beſides we are ſo well divided and ſeparated from *Brabant* by the *Maeſe*, *Biesbos*, and Arms of the Sea, that we need fear no Enemy that way, altho thoſe Citys

ſhould rebel, yea revolt to the King of *Spain*.

So that Holland *is able to ſubſiſt againſt them all.*

So that by what has been ſaid it appears, that *Holland* alone is well able to ſtand againſt all its Neighbours.

CHAP. XIV.

That Holland, *tho ſhe don't fortify her Citys, if ſhe keep united with* Utrecht *only, is able to defend her ſelf againſt all the mighty Potentates of the World.*

Holland *with* Utrecht, *able to ſecure it ſelf againſt the worſe that can happen.*

BUT now ſuppoſing the very worſt that could happen, *viz.* that the Rulers of the great Citys of *Holland* neglect to put their Citys into a ſufficient State of Defence; and that the States of *Holland* do not fortify the other leſſer Citys of *Holland* or their Avenues. And moreover I will take it for granted, that the Rulers of the reſpective Provinces of *Guelderland*, *Zealand*, *Frieſland*, *Over-Yſſel* and *Groningen*, ſhall be ſo improvident and ill-minded, as to chuſe one and the ſame Perſon to be Stadtholder, and Captain-General of their Republicks; and that the Deputys of the Generality ſhall combine with that Ruler to make him Lord Paramount of the ſaid Republicks. And I will alſo ſuppoſe that his blind Ambition ſhall be as great as that of *Lewis Sforza*; who to preſerve the uſurped Dukedom of *Milan* againſt the weak King of *Naples*, who pretended a Right to it, invited the Powerful King of *France* to make War againſt *Naples*; who, as ſtrong Auxiliaries uſually do, firſt ſwal-

If the other Provinces ſhould elect one Head, and have Foreign Forces to join with them againſt us.

 lowed

lowed up the Kingdom of *Naples*, and afterwards the Dukedom of *Milan*. So that I ſhall now ſuppoſe as certain, that ſuch a Ruler of the other *United Provinces*, with ſome victorious *French* and *Swediſh* Forces, or any others joining with them, may endeavour on the ſudden to bring into the Heart of *Holland* a mighty Army to ſubdue it, and divide it among them: Suppoſing I ſay all this, yet I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, that *Holland* making due Proviſion beforehand, ſhall be able to ſubſiſt againſt all thoſe Forces, as ſoon as the Inhabitants ſhall be brought to a ſufficient uniform ſenſe of the Matter, and that both Rulers and Subjects make uſe of their unanimous Care and Strength to repel all Foreign Hoſtilitys; otherwiſe it is certain that no Country in the World being divided and rent aſunder can long ſubſiſt.

Yet could we be able to repel them, and how.

But ſeeing that upon ſuch an Accident there would follow innumerable Alterations among the other Potentates of *Europe*, and thoſe Changes I ſhould be obliged to gueſs at, which would be of great difficulty, and not ſutable to my purpoſe of making Obſervations upon the preſent State of *Holland*; I ſhall, that I may not miſs my Aim, and to clear my ſelf of that trouble, ſay briefly, That the two Provinces, *viz. Holland* and *Utrecht*, might in a little time, by making a Graft, Trench, or Channel, from the *Zuyder-Sea* into the *Lek*, order it ſo by Sluces, that the Country may all be overflowed at pleaſure: This might be done with little Charge, and yet be ſo ſtrong a Defence againſt any Force, that humanely ſpeaking, it would be impoſſible to ſubdue it by any

outward Power. This Poſition is ſtrengthned by the Judgment of *William* the elder Prince of *Orange*, who, as I have either read or heard, was ever of that Sentiment, and had Schemes of it made by the beſt Ingineers of that Age.

They that are skill'd in theſe Affairs, will find it practicable in the following manner, *viz.* If a Summer were ſpent to ſurround *Holland* with ſuch a Graft or Channel, beginning at the *Zuyder-Sea*, between *Muyden* and *Muiderberg*, running from thence South to the *Hinderdam*, from thence to the Eaſt ſide of the *Vecht* through the *Overmeerſe Polder* to the *Overmeer*; from thence within the Eaſt or Weſt ſide of the *Vecht*, about a hundred or more Rods from the ſame, or cloſe by it along to the fitteſt place; and in that manner following the *Vecht* to the City of *Utrecht*, and to run Eaſt about the City, and incloſe it in the Line; from thence along the new *Vaert* unto *Vreeſwyck*, digging throughout a Graft ten Rods wide; and the Walls, Bulworks, and proper Flankings taking up one place with another the like breadth of ten Rods: Such Walls and Grafts would certainly be invincible in ſo populous a Country againſt all the Potentates of the World. And ſuppoſing it might be taken by Approaches, yet would the whole Land be entirely open behind, that in the mean while new Intrenchments might be made. Yea moreover, ſuppoſing that were not done, what Army in the World would dare to force a Breach, where a whole Army of the Enemy ſhould be ready on the inſide to reſiſt the Stormers, as would here be the caſe?

Viz. *By making a Graft, which would render us invincible by Land.*

And if any object, that this Graft is either not practicable, or too chargeable; I ſhall add, that this Line would take up twelve thouſand *Rhynlandiſh* Rods, which would require 400 Morgens or *Dutch* Acres of Land; this being valued at 700 Guilders each, it would amount to ——— Guilders 280000

The digging of every Rod of this Graft, with the forming of the Wall and Flanking, 100 Guilders each, which in all would coſt no more than ———	1200000	*And would coſt but 1600000 Guilders.*
To thoſe concerned, and for extraordinary Charges ———	120000	
Total ———	1600000	

But the ſaid Graft might likewiſe be digged after the following manner, which would be leſs chargeable, and would beſt ſute with the unfortifiable part of the Province of *Utrecht*; namely beginning at the *Zuyder-Sea* along, or within the Weſt ſide of the *Eem*, and to the Eaſtward of the City of *Amersford*; paſſing there over the *Eem*, and to the Eaſtward of the City of *Amersford*, to comprehend it in the Line; and thence forward South to the fitteſt place over *Woudenburg*, along unto the *Lek*, about and to the Eaſtward of *Wyk* to *Duurſteede*, for the taking of that City likewiſe in: which Line would be in length eleven thouſand *Rhynlandiſh* Rods. *After another manner not above 1400000 Guilders.*

The Graft and the Walls, taking them of the ſame breadth as before, and they taking up about three hundred and ſixty Morgens at 500 Guilders each, amount unto Guilders

Guilders,	180000
The digging of the Graft, at 100 Guilders the Rod, for eleven thousand Rods,	1100000
For extraordinary Charges,	120000
	1400000

If the first way be taken, then the *Lek* between *Vreesnyk* and *Hondwyk*, is to be kept with Redoubts to the length of about twelve hundred Rods. If the second way be taken, the *Lek* would then be to be kept between *Wyk* to *Duurstede* and *Hondwyk*, the length of about four hundred Rods.

'Twould yet be necessary to lay out in Fortifications, 470000 Guilders, and why.

Moreover, when it were needful for securing the Land of *Gorcum*, *Vianen*, and the *Alblasserwaard*, there may be digged another such like Graft and Wall from the *Lek* about *Hondwyk*, to the Wall about *Loveslein*, and that over *Akkooy* along the borders of *Holland*: Which Line would be about six and thirty hundred *Rhynlandish* Rods, and by consequence there would be taken up one hundred and twenty Morgens of Land, each valued at 500 Guilders, is

	60000
The Graft and Wall as above	360000
Extraordinary Charges	50000
	470000

And lastly 430000 Guilders to be paid once for all.

From *Loveslein* to the City of *Heusden*, the *Maese* would be serviceable for the preservation of the Land of *Altena*, which should be provided with Redoubts the length of about 4000 Rods.

From the City of *Heusden* along and about the

the old *Maese* to little *Waspik*, lying at the *Biesbos*, for preservation of the Land of *Altena*, the making of a Graft and Wall as above, and being about three thousand Rods, it would require about one hundred Morgens of Land, each reckoned at 500 Guilders amounts to ——— 50000

Digging of the Graft, and forming of the Wall at 100 Guilders the Rod as above, is ——— 300000

Extraordinary Charges as above,— 80000

430000

This in all would amount to two Millions and five hundred thousand Guilders, in case it was begun about the *Vecht*; and if it were begun about the *Eem*, two Millions three hundred thousand Guilders, besides the Fortifications which might be rais'd along the *Lek* and the old *Maese*.

All which would be but one sixth Part of the yearly demands of the Council of State for 1629.

And if it be observed, that the Mony which the Council of State yearly demanded in the time of Prince *Henry* of *Orange*, did ofttimes amount to more than sixteen Millions; and that the same for the Year 1629, when the *Bosch* was taken, came to twenty one Millions, and seven hundred eighty two thousand two hundred sixty eight Guilders, you will then clearly see that those Campagns, and Sieges in that Offensive War, even when they succeeded best, and we made Bonfires for joy, cost the Province of *Holland* alone, omitting the other *United Provinces*, 4 or 5 times more than such a Graft would amount unto; besides that the *Bosch* or *Boisleduc* with its circumjacent Forts, *Breda*, *Bergen op Zoom*, and *Steenbergen*,

And then there would be less to be kept by Garisons than Bolduke, Bergen, *and* Breda *now require.*

bergen, with their Outworks and adjacent Forts, do make together a far greater Line, which either in Peace or War will coſt abundantly more: and it is evident, that many of the honeſt *Hollanders* have been made to believe, that ſuch Conqueſts have been very advantageous, if not neceſſary. So that it ſeems to me that ſuch a Graft and Walls, which will laſt *Holland* and the Province of *Utrecht* for ever, and ſufficiently free the Country from further Charge, will be found exceeding more profitable for theſe two Republicks, when it is effected.

Utrecht *inſeparably link'd to* Holland's *Intereſt both by Situation and Government.*

Laſtly, it may be objected, that it is here taken for granted, that the Province, or at leaſt the City of *Utrecht*, ought always to join with *Holland*; whereas it may happen, that that City may join with the Enemy to ruin *Holland*. I acknowledg, *if the Sky fall we ſhould catch ſtore of Larks*, becauſe all thoſe things are poſſible, but it would be a great wonder if all thoſe things ſhould happen: At leaſt it is not likely that the City of *Utrecht* enjoying a free Government will ever make War againſt *Holland*, becauſe the Intereſts of theſe two Republicks are perpetually link'd together, and the Province of *Utrecht* has of old been, and is at this day, the moſt faithful Ally to *Holland*, as lately appeared by their readily bringing in their *Quota* agreed on for carrying on the laſt War againſt *England*, as alſo in mortifying the Stadtholderſhip.

And by mutual inclination, having of old run the ſame fortune with us.

And beſides that great City hath of old found the Government of a ſingle Perſon ſo uneaſy, that it hath always been of *Hoek*'s Faction, and endeavoured more than any o-

other

ther after a free Government, being neither able nor willing to ſubmit their Necks to the Biſhops, Lords or Stadtholders Yoke. And it is obſervable, that for that very reaſon the Inhabitants have gotten the name of *Mutineers*. For thoſe that eat Cherries in common with great Spiritual or Temporal Lords or Princes, muſt ſuffer them to chuſe the faireſt, and yet be pelted with the ſtones; or if they oppoſe it, they will be forthwith excommunicated for Hereticks, and puniſhed as ſeditious Fellows.

Laſtly, the Province is in it ſelf very weak by its inland Situation; and continues ſtill unfortified as well as *Holland*, by reaſon of the Maxims of the Lords Stadtholders and Captain-Generals: So that there is nothing more to be wiſh'd for by them, than their maintaining a free Government, and erecting ſuch Fortifications. And ſeeing Experience and a well known Political Maxim teacheth us, *That there is no State in this World ſo ſecure, that has nothing left unſecure*; I have already given ſo many Reaſons and Inſtances to prove That the Republick of *Holland* can ſubſiſt of it ſelf againſt all its Neighbours, and that it is a hard matter to name any other State in the World of which the like may be ſaid with more certainty: But if the Reader hath any doubt remaining, I ſhall endeavour in the next Chapter to clear it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

That every great City in Holland, *whether it be well or ill fortified, is able to defend it ſelf againſt all Force from without.*

Every great City in Holland *can ſubſiſt of its ſelf,*

I Shall now endeavour to ſhew that each great City in *Holland* is able, no leſs than other Republicks conſiſting of one City, to ſtand againſt all the Potentates in the World. To which end this Rule of Politicians and Ingineers comes into my mind; That all great Citys that can abide a Siege of a whole Seaſon, muſt be counted invincible; becauſe, tho all things ſucceed well with the Beſiegers, they can in no wiſe compenſate the Charges of the Siege; and that that Power and Expence might with much more Benefit and Certainty be applied againſt Citys which are not ſo ſtrong nor ſo well fortified.

Becauſe it is able to ſtand out a Winters Siege.

Beſides which, for the taking ſuch a City a very great Force of Men and Mony is required, which is ſeldom found among Monarchs, becauſe of their living ſo magnificently, and that the Treaſurers of Kings and Princes conſume all their Revenues; and we ſeldom find ſuch Republicks ſo fooliſh (unleſs they are ridden by ſome Tyrant) to make ſuch detrimental Conqueſts. For an incredibly great Army is neceſſary to ſurround ſo great a City; and while one ſide of it is attack'd with a great Strength, thoſe on the other ſide may make ſuch terrible Sallys, that the Enemy ſhall not be able to keep any Watch in the Approaches or Redoubts, ſo that thereby whole Armys may be ruined. And

And lastly, tho all things succeed well with the Besiegers, it is certain that Scaling of Walls causeth great destruction among the Assailants; because the Besieged, with the great Military Power which they have in readiness in the Places of Arms, or about the Breaches, as a Reserve, may easily beat back the Assailants: Therefore such Places are usually taken by Famine; and seeing the Besiegers cannot without difficulty cast up Lines of Circumvallation, or intrench a City, and yet with more difficulty intrench themselves well in so great a compass of Ground, as to be able to defend themselves against a great and populous City, and to supply their own Army with all the Necessaries requisite for the famishing of the City: We therefore see for the most part, that those obstinate Besiegers do melt and consume away, and their great Armies come to nothing. And moreover the Neighbouring Potentates are commonly very jealous, *hodie tibi, cras mihi*, of such formidable growing Conquerors; so that in time Succours happen to come from whence it is not look'd for, according to the Proverb, *Time gained, much gained*; and in truth, the Life of all Men depends upon these political Maxims, That no Man will ruin himself to undo another: So that the contrary hereof is neither to be credited nor practised in the great Citys of *Holland*, so as to make them continue in a defenceless posture.

In which time the City may be relieved, or the Siege raised.

Which is proved by Examples.

For besides all the Reasons abovementioned, this political Rule is established by Experience, That all great Citys that can hold out the Siege of a whole Season, ought to be considered to be able to subsist for ever, seeing

ing at this day many Republicks, consisting of no more than one City, have maintained themselves some hundreds of Years against all their Enemys, altho many amongst them are but meanly fortified, and others tho stronger are but small.

And moreover among the said Republicks, consisting but of one City, there are several Republicks, wherein there are neither great nor fortified Cities, and yet by their own Government, the jealousy of their Neighbours, and other Circumstances, or humane Accidents, have stood very long. We are indeed strong when we dare be our own Masters, and when the Inhabitants begin to know the Metal or Stength of a People that will fight for their Freedom, and when the People of a Republick understand aright the weakness and mutableness of a Monarchical War, and that the Republicks do ofttimes ruin the great Armys of Monarchs by good Fortifications and Orders; or can quietly sit down, and be Spectators of the great Desolations, and ruinous Revolutions which Monarchs do continually cause among themselves by their Field Battels.

Tho the great Citys be not fortified, yet might they resist Foreign Forces.

Moreover, supposing the great Citys of *Holland* were so improvident, as that during their free Government they should neglect the strengthning themselves with good Fortifications, Gates, Walls, and Grafts, but took care only to furnish themselves sufficiently with good Arms for their Inhabitants, and to exercise them thorowly, those Citys might subsist very well against all Foreign Power; and according to the Political Maxim which teacheth us, That all populous Citys which can

can raise an Army out of their own Inhabitants, cannot be either besieged or conquered; because a dispersed Army without shelter, must needs give way to one within that is united and sheltered by a City. *Vis unita fortior dispersâ*, An united Force is stronger than a scatter'd one.

All that hath been said, whether of fortified or unfortified populous Citys, that provide their Inhabitants with Arms sufficient, and train them up in the use of them, is strengthned by Experience: and we shall say, that lately, during that great devastation of Countrys and Citys of the great and Potent Electors and Princes of the Empire, all the free Imperial Citys have very well secur'd themselves, as *Francfort*, *Strasburg*, *Ulm*, *Nuremburg*, *Breslaw*, *Lubeck*, *Hamburg*, *Bremen*, *Cologn*, &c. against the Emperor, *Spain*, *France*, &c. except poor innocent *Stralsond*, which tho really impregnable, yet *terrore pannico*, dreading the Imperial victorious Arms, took in a *Swedish* Garison for its defence, but in truth leap'd from the Smoak into the Fire, and so lost her dear Liberty. Thus have those inconsiderable, or small *Switzer*-Republicks, and Citys, *viz.* *Zurich*, *Bern*, *Bazil*, *Schaffhuisen*, *Friburgh*, *Lucerne*, *Solothurn*, *St. Gal*, &c. preserved themselves some hundreds of Years successively against *Austria*, *Spain*, *France*, *Savoy*, and *Burgundy*; yea, even little *Geneva* hath done the like.

All which appears by Examples.

Of the free Imperial Citys of Germany.

The Cantons of Switzerland.

Thus that small City of *Ragousa* subsisted very well against the Great *Turk*; *Austria* and *Venice*, which is not above 2000 Paces in circumference, and in its greatest Prosperity could not be inhabited by more than ten

Ragousa.

Lucca.

thouſand Souls, Men, Women, and Children. Thus ſubſiſts little *Lucca*, which hath not above twenty four thouſand Souls in it; yet by its Republican Government, and good Fortifications, keeps its ground againſt the *Pope* and *Genoa*, and the Duke of *Tuſcany*, and the King of *Spain* as Duke of *Milan*.

It is not ſtrange to ſee ſuch incredible Fruits of a free Government: becauſe for a Man to be his own Maſter, and conſequently to feed, clothe, arm and defend his own Body, which he always unfeignedly loves, and will provide for and defend to the utmoſt, is certainly an incomparable if not an infinite Advantage above Slavery, where a ſingle Perſon hath the charge, takes care of or neglects other Mens Lives, Healths, and Safetys, according to his own Will and Pleaſure.

The Citys of Holland *can better ſubſiſt than thoſe forenamed.*

And if this be true, as it certainly appears to be, we ought in my judgment to eſteem that not only all our great Citys of *Holland* which are ſituated on Havens and great Rivers, are impregnable, yea not to be beſieged or approach'd to, if once they can put themſelves into a ſtate of good defence, and convince their Inhabitants, that their own Strength is ſufficient to repel all Foreign Force: But methinks it is alſo conſequently true, that all our great inland Citys, as *Harlem*, *Delft*, *Leyden*, *Alkmaer*, &c. are ſufficiently able to defend themſelves againſt all Force from without, under a free Government, in caſe they neglect not to provide themſelves with all Neceſſarys according to their Power.

And

And tho it may be objected that *Harlem* being formerly besieged a whole Winter by the *Spaniard*, was yet taken at last. I answer, That *Don Frederico* who commanded there in chief, repented oft that ever he began that Siege; and he himself was for abandoning it, and would so have done, had it not been for that obstinate and impolitick Duke of *Alva*'s Son, who wrote him contumelious and reflecting Letters about it, and thereby compel'd him to continue that Siege. And besides it is notorious, that some such imprudent Sieges, as that of *Alkmaer*, *Leyden*, and *Zierickzee*, did occasion the breaking of the *Spanish* Power, and the Mutinys of the Souldiers at that time, as it did afterwards to Arch-Duke *Albert* when he besieged other Citys. And moreover, *Haerlem* at that time had not half the Strength and number of Men as it has now; for being newly revolted from its mighty Prince the King of *Spain*, and the *Romish* Religion at once, it must necessarily, by reason of that new Government and Religion, and especially by treating the *Spanish* and *Romish* Inhabitants too hardly and reproachfully, have been at that time much divided and weakned, and not well able to bridle those discontented Inhabitants. And yet with that divided Force, and their weak Walls, they were able to keep off the Army of their old Sovereign a long time. So that this Example of *Harlem* seems rather to strengthen than weaken the said Maxim, that all the great *Holland* Citys continuing in a free State, that are able to form a well-armed and disciplin'd Army out of their own Inhabitants, are impregnable. And we lie in so

Vid. Strad. l. 7. *Which the Example of* Harlem *taken in* 1573. *by the* Spaniards, *doth not contradict;*

Because our Citys have great Advantages above others, therefore is that Maxim the stronger.

ſo cold a Climate, that it is impoſſible, unleſs the Enemy deſign to conſume a whole Army, to hold out a Winter's Siege. Beſides, thoſe Citys lie not above a League and a half from the Sea on low and plain Lands, which for the moſt part may be put under Water in the Winter: So that they have naturally and of themſelves great Advantages, and beſides might eaſily be fortified; and Men to defend ſuch Fortifications are eaſy to be found here from our own Inhabitants, and thoſe of neighbouring Countrys. Theſe are natural Advantages which are not to be acquired by Art or Mony, but all other neceſſarys depend on the provident care of the Rulers, who I conceive ought ever to be imployed about that Work during their Free Government, without further loſs of time; for *(chi a tempo, non aſpetti tempo)* He that has time, and does not improve it, ſhall never be wealthy. If hereafter a Stadtholder or Captain-General be obtruded upon them, and they would then poſſibly make it their buſineſs to fortify themſelves, they might have cauſe to fear his diſpleaſure for it.

So that the Rulers ought not to ſuffer Suburbs to be built.

For in the firſt place, the Suburbs of Citys in times of Peace having all the Privileges of Citys, and paying no Taxes, are like Wens in the Body, which attract much nouriſhment, and are very troubleſom, and yet good for nothing; and on the other hand, the ſame Suburbs in time of War do not defend the City from the Enemy, but are commonly the occaſion of their being loſt, and ſo may be likened to Cancers, which cannot be cut or burnt off but with the hazard of a Man's Life, a great Charge, Loſs and Pain, to which

which Extremitys People are not commonly willing to come but when 'tis too late; ſo that one may truly ſay, that that Maxim can never be ſufficiently commended, That the Rulers of free Citys ſhould prevent all Out-buildings, or Suburbs, under what Pretext ſoever.

And to keep vacant Places within the City,

And conſequently the ſecond thing to be taken care of by Rulers, is in time to inlarge their reſpective Citys according to the increaſe of their Inhabitants, or Traffick, and continually to have many void Places to ſet out for Buildings within their Walls, as for all publick known Uſes and Accommodations, ſo for other unexpected Occaſions, whether in Peace or War, and eſpecially againſt a Siege, to ſecure and harbour the Country people with their Cattel, Fodder, Corn, and Firing; which ſort of People during a Siege, can dig, and undergo Rain, Wind, Cold and Heat, and ſo may be ſingularly uſeful, while they have left the Land round about them naked to the Enemy; who otherwiſe would, by the Aſſiſtance of themſelves and their Proviſions, be inabled to continue the Siege longer, and to ſtarve the City. And moreover by this Method, if a City in time of War be well fortified, many Inhabitants of the weaker neighbouring Citys may there have protection, and many of them will afterwards ſettle there in time of Peace, when by their Loſſes they have learn'd the great Advantages which in times of War, and the great Conveniences and Pleaſure which in times of Peace the Inhabitants of great and ſtrong Citys do injoy, above thoſe ſmall and weak ones. Rents would likewiſe be always kept low,

Which are neceſſary both in War and Peace.

by reſerving of Ground in Citys, to the exceeding Benefit of them in times of Peace, ſeeing thereby Traffick and Trades might be follow'd at a cheaper Rate, and the Inhabitants might dwell in healthful, convenient, and pleaſant Houſes.

The Magiſtrates ought to fortify their Citys well,

The 3*d* Care of Rulers ought to be to ſurround their Citys with good Walls and Flankings, and provide great Gates, and convenient Watch-houſes; and alſo that each Gate have a fit place to draw up the Souldiery in: And in the middle or heart of the City near the Town-hall (whence all the vigour and ſtrength muſt be diſperſed over the whole Body of the City) there ought to be plac'd the great Guard, and place of Aſſembly, with ſufficient ground to draw up ſome thouſands of Men in order to lead them out thence, where they ſhall be moſt uſeful, whether againſt Inſurrections within, or Aſſaults from without.

And to provide all Neceſſarys againſt any Enemy.

The 4*th* Care of Rulers ought to be, to build Houſes for Arms, and in time to provide them with all ſorts of Offenſive and Defenſive Weapons. It is probable that every great City would require 250 Pieces of Ordnance, and Arms for ten thouſand Men: Shovels, Spades, Waggons, Spars and Deals, are in ſuch caſes alſo neceſſary; as are likewiſe publick Buildings for Proviſions, Corn, and Fewel. This being once done, it might be maintain'd with very ſmall Charge. But Proviſions are periſhable Wares; Corn is preſerv'd with great Charge; Turf may always be had in a ſhort time out of the Country, ſo that in time of Peace Barns ſeem to be ſufficient, which may be let out to the Inhabitants at a

ſmall

ſmall Rent, who oft-times would themſelves fill them with Corn, ſeeing the Traffick of *Holland*, and ſmall or low Intereſt, added to the free hire of Garrets, might poſſibly cauſe many that live on their Rents, when the Prices of Corn are low, to lay out their Mony upon it, in hopes of profit by raiſing of its Price.

And conſtantly to exerciſe the rich Citizens in Arms.

The 5*th* Care of Rulers ought to be, thorowly to exerciſe their wealthly Inhabitants in Arms, for thoſe you have always at hand in time of need; and the rich Citizens will ſerve faithfully without pay to defend the Lawful Government and their dear-bought Liberty, and will ſtedfaſtly endeavour the preſervation of other mens Goods from all violence, whether Domeſtick or Foreign. The poor Inhabitants ought in time of War to be taken into pay, tho it be but ſmall, thereby to prevent their inclination of making Mutinies or Uproars, and they ſhould be commanded by none but rich and truſty Citizens.

Laſtly, to have in ſtore ſome, tho not much Mony.

The 6*th* and laſt Care of the Magiſtrates of Citys ought to be, to have ſome Mony, tho not much beforehand. And ſince ſome may wonder, conſidering that in the general opinion of Men, Mony is the Sinews of War, that I put it in the laſt Place, and beſides that I preſume to adviſe the keeping only ſome Mony in Caſh: I ſhall therefore add, that the Maxim, that Mony is the Sinews of War, is never true, but where all means of Defence and Offence is provided. For every one knows, that toothleſs and unarm'd Gold cannot be defended but by ſharp Iron: And that great and unarmed Treaſures, or Cheſts

of Mony intice Mutineers within and all Enemys from without to plunder. At leaſt that Maxim hath ſeldom any place but to make Field-Armys ſtand to it, in Sieges, or to cauſe Men to keep their Station at advantageous Paſſes, and thereby to outſtand or famiſh an Enemy, and when the Enemy gives way, to attack them. But in Citys that Maxim holds not, unleſs they have already provided themſelves with that for which Men gathered or laid up Mony. And ſeeing in Governments where ſo few are Rulers, as in the Citys of *Holland*, Mony is ſo oft meaſured and ſtrik'd, and ſo much of it ſticks to the Meaſure and Striker as the Rulers pleaſe; ſo that good Regents and Patriots muſt take ſpecial care, that the Mony be immediately imployed about things neceſſary to the durable Welfare, Eaſe and Ornament of the City, before it be expended through alteration of the Government by indigent Rulers, and haters of the Liberty of our native Country, to our ruin in building Tyrannical Caſtles, or by letting it drop through their Fingers into the Blew-bag.

Becauſe our Government conſiſts of too few to be long burdened with needleſs Impoſitions, and not be ſubject to Tumults.

And that Mony may otherwiſe be ill expended.

And when Men have gotten all theſe neceſſaries, it's then time to gather a ſtock of Mony. For in times of adverſity, when things run croſs, and unexpected accidents happen, Mony is very neceſſary to procure all that was neglected or eſteemed uſeleſs in time of Peace. But for great Treaſures, the Citys of *Holland* ſhould not aim at them, for theſe would cauſe great Impoſts and heavy Taxes, which would make the Rulers of a rich Mercantile City conſiſting of a ſmall number of People ſo hateful, that by ſuch Impoſitions, when neceſſity requires not, they would be lookt on by

And being provided with all Neceſſarys, the Rulers ought to lay up a Stock againſt unexpected Accidents.

by the Subject as Plunderers of the Commonalty, and run the riſque of being kickt out of the Government. The People would eaſily think, that they had reaſon to believe, that if the Rulers ſought only the Welfare of the Subject, and accordingly depended on their Defence, and to that end gathered of their own Inhabitants the Mony thereunto neceſſary, that they could then alſo ſubſiſt with ſuch ſmall Impoſts as other Republicks do. And the Rulers ought to know, that many Republicks have ſubſiſted a long time againſt very potent Neighbours without any Impoſts; and ſome with very few, but none in the World by ſuch vaſt ones as are levied in the Citys of *Holland*. So that it will be a Miracle from Heaven if it be long born by Citys that cannot live upon their own Fund, or Country, or unalterable Situation, but where all the Inhabitants muſt ſubſiſt and live upon fickle Traffick, and the uncertain conſumption of Manufactures, and Fiſhing.

Little concern needful for good Alliances,

Laſtly, we may add what has been ſaid already, That the Rulers of the great *Holland* Citys ought to provide themſelves with good Allys of ſome of the Neighbouring Citys and Lands, who are moſt concern'd in their ſafety. But when all things are ſo well provided, ſuch Citys are uſually helped without previous Alliances or mutual Obligations; but when unprovided, there is nothing for all their Care and Charge to be gotten but good Words under Hand and Seal, which are all but feeble things, and are conſtrued according to the ſenſe of the ſtrongeſt, or of him that hath no need of aſſiſtance. So that ſuch Alliances before neceſſity requires, need not

be

be too anxiouſly ſought after, eſpecially with the advance of much Mony. Moreover it is well known how ſtrictly and well bound all the *United Provinces* are by the Union of *Utrecht*, and all the *Holland* Citys by the Provincial Government.

For Jealouſy will occaſion them of it ſelf.

And if the worſt ſhould happen, yet nevertheleſs all the great *Holland* Inland Citys by their Vicinity, and Communication with the North-Sea, might expect from thence in their extremity ſome Succors; and if the Beſieged behaved themſelves any thing well, one or other of the Citys of *Holland* lying at a Sea-Port, will be inclined to help them, were it but for injoying the benefit of the Conſumption or Tranſportation of their Commoditys, which they either ſupply them with or receive of them. But when all is well conſidered, it is moſt adviſable for all Rulers to provide themſelves ſo well of all Neceſſaries, as if none in the World would or were able to help them but themſelves, which is a thing feaſible enough, as hath appeared by what I have already laid down.

The Concluſion of this Chapter, that every great City may ſubſiſt of it ſelf.

And therefore I hope by what is before alledg'd it is evident, That every great City of *Holland*, no leſs than other Republicks conſiſting but of one City, may very well defend it ſelf againſt all the Potentates of the World; ſo that it is at laſt made evident that this Republick, or all the Gentry and Citys of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* conjoined, may very well be able to defend themſelves againſt all Foreign Power whatſoever: which is the thing I had undertaken to prove.

Thus having in the Firſt Part obſerved the Intereſt and Maxims of *Holland* in relation to its

its Inhabitants within the Country; and in the Second Part duly considered *Holland*'s Interest as to all Foreign Powers, I shall now end this Second Part, laying before the Reader a short View of all that has been said at once, and shew him the Inferences and Conclusions which every one ought to make from the same; *viz.* That in the first place and before all other matters, Fisherys, Manufactures, Traffick and Navigation ought to be indulged and favoured.

That Fisherys, Manufactures, Traffick, &c. ought chiefly to be indulged.

And *Secondly*, That to that end, the freedom of all Religions for all People is very necessary, *viz.* such freedom whereby all the Rulers should be of the Publick Reformed Religion, who are bound to defend and favour the same by all lawful means; yet so, that the other Religions may not be persecuted by Placaet, but publickly tolerated or favoured, and defended against all the violence of the Rabble.

Toleration in Religion very useful to that end.

Thirdly, That necessary Freedom be given for all Strangers to dwell in *Holland*.

Liberty for Strangers,

Fourthly, That it is necessary that every Inhabitant of *Holland* have the liberty to follow and exercise Merchandize, their own Occupation, and Mechanick Trades, without the control of any other Inhabitants.

And all Handycraft Traders to deal with us.

Fifthly, It is above all things necessary, that the Rulers be prudently wary and cautious, how they lay Imposts upon Consumption, and especially that they be circumspect in charging of Merchandize, or levying any Convoymony upon Ships or Goods imported or exported, without distinction, as also in charging of Ships let to freight.

Freedom from Imposts, &c.

Sixthly,

Impartial Justice.

Sixthly, That the Justice of *Holland* be accommodated or framed, not to the Benefit of the Officers of Justice, but of the Inhabitants, as also *e Mercaturæ bono*, more to the Interest of the Merchant.

Seventhly, Here is also shewn that which is necessary for all sorts of Governments, and especially for Republicks, which cannot subsist without continual attracting or alluring in of fresh Inhabitants, and to keep them employed about Manufactures, Fisherys, Traffick and Shipping; above all, it is absolutely necessary in *Holland*, to make new Colonys in Foreign Parts, that from time to time they may discharge their supernumerary, poor, straitned, and discontented Inhabitants with Honour, Convenience and Profit, whereby also they may increase Commerce.

Colonys.

To keep the Sea uninfested from Rovers.

And forasmuch as in the Second Part we have handled *Holland*'s Just and True Maxims relating to Foreign Powers; it is in the first place clear, that the narrow Seas ought to be kept intirely free from Pirates, and that Merchants Ships in the *Spanish* and Midland Seas be continually defended, and freed by Ships of War from *Turkish* Piracys. As also that Peace should by all means be sought with all People: But yet that *Holland* must not seek its preservation from Alliances; for this is the Sheet-Anchor of the weakest Republicks and Potentates, whereas *Holland* subsists not by the Jealousy of its Neighbours, but by its own Strength. And therefore not only the other Provinces and the Generality, but especially all the Frontiers of *Holland* ought to be fortified and provided with all things necessary against any Foreign Attack or Surprize.

To pursue Peace.

And that Holland *be fortified; which has all not only appear'd to be necessary and true,*

prize. And above all, those great and strong Citys of *Holland* ought to be put into a posture to hold out a Year's Siege; because then they will be held impregnable, or at least stronger than many Republicks of single Inland-Citys, situated in a hilly mountanous Country, and therefore cannot be so well fortified. As for example, all the free Imperial Citys of *Germany*, the *Swiss Cantons*, *Geneva*, *Ragousa*, *Lucca*; yea even those Citys that are under Princes, as *Parma*, *Mantua*, *Modena*, which must be somewhat the weaker by reason of their own Princes, for one Sword keeps another in the Scabbard; and in this sense it is true, That two curst Dogs don't bite one another, but the good natur'd toothless ones are always bitten by the curst Curs.

But been manifested by many Examples to be so.

The End of the Second Part.

The

The True Intereſt, and Political Maxims of the Republic of *Holland* and *Weſt-Friezland.*

PART III.

CHAP. I.

Wherein enquiry is made in what the Intereſt of the free Rulers of Holland, *as to all the Particulars by which the People may live happily, conſiſts.*

Before we treat of the Intereſt of Rulers in general, we ſhall briefly repeat what hath been diſcour.s'd of.

HAVING hitherto ſhewn, that the Welfare of the Inhabitants of *Holland* is grounded upon the preſervation and improvement of Fiſherys, Manufactures, Traffick and Shipping, and that the ſame cannot be acquired nor kept but by Liberty, or to ſpeak plainer a Toleration of all Religions, tho differing from the Reformed, and by a free Burger-right for all Strangers that will cohabit with us, with Licence to follow all their Trades and Occupations what-

whatever without trouble or moleſtation from their fellow Inhabitants, in reſpect of any Societys, Companys, Halls, Guilds, or Corporations: And by ſuch moderation about Convoy-monys and Tolls, that no Ships or Goods coming in, or going out, may be charged with, or eaſed and freed from all Taxes, otherwiſe than as it may be ſubſervient to the improvement of our Fiſherys, Manufactures, Traffick and Navigation. Moreover, having ſhewn that all the things beforementioned are not ſufficient to preſerve and keep up the ſaid Fiſherys, Manufactures, Traffick and Navigation, unleſs the Courts of Juſtice, and Laws be conſtituted and executed more than hitherto in favour of the Inhabitants, and of Traffick. And laſtly that in foreign Countrys, Colonys of *Hollanders* ought to be eſtabliſh'd and protected.

And in the Second Book having likewiſe ſhewn, how neceſſary it is that the Sea be cleared of all Free-Booters and Pirats, and that Peace be ſought with all Men. And moreover, having ſhewed that *Holland* is to beware of entring into any prejudicial Alliances with its Neighbours and Potentates, but rather to ſtrengthen their own Frontiers, and inland Citys, and exerciſe their Inhabitants well in Arms, and to keep the Sword in their own hands, againſt all Domeſtick and Foreign Power, which would be as great a ſtrengthning and ſecurity to them, yea and more than any other Country. Therefore I judg it now uſeful, deliberately to examine whether a Land having ſuch Intereſts, ought to be governed by a Republican or Monarchical Form of Government: For it is cer-

The power of raiſing or ruining a People is in the Magiſtrates hands.

certain that all publick Power to improve, or impair the Intereſt of a Land, and to preſerve and enlarge, or diminiſh and ruin a State, muſt be, and is in the Hands of the Lawful Rulers of a Country, whether they be Monarchs, Princes, Statelmen, or the Common Burgers.

And tho I have in many places of the two firſt Parts of this Treatiſe ſeemed to have ſaid enough that *Holland* and its Inhabitants ought to be governed by a free Republican Government; yet ſeeing it was done but curſorily, and as *aliud agendo*, and that on a Government that is well or ill conſtituted according to the Intereſt of the People, depends all their Proſperity or Adverſity: It ſeems to me that in the Third Part of this Treatiſe my beſt Endeavours ſhould be employed to enquire what kind of Rulers would be moſt profited by the Welfare of the Fiſherys, Manufactures, Traffick, and Navigation, and all their Conſequences, or be moſt injur'd by the decay or weakning of them. For ſeeing it is true generally ſpeaking, that all Rulers whether high or low are alike in this, that in ſeeking their own Profit, they do not aim at the Benefit of the People to their own loſs, but on the contrary (as no man halts of another man's ſore) will out of the Common Misfortune ſeek their own Advantage; it is therefore evident, that of the two propoſed Governments, that will be beſt for *Holland* in which the well or ill-being of the Rulers depends upon, or is join'd with the well or ill being of the Fiſhing, Manufactures, Traffick, and Navigation, and with all the neceſſary Conſequences or Dependences of the ſame.

As alſo that all Rulers ſeek their own benefit more than anothers.

And

And upon that Foundation we shall consider

And tho ſeveral kinds of Government might here come into Conſideration, yet, I conceive, that of the Land of our Nativity is the fitteſt, and agrees beſt with my brief Undertaking, to guide my Thoughts upon the Government which is now there in being, and upon that which we lately had, and by many is deſired again. And to that end, I conceive it needful to expreſs what we ought to underſtand by the words Republick and Republican Governors, or Monarchy and Monarchical Rulers.

What a Republick and a Monarchy really are.

By the word *Republick* and *Republican Rulers*, I mean, not only ſuch a State wherein a certain Sovereign Aſſembly hath the Right and Authority for coming to all Reſolutions, making of Orders and Laws, or to break them, as alſo of requiring or prohibiting Obedience to them: But I underſtand thereby ſuch a State wherein an Aſſembly, tho poſſibly without any Right, yet hath the Power to cauſe all their Reſolutions, Orders, and Laws, to be obeyed and put in execution. And again, by the word *Monarchy* and *Monarchical Rulers*, not only ſuch a State wherein one ſingle Perſon hath all Right and Power for the taking, making, or revoking all Reſolutions, Orders, and Laws, and to cauſe Obedience to be given to them, or to hinder the obſerving of them: But, I mean, thereby ſuch a State wherein one only Perſon, tho without Right, yet hath the Power to cauſe Obedience to be given to all his Orders, Reſolutions, and Laws, or to ſuſpend or hinder all Orders, Reſolutions, and Laws of the True and Lawful higheſt Aſſembly, that they be not executed, and this according to his own Pleaſure.

Not where the name of Freedom or Slavery is, nor yet where the Right and the Name alone is, but where the Power alſo thereof is preſent.

For tho it be true, that the Republican Form of Government is ſo acceptable to the Merchants, and all wiſe and vertuous Men, that many will object, that the bare name, ſhadow, and appearance of Freedom hath been able to encourage the Traffick and Navigation of *Holland*; yet to me it ſeems to be no leſs true, that we ought to expect many more good Fruits from the thing it ſelf, than from the appearance of it: And beſides, it cannot be denied, but that the Name and the Shadow must, and ſhall always give way to, and vaniſh before the Power, Effect, and Thing it ſelf. So that he that will narrowly enquire into the good or bad Fruits which are to be expected of ſuch or ſuch a kind of Government, would do very ill if he ſhould not let his Thoughts and Obſervations, in this particular, run more on the Power which can operate without Right, than upon Right which without Power is inſignificant, and when Violence or Force comes, muſt always ceaſe.

The Right and the Name vaniſh by degrees, before the Power and Effect.

And that this may more clearly appear, the Reader may pleaſe to conſider, that by the word [Lawful Government] is meant, and muſt be meant, the Right of compelling Obedience to that Government; and that this is grounded upon antient Poſſeſſion, or upon Laws, Cuſtoms, or Oaths, or upon all together, which are of themſelves weak, unleſs they be back'd by Perſons authorized, that are willing and ready at the Command of the lawful Rulers to puniſh ſuch rebellious or perjured Subjects. Whereas on the other ſide, a greater or ſtronger adherence of People to a Governor, or ſome leading Men, and without the leaſt Right, may have ſo great a Power,

Which is demonſtrated by manifeſting,

Power, that they ſhall deſtroy all good Orders and Cuſtoms; and ſuch are wont to caſt all the antient and virtuous lawful Rulers out of their Right and Poſſeſſion.

Of what importance the Love of the People is,

Which adherence of the People I ſhall conſider more at large, becauſe thereby the Being and Power of all Government is either made or broken. I ſhall firſt conſider and fix upon an unarmed State, wherein the Power of Governing uſed to reſide in thoſe who can force Obedience from the greater number, and eſpecially of the meaneſt People. For in ſuch a caſe one Man is not only a Perſon to be accounted as good as another, but then beſides the Poor, the Ignorant, and the worſt People will be always ſooner ready to help to oppreſs lawful Rulers than the other few rich, prudent, and virtuous Inhabitants to defend them againſt that Violence.

Or that of the Soldiery.

And as to an armed State, it is held by all Men of Underſtanding for an infallible Maxim, That he that is Maſter of the Soldiery, is conſequently Maſter of all thoſe Places where they lie in Gariſon; and he that is Maſter of thoſe Places of Strength, and of the Soldiery, is likewiſe Maſter of the State, or may make himſelf ſo when he pleaſes. For the Soldiers have always their Officers, whoſe Commands they are daily accuſtomed to receive and obey, or elſe are ſeverely puniſhed for their Diſobedience. And ſeeing for their Diſobedience, or Crimes againſt the Polity of a People, they are not wont to be puniſhed at all, or but very ſlackly, even when the illegal and wicked Attempts of the Captain-Generals miſcarry, as alſo becauſe they have nothing to loſe; and laſtly, ſeeing they have

thereby alſo much more Advantage in Tumults and Wars, than they can hope to gain in times of Reſt and Peace; therefore he that can get to be their chief Head and Maſter, tho by the greateſt Injuſtice of the World, * may ſuddenly ſet on foot all manner of undutiful Practices and Undertakings againſt the lawful and unarmed Rulers, and fall upon them in hoſtile manner before they have time ſo to fortify their Cities, and exerciſe the Burgers and Boors in Arms, as to drive away the ſeditious Soldiery from their Gates and Walls.

The Rulers, as well as the People, uſed to be ſway'd by the Soldiery.

And if the ſaid Maxim, That he that is Maſter of the places of Strength and Soldiery, is alſo Maſter, or may make himſelf ſo, of the State, be infallibly true; then it is a more material truth, That he who, beſides the command of the Soldiery, poſſeſſeth the Favour of moſt of the Inhabitants, or the rude Rabble, can make himſelf Maſter of the State when he aſſembles the ſaid Soldiery for that end. So that if any one may do this by a deputed Power, we muſt conſider him, tho a Servant or Miniſter to the State, as having in all reſpects the Power of the Republic in his hands; and therefore the thing it ſelf being duly conſidered, he is already Sovereign Monarch of that State, and is ſo to be underſtood, that the Name and the Right of that free Republican Government will likewiſe ſoon vaniſh, and conſequently after that, not any of the Fruits of the Free Government, or any thing like it ought to be expected. But on the contrary, all that uſeth to proceed

Eſpecially by him that has the Soldiery, and at the ſame time the Rabble on his ſide.

Becauſe the Strength of a Government conſiſts of ſuch Parties.

* Nulla fides pietaſq; viris qui caſtra ſequuntur.

from

from a Monarchical Government, must be supposed to happen; and therefore such a Government ought no more to be called a Republick, but a Monarchy in Practice and in Fact.

And the more, whilst the Governors of a Country, where there is such a Commander in chief, during that colour or appearance of a Free Government, must always have an Eye upon him, and in all weighty matters, Sycophant like, repair to his profound Wisdom, and take special care that they oppose it not, unless that miserable and humble Suppliant means immediately to be deposed, if not worse handled by the Rulers in Power; wherein * *Rome* may and ought to serve us for an example: For if *Rome*, which was provided with so many hundred Counsellors of State *ad vitam*, and so many hundred thousand sprightly Citizens that loved their Liberty, was not able to preserve her Freedom against the Tyranny of one such Head, it is then impossible for others to do it in the like case.

See Aitzma, *how the States were fain to demean themselves towards Pr.* Henry.

Which we may clearly discern by the Roman *Republick.*

Especially when it is considered, that that high spirited Republick having always had several warlike General Officers, who did ever mutually envy one another, and therefore were too weak to master the Republick; yet was it fain at last to bow the Neck under them, and serve them after a slavish manner assoon as one of those principal Officers be-

Which could preserve its Freedom under several Heads of the Soldiery.

* Libertas inquit populi quem Regna coercent.
Libertate perit cujus servaveris umbram,
Si quicquid jubeare velis. *Lucan.*

came too ſtrong for all the reſt, or that three of them conſpired together, and divided the Republick amongſt them. So that a Republick, where one ſingle Perſon or Head poſſeſſeth the general Favour of the Rabble and Soldiery, according to the ſaid Maxim of State, may be accounted to have loſt its univerſal Freedom, or ſhall certainly loſe it.

The common Freedom in Holland *cannot ſubſiſt under a perpetual Head over all its Forces.*

And this infallible Maxim will of all Countrys be found trueſt in *Holland*, when the ſaid Republick ſhall maintain a conſiderable Army of foreign Soldiers in conſtant pay, that are born and educated in Monarchical Countrys, ſuch as *France* and *England*, &c. and put them into impregnable Cities, and Strong-holds, which ſurround the Republick of *Holland:* and on the other ſide, *Holland* conſiſting of Cities wholly unfortified, and governed by a very few Ariſtocratical Rulers, and moſtly inhabited by a People ſo ill informed in the Grounds of their own Welfare, and in the lawful Government of the Country, that they will expect much more Proſperity under ſuch a potent Head, than from a free Republick; and beſides, will conceive, that they owe more Obedience to the Maſter of the Soldiery, and Strong-holds, than to the ſaid Ariſtocratical Rulers; in ſuch a Condition we ſhall find, that * where Force comes, Right ceaſeth; and that a Government cannot be ſafe without the poſſeſſion of the Sword.

According to the known Truth and Maxim of Politicians, the Sword of War in the Hand of a Captain-General is always ſharper, and

* Inter arma ſilent Leges. Parum tuta eſt ſine viribus majeſtas. *Liv.*

reacheth farther than the Sword of Justice in the Hands of Political or Civil Rulers and Judges. This might be confirmed by numerous Examples which I shall not mention, because they are pertinently related in that unanswerable Deduction of the States of *Holland*, and likewise in the Political Ballance of *V. H.* where it is shewn that all Republicks, which have had a Military or Political Head, have not long preserv'd their Liberty, especially when the Son of such a Head shall come to be vested in the same Office and Dignity. And now to the Matter in hand; The Reader is in the first place earnestly desired maturely to consider, whether the Author of the said Political Ballance has not abundantly shewn, that a Republican Government in all Countrys of the World, and especially in *Holland*, would be much more advantageous to the People than a Government by a single Person.

Seeing the Ministers of Government and Justice can never preserve their own against a hired Soldiery.

See the Second Part, c. 1. §. 10.

Secondly, It is very well worth observation, that in Republicks the Rulers, Magistrates, and other Publick Ministers have very little Reward and Salary for their Service, who while they are in the condition of Citizens, neither may nor can enrich themselves with the Revenues of the Land, and therefore are necessitated by other ways than that of Magistracy, and publick Imployments, to maintain themselves and their Familys, as by Merchandizing, *&c.* Thus it is still, or was lately in the Republicks of *Venice*, *Genoua*, *Ragousa*, *Lucca*, *Milan*, *Florence*, &c. At least it is well known that in *Holland* very many Rulers and Magistrates maintain themselves by the Fisherys, Manufactures,

Fisherys, Manufactures, &c. depend upon having free Rulers.

factures, Traffick and Navigation.

Or if ſome of the Rulers and Servants of the Republick of *Holland* do poſſeſs ſuch Eſtates as to be able to live at eaſe on their Lands and Revenues, yet it is evident that the Reformed Religion, permitting no Cloiſters or Spiritual Revenues, and the Publick Worſhip being performed by Miniſters for a very ſmall Reward or Salary, and by the Elders and Deacons *gratis*, there is no Relief to be had thence for diſtreſſed, impoveriſhed Relations and Familys. So that many Rulers being ſenſible, that according to the Proverb, Many Swine cauſe but thin Waſh; either they themſelves, or at leaſt their Poſterity in the third or fourth Generation, muſt in this naturally poor, tho for Merchandize well ſituated Country, riſe again by Traffick. And hence it is that all the Rulers in *Holland* are derived of Parents that have lived by the Fiſherys, Manufacturys, Traffick or Navigation, and ſo their Children after them; and that the ſaid Rulers do ſtill daily to maintain their Familys find it proper to marry their Children to rich Merchants, or their Children. So that ſuch Rulers, whether conſidered in themſelves by their Conſanguinity or Affinity, are in all reſpects intereſted in the Welfare or Illfare of the Fiſherys, Manufactures, Traffick and Navigation of this Country.

Becauſe the Government and Magiſtracy yield little Profit here.

They oft breed up their Children to Merchandizing, or marry them to Merchants Children.

Which is the more credible in the Citys of *Holland*, becauſe the Common-Council, and the Magiſtrates conſiſt but of a few Perſons thereto elected in ſuch a manner, that the Government, and thoſe particular Imployments being fixed to no particular Familys, thoſe who by accident come to get the greateſt Authority

thority or Adminiſtration, do uſe, out of natural Love, Ambition and Jealouſy, to advance their own Friends, and to exclude the Friends of the deceaſed Rulers and Magiſtrates, moſt of them having already had their Turn in the Government and Magiſtracy: So that from time to time new Familys come into the Government, and the Magiſtracys of Citys, which yield for the moſt part but little Profit, and that only during ſome yearly Magiſtracy or Commiſſion, fall vacant ſo ſeldom, that all thoſe new Familys cannot be provided for, much leſs maintained by them. Wherefore it is and will be neceſſary, ſo long as the Government is not tied or intailed to any particular Family, that many of the Relations of the Rulers in the Citys of *Holland* muſt live by Merchandizing.

And accordingly we muſt believe, that the ſaid Rulers and Magiſtrates, under a Free Government, whether in their own Citys, or at the Aſſemblys of *Holland*, will, by their Counſels and Reſolutions, indeavour to preſerve and increaſe the ſame means of Subſiſtance for the Country in general; unleſs it could be proved, that the Republican Form of Government, and by its neceſſary Conſequences, (*viz.* Liberty of Conſcience, Freedom of Burgerſhip, and from Monopolies, laying aſide all Trafficking Companys, Halls and Guilds, which defraud other Inhabitants of that way of living; likewiſe moderating, or taking away of Convoys and Tolls, ordering and directing Juſtice to the benefit of the common Inhabitants, and Merchandizing, by Colonies, by their keeping the Seas open and free from Privateers; by Peace, fortified Citys,

Whatever is neceſſary for the proſperity of the Country, will be profitable for the Rulers.

tys, and arming the Inhabitants) unleſs I ſay it could be proved that the Inhabitants are more endamaged by theſe, or put into a better condition by uſing Compulſion in Matters of Religion, by ſecluding from Burger-Right, by Monopolys, Societys, or Companys of Merchants, by Patents, Halls and Guilds, unreaſonable high Convoy-Mony, and Tolls, corrupt Juſtice, Sea-Robberys and Wars for want of Colonys, and by weak Citys and unarmed Inhabitants. So that I find my ſelf bound to enquire a little more ſtrictly into all the parts thereof, and yet with all the brevity I can.

Freedom of Religion not hurtful to free Rulers.

As to the Adminiſtration or Service of the Church, by the Preacher, Elder and Deacon in *Holland*; it muſt be confeſſed that thoſe Services there are of ſo little Profit and Credit, that the Rulers and Magiſtrates, or their Friends, are very ſeldom inclined to perform thoſe Functions: So that the freedom and toleration of the Aſſemblys of different Worſhip in *Holland*, cannot be expected (from ſuch a Supreme Head) by Rulers or Magiſtrates, becauſe the Diſſenters, under pretence of aſſembling for the Service of God, would indeavour to make Inſurrections, and thereby depoſe the Rulers to domineer over the State, and the eſtabliſh'd Religion. Againſt which it may be ſaid, that the honeſt diſſenting Inhabitants, who fare well in this Country, or poſſeſs any conſiderable Eſtates, ought not to be preſumed to fall into ſuch ſeditious Thoughts, ſo deſtructive to themſelves and the Country, ſo long as they are not imbittered by Perſecution; but on the contrary will be obliged by ſuch Liberty, eaſy and mode-

Seeing thoſe would not ſo much occaſion as hinder Tumults. Vid. Thuan. Hiſt. in Præfat. ad Regem.

moderate Government, to ſhew their Gratitude to ſo good a Magiſtracy. Wherefore the raſcally People, or thoſe of mean Eſtates, and ambitious and ſeditious Inhabitants, would be deprived of all Adherents, whom otherwiſe under the Cloke of Religion they might the more eaſily gain to carry on their ill Deſigns.

The Heads of the Seditious make uſe of the Tongues and Pens of Preachers, as the Cat's Paw.

And moreover it is well known to all prudent Men, that ſuch Perſons as ſeek after Sovereignty, do uſually favour ſeditious Preachers, and zealous Devotees, that by the help of thoſe tumultuous Spirits they may arrive at that Dignity; and yet no ſooner do they acquire that Sovereign Power, but preſently they are ſenſible how unfit thoſe ſtubborn and imprudent Devotees and ſeditious Preachers are to be made uſe of in Magiſtracy or Government; inſomuch that they then uſe to deſert them, and in lieu of preferring and inriching them, uſe to puniſh them for their Sedition.

Hereof we have lately had very remarkable Examples in *France*, when K. *Henry* IV. had ſo long favoured the Preachers and People of the Reformed Religion (there called *Hugenots*) as he needed them, and then abandoned and curb'd them as he ſaw fit: So that now among their Offspring we may ſee the miſerable State of the *Hugenots* in that Country. And later than that we have ſeen the like in *England*, where *Oliver Cromwel* having craftily made uſe of, firſt of the *Presbyterians*, and then of the *Independent* Preachers, and thoſe of their Party to favour him, and by their Multitude to gain the Protectorſhip, yet afterwards wholly forſook them, and often puniſh'd them ſeverely. And

And that Prince *William* the Elder would have taken the ſame courſe, appears clearly by our Hiſtorys, which teſtify that the Reformed Preachers, who in the beginning of thoſe Tumults were very kind to him, afterwards, when he was arrived at his higheſt pitch of Grandure, they hated and ſpake injuriouſly of him, becauſe he was not kind enough to them, and gave more Liberty to thoſe of different Perſwaſions in the Service of God than was pleaſing to them; and things went ſo far, that the principal and moſt refined of the Reformed Preachers did in their Pulpits openly exclaim againſt him for an *Atheiſt*, and ungodly Perſon: And therefore in the Year 1580, he found himſelf conſtrained to move the States of *Holland* and *Zealand* to make good and ſound Laws about Church-Government, declaring, that unleſs ſome good Order were taken about the ſame, the Reformed Religion, and the Country too, would fall to ruin. And accordingly they proceeded ſo far with theſe Spiritual Laws, that we may truly ſay, the only reaſon why they remained imperfect, was the ſudden death of the ſaid Prince. In the mean time he could very hardly maintain his Power againſt thoſe Eccleſiaſticks, and kept it up only by his numerous Adherents, whom he acquired by his great Moderation as aforeſaid towards the other Inhabitants that were of different Judgments and Opinions. And this averſion of the Reformed Preachers and Zealots towards Prince *William* went ſo far, that for that reaſon they greatly affected the Earl of *Leiceſter*, and hated his Son *Maurice* whom he left behind him, and became Stadtholder

of

of *Holland* and *Zealand*, &c. till he and the moſt refined of the Miniſtry were afterwards reconciled and united, and at laſt colluded together about the Political Government and Church-Service in thoſe ſad unſettled Years of 1618, and 1619. Wherefore it is not to be believed that the lawful Authority of this Republick being now delivered from a ſingle Perſon that aimed at the Sovereignty, will give much countenance to the moſt politick and chief Churchmen, or that a Toleration of Religions would eaſily give occaſion of an Uproar here.

Prudent Toleration of the Romiſh Religion in Holland, would not be detrimental to the Civil Government.

But if any ſhould conceive that the Papiſts, who are the ſtrongeſt Sect in Number, Order, and Combination (as having the Pope for their chief Head, and others their Spiritual Heads amongſt them, and being generally inclined to our powerful Neighbour the King of *Spain*, who formerly was Lord of this Country) might be able, in caſe they had more Liberty to exerciſe their Religion, to ſubvert ſo mild a Government, and poſſeſs it themſelves. In anſwer hereunto it may truly be ſaid, That the *Roman Catholicks* in their Religion are governed in a Monarchical manner, and conſequently where they are Supreme, ſuffer no other Sects; ſo that in ſuch a caſe all other diſſenting Inhabitants of our Land would join with the Rulers of our Republicks, whereby more than $\frac{4}{5}$ parts of the ſaid Inhabitants would adhere to the Lawful Civil Power, to quell thoſe ſeditious Perſons at their firſt riſing.

But Coercion in Religion would prove more hurtful.

But in caſe of Compulſion there might follow a concurrence in Points of Faith among the Inhabitants; it were fit then to be conſidered,

dered, whether when this difference in Matters of Religion ceaſed, the Churchmen who have their Office during Life, and not for ſome few Years, by their Sermons to their Hearers, who for the moſt part ſuppoſe they hear nothing but God's Word out of the Miniſters Mouths, and therefore believe they obey God when they obey the Miniſters; and alſo on the other ſide, when they obey Political Commands and Laws, they obey Men only: I ſay, it ought well to be conſidered, whether in a ſhort time they might not acquire a greater number of Followers or Adherents when they give themſelves out for God's Ambaſſadors, and teach men that ſcriptural ſaying, *That we muſt rather obey God and his Ambaſſadors than Man*; and this out of a corrupt Self-love, and natural Ambition; and ſo find it good corruptly and impiouſly to inſtruct their Auditors, thereby to magnify themſelves as it hath oft hapned, and may again happen; and whether their Adherents might not conſequently make ſuch ambitious Churchmen ſo powerful, as to cauſe the Civil Governours, who exerciſe the Magiſtracy here but for a ſhort time, to truckle under them.

The Eccleſiaſticks thereby gain too great a Party againſt the Civil Powers.

We have Examples of the Primitive times, that the ſpiritual Perſons of thoſe days, having firſt converted the *Roman* Emperors to Chriſtianity, and by degrees brought under the Heathen Oppoſers more by that Political Power, than by a holy Life, and ſtrong Reaſons; did afterwards make uſe of their Sermons to aggrandize their acquired Eccleſiaſtical Power to the detriment of the Civil Authority, by erecting an Hierarchy, or Church-Power independent from the Political, ſuch as is now under the Papacy. From

From this Ambition of Churchmen the Proverb roſe, * That the Clergy always fear and hate the Supreme Authority; or to vary the Phraſe, It hath been an old Game; My Nunkle is ever plucking my Lords Staff out of his Hand, not only to evade being beat therewith himſelf, but alſo to beat others and make them ſubmit to him.

This is alſo confirmed by *Otto Friſingenſis*, tho a *Romiſh* Biſhop, who ſaid, That the Empire by reaſon of its love to Religion, impaired it ſelf, yea was exhauſted; and that it had ſo aggrandized the Church, that it was not only deprived of the Spiritual, but alſo of the Temporal Sword, which evidently belongs to the Empire; adding thereunto very ingeniouſly; " And altho it be above our " Power to treat hereof, ſo as to give Sen- " tence, yet methinks the Clergy are ve- " ry blame-worthy who endeavour to in- " jure the State, *viz.* the *German* or *Romiſh* " Empire, with a Sword which they have ac- " quired of the Rulers, and by the Favour of " the Emperors; unleſs they will herein " imitate *David*, who when he had fell'd the " *Philiſtine* by the Spirit of God, cut off *Goli-* " *ah*'s Head with his own Sword.

Lib. 7. Chron.

The ſame happen'd in the Roman *and* German *Empire.*

But the truth is, if you pleaſe to enquire diligently into the Reaſons of theſe Broils and Jealouſies, between the Sovereign Rulers and Magiſtrates on the one ſide, and the Clergy on the other, we ſhall find, that tho the imprudence and ignorance of the Rulers, and their love to the Clergy, might at firſt have contri-

Which might not proceed from an Eccleſiaſtical, but a general human frailty.

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* Cæſares timere & odiſſe proprium eſſe Eccleſiæ.

buted

buted ſomewhat towards it, yet that Ignorance and Favour was not ſo great for a long ſeaſon after their firſt converſion to Chriſtianity, as to effect it. And as to the Clergys Self-love and Ambition, we ſhall find that they are not Defects peculiar to the Clergy only, but common to all Mankind.

So that they that will inquire into the Cauſes why of late times there have been more Diſſenſions and Enmity between the Civil Rulers and the Publick Teachers of Chriſtianity than before, during Heatheniſm and Judaiſm, muſt obſerve, that Heatheniſm and Judaiſm conſiſted moſtly in Sacrifices, without publick Sermons and Common-prayers, and much more Convocations; and that thoſe Sacrifices for divers things not hapning daily nor weekly, but once a year or ſeldom, required ſo little time, that among the *Heathens*, the Kings, Burgomaſters, and Principal Field-Officers, whether all together or ſucceſſively, might officiate as eaſily as Prieſts. Wherefore as no Reaſon can be given, why one Perſon veſted with thoſe two Offices, ſhould be ſeditious to magnify his Service in the Church, by diminiſhing that to the State; ſo we cannot ſee how thoſe *Heathen* Prieſts, being deveſted of all ſecular Power, could have cauſed Inſurrections, without being immediately ſuppreſs'd by the Supreme Power.

Heathen Prieſts and Jews *have not cauſed ſo many Seditions againſt the State as Chriſtian Prieſts.*

The Heathens leaſt, becauſe they uſed not to preach.

We ought likewiſe ſtrictly to obſerve, that the *Jewiſh* High Prieſts became ſuch partly by birth, and that by virtue of that Office in the time of the *Iſraelitiſh* free Government, they might be choſen the ſecond, and in the time of the Kings, the firſt Perſon or Preſident of the Supreme Court of Government and

The Jewiſh *Prieſts more, becauſe they preach'd ſometimes.*

See Schikardus Jus Reg. Hebr. p. 10.

and Justice called the *Sanhedrim*; and besides, they had all the Priests and the whole Tribe of *Levi* to follow them, whereby they had great Opportunitys to alter the Political State after their own pleasure, when they could acquire the Reputation of being gifted with the Spirit of Prophesy, and be suffered to prophesy publickly before the People. So that indeed there were also many tumults and Changes that hapned in the State when some impious Priests, and false Prophets abused the Power of the Church to make themselves great. But in regard nevertheless that the ordinary *Jewish* Worship consisted in Sacrifices, and that the high Priests were not always chosen Members of the *Sanhedrim*, or did not get the opportunity of prophesying before the People, they could not therefore put their Projects in execution to the prejudice of the Civil Power, and Advantage of the Priestly State. Ibid. p. 8, 9, 10.

But it is very observable on the other side, that the Christian Worship doth mostly consist in a verbal Application to God, by such as are no Civil or Armed Teachers, and in their Sermons apply themselves to a great Assembly of People. Which Administration, considering its weight, and constant preparation by Study and Employment, takes up the whole Man, and the abuse hereof may be very mischievous to the Civil Magistrate. The higher Powers have therefore appointed particular Persons to exercise the Civil and Military Offices, and others to take the Charge of the Worship of God in manner aforesaid, and to abstain from all secular Employments; so that it necessarily followed hence,

The Christian Preachers most of all, by their Sermons and Prayers.

See the 12 *first Titles of the* Codex de Novell. *of* Justinian, *and the Constitutions of the Emperor* Leo.

hence, that in all those Places where such publick Teachers and their Hearers were of the same Mind or Belief, those Preachers have had a great power and influence to quiet or disquiet the Minds of the Subject.

Being always able to irritate or appease their Auditors.

So that Rulers (seeing how the Preachers influenced the People) were compelled to favour them in tumultuous times, if they would be obey'd by their Subjects, who will in such times be more moved by the Admonition of the Preachers, than by the Commands of the Civil Magistrate. For tho Rulers might easily perceive that this Increase of Ecclesiastical Power will be very prejudicial in future times to their Successors, yet they chuse to enjoy the present Benefit, to keep up their own Grandeur, and hereby many times Great, Civil or Military Officers have attempted to obtain the Supreme Power.

Especially in Countrys where the Subjects are of one Religion, and which is Monarchically governed.

So that it is not strange if Preachers, being sensible of their own Strength in Countrys where there are no Dissenters from them, have always opposed the Crown; and yet by reason of their weakness in the Government, their exclusion from Civil Imployment, and their being unarmed, they have hardly attained their Ends, but have been able continually to raise Tumults and Dissension. And tho since the Reformation, the Clergy in the *German* and *Switzer* Republics have not by their Sermons, and the Unanimity of the Inhabitants in Matters of Faith, been able hitherto to overtop or equal the Civil Power of the numerous free Rulers, great Councils, *&c.* yet I conceive, that in case of such an unanimous Sentiment of the Inhabitants in the Citys of *Holland*, our small number of Magistrates or City

City Councils could not be able to keep their yearly Magistracy without prejudice by those Preachers. For every one would clearly discern that the Party who adhere to the Clergy do far exceed the Civil Magistrates Adherents, in natural Strength; so that such Preachers would not always be kept under by mercenary Soldiers: Wherefore they and those of their Church-Councils could never have an opportunity of withdrawing themselves from under the Civil Power.

Why the same above all Republicks, should be feared in Holland.

And seeing the Preachers and their Adherents by such opportunities, are daily capable of putting their ill Designs in practice when they please; we are therefore to expect that all Preachers will not keep within their due Bounds, but that many of them in seditious Times will extend their legal and limited Employment under pretence of their Ecclesiastical Power, to the chief or Sovereign Command in the Affairs of the Church, and to an impudent boldness of expounding in the Pulpet all Political Acts or Laws, under the pretext of God's Word, and so to say whatever they have a mind to: Unless we had reason to believe, that the Reformed Preachers pretending to a Revelation and special Assistance of God's Spirit, or a special Godly Call to the Ministry, and accordingly being sufficiently qualified to that Service consisting in an extraordinary Holiness and obedient Reverence towards God, and their Lawful Magistracy, are not so subject to Ambition and Covetousness as other Clergymen are.

See that excellent Book Luc. Antist. Const. de Jure Ecclesiasticorum, *printed* 1665.

Preachers are but Men as well as others.

But God amend it, says our Proverb, Ministers are no Saints, and therefore the same

Temptations that ensnare others, mislead them too, which hath often appeared in these Countrys formerly, and since the Reformation, by frequent Political Corrections and Banishments of Preachers from Citys for their offensive Sermons and Prayers; and every one still remembers what hapned about the same in our times at *Amsterdam*, *Utrecht*, *Delft*, *Goude*, the *Hague*, &c. And tho those that are good Preachers should not be oppressed for the said Defects, Weaknesses, and Ambition, yet it is necessary that Rulers so govern the State that seditious and proud Preachers shall not be able to subvert the Republick, and ruin the Prosperity of the Land.

And therefore we may presume that our wise free Rulers will ever continue to indulge and permit the Religious Assemblys of Dissenters, hereby to invite over continually more dissenting People into *Holland*; and will plant and improve the Reformed Religion, not by Compulsion but Moderation, and soft Means among their good dissenting Inhabitants; and that they will always preserve, and maintain in like manner our present publick Worship, without ever admitting of an Episcopal or any other coercive Spiritual Authority.

A free Burgergership would do more good than harm to free Rulers, because it would cause populous Citys.

An open or free Burgership, with a Right for all Foreign Inhabitants to follow their Employments, being added to Liberty of Conscience in Matters religious; it will certainly cause very great and Populous Citys, and incredible many conveniences and divertisements for all the Inhabitants: so that all Civil Magistrates ought for that reason, were there no other, to endeavour it; and the more

more the better, if we observe that in such Lands and Citys, Offices do exceedingly multiply, and are made profitable, and that then the Rulers would have the Power to prefer many, if not all their Friends to make them to live in Credit and Ease.

And consequently many Offices and Benefices for their Friends.

Moreover, in such Lands and Citys there will be found naturally among the Inhabitants diversities in Religion, Nations, Tongues, and Occupations: So that there would be no occasions ministred to the few Aristocratical Rulers who govern our Republick, and Citys, of dividing the People by artificial, and often impious Designs, in order to govern them: for by these natural Divisions, and the Diversity of the Peoples Occupations, they may as peaceably and safely govern them, as in the open Country; for in the great Citys of *Holland*, and other Citys filled with Foreign Inhabitants, as *Amsterdam*, *Leyden*, *Haerlem*, &c. there have been nothing near so many Seditions against the Rulers, as in other Countrys, and much less and worse peopled Citys, unless when they have been stirred up to Mutiny or Sedition by a Sovereign Head. For in such a Case, I confess that no Countrys or Citys great or small, are or can be at rest, and without Uproars of the Subjects against their Rulers and Magistrates, any longer than such a Head pleaseth to leave such Lands and Citys in Peace.

And those Rulers will thereby have an easy Government.

Finally, it is to be observed, that the Rulers of such populous open Countrys and Citys, are also much better able to defend themselves against all Foreign Power, whether by an Army formed of their own Inhabitants, or by strengthning their respective Citys by good

And be better settled against Foreign Power.

Fortifications, and repelling all Enemys from their Walls. And ſeeing on the other ſide the Rulers of *Holland* will not be advantaged by a Burgerſhip that excludes all Foreigners, we may therefore believe that they will eaſily approve of it.

Select Companys, &c. excluding other Inhabitants, are very prejudicial to free Rulers.

As to Societies or Companys erected by Patents, Halls and Guilds, upon Manufactures, Trades, Fiſherys, Commerce, and Navigation; It is certain that the Rulers, Governours, and Maſters of Guilds, having power at their pleaſure, or at certain Times and Places, to call Aſſemblys, and by a general Intereſt having an united number of Dependents, Members and their Followers, whether of Mariners, Soldiers, Clothiers; and Brethren of the Guild or Workmen may have fair opportunitys by Sedition to diſplace a few Ariſtocratical Rulers, and put themſelves into their places, as hath been ſeen in all *Netherlandiſh* Citys, where heretofore ſuch Halls and Guilds have been erected, *viz. Gent*, *Bridges*, *Iper*, *Loven*, *Antwerp*, *Dort*, *Liege*, &c. wherein there were many Tumults proceeding from that cauſe.

Becauſe they may cauſe Uproars.

And tho hitherto there hath ariſen no ſeditious Commotion of note from the Patent Companys, yet it is certain that they tend only to the advantage of ſome very few Perſons, and to the detriment of all other Inhabitants of that way of dealing; and having laid the Foundation of one Government within another, they may in time expect from thence, eſpecially under a free Government, more Commotions, unleſs the Civil Rulers be ſo prudent and happy as to appoint their Deputys in all the ſaid Aſſemblys, who will not ſeek their own Welfare in the Go-

And lay the grounds of one Government in another.

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vernment by Faction or Combination, but by a praiſeworthy deſire after the Welfare of their Native Country, to ſeek the common Good.

So that if on the other hand we do rightly conceive that the Rulers of the *Holland* Citys by erecting of Companys, Halls and Guilds, have not the proſpect of a conſiderable Benefit to ariſe thereby to themſelves; we may preſume to ſay, that hereafter they will have little inclination to bar the freedom of their Commonalty by new Grants, and conſequently that the old Grants and Reſtrictions which hereafter ſhall be prolonged or continued, will be in ſuch a plight, that they cannot, according to the Proverb, without prejudice to the Nation, be either altered or annul'd.

Free Rulers ought to ſet the Rates on Goods paying Convoy-mony with great caution.

Concerning the Rates of Convoy-mony, or Cuſtoms upon Goods exported or imported; let them be laid on with ſuch prudence and moderation, that they may be calculated purely for the benefit of our Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick and Navigation. I have already ſhewn how much the Rulers of *Holland* are concerned in the flouriſhing of thoſe Particulars. Wherefore on the other ſide it is evident, that during a free Government a very good Account of all Monys received ought to be given, and that the ſame ought to be employed for the clearing of the Seas. It is ſelf-evident that the Rulers cannot enrich themſelves with the Mony iſſuing thence; and therefore the ſaid Rulers of the *Holland* Citys will not henceforth be inclin'd to charge Goods with ſuch high and prejudicial Rates, but rather in proceſs of time to favour the Merchants in that particular; and that the Seas be cleared by ſuch Monys as are the publick

Becauſe they may not put the Mony into their own Purſes.

Revenue of the Land, raiſed of all the Inhabitants as ſuch, and to defend the Merchant from oppreſſion by Sea.

Courts of Juſtice ſhould be better regulated by Republick Rulers, becauſe they tend to their own advantage.

Moreover, from what is ſaid before it may be fairly inferred, that ſuch intereſted free Rulers ſhould incline to enact good Orders and Laws, and ſo to frame Juſtice, that there may be quicker Diſpatch made, and better Juſtice done, and that knaviſh Bankrupts be puniſhed and the honeſt Merchants protected in their Right: for the Civil Rulers by encreaſing the number of ſubordinate Judges and Counſellors, may be able to beſtow on their beſt Friends more honourable and profitable Employments, and by that means the better ſettle themſelves in the Government and Magiſtracy. Whereas by the contrary, ſuch Judges will rather be prejudiced than advantaged by Bribes, and the favour or diſfavour of the Rulers, becauſe poſſibly they would not give ſo much Mony on that ſcore as others would.

They ſhould erect new Colonies for the ſame reaſon.

As to Colonies, it is evident that the Rulers of Republicks do not pay out of their own Purſes the Expence of erecting and protecting them from outward Violence; but it is paid out of the Publick Treaſury, and in the mean while they would reap this Benefit for their indigent Relations to ſend them to ſuch Colonies, when they are not able to prefer them all in *Holland*: And the like might be done with many other Inhabitants that are ambitious of Government, or publick Imployment; and the ſaid Colonys would in no other regard be hurtful to the Republican Rulers. So that ſince thoſe Colonys would be ſo generally profitable for the Land, and Inhabi-

habitants of *Holland*, as is heretofore deſcribed, we are then rationally to expect that they will be erected by our Rulers.

And the Seas ought to be kept clear from Pirats or Enemys.

As to the clearing of the Seas againſt Enemys and Piccaroons; it is certain that during a free Republican Government, the Treaſure requiſite for building and ſetting forth of Ships, proceeds not out of the Rulers Purſes; and that they and their Friends that trade at Sea, being as liable as other Inhabitants to loſe their Goods by ſuch Enemys, and that this may be prevented without putting them to any charge, we may likewiſe expect the ſame of them. And that the Sea may with Honour and Safety for the State be cleared by the free Rulers, cannot be denied.

Without Prejudice to Republican Rulers.

For tho the Admiral of a Fleet going to Sea without a ſufficient Strength, ſhould loſe the ſaid Fleet to the Enemys of the State, and thereby might excedingly miſchieve our Republick, yet would it not totally bereave us of our Liberty, nor ſhould it be diſſolved by ſuch a Treachery; but on the contrary, our Republick has ever been able to be recruited, and has oft-times been reinforced by our Land Forces, when they have been intruſted to Captain-Generals; and even when they have thought fit to uſe their Strength to conquer the Citys of *Holland*, and to ſeize their Deputys when they were aſſembled by Summons. And therefore ſince the free Rulers will not incline to carry on an Offenſive War, and conſequently to ſend a chargeable Army into the Field to take Citys from our Neighbours; it is not credible that the ſaid Convoy-Monys paid for clearing the Seas, will be taken from the Admiraltys

miraltys to make therewith any needleſs and yet chargable Conqueſts by Land, and in the mean while to abandon our Inhabitants, or their Goods, to the Depredations of the Sea-Robbers.

The free Holland *Rulers ought eſpecially to aim at Peace.*

Laſtly, It is certain that the Rulers of *Holland*, and all their Trafficking Subjects would fare much better in Times of Peace than in War, becauſe then they would be reverenced and obeyed by them without any oppoſition. And beſides, our City Magiſtrates cannot receive any conſiderable Profit by War, either by Land or Sea, but muſt bear all new Burdens and Taxes thereby ariſing, as well as the other Inhabitants, and cannot be freed from the ſame, as the late Heads of our Republick were. It is evident the Soldiery, and their Officers, who are for Monarchical Government, and an Illuſtrious General *ad vitam*, would not uſe their due and ſtrenuous endeavours to perform the Commands and Counſels of the Republick, or thoſe that are in Authority for the State: So that the Rulers of the Republick of *Holland*, in caſe of an unſucceſsful War, would ſoon ſee their reſpect from the Subject diminiſhed, and be every way aſperſed by the ſottiſh ill-natur'd Rabble, who always judg of things by the Succeſs, and ever hate, and are ready to impeach the Ariſtocratical Rulers of their Republick; with whom ſome laviſh, ambitious and debauched People, whether Rulers or Subjects, might join themſelves to ſtir up Sedition, and under pretence of being of the Prince's or Captain-General's Faction, turn this Republick into a Monarchy, in hope of attaining the moſt eminent and profitable

Becauſe they as well as the common Inhabitants muſt bear all the Burdens of a War,

ble Employments under the Monarch.

And above all, the preſent free Governours would be liable to that hazard in caſe they ſhould make uſe of ſuch a Field General in their Wars by Land, whoſe Anceſtors have had the ſame Truſt repoſed in them; for then, whether in good or bad Succeſſes, thoſe few Citizens that rule in *Holland* during Life, and ſerve in the Magiſtracy but a Year or two, would ſoon find that none amongſt them would dare to tie the Bell about the Cat's Neck, to diſcharge ſuch a Captain-General with ſo many Dependents and Adherents, when they have no further need of his Service, or to puniſh him when he deſerved it, whether by Diſobedience, Correſpondency with the Enemy, or any Attempt againſt the free Government, even tho an open Endeavour to gain the Sovereignty; ſo that thereby alone our Republick would be really changed into a Monarchy.

And of a Captain-General.

And moreover, ſuppoſe we ſhould chuſe a meaner Perſon to be our Capt. General, and give him the Command of the whole Troops of this State, and that but for a ſhort time, yet it is evident that the Rulers of *Holland* would put themſelves in great danger of being overmaſtered by that Captain-General, as by innumerable Examples which happened here and in other Countrys may be perceived; unleſs Men could make the dull *Hollanders* to believe that God hath indued them with two miraculous Privileges above all other People in the World: The firſt is, that they ſhall never chuſe any Captain-General but out of ſuch excellent and bleſſed Familys, that tho they could, yet differing from all other

Yea be kick'd out of Imployment by a common Field-Officer.

Unless God would continually work Miracles for our Country.

ther Men, they would not rather chuse to be Lords than Servants; and that therefore that Ambition that is natural to all Men, even to their very Graves, should find no place in him during his whole Life. And the second is, That the *Hollanders* having at first, whether voluntarily or inadvertently, and after that by Succession or Constraint, placed over themselves a Monarch *in fieri*, that then God from Heaven will snatch away such a Monarch suddenly, and by an unexpected Judgment deliver a People from Slavery, who are so unworthy of Liberty, as indeed hath sometimes hapned.

But it would be cursed Divinity, which instead of forewarning us, that if we love the Danger, and will not avoid the Places where Plagues do reign, we shall find our certain ruin in those Places; and moreover instead of teaching us to be thankful to God for that great and undeserved Mercy, should continue to instigate us to seek Mercy once again, and provoke him by publick and private Prayers, tending to cause us to return to *Egypt* out of that free Land of Promise, and there obstinately to pull down upon our own heads a heavy Yoke, under which our Forefathers were constrained to groan, and from which we by the Mercy and Blessing of God were wonderfully delivered.

Republican Rulers ought to make good Alliances with Foreigners.

And concerning Alliances with Foreign Princes and Potentates, it is apparent that Princes have not so much Interest in the Welfare of their Subjects as in a Republick; nor is there that Wisdom or Virtue in a Monarchy, as in a free Government: we shall here more and more shun those prejudicial Ingagements.

And

And as touching the Intereſt of the Rulers of a free Republick, or of Kings and Princes about fortifying the Frontiers and populous Citys, as alſo about exerciſing the Commonalty in Arms: I ſuppoſe it hath abundantly been ſhewed you in the firſt Chapter of this Book, that it is only to be expected of Rulers of Republicks, but not at all from Kings and Princes; ſo that it is needleſs to ſpeak any more of it here.

And to fortify the Citys ſufficiently, and provide them with Arms.

CHAP. II.

Wherein is maturely conſidered the Intereſt of the Monarchical Government in Holland *as to all the foregoing Matters, by which the Commonalty may thrive or proſper.*

I Come now to enquire whether Manufactures, Fiſhery, Traffick, or Shipping, and all the means beforementioned, that are neceſſary or uſeful for the Proſperity of the Country, would be well managed and laid to heart by Monarchical Rulers; or on the contrary neglected and ruined by them.

Monarchical Government would be very chargeable to Holland *by its Court.*

For the ſolution of this Queſtion, we ought to conſider, That ſo ſmall a Country producing nothing of its own for which Foreigners bring Mony into *Holland*; and on the other ſide, being charged with all the natural Taxes mentioned in the third Chapter of the Firſt Part of this Book: It would be farther charged by a Monarchical Government, whoſe Family

Family Expences would yearly conſume many Millions. And it is alſo certain that the good Inhabitants, out of whoſe Purſes thoſe Sums muſt be ſqueezed, would moreover at the ſame time be ſubject to all manner of uneaſineſs, which neceſſarily attends a Monarchical Government, and are expreſſed in a Book intituled, *The Political Ballance of* V. H. with many Circumſtances, ſo that I ſhall be but ſhort in relating them here.

And would both leſſen and weaken great Citys.

It is acknowledged, that an intelligent Prince will by all means endeavour to bring the great Citys of *Holland* into ſuch a ſtate or condition, as to lord it over them without any controul; and at the beſt it would follow, that to weaken the Power of the old Rulers and Natives, ſuch a Sovereign would, as much as in him lay, bring in new Upſtarts or Foreigners into the Government; and would moreover continually favour the Villages and ſmaller Citys, to the prejudice of the great and ſtrong ones.

And keep them in aw with Caſtles;

And ſeeing neither the Rulers nor Inhabitants of ſuch great Citys could with any patience look upon their own ruin: He will therefore fill their Gariſons with Foreign Troops to force them to bear it, at leaſt ſo long as thoſe Troops are too ſtrong for the Citizens. And ſince this would not give him ſufficient Satisfaction, and would beſides be extraordinary chargeable, he would therefore force ſuch populous Citys by erecting Citadels over them.

As we have ſeen by the Spaniſh *Monarchs.*

Thus the wiſe and abſolute *Spaniſh* Monarchs, *Charles* the Fifth, and *Philip* the Second, knew no better courſe to make thoſe great trading Citys of *Naples* and *Milan*, *Antwerp*

Antwerp and *Gent* ſubmit to their Yoke, than by forcing them with Citadels. Moreover we have ſeen, and may ſtill ſee in our own Days, that the late King of *France* going yet further, and following the Maxims of the famous Cardinal *Richelieu*, he intirely diſmantled and bereft of all Strength that Maritime and Frontier City of *Rochel*. And upon the ſame Motive *Lewis* the Fourteenth, in the Year 1667, having taken the two trading and populous Citys of *Dornick* and *Riſſel*, gave command immediately to overawe and curb them with Caſtles.

And the French.

So that it is no wonder if the City of *Amſterdam* in the Year 1571, being then about the bigneſs of 200 Morgens or Acres of Land, tho the Rulers thereof were no leſs faithful to the King than other zealous *Roman* Catholicks were, gave occaſion to the ſaid *Philip* of *Spain* to intend to build a Citadel there, becauſe of the flouriſhing of their Eaſtern Trade, their Populouſneſs, and formidable Greatneſs, or apt Situation to defend it ſelf againſt all Foreign Power: But the King was moved to leave that Caſtle unbuilt, not ſo much by the *Amſterdammers* offering him two hundred thouſand Guilders for the building of the Caſtle at *Fluſhing* which was then begun, as by reaſon of the ſudden Troubles which ſoon after enſued, with the loſs of the *Briel* and *Fluſhing*, when he had no more occaſion for the *Amſterdammers* Favour. And therefore 'tis not improbable, that our laſt Captain General and Stadtholder, following theſe Maxims of Sovereignty, deſigned in the Year 1650 to force the City of *Amſterdam*, which was then enlarg'd to 600 Morgens

See Vigl. Ep. 136. ad Hopperum.

Above all places Amſterdam *would have been under the power of Caſtles.*

gens or Acres of Land in circumference, and inhabited by three hundred thouſand Souls, by building a Caſtle on the *Vigendam*, and another on the *Voolwyk*.

Guardians, Favorites, and Courtiers will riſle and drain the People.

But it very ſeldom happens that Monarchs and Princes do rule by themſelves, and not by others; there are alſo Children, weak-brain'd, and old doting Perſons that bear the name of *Rulers*, and yet in effect muſt be ruled by others; and ſuch Monarchs and Princes that are in the flower of their Age, take greateſt pleaſure in fulfilling their fleſhly Luſts: So that while they are Orphans, and old Men, thoſe that are their Favorites or Guardians, whether Women, Princes, or Nobles, and ſometimes Courtiers, Whores and Rogues, who miniſter Fewel for their Lords or Ladys Debauches and Luſts, and ſo gratify their Delights and Pleaſures, uſe to rule all. And therefore it is reaſonable to believe that all theſe Perſons, whether Guardians and Favorites, or Minions and Courtiers, that for ſome time govern the Land inſtead of their Sovereign, do not in that time wholly forget to inrich themſelves and their Relations by all imaginable means, and many times by Rapine out of the Eſtates of the rich trading Inhabitants. All which being diſcourſed at large in the *Political Ballance of* V. H. I ſhall not hear ſpeak of it in general, but go over it in particular, and examine how much the Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Navigation of *Holland*, and its Dependences, are likely to be prejudiced or improved by a Monarchical Government.

As is ſet forth in the Politick Weeghſchale van V. H.

And in the firſt place I conceive, that neither ſuch Rulers as do actually govern, whether

ther Men or Women, their Guardians, Favorites or Courtiers, Princeſſes or Nobles, will regard or concern themſelves in the leaſt for the Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick or Navigation, and what depends upon them: For according to the Calculation or Number of the few Familys of the Courtiers, compared with all thoſe of *Holland*, there are an incredible number of both honourable and profitable Imployments and Benefices belonging to the Government of the populous Countrys, and great trading Citys; and theſe Courtiers would make them much more beneficial for themſelves than they now are, under pretence that the Monarch's Revenues would thereby be improved. Whereas indeed, when all the Revenues of the Monarch are ſum'd up, the beſtowing of ſuch profitable, yea and creditable Offices which may always be made profitable, are therein included. And therefore ſuch Guardians, Favorites and Courtiers, being able to inrich themſelves and their Friends after this manner, none will be ſo ſottiſh as to ſeek their Maintenance by an uncertain Gain, and with the danger of loſing all in that ever laborious and anxious way of Merchandizing.

Courtiers will drive no Trade.

But ſuppoſing that the Sovereign, or his Guardians, Favorites, Courtiers, and their Relations ſhould ſeek their gain by Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traffick, and Navigation, or what depends on 'em, they would then make ſuch Orders and Laws by their overſwaying Power, or would manage it ſo, that it might tend to their own Benefit, tho all the other Trading Inhabitants of *Holland* ſhould be thereby prejudic'd.

If they merchandize, it muſt be to the prejudice of others.

Hollanders *having a natural averſion to Court-Flatterers,*

And beſides it is certain, that the rich, and naturally Clowniſh *Hollanders*, would not be ſo apt to gain the Love and Favour of our Monarchs, Princes, or Nobles, by Courtly Services, as the indigent younger, and ingenious Sons of the *French* and *Engliſh* Gentry, or the adjacent beggarly laborious, and ſlaviſh *Moſſen*, or *Eaſtlanders*; who being accuſtomed to accoſt their Lords and Gentry with great Humility, and many Flatteries, and to ſerve in their own Country, are oft-times compelled by Poverty to forſake it; and then by introducing thoſe genteel Foreign Recreations, and Debaucherys, as well as their ſlaviſh manner of Services, they endeavour to render themſelves acceptable to our Monarchs: While on the other ſide a Monarch or Prince of *Holland* would ſooner and more expect, that ſuch indigent Strangers (who would be indebted to him for all they have of Eſtate and Office, and which without his Favour they could not hold, as being an Incroachment upon our Privileges) ſhould be always inclined to encreaſe the Authority of the Monarch, or Prince, tho to the Ruin of the Commonwealth.

A Dutch *Prince will ever entertain Foreigners to the ruin of* Holland.

All which cannot be expected from Natives who are in the Government or Magiſtracy of the Land, and are generally Wealthy, and as ſuch pretend to a Right to the ſaid Government and Magiſtracy, eſpecially when their Parents have ſerved in the Government. And then *Holland* will be continually ruled and ſerved by Foreigners, who have neither by themſelves nor by their Relations ever been in any meaſure concerned in the Proſperity or Decay of the Manufactures, Fiſherys, Traf-

Traffick and Navigation, and their Dependencies: So that those Courtiers would and must by all endeavours seek themselves, tho to the neglect, yea subversion of the Foundations of *Holland*'s Prosperity, and the annihilation of the Commonwealth Government; and accordingly we may conclude, that the same would certainly happen.

As for the Liberty of Religion, or Toleration, it is clear that under a Monarchical Government, it is not to be expected; for *no Bishop, no King*, is a common Maxim. As it is certainly and ever very dangerous for Kings, their Minions and Courtiers, to have Subjects, that under pretence of Right will not be subject to the Civil Government in being, but assemble to order matters of Weight by majority of Votes: So it is principally hazardous under a Monarchical Government, in Affairs which in the highest degree concern all Men, *viz.* Religion, where the Ecclesiasticks who oft-times dare undertake to demonstrate that their spiritual Authority is deriv'd, neither from the higher, nor subordinate Magistracy of the Land, would soon under pretext of such a Holy League draw in a number of discontented, ignorant, indigent, and consequently most seditious Persons. So that if they are but resolved to countenance their discontents against Kings, their Favorites, &c. in their Sermons and Publick Prayers, they will soon invite into them a number of considerable tho poor mutinous People, that are inclin'd to them as their Hearers, who then term them Nursing Fathers, and Men of God, and so appoint them Captains and Superior

Church Government consisting of Councils, Classes and Synods, will offend Monarchs, as well as the freedom of Religion.

See A. Constantes de Jure Ecclesiasticorum.

Because a Prince would oft be silent at so great an Assembly.

Officers to make head againſt their Sovereign, his Favorites and Courtiers.

And by having Biſhops placed and diſplaced by himſelf, would acquire a great Power over his Subjects.

But on the other ſide, Kings gain a great Power in Matters of Religion, and in the affection of their Subjects, if by their own Authority they may place or depoſe Biſhops or Superintendants that may be choſen by them in all the Pariſh Churches in their Dioceſſes, *viz.* ſuch Paſtors and Preachers, as will and muſt teach the Subject that which beſt agrees with the Power of the Monarch. Moreover, ſeeing the Biſhops or Paſtors are not to have their peculiar Church-Councils under a Monarch, ſuch Kings and Princes may in caſe of diſobedience eaſily and ſuddenly depoſe them.

Which is particularly proved.

Wherefore it is probably the main Reaſon why under the *Roman* and *Grecian* Emperors an Epiſcopal or Monarchical Government was every where introduced; which afterwards by the Papacy, and the Biſhops, extended to other free Countrys Northward. And thus in the preceding Age we found that King *Philip* the Second of *Spain* intended to aſſume a greater Monarchical Power in theſe *Netherlands* by new Biſhops of his own Election. And at this day the *Engliſh* Proteſtants that are for Regal Government, ſee no means of preſerving the King's Monarchical Power by a Presbyterian Church-Council, or Republican Church-Government: So that they did not only think fit in *England* now of late years to annul the ſame where it was ſet up in the late Troubles, but even in *Scotland*, where that Government ſtood firm ſince the beginning of the Reformation, even againſt the inclination of very many *Engliſh*, and all the

Scotiſh

Scotiſh Nation almoſt, to erect in lieu of a Church-Council, a Monarchical or Epiſcopal Church-Government. And thus likewiſe in *Germany* at this day, we ſee that the Proteſtant Princes have poſſeſſion of the *Jura Epiſcopalia*, all the Power of the Biſhops whom they have caſt out; and none of thoſe Princes have ſuffered or ſet up any Church-Councils, Claſſical or Synodical Aſſemblys independent of them.

And moreover we have in all Ages under the Papacy obſerved, that Epiſcopal Government is very dangerous in Republicks; ſo that the Biſhops in many Places, eſpecially in *Germany*, and in theſe *Netherlands*, where at the time when the Chriſtian Faith was receiv'd, there was for the moſt part a free Popular Government, have been able by little and little, by their pretended holy Sermons to the People, to make ſo great a Party among them, as to get the Temporal Government of Citys and Countrys; and in other Republicks, as *Raguſa*, *Venice*, &c. there were many Laws made againſt ſuch Biſhops to prevent the like Uſurpation. Yea among all the *Switzers*, *German*, or *Netherlandiſh* Republicks, that have received the Reformed Religion, there is to my knowledg not one of them that have not expelled their Biſhops, and erected in their ſtead a Church-Council, or Republican Eccleſiaſtical Government, whereby the freedom of the Republick might be better preſerved.

Biſhops are intolerable in Republicks, and much deſired in Monarchical Governments.

So that now we may conclude, that if the Monarchs of *Holland*, or their Favorites and Courtiers, ſhould introduce Epiſcopal Government into the Church; we are to obſerve

that the Biſhops who are elected, and depoſed by ſuch Monarchs and Princes, muſt needs have Friends at Court, and continually make more. And if ſuch Biſhops become not the Minions of the Monarchs, and Princes of *Holland*, we may then well ſuppoſe that at leaſt they will uſe all the intereſt of their Friends at Court to enlarge their own Power, Honour, and Wealth, which would chiefly conſiſt in this; That all the Subjects ſhould acknowledg and repute them for Orthodox Spiritual Fathers. And ſeeing it might very well conſiſt with the Supreme Magiſtrates Intereſt, that the Subjects who chiefly depend on him, be revered by the Inhabitants as Holy and Orthodox Perſons; the Biſhops might eaſily by this means obtain all that they deſire of the Sovereign tending to that end: And then ſuch Biſhops would never reſt, till they had procured a Law to have all Diſſenters from them in Matters of Religion, to be either brought over to their Opinion and Faction, or baniſh'd the Country; as we have had experience in former Ages under the Biſhops, and may at this day ſee it take place every where. Inſomuch that under them there will never be any freedom of Religion for Diſſenters, but only for the *Jews* who indeed have Liberty for theirs, which they purchaſe for Mony.

Biſhops are Enemies to all Toleration of Diſſenters.

Moreover, tho Kings and Princes by ſuch Chriſtian Biſhops, Superintendants, and Political Church-Councils depending on them, ſeem to be ſecured againſt the danger of Chriſtian Preachers; yet ſuch is their aptneſs to raiſe Seditions, that ofttimes by their licentious Sermons, and publick Prayers, many

terrible Changes might have been occaſioned in that Government: As appears in the foregoing Age at the time of the Holy League, for the *Romiſh* Religion in *France*, and in our times in *Scotland* and *England* by the Holy Covenant for the Reformed Religion. And therefore many Proteſtant Kings and Princes, eſpecially thoſe who own themſelves Heads of the Church, and diſown the Pope of *Rome*, did for their greater ſafety find it convenient to prohibit all publick Extemporary Sermons and Prayers, and in lieu thereof appointed others by their Sovereign Power to be read *verbatim*.

Popiſh Princes will eaſily change the way of preaching ſtudied Sermons into reading of t Forms, Homilys, &c.

This the Political Martyr, *Charles* the Firſt King of *England*, had in part effected by taking away the Sabbath Days Afternoon's Sermons, or changing them for the reading of the Book of Common-prayer. And as I have underſtood, the Proteſtant Prince of *Tranſylvania*, *Ragotzki*, went yet further, and by advice of four of his moſt Learned, Wiſe and Virtuous Preachers, having cauſed ſome Sermons and Prayers to be compoſed ſutable to all Occaſions, which being afterwards examined by a Synodical Aſſembly, and judged by Unanimous Conſent very ſolid and edifying Sermons, and Prayers; he laid aſide the Vizard, and ordered that no other Sermons, and publick Prayers ſhould be uſed, but that they ſhould have them word by word read to the People in the Churches. As of antient times alſo in *Muſcovia*, where by command of the Czar there were ſome old Homilies of the *Greek* Fathers ſuting all Occaſions tranſlated into the *Slavonian* Tongue, and upon occaſion of War, Famine, or Plague, *&c.* appointed to be read

This was begun in England, *encreaſed in* Tranſylvania, *and antiently practiſed in* Muſcovia.

Vide Thuan. Hiſt. l. 69. *p. mihi* 305. Atlas of *J. Blaw*, Part 1. fol. 7.

by his Metropolitan; so that all the Preachers there were compelled to use no other Prayers or Sermons, and forced to read them *verbatim*.

And among all Mahometan Princes.

Which Maxim likewise very well sutes all the Monarchs and Supreme Rulers in *Asia* and *Africa* that are addicted to *Mahometanism*, and therefore acknowledg neither Pope nor any other Head Superior to themselves: For tho that Religion by reason of the differing Expositors of the *Alcoran* is divided into several Sects, insomuch that the *Moors*, *Turks*, *Persians*, &c. in that behalf do very much differ, and hate and persecute one another; and that the *Mahometan* Religion being a Mixture or Collection of the Heathenish, Judaic, and Christian Worship, acknowledg no Sacrifices, and in lieu thereof each Sect seems to be maintain'd by the publick Speeches or Declarations of the Priests or Teachers; yet it is certain, these Priests may do nothing in the Churches, but sing some well-known publick Prayers, or read the same, or the *Alcoran* to the People.

But never yet in free Christian Republicks.

And on the contrary, I cannot remember that any free Republick of the Christian Religion, separated from the Pope of *Rome*, and that by consequence hath acquired the Supreme Right and Power about the publick Order of Ecclesiastical Affairs, ever prohibited extemporary publick Prayers and Sermons, and in lieu thereof caused any set form of Prayers, or Sermons to be read *verbatim*.

Monarchs will ever use Foreigners in their Government,

As to Liberty for all Foreigners to dwell in *Holland*, and live by their Trades, and also to be taken into all Places or Employments

 of

of the Government; I muſt acknowledg it would prove an acceſſion of Strength to a King or ſupreme Head, and his Favorites and Courtiers: and therefore we ought to conceive, that under a Monarchical Government Strangers would be every where placed in the Government; as heretofore thoſe of *Haynault*, *Burgundy*, and *Flanders*, under the Government of the Earls, and the *German*, *French* and *Engliſh* under the Captains-General, or Stadtholders of *Holland*, have had the greateſt Employments in the Country. But that this tends to the benefit of Manufactury, Fiſhery, Commerce, and Shipping, I cannot imagine; but on the contrary, it is eaſier to believe, that thoſe Strangers, whether Favourites or Courtiers, having any Employment in the Militia, Law, Civil Government, Treaſury, as Captains of Foot or Horſe, Colonels, Governours of Cities and Forts, Schouts, Bailiffs, *&c.* would uſe all their Power to rob the richeſt trading Inhabitants, upon one Pretence or other, of their Wealth, and thereby enrich themſelves with the Sweat and Blood of other Men. For becauſe theſe indigent laviſh new Upſtarts will have need of it every where, therefore it is certain they will ſeek it where it is to be had, and ſo they may eaſily borrow, or take it from unarmed People. And it is alſo certain, that the ſaid Strangers will not reſt till they have broken down, and deſtroyed both the Subſtance and Shadow of the States manner of Government, to the end that in time to come they might not be ſubjected to any Puniſhment for their Crimes, and deſtroying the Liberty of the Country, and

To the Ruin of Trade.

And the Deſtruction of the Government by States.

and turned out of their ill-gotten Employments.

Monarchies promote Monopolies,

As concerning the Freedom of all Inhabitants to ſet up their Trades every where in *Holland*, without Moleſtation from the Burgers, ſelect Companies, and Guilds; this is not at all to be expected under a Monarchical Government. For every one knows, that at Court all Favours, Privileges, and Monopolies are to be had by Friendſhip, or elſe by Gifts and Contracts, for the King's Profit, and that of the Favourites and Courtiers. This is an epidemical Evil, and in continual Vogue in all Princes Courts, not one excepted; ſo that there needs no proof of it. But yet I confeſs that no Grants by Patents of ſo great Companies as our *Weſt-India* Company have been, and our *Eaſt-India* Company ſtill is, would be tolerable under a Monarch; ſo that the Grants of both, for theſe and many other Reaſons, would be voided or annulled before the Governours or Members ſhould arrive to be ſo powerful as now they are. And then thoſe Monarchs would make Mony of thoſe Grants again, by ſelling them to others to make new and weaker Companies of, and ſo make more Mony of the new Grants or Charters, than they could do by continuing the old ones.

Under a ſingle Perſon in Holland, *Cuſtoms would be very much heightned,*

Moreover, as to the charging of Convoymonies, and Cuſtoms upon Goods with ſuch Moderation and Prudence, that our Manufactures, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Navigation, may be thereby encreaſed; it is apparent that this cannot be expected under a Monarchical Government: For ſeeing Kings with their Favourites and Courtiers, have good Reaſon to fear,

fear, that the Proſperity of ſuch Manufactures, Fiſheries, Commerce, and Navigation, with the numerous Advantages ariſing thereby, will cauſe ſuch mighty and flouriſhing Cities, as could not eaſily be forced by a Sovereign and his Courtiers, therefore they will endeavour to keep them as low and mean as poſſible.

To keſſen the greatneſs of their Cities.

For Monarchs and their Courtiers, in lieu of affecting the Welfare of Manufactures, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Navigation, will envy the moſt fortunate Owners of Freight-Ships, Merchants, and Traders, becauſe by their honeſt Gain and Riches they obſcure the Luſtre and Pomp of the Court and Gentry, and becauſe all that they force from the Merchant and Owners of Freight Ships for Convoy-Mony and Cuſtoms, can preſently be put into the King's or their own Purſe, and not as by a general Impoſition, equally burdening all the Inhabitants alike: So that it is not ſtrange, if under all Monarchs it be affirmed as a good Political Maxim, That no Impoſitions are leſs hurtful than thoſe that are laid upon Goods Imported and Exported, becauſe they are for the moſt part born by Strangers, and therefore all Goods coming in, or going out, are unreaſonably charged; as it appears in *Spain*, *Portugal*, *France*, *Sweden*, and alſo in theſe Provinces, there being ſtill a remainder of our rigorous Government. It was the like alſo formerly in *England:* But ſince the laſt Troubles there have in ſome meaſure increaſed the Power of Parliaments, and conſequently of the People, ſuch Duties are conſiderably abated, and were with great Circumſpection impoſed on Merchandize, *Anno* 1660.

And in the mean time put the Cuſtoms into their own Coffers.

We

And Juſtice would be corrupted thereby.

We are much leſs to expect under a Monarchical Government, that Laws and Juſtice will be better framed to the Benefit of the Community, and eſpecially of the Merchant: For (as was formerly ſaid) beſides that the rich Merchants will be pillaged and exhauſted by thoſe Rulers, or at leaſt envied and hated by them; the Rulers, Schouts, and Bailiffs, have moreover ſuch Friends at Court, that they publickly ſell Juſtice, and none that are wronged dare complain of them. Yea, ſeeing all Laws and Judgments are made and pronounced in the King's Name, and according to his Pleaſure; we cannot therefore expect under ſuch a Government, but that all things will be carried for the benefit of the Sovereign and his Courtiers. As the Scripture teaches us, That a Prince asks not ſo ſoon what his Luſt dictates, but the Judg as readily granteth it, *that they may do Evil with both Hands.* So that it is no wonder, if in all Monarchical Governments theſe Verſes be found true, which were made by one *Owen* an Engliſh-man:

Micah 7.

Judicibus plus quam Juri ſtuduiſſe juvavit,
Hos Tibi quam Leges conciliato prius.

And if any one will alledg, that this tends no more to the prejudice of a Monarchy than of a Republick, let them pleaſe to conſider, whether all the Monarchical Cities belonging to the *Hollanders*, as *Culenburgh*, *Vyanen*, *Yſſelſtein*, &c. do not ſo practiſe their Juſtice to the prejudice of the Merchants of *Holland*, as that they might be aptly reſembled to *Algier*, *Tripoli*, *Tunis*, *Salley*, &c. yet with this Dif-

Difference, that those Pirates being Inhabitants there, do take the Goods of the *Dutch* by force, and carry them away as good and lawful Prize. Whereas on the other side, our Inhabitants, or Strangers, having by Fraud gotten some Merchants Goods into their Power, can secure them in their own Monarchical Cities, to the prejudice of the honest *Hollander*, they giving but some part of their treacherous Booty to the Servants of Justice. But in both Cases, whether by Force at Sea, or by Deceit, and such undue Countenance or Protection given to Cheats by Land, the *Holland* Merchants are equally sure to lose their Goods. And therefore we have no reason to expect an Amendment in Justice under the Government of a single Person or Monarch, to the benefit of the Trade of the Inhabitants in general.

Whereof Culenburg, Vyanen, &c. *are very sensible Examples for* Holland.

And tho Colonies would be very useful for Monarchs, thereby to ease themselves of their discontented People, which daily increase by their rigorous Government; yet is it true, that the old Monarchical Lands are thereby more depopulated, and improve not so much by foreign Traffick and Navigation as Republicks use to do. Besides, generally Kings and Princes are too indigent and unconstant, and of too short Lives, to be at those lasting Expences often required in erecting Colonies. And when such Colonies are planted, if they be not strong enough to defend themselves against any foreign Power, it is not rationally to be expected that the indigent, mutable, and mortal Prince will out of his own Purse protect such foreign Colonies by vast Expences, and continual Care for the common Good of

Few Colonies made by Monarchs, and less defended.

of his People, and to the Prejudice of his Courtiers: ſo that the ſame, for the moſt part, under ſuch a Government would fall to Ruin, and tend to the great Loſs of the Inhabitants.

Which is not refuted by the Portugal, Spaniſh, *and* Engliſh *Colonies.*

Againſt which Reaſons it cannot rationally be objected, that the *Portugueſe*, *Spaniſh*, and *Engliſh* Colonies in the *Indies* have had better Progreſs and Succeſs than ours; and conſequently, that Republicks are neither ſo inclinable, nor fit for the planting and preſerving of Colonies, as Monarchies are; ſeeing thoſe Monarchs have born little or no Charges towards the planting and defending of them.

Seeing thoſe Monarchs have contributed very little to the Colonies.

But in anſwer to this, we may with truth affirm, that the Subjects of the ſaid Monarchs are governed with more ſeverity in their Native Country, than in the *Indies*. And moreover, the People in thoſe Colonies enjoying every where a greater Freedom to plant Lands, and exerciſe Traffick, than in their own Country, they are excited alone by that, and not put into any better Capacity to erect or improve ſuch Colonies, by the Act or Favour of their Prince.

Our India *Companies only have hindred the erecting of Colonies.*

It is likewiſe certain, that the Inhabitants of *Holland* enjoy a much ſofter or milder Government than they do in the *Indies*, where our privileged Companies, by their ſingle Generals and Governours, do rule over ſome particular Cities and Lands with a Monarchical Severity, and oft-times deſpotically; not by way of Laws, and general Commands, but by ſeparate or different Commands and Declarations: and moreover, they have there the Trade to themſelves, with Excluſion of all

all the other Inhabitants. So that it appears, that this letting and incumbring of our Colonies in the *Indies*, ought not to be aſcribed to the Free Government of *Holland*, but to thoſe privileged Companies, and their Monarchical Government, as alſo to the Monopolys in thoſe parts; or elſe to the Prince of *Orange*, or his Deputies of the Generality, by following whoſe Counſel or Command the *Weſt-India* Company have ſo weakned themſelves, that they have not been able to maintain that Colony they begun.

The Sea would not at all be ſcour'd.

All that has been ſaid being found true under a Monarchy, and well apprehended, I ſuppoſe none will be ſo fooliſh as to believe, that Kings, or their Favourites and Courtiers, will out of their own Purſes ſet out Ships to clear the Seas, for the benefit of the Merchant; I ſay, *out of their own Purſes:* For ſeeing all that is by Monarchs levied from the Subject, comes into their own Purſe, to manage as they pleaſe; and thoſe Sums go not into the publick Treaſury, wherein no Perſon has a particular Intereſt, but muſt be employed only for the Service of the Country; the difference between Monarchies and Republicks is in this reſpect ſo great, that none can ſhew us any Monarch that ever kept the Seas clear, only for the benefit of the Merchant. On the contrary it is certain, that during our Stadtholders Government, when we poſſeſſed a ſhadow of Freedom, the Monys that were received of the Merchant, applicable only for clearing the Seas, were very often wreſted from the Admiralties for the uſe of unneceſſary Land Armies, and not to the Profit of *Holland* nor the Merchant, while in the

Becauſe thoſe Princes would give no Mony out of their own Purſes.

See Chap. 1. Part 2.

the interim the honeſt Inhabitants ſhamefully loſt their Ships at Sea.

But Holland *would be ever falling into Wars.*

Laſtly, It is evident, that Monarchies of themſelves are more ſubject to Wars than Republicks, whether by Inheritances, or to ſecure their Relations, or to aſſiſt them in the Conqueſts of foreign Countries. And moreover, theſe Princes and Captains-General are much more inclined to War than * Republicks: inſomuch, that they often are the Aggreſſors, or pick a quarrel to make glorious Conqueſts; and at the ſame time by their Forces, which they have in readineſs, they cauſe all their great Cities to be curb'd and made to bow to them with the greateſt Humility, or to render themſelves ſo neceſſary to their Republick or State, that they cannot be disbanded.

Make bad Alliances.

And as to Alliances with foreign Nations and Potentates, it is clear, that if *Holland* were governed by a ſingle Perſon, or his Favorites and Courtiers, he might eaſily, either by Ambition, or foreign Coin, be moved to make very hurtful offenſive Alliances: Since ſuch a ſingle Governour of *Holland* would for his great Naval Power upon all Occaſions be ſought to by Countries and Potentates far and near for that end.

And continue unfortified and undiſciplin'd.

Laſtly, A King, or Prince of *Holland*, would not haſten his own Ruin, by fortifying the great Cities of *Holland*, and exerciſing their

* Quod ſi Regum, atque Imperatorum animi Virtus in pace ita ut in bello valeret, æquabilius atque conſtantius ſeſe res humanæ haberent, neque aliud alio ferri, mutari, & miſceri omnia cerneres. *Salluſt.*

Inha-

Inhabitants in Arms, to repel other Forces as well as his own: whereof, I ſuppoſe, I have ſpoken ſufficiently. But in caſe any Man ſhould yet doubt of this, I ſhall affirm, that formerly our Earls have demoliſhed many of the Caſtles and Strong-holds of the Gentry, even when the Strength of *Holland* conſiſted in them. And further, to break the Strength of the Gentry, in whom only (conjointly with the Earls) the lawful Government of this Republick firſt conſiſted, they have from time to time, and eſpecially ſince the Year 1200, built ſeveral Cities in *Holland*, and given Freedom to the Inhabitants of certain Places and Towns of the adjacent open Countrys, or even to Foreigners, who would come and dwell in thoſe Cities, and have freed them when they had dwelt therein a Year and a Day, from the Vaſſalage they were under to their Lords, or even to our own Gentry; and likewiſe freed ſuch Inhabitants from all Taxes due to the Earls, and from the Juriſdiction of Bailiffs with their Aſſiſtants, and other Perſons, and from the Domination of others. And thoſe Earls did, eſpecially in thoſe days, indulge the ſaid Cities, by giving them Privileges, *viz.* that their Schouts, and Schepens ſhould be free of thoſe Cities, and that they ſhould make their own Laws and Statutes for all their Freemen; according to which the ſaid Inhabitants (by their Fellow-Citizens, Schouts, and Schepens, with thoſe who were before choſen by the Earl according to his Pleaſure, or out of a great number of Men nominated to him by the People) were to have Juſtice done them.

Which our Earls have taught us, by razing the Caſtles of the Gentry.

And by raiſing Cities, whereby the Inhabitants might be able to curb the Gentry.

And tho thoſe Burgers did moreover continue Maſters of their own Mony, Proviſion, and Arms, and by virtue of that natural Equity did, with the Inhabitants, chuſe by plurality of Voices, ſome of the Freemen their own Counſellors and Burgo-maſters, to order and govern the Government, Treaſury, and Militia of their own City; yet the Inhabitants of the Cities might not, tho at their own Charge, ſet up Gates and Walls to preſerve their Cities, but with the ſpecial Favour and Privilege of the Earls, which was obtained commonly againſt their own true Intereſt, by giving Mony to thoſe laviſh and indigent Earls, whoſe Deſign was not to ſtrengthen thoſe Cities, as the Caſtles of the Gentry had been, but to bring the old powerful Gentry to their Bow, by the number of thoſe inconſiderable Freemen.

And not ſuffer'd the Cities to be wall'd.

And hence proceeded the Difference between walled and unwalled Cities in *Holland*, as alſo that the Earls of *Holland* being afterwards jealous of their walled Cities, by reaſon of their increaſing Power, thro this Freedom, did totally burn and deſtroy *Vroonen*, *Gaſpaarn*, *Luick*, &c. and pull'd down the Gates of *Utrecht*, *Delft*, *Yſſelſteyn*, *Alkmaer*, &c. with ſpecial Command to the Citizens never to ſet them up again. And this is that which *Pontus Heuterus*, a Friend of thoſe Earls and Princes, did acknowledg of our Earl *Charles* of *Burgundy*, namely, * That he as Earl of *Flanders* had firmly reſolved to

But to beat down their Walls.

* Decreverat ex urbe Gandavo oppidulum facere. *Rerum Auſtriac.* p. 45.

make

make of that great and potent City of *Gent*, a very weak and ſmall Town, that it might not oppoſe its Earl any more. Wherefore I again conclude, that *Holland* by ſuch a Monarchical Government, according to the true Intereſt of ſuch a Head, will not be more ſtrengthned, but rather weakned, and bereft of its Strength.

CHAP. III.

Wherein is examined, whether the Reaſons alledged in the two preceding Chapters, receive any Confirmation from Experience.

HAVING thus laid before you the true Intereſt of the Republican and Monarchical Governments, relating to Manufactures, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Shipping, and their Dependencies; it is neceſſary that we relate Hiſtorically what hath hapned as to thoſe Maxims of our State, both in Republican and Monarchical Governments, that ſo the Reader may ſee, whether our former Reaſonings can be confirmed by Experience. In order to this, it is very neceſſary to obſerve, that to the beſt of my Knowledg, Merchandizing, and the general Staple of Traffick, and publick Exchange-Banks were never found, or continued long under a Monarchical or Princely Government. So that Manufactures, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Navigation have thriven very little in thoſe Monarchical Lands of *America*,

Hiſtory teaches that Traffick has thriven little in America, Aſia, *and* Africa.

rica, *Aſia*, and *Africa*, and that the great and ſtrong Citys of thoſe Lands have been enlarged by the Reſidence of great Monarchs Courts, and conſequently by the exhauſting, plundering, and ſacking of all adjacent Countrys, whether of Enemys, or their own Subjects. Which we may perceive by the Citys of *Cuſco*, *Quito*, and *Mexico*, &c. in *America*; as alſo in the *Aſiatick* great Citys of *Japan*, *China*, *Perſia*, *India*; and laſtly, by *Morocco*, *Fez*, *Jeruſalem*, *Ninive*, *Cairo*, and other great Citys on the Coaſts of *Europe*, or in *Aſia* and *Africa*.

See Acoſta *of the Citys in* America.

The Atlas of J. Blaw, *and* P. Martinus *of* China.

And not at all but in Republicks.

Moreover Hiſtory tells us, that the Flower of the Traffick of theſe mighty Countrys is no where found but in Republicks, as *Sydon*, *Tyre*, *Carthage*, *Banda*, *Amboyna*, &c. and that Traffick hath exceedingly flouriſhed in thoſe Lands, only ſo long as they enjoyed their free Government. But becauſe theſe three firſt Places are known to be the firſt and moſt antient Trafficking Citys of the World, I ſhall therefore ſpeak particularly of *Sydon* and *Tyre*, ſuppoſing it will not diſpleaſe the Reader to touch on them, ſeeing thoſe Matters are not much known abroad, and yet are very uſeful to confirm what we have advanced.

Sydon being a City in *Syria*, upon a Coaſt abounding with Fiſh, and good Havens, tho without Rivers, built by *Sydon* a Grandſon of *Cham*, who was Son to *Noah*, was in the earlieſt times that we have any notice of, a Mercantile or Trafficking City, which according to the *Jewiſh* computation of Time was in the Year 2500 after the Creation of the World; and in the time of *Joſhua* was ſo improved, that

Gen. 10.

Joſh. 11.

that it was termed, *The great City of* Sydon. And it appears that 220 Years after, *viz.* in *Sampſon's* Time, it was a very plentiful, ſtrong, and well-fortified City, whoſe Inhabitants lived in profound Peace and Safety in a free Republick, having no King or Sovereign Head over them, which might have weakned them. And about 210 Years after *Sampſon*, the *Sydonians* were much commended by *Homer* for great Artiſts. Judg. 18.

And that *Sydon* afterwards in the time of the Prophet *Iſaiah*, and *Ezekiel* (who lived the firſt about 180 Years after *Homer*, and the laſt about 225 Years after *Iſaiah*) was very famous for her Traffick, we may ſee in their Prophecys. Now this City of *Sydon* having flouriſhed above 1500 Years, and raiſed many Colonys, it was about the Year 3590 after the Creation, beſieged by *Artaxerxes Ochus* King of *Perſia*, with a mighty Land Army, 300 Gallys, and 500 Ships of Burden by Sea, till they were betrayed by the Chief Head of the Republick *Tennis*, as alſo by their General *Mentor*. So that the *Sydonians* ſeeing no way to eſcape, and bearing a deadly hatred to a general Slavery or Monarchy, they ſet their own City on fire, wherein 40000 of their Inhabitants periſhed; and the King of *Perſia* ſold the Rubbiſh of this incredibly rich City for many Talents. And yet we read in *Q. Curtius*, that *Sydon* about 25 Years after became very conſiderable again; whenas the Head of the Republick, *Strato*, having firſt joined with *Darius* King of *Perſia*, was afterwards compelled by the People to yield up the Place to *Alexander the Great*, who in the room of *Strato* ſet up an Iſa. 23. Ezek. 16. 27, 28.

As firſt of all at Sydon, *when it was a free Government.*

Diod. Sic. l. 16.

But under its Heads of the Republick it ſuffered much. Juſt. lib. 11.

inconſiderable Perſon, called *Abdalonimus*, giving him Power of Life and Death over the Citizens.

But in regard *Alexander* ſoon after died, and his Monarchy was ſo rent and divided under his ſeveral Chief Commanders, that moſt of all the Republicks by him conquered, recovered their Freedom; we may therefore ſuppoſe the *Sydonians* did the ſame: For *Strabo*, who lived about 340 Years after, ſays, That *Sydon* was in all reſpects comparable to *Tyre* in Greatneſs, skill in Navigation, and many other Sciences and Arts relating to Traffick. And in regard he writes at large of theſe two Citys at once, it may be underſtood of the *Sydonians*, who are by him ſpoken of in common, tho with more regard to thoſe of *Tyre*, viz. That they were not only left to their Freedom in the time of the old Kings of *Phœnicia*, and had their own Government; but that under the *Romans*, by giving a ſmall Sum of Mony, they preſerv'd their Liberty.

Strabo lib. 1. Geog.

Lib. 16. Ib.

During the Reign of the *Roman* Emperors there was little mention of *Sydon*, nor yet in the time of the *Saracens* afterwards, or of the Chriſtian Kings of *Syria*, ſave that that City was taken, ſometimes by one, and ſometimes by another, till at laſt with their Hereditary Prince, formerly tributary to the *Saracens*, and the *Mamalukes* of *Cairo*, they were upon the ſame Conditions brought under the Monarchy of the *Turks*, about the Year of Chriſt 1517.

It loſt all its Trade by Sea, when it fell under a Monarch.

And tho ſince its old flouriſhing State, *viz.* about the Year 600 after Chriſt's Birth, the Silk-worms in thoſe Parts, and afterwards

wards the *Turkiſh* Yarn came to be known; ſo that now much Silk is found there, and in the adjacent Places of *Begbaſar* and *Angori*, much of the Yarn of Goats-hair is ſpun, and therefore they are able to ſet up a much more conſiderable Traffick and Navigation, by means of the Manufacturys and Fiſherys: yet on the other ſide it is certain that *Sydon* now yields no Manufactures of their own, nor Ships, nor Traffick, becauſe the Inhabitants under the preſent Monarchical Government could not peaceably poſſeſs their Wealth, and follow their Trades; inſomuch that moſt of their Traffick in raw Silk is now driven by Strangers, who have their own Conſuls, and are always ready to depart from thence, when by the Government they find themſelves too much oppreſſed: And it is ſaid, that there are continually at leaſt 200 *French* Factors that reſide there, to manage that important Silk Trade.

Tyre lying within ſixteen *Engliſh* miles of *Sydon*, was firſt built upon the Continent; from whence the Inhabitants fled to an Iſland lying within a quarter of a mile of it, to withdraw themſelves from the Attempts of the *Iſraelites* who were then poſſeſſing the Land of *Canaan* under the Conduct of *Joſhua*, where they built *Tyre*, who by taking of the purple Fiſh which were moſtly in thoſe Seas, and thereupon dealing in the dying of Purple, making of Garments after the manner of *Tyre*, and Trafficking or uſing Navigation, became ſo famous during their free Government, as you may ſee in the Holy Scriptures, where *Tyre* is ſaid to be a Crown of Glory, or Pearl of Citys, and her Merchants

At Tyrus *Traffick and Navigation flouriſhed, ſo long as it kept its free Government.*

Joſh. 19.

Iſa. 23. Princes, and her Traders the nobleſt of thoſe Lands. That City, and the Traffick thereof, is likewiſe mentioned by *Ezekiel*, of whoſe ruin he likewiſe propheſied, which happened after had flouriſhed 880 Years, about 3360 Years after the Creation; at which time the King of *Babylon*, *Nebuchadonoſor*, after thirteen Years Siege, took the ſaid City, and deſtroyed it.

Ezek. *Ch.* 26, 27, 28.

We read alſo, that about this time the Men of *Tyre* had in their Republick two Officers called *Suffetes*, or yearly Burgomaſters and Rulers, who ſerved in the chief Magiſtracy: And that this Republick ſoon after got its Head above Water again; for about the Year of the World 3615, and when about 255 Years were expired, *viz.* in the time of *Alexander the Great*, it was according to *Q. Curtius*, and *Diodorus Siculus*, the greateſt and moſt renowned City of all *Syria*; and ſo conſiderable in reſpect of its Navigation, that the People and Council of *Tyre* had the Courage to repulſe that victorous Commander from their City, which in no leſs than ſeven months Siege, and incredible Oppoſition, was at laſt overpowered and burnt, and almoſt all the Inhabitants were either deſtroyed or ſold. Nevertheleſs the Men of *Tyre*, in a ſhort time after the death of *Alexander the Great*, by means of their old free Government, Diligence, and Frugality, arrived to their former Power and Riches. We likewiſe read in *Strabo*, that this City of *Tyre*, during their Republican Government, and in the proceſs of 350 Years after, arrived at its antient Luſtre and Riches, by means of Traffick and Navigation.

Q. Curt. l. 4. Diod. Sic.

Juſt. lib. 18. Strab. Geogr. *l.* 16.

And tho the Emperor *Septimus Severus* about 170 Years after ſacked the City of *Tyrus*, and demoliſhed it, yet *Ulpianus* about thirty Years after this tells us, namely about 220 Years after Chriſt, "That *Tyre*, his native City, was an Ally of the *Roman* Empire, and was very conſiderable and mighty for War. And that they of *Tyre* had obtained of the Emperor *Alexander Severus*, the Right of the free Citizens of *Italy*; and according as a free State had power of chuſing and making their own Laws and Magiſtrates. And to this day *Tyre* hath been expoſed to all the ſame Accidents by Monarchical Governments, which thoſe Lands were ſubject to in the following Times of the *Saracens*, *Chriſtians*, and *Turks*, which we before mentioned of *Sydon*: So that *Tyre* is now inhabited by almoſt none but Strangers and Merchants, who for ſome ſmall time reſide there; among whom are many *Frenchmen* that deal in Silk.

Dig. lib. 50. Tit. 15. l. 1.

After that it loſt all its Traffick.

And thus we ſee theſe two Republicks loſt their Traffick and Navigation, not by Wars or Earthquakes, by which they were more than once overthrown and ruined; but by the loſs of their free Government, whereas otherwiſe they as often reſettled themſelves. And in what condition thoſe two Citys are at this time, we may be inform'd by the Travels of that worthy *Engliſh* Writer *Sandys*, who ſays, "That the *Emer*, or Heredi-tary Prince of *Sydon* and *Tyre*, was ſprung from the old *French* that went thither with the Chriſtian King *Godfrey de Bouillon* to conquer the Holy Land; who beſides ſeveral Taxes and Impoſts he exacted of his Subjects,

Q. Curt. l. 4. Strabo l. 16.

As is ſeen by Sandys *his Voyage*, p. 209, *to* 214.

" Subjects, takes the fifth part of their Re-
" venue. And tho he takes for Cuſtom but three *per Cent.* of Foreign Merchants for their imported and exported Goods, yet we may eaſily obſerve how little Traffick and Navigation can proſper there, ſeeing, as Mr. *Sandys* ſays, " The ſaid Chriſtian tributary Prince,
" named *Facardyn*, keeps continually in his
" Service forty thouſand Soldiers, and late-
" ly, *viz.* in 1611, cauſed falſe *Holland* Li-
" on Dollers to be coined, and made them
" paſs current in Receits and Paiments as if
" they had been of good Alloy; and that it
" is uſual with him to ſeize the Goods of
" Merchants that die there, yea even the
" Goods of Foreign Factors, ſo that the
" right Owners or Inheritors cannot get
" them out of his hands, unleſs they agree
" to pay him half the value. And beſides,
" thoſe Citys are wholly unfortified, having
" only a Caſtle for the Prince to keep his
" Court in. It is not therefore to be won-
dred at what *Sandys* ſays, " That theſe two
" Citys are ſo ruined, that they ſcarce retain
" a Shadow of their antient Grandeur and
" Renown; therefore they deſerve to have
" no more ſaid of them.

I ſhould leave off here, but that I foreſee it will be objected, That *Sydon* had certainly one Supreme viſible Head of their Republick. And beſides, the Kings of *Tyrus* are by Sacred and Profane Hiſtory repreſented as very famous: from whence we may conclude, That ſuch a Government very well conſiſts with the flouriſhing of Trade and Navigation. I anſwer, That the ſaid Hiſtorys do clearly inform us, that the ſaid Sovereign Princes

of

of *Sydon*, namely *Tennis*, *Mentor* and *Strato*, were in their reſpective times the Ruin of *Tyrus*. And as to the King whom *Diodorus Siculus*, and *Arrianus* report in their Hiſtorys to have been in *Tyrus* when *Alexander the Great* beſieged that City, the Learned affirm, that 'tis a miſtake, and muſt be underſtood of *Sydon*, and its laſt Government.

Notæ Var. in Q. Curt. & Juſt.

And that we may clearly expound what the Holy Scripture ſpeaks of the Kings of *Tyre*, without contradicting what I affirm of their being a free State; I ſhall tranſlate a Paſſage out of the 16*th* Book of that authentick Writer *Strabo*; and the rather, ſince I conceive that the State of theſe two Republics are there well expreſs'd, " Next to *Sydon*, *Tyre*, ſays " he, is the greateſt and oldeſt City of *Phœ-* " *nicia*, may be compared with it for Large- " neſs, Beauty and Antiquity, and is famous " in many Hiſtorys. And tho Poets extol " *Sydon* more, yea and ſo far, that *Homer* " makes no mention of *Tyre* at all; yet is " *Tyre* by its Colonys extending as far as " *Africa* and *Spain*, without the Straits of " *Gibraltar*, become more famous. So that " theſe Citys, both now as well as of antient " Times, are ſo eminent for Gallantry, Lu- " ſtre, and Antiquity, that at this day it is " queſtioned which of them ought to be ac- " counted the chief City of *Phœnicia*. *Sydon* " lies on a Sea-Haven, on the Continent; " but *Tyre* is an Iſland, and is almoſt as well " inhabited as *Aradus*; it is joined to the " Continent by a Bank or Cauſey made by " *Alexander* when he beſieged this City. It " has two Havens, one of which was called " the incloſed Haven, the other named the

Strabo lib. 16. Geogr.

" *Egyp-*

" *Egyptian*, or open Haven. It is ſaid, that " the Houſes here have more Storys than " thoſe at *Rome*, and therefore that City " was ſometimes well nigh deſtroyed by " Earthquakes, as it was by *Alexander*. But " it overcame all thoſe Diſaſters, and reſtored " it ſelf by means of its Navigation, where- " in, as alſo for its Purple Dye, thoſe of " *Phœnicia* exceeded all other Nations. The " Purple of *Tyre* is accounted the beſt, and " that Fiſhery lies very near them, as do " all the other Neceſſarys for Dying; and tho " the great number of Dyers made the City " uneaſy to other Inhabitants, yet they were " thereby enriched. They did not only un- " der their Kings preſerve their own free " State, and Power of making what Laws " they pleaſed, but alſo among the *Romans*, " who for a ſmall Tribute eſtabliſhed their " Council. *Hercules* is extravagantly ho- " noured by them. How powerful they " were at Sea, appears by their numerous " and large Colonys. So much of *Tyrus*.

They kept their Freedom in the time of the Phœnician *Kings, and of the* Romans.

" The *Sydonians* are famous for their ma- " nifold and excellent Arts, whereof *Homer* " alſo ſpeaketh; they are moreover renown- " ed for their Philoſophy, Aſtronomy and " Arithmetick, having begun it upon Obſer- " vations and Sailing by Night: For thoſe " two Arts are proper for Traffick and Na- " vigation. It's ſaid the *Egyptians* found out " the meaſuring of Land, which is needful " to ſet Limits and Bounds to every Man's " Ground, when the overflowing *Nile* de- " ſtroys the Land-marks. It is believed, " that this Art came to the *Greeks* from the " *Egyptians*, as the *Grecians* learned Aſtrono-

" my

" my and Arithmetick from the *Phœnicians*;
" and all the other parts of Philoſophy may
" be fetch'd out of thoſe two Citys: Yea if
" we may believe *Poſſidonius*, that antient
" Learned Piece *(de Atomis)* concerning the
" indiviſible Parts of all Bodys, was written by
" *Moſchus* a *Sydonian*, who lived before the
" *Trojan* War. But I ſhall let theſe old things
" paſs, and ſay, that in our time *Boethius*, with
" whom we practiſed *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy,
" and his Brother *Diodotus*, both excellent
" Philoſophers, were *Sydonians*. *Antipater*
" was of *Tyrus*, as alſo *Apollonius*, a little
" before our time, who made a Catalogue or
" Liſt of all the Philoſophers, and of the
" Books of *Zeno*, and of all them that fol-
" lowed his Philoſophy. Thus far *Strabo*.

I ſhall now turn to the other Republicks of *Aſia*; amongſt which thoſe ſmall Iſlands of *Banda*, and *Amboyna* are very remarkable, becauſe they were formerly governed in an Ariſtocratical manner by the moſt conſiderable Inhabitants of thoſe reſpective Iſlands; which during that Government drove ſo great a Trade in their Spices, of Cloves, Mace, Nutmegs, and the Return and Dependencies of them, that tho the third part of the Spices were not caried by Shipping to *Calicut*, that great Staple or Storehouſe of *India*; and being ſold, were carried to *Baſſora*, and from thence to *Cairo*, with Caravans; and laſtly from thence tranſported to *Europe* by Shipping: nevertheleſs the Sultans of *Syria* and *Egypt*, thro whoſe Lands the ſame were brought hither, as alſo the Cloves of the *Molucca* Iſlands, were wont to receive yearly above eighty thouſand Ducats for Cuſtom;

Grot. Hiſt. l. 15. *The Inhabitants of* Banda *and* Amboyna *great Merchants during their Republican Government.* Maffei Hiſt. Ind. Grot. l. 11.

ſo

ſo that the ſaid Iſlands flouriſhed then in Riches.

But in 1512, when the *Portugueſe* firſt navigated thoſe Seas, and afterwards fought with the People of *Banda*, the Inhabitants were ſo terrified by theſe new People, and their unheard of Military Art, that conceiving themſelves unable to withſtand that formidable outlandiſh Power, they raſhly agreed to elect out of their own People the moſt conſiderable Perſons for their better defence, and thereby immediately loſt much of their Freedom; and afterward they were, partly by the jealouſy they had of each other, *viz.* of the free Inhabitants againſt their reſpective Heads, and of ſuch Superiors among themſelves; and being in part likewiſe overcome by the *Portugueſe*, they were at length forced to ſubmit to that Foreign Yoke.

And laſtly, there was ſome Freedom ſtill remaining in thoſe Iſlands, when the *Netherlanders* that were Enemys to the *Portugueſe* began to frequent them; and theſe People of *Banda* who greatly affect their Liberty, look'd upon the *Dutch* as Angels ſent from Heaven to defend them, and to deliver the other Iſlands from the Slavery of the *Portugueſe*. For which end the Natives entered into Alliances with us for common Defence; covenanting, that we might not only build Houſes and Warehouſes, and dwell there to trade in their Spices, but expreſly agreeing that they of *Banda* and *Amboyna* ſhould ſell their Spices to no other People. Whence proceeded all that uſually happens when weak States or Potentates call in too powerful Aſſiſtants, *viz.* That not only the *Portu-*

Grot. Hiſt. ib.

gueſe

gueſe loſt their Power over theſe Iſlands, but the Natives loſt their free Government and Trade, and are now under the Dominion of the *Dutch Eaſt-India* Company. It is alſo very obſervable, That the Spices of thoſe Iſlands, when brought into *Europe* by way of *Portugal*, produced yearly to the King above two hundred thouſand Ducats. But the ſaid Iſlands being ruin'd by the Forces of the *Portugueſe*, and thoſe of the *Dutch Eaſt-India* Company, and the ſaid Company deſtroying their Spices which produced too great a quantity for them to vent, their Plenty by degrees decay'd, and their Commerce is now mightily diminiſhed, as we may underſtand by the Hiſtorys of *India*, and from thoſe that have been lately there.

And are now under a miſerable Subjection. Grot. l. 15.

Hitherto I have at large inſiſted upon the cauſes of the Ruin of Traffick, and Navigation, in the Republicks before mentioned, becauſe they were not common. But ſeeing the Caſes of the following Republicks, together with their Navigation and Commerce, are ſufficiently known by moſt men, I ſhall uſe no more words about them than may ſerve to the purpoſe we aim at. It is well known that the City of *Carthage* was built by a Colony from *Tyrus*, about the Year of the World 2940; and that it was governed by its own free popular Government, under two *Suffetes*, or yearly Burgomaſters, and Judges, who jointly for that time were ſupreme Magiſtrates, and had a Council conſiſting of ſome hundreds of Perſons, without any Supreme Head; and about 800 Years ſucceſſively was very famous for Navigation and Commerce, and became incredibly Wealthy and Populous.

The City of Carthage *kept its Navigation and Trade ſo long as it enjoy'd its free Government.*

So

So that after the ſaid Republick and City by manifold Wars, and eſpecially by its laſt againſt the *Romans*, had loſt an infinite number of Burgers in ſeveral unfortunate Battels, and was near its ruin, yet by what *Strabo* credibly teſtifieth, there were remaining in *Carthage* at leaſt ſeven hundred thouſand Inhabitants, who alſo at the ſame time in a very ſhort ſpace, built and made an extraordinary number of Ships, and Arms. And beſides, it is well known, that the *Carthaginians*, living in great plenty, were by their too powerful Nobility involv'd in many Wars, to make Conqueſts, by which at laſt they were ſo overborn by the *Romans*, who were more warlike than they, that *Carthage* was wholly deſtroyed; and tho it were afterwards rebuilt, and again ruined, yet being deveſted of its free Government by the *Romans*, and the ſucceeding Monarchs, it was never afterwards famous for Merchandize or Navigation. Thoſe that deſire to know more of *Carthage*, let them read *Juſtin*, *Diodorus*, *Polibius*, *Livy*, *Strabo*, and eſpecially *Appianus Alexandrius*.

Geogr. l. 17.

And loſt by War, and the Slavery thereupon following, all Traffick and Navigation.

Thus went matters with the Traffick of the Grecians,

Afterwards, Commerce and Navigation did incredibly flouriſh in the *Greeian* Republicks and Iſlands; amongſt which *Athens* and *Rhodes* were very conſiderable. And it deſerves our notice, that all that Country, when under the *Romans* as their Allys, did ſtill retain a great part of their Government, together with their Commerce and Navigation; but loſt all after they were brought to ſubmit to the ſucceeding Monarchs.

And the Italians.

After this, Commerce, Navigation and Manufactures, ſettled and continued in the *Ita-*

Italian Republicks, so long as they enjoyed their Liberty. But we may easily perceive, that *Florence* and *Milan*, tho they became the Courts of Monarchs or Stadtholders, did much decrease in their Commerce during the Monarchical Government. It is also known that *Pisa* under a free Government was famous for a Foreign Trade, but now since its subjection has lost all its Commerce; and so in truth have all the old great *Italian* Citys since the loss of their free Government, so that they are fallen almost to nothing, unless where the Princes or Stadtholders by their Train, and the Consumption of their Courts or Families, have in some measure prevented the same. Whereas those two ill-situated Towns, *Venice* and *Genua*, by their free Government, notwithstanding the loss and removal of the *Indian* Trade, have preserved their Greatness and Traffick, as much as possible, and little *Lucca* keeps her Trade still.

Viz. Milan, Florence, Pisa, *&c. have lost their Liberty and Traffick.*

Genua, Lucca, *and* Venice, *retain their Liberty and Trade.*

It's known that afterwards by the Conversion of *Prussia* and *Liefland*, much Foreign Traffick and Navigation settled in the *Hans* Republicks; and that all those that were not able to hold and preserve their Freedom in former Ages, lost all their Traffick; so that *Stralesond*, *Riga*, *Stettin*, *Koningsberg*, and other Citys which are under a Monarchical Government, or have lost their Liberty, can expect no more Trade than what necessarily depends on their own Situation. Whereas on the contrary, *Lubeck* and *Hamburgh*, with a free Government, have had a greater Trade and Navigation than their Situation necessarily required. As we see it still in *Germany*,

And the Hans Towns.

that *Bremen*, *Embden*, *Munſter*, &c. being continually put to wreſtle or contend with their Prince or Head, are much obſtructed in their Trade; and that the Traffick there could not keep its footing in any Monarchical inland Citys, but only in the free Imperial Towns, as *Nuremburg*, *Ausburg*, *Frankfort*, &c.

In the Netherlands *Merchandizing and Navigation have been both advanc'd and ruin'd.*

In the *Netherland* Provinces it is manifeſt by the Manufactures, Fiſherys, and Foreign Traffick, that Commerce thrives beſt in free Governments. For when the Earls or Dukes were ſo weak and ill-armed, that they were forced to ſubmit to thoſe Citys that flouriſhed by Traffick, and could not oppoſe the true Intereſt of the Merchants, Merchandize flouriſhed: But when the Earls or Dukes became ſo powerful as to make War againſt the great trading Citys, Cloth-Trade, Fiſhery and Traffick, were by little and little driven out of the Land. Thus about the Year 1300, and after, the Citys of *Gent*, *Bruges*, and *Ipres* loſt much of their Trade in Manufactures; and about the Year 1490, the City of *Bruges* loſt moſt of her Trade by Sea, when the Arch-Duke *Maximilian* brought that Town into ſubjection. And laſtly, all the other *Flemiſh* Sea-Ports loſt their Fiſhery, when they were forced to ſubmit to the King of *Spain*; and yet during our Wars, they would rather turn all their Force to invade us by Land, than beſtow their Mony to clear the Seas for their own Inhabitants, by which they could have done *Holland* and *Zealand* much more Miſchief.

In Brabant *Manufactures and Trade did formerly flouriſh.*

Thus thoſe of *Brabant* alſo, particularly in *Bruſſels*, *Tienen* and *Lovain*, loſt much of their Trade in Manufactures about the Years 1300 and

and 1400; and in the following Age under the Houſe of *Burgundy*, when thoſe Dukes were ſo powerful as to force thoſe Towns. Thus we ſaw in the following Age, that the Duke of *Anjou* being an Illuſtrious Prince, and a great Warrior, was no ſooner become Duke of *Brabant*, than the mighty Mercantile City of *Antwerp* ran a great Hazard by the *French* Fury of loſing all its Traffick. And laſtly, it actually loſt all its Traffick by Sea about the Year 1585, when *Philip* II. took the City by the Prince of *Parma*, and built a Caſtle with a *Spaniſh* Gariſon there, without ever endeavouring to reſtore to the Merchants their Trade, by opening the *Scheld*.

Thus were moſt of the antient Citys of *Holland* oppreſt, ſo long as they had their particular Lords, who uſed to curb the Citys, and open Country, by Forts and Caſtles, but would not ſuffer them to be walled and fortified for the Security of the Inhabitants; as appears by *Haerlem*, *Delft*, *Leyden*, *Amſterdam*, *Goude*, *Gorcum*, &c. But thoſe Citys afterwards enjoying more Freedom under their indigent unarmed Earls, when they made uſe of them to overpower the antient *Holland* Gentry and Nobility, who likewiſe oppreſſed their ſmall Citys; they did about the Year 1300 begin to gain the *Flemiſh* and *Brabant* Manufacturys, which forſook their places of abode; and they loſt moſt of them again about the Year 1450, or ſoon after, when our Earls or Dukes of *Burgundy* were able by their Forces to ſubdue all thoſe Citys. And tho during the laſt Troubles, and Compulſion in Matters of Religion, many *Flemiſh* and *Brabant* Clothiers and Merchants retired

Likewiſe in Holland *Manufactures throve whilſt the Earls were weak.*

As did the Fiſhery and Traffick during the Government by Stadtholders.

and ſettled in *Holland* about the Year 1586, yet were they preſently in great danger of being driven out again by the zealous, and ſeemingly pious Activity of our Captain-General, otherwiſe called *the Government of the Earl of* Leiceſter, who by the Intereſt of the Clergy with his Courtiers, and *Engliſh* Soldiery, endeavoured to make himſelf Lord of the Country: And for that end having reviled the States, and the Merchants for Libertines, and deſpicable Interlopers, iſſued very prejudicial Placaets againſt Traffick and Navigation; and laſtly, deſign'd by ſurprizal to have taken and ſeized the three greateſt trading Citys, viz. *Amſterdam*, *Leyden*, and *Enchuyſen*.

At laſt the Stadtholders would have driven away Traffick out of Holland, *but were prevented.*

So that if this Governour and Captain General had not perceived that our Soldiery were incenſed againſt the *Engliſh* Forces under him, and that the Government of the Land was by this means able to oppoſe him, by ſetting up another Military Head, whether it were Count *Hohenlo* or Count *Maurice* of *Naſſau*: and again, if this Earl of *Leiceſter* had not been a Subject to Queen *Elizabeth* of *England*, whoſe Favour he much needed to make himſelf Sovereign here; and beſides, if afterwards he had not found himſelf conſtrained to leave theſe Lands by command of the ſaid Queen, he had certainly by this his Monarchical Government, driven away our Manufacturies, Fiſheries, Traffick, and Navigation.

The ſame were afterwards in great Danger under the ſucceeding Captain-Generals (when we might have had a Peace) by the continual high Convoy-monies, and the no

no leſs formidable Piracies of the *Dunkirkers* upon our Merchant-men and Fiſhers, and alſo by the needleſs and intolerable Impoſts raiſed in the Year 1618, but eſpecially in the Year 1650, at which time the Citys were brought under by our own hired Military Forces, as is yet freſh in Memory.

CHAP. IV.

Reaſons why the Inhabitants of Holland *were no more damnified under the Government of the Captains-General or Stadtholders.*

BUT ſome may object, That all theſe Reaſons and Examples cannot weigh down a contrary Example taken from our ſelves, *viz.* That *Holland* having a Governour for Life, or a continued Captain-General, carrying on a conſtant War both by Sea Land, with a great Army in pay, obtained the Trade which removed from *Antwerp*, and keeps it ſtill. That during the ſaid Form of Government *Holland* hath advanced it ſelf in all ſorts of Commerce, Manufactures, Fiſheries, and Navigation, incomparably above all other adjacent Countries, and eſpecially above *Flanders* and *Brabant*, where the Trade of Manufactures and Traffick had ſome time before mightily flouriſhed: ſo that the ſaid Form of Government ſeems to conſiſt very well with the Intereſt of the Country. Tho this Objection is perhaps ſufficiently refuted in the foregoing Chapters, yet it will not be

Object. *Has not* Holland *proſpered under the Conduct of Captains General?*

amiſs to anſwer it diſtinctly.

That flouriſhing State may be attributed to other Cauſes,

Firſt, It is to be noted in general, that at the time when *Antwerp* loſt its Traffick, as alſo afterwards, there were in all the adjacent Countries much greater obſtructions to Trade than in *Holland*, *viz.* among all the Monarchs and Princes, whoſe laviſh Government preys upon all Burgers and Peaſants, and lays upon the Merchant the intolerable Burdens formerly mentioned, without toleration of Religion, ſave only in *Poland*. And that in all the Republicks on the *Eaſtern* Sea, and Land-Citys, all Strangers were, by the Monopolies of the Burgerſhip, and Guilds, excluded from Traffick, from being Owners of Ships, and medling in Manufactures; and beſides they tolerated but one Religion. So that at the beginning of the Troubles eſpecially, there being no ſuch apparent Monarchical Government in *Holland*, but the ſhadow of Liberty, the Prince of *Orange* and his Favourites, to encreaſe his Party, and make them adhere more cloſe to him, continually boaſted that he had no other intent but to defend the common Freedom, and to increaſe it in theſe Countrys. And indeed there being at that time in *Holland* freedom of Religion, Burgerſhip, and Guilds, with ſmall Charge of Convoy and Cuſtoms applicable to the clearing of the Seas, which were then very little infeſted; it is no wonder that Traffick and Navigation ſettled here.

Namely to the Monopolies and ill Government of the bordering Countries.

And the outward appearance of our Republican Government.

For it is evident, that all the forementioned Vexations, *viz.* that violent Oppreſſion of the lawful Government, and all thoſe Taxes with which the common Inhabitants are now burden'd, were introduced gradually, and

from Year to Year encreaſed; ſo that they were heavieſt in the Year 1650, in a profound Peace, and likely to continue ſo for ever, when the Captain-General openly ſet himſelf againſt his lawful Sovereign, and not only impiouſly trampled upon his Maſters that payed him his Wages, but alſo upon the ſacred Rights of the People, and their Repreſentatives; ſix of whom from the Cities of *Dort*, *Haerlem*, *Delft*, *Horne*, and *Medemblick*, legally appearing at the Aſſembly of the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, his Sovereign, he dared to impriſon, only for having the Courage to refuſe to keep on foot ſome Taxes for maintenance of the Soldiery; which ſaid Repreſentatives he releaſed not till they had renounced all Government in *Holland*: ſo that every one might ſee what a terrible thing a Tyrannical Monarch, Prince during Life, or Stadtholder was in *Holland*, and how little appearance there was, that the Inhabitants of the Country ſhould ever be eaſed of their Taxes.

See the Deduction, Part 2. Chap. 1. §. 22.

Secondly, As to the Captains General, or Stadtholders in particular; I ſay, ſeeing theſe Lands under our firſt Captain-General, Prince *William* of *Orange*, who was a prudent Lord, were oblig'd to make War againſt their own puiſſant Prince, who was irreconcilable to the Captain-General, he was in no Condition of ſaving either his own Life or Eſtate, but by promoting the Proſperity of theſe ſmall Countries as far as he was able, in order to keep his footing in them. For in caſe the ſaid General had in thoſe days not been careful to gain the good Will and Affection of the Rulers and Inhabitants, by providing for their u-

We ought to conſider when the Captains General, or Stadtholders have done good or harm.

And firſt as to Pr. William, *who placed his Safety in ſome meaſure in* Holland's *Proſperity.*

niverſal Welfare and Preſervation, he had certainly run the risk, which might have enſued upon the People's making their Peace with their Sovereign; which how advantageous ſoever the Terms might have been for the Captain-General, yet it would neceſſarily have drawn on his Ruin ſooner or later.

And afterwards the Earl of Leiceſter, *who did not ſo.*

Our ſecond Captain-General, the Earl of *Leiceſter*, proved ſo detrimental to us during his two Years Government, that if he had not ſtood in awe of the States of *Holland* and *Zealand*, who were ſtill obeyed by Prince *William*'s Lieutenant, the Count of *Hohenlo*; and had he not been afraid of the Army, moſt of whom were not *Engliſh*, and dreaded Q. *Elizabeth* of *England*, he would certainly, by continuing ſuch Maxims, have driven away our Trade and Republican Government, and ruin'd the whole Country.

Prince Maurice *being young, and ſo obedient to the States, did much good.*

As to our third Captain-General, Prince *Maurice*, it is confeſs'd, that in the 18*th* year of his Age, when he became Stadtholder of *Holland* and *Zealand*, by the Conduct chiefly of *John van Oldenbarnevelt*; and becauſe in his Youth he followed that Gentleman's grave Advice, and obey'd his Maſters the States, he did them great Service, and help'd to conquer many of the Enemies Cities in a little time, and with ſmall Expence: But it is no leſs true, that the ſaid Prince, eſpecially after the Year 1600, being 32 Years of Age, and following no longer the Command of the States, nor the Counſel of the ſaid *Barnevelt* of honourable Memory, but his own Maxims, or thoſe of Count *William*, he was hardly able, with much greater Expence, to keep what he had gotten.

At leaſt, as ſoon as the ſaid Prince conceiv'd that the Countrys under him could ſubſiſt againſt the King of *Spain*, he not only neglected, but oppoſed and withſtood the Welfare of the Country, thinking thereby to increaſe his own. Thus did he ſet himſelf ſo violently againſt the Truce with *Spain*, that in the Year 1608 he wrote to the particular Cities and Members of the Government of *Holland*, and to *Henry* the 4th of *France*, contrary to the Laws and Order of the Government, to perſwade them and him againſt the Treaty for a Truce; yea, and threatned to continue the War againſt the King of *Spain*, tho he ſhould have no Aſſiſtance but that of *Zealand* only. Nor could the ſaid Truce be concluded till Arch-Duke *Albert* had firſt promiſed to pay him or his Heirs the Sum of three hundred thouſand Guilders, to take him off from his unrighteous Deſigns, or from his unjuſt Pretenſions, as the Ambaſſador *Jeanin* wrote to *Henry* IV. and that the States of theſe *United Provinces* had moreover engaged to continue him, during the Suſpenſion of Arms, as they did formerly in the War, in all his military Offices, and other Advantages which he receiv'd by the occaſion of the War, and likewiſe in all his Annual ordinary and extraordinary Salaries or Entertainments; and moreover preſented him with a yearly Hereditary Revenue of twenty five thouſand Guilders, which at twenty Years Purchaſe would be five hundred thouſand Guilders (See the Negotiations of *Jeanin*, who as Ambaſſador of *France*, was Mediator in that Treaty of Truce) And which is more, the ſaid Captain-General proſecuting ſevere-

But grown older, and following bad Counſel, did afterwards much harm.

See Negotiat. de Jeanin.

ly

ly ſeveral Perſons under pretext of eſtabliſhing the true Religion, the moſt zealous lovers of *Holland*'s Welfare were forcibly turn'd out of the Government, impriſoned, and ſlaughtered, and many Inhabitants driven out of the Country.

See Part 2. Chap. 1. *of this Book*, &c. *Under* Henry's *Government all* Holland *Merchant Ships, and Fiſhers, were a continual prey to the* Dunkirkers.

In the time of the 4*th* Captain-General or Stadtholder, the Reader is deſired maturely to conſider, whether for twenty Years together the clearing of the Seas, in as much as it concerned the Fiſheries, Manufactures, Traffick and Navigation of *Holland*, was not deſignedly neglected: and therefore whilſt the *Dunkirkers* were very ſtrong, and did us much damage by Sea, thoſe Monies were withdrawn from the Admiralties of *Holland*, which were neceſſarily deſigned for ſcouring the Seas, and levied for that end on Goods imported and exported. And moreover, we have ſeen thoſe manifold Impoſts raiſed, all the Forces of the Land made uſe of, and alſo incredible Sums of Mony taken up at Intereſt, to make Conqueſts as advantageous for the Captain-General, as ever they were hurtful and chargeable for *Holland*. And how little the Captain-General, or he who, in reſpect of his great Age and Unfitneſs, had then the Adminiſtration, and really ruled in his ſtead, was inclined to this preſent Peace with *Spain*, appears by this, that in the Year 1646, the 25*th* of *Auguſt*, Monſieur *Knuit* made a Report to the Prince, and aſſured him, That he had covenanted at *Munſter* for his own or his Lady's particular Satisfaction, to have the value of upwards of five Millions of Guilders. Which if true, we may perceive that in the ſaid private Treaty of Peace by the Prince of *Orange*, his Preten-

He ſought to continue a chargeable War on us, till a Peace was concluded at Munſter. Aitzma *p.* 233.

tenſions that were annihilated at the Charge of the King of *Spain*, ſerved only for a Cloke to his frivolous Actions, that under pretext of a Treaty he might gain the Lordſhips of *Montfort*, *Sevenbergen* and *Turnhout*, with the Caſtle called *Bank* of *Schoenbroek*; as likewiſe a yearly Increaſe of Revenue of more Lordſhips, to a very conſiderable Sum.

Making clandeſtine Covenants of ſeveral Lordſhips for himſelf,

And how much the exchanging of ſome meaner Lordſhips belonging to the Prince of *Orange*, has tended by a fair Pretext to gain the mighty ſtrong City and Marquiſate of *Bergen op Zoom*, may be gueſſed, if it be obſerved that the Counteſs of *Hohenſolern*, being unwilling to quit her Right to the Marquiſate, and he in the mean while dying, the Executors of the ſucceeding, and now reigning Prince of *Orange*, in *October* 1651, adjuſted with the King of *Spain* upon that Point, *viz.* that the Prince of *Orange* ſhould continue in poſſeſſion of all thoſe Lordſhips which by exchange were covenanted to him, and moreover ſhould receive in Mony the Sum of two hundred thouſand Guilders; and 5 Months after the ſigning of the Covenant, three hundred thouſand Guilders more: And laſtly, beſides theſe five hundred thouſand Guilders, a yearly Rent of eighty thouſand Guilders for twenty Years to come. So that it ſeems by this covenanted Exchange of ſome Lordſhips againſt the Marquiſate of *Bergen* alone, the ſaid Prince ſhould receive the Value of twenty one hundred thouſand Guilders.

Of the King of Spain's.

And therefore it is evident, that the King of *Spain* has been oblig'd to do much to move the Prince in particular to agree to this preſent Peace; which for many Years has been

been so frequently offered to *Holland* by the King, and was so necessary for us: As those continual and extraordinary Robberys of the *Dunkirkers*, and the taking of our Fishermen in great numbers, and our exhausted and indebted Treasury do at this day testify. But if nevertheless it should be objected, that it is lawful and commendable for any Man, and consequently for the Prince of *Orange*, to obstruct a Peace which would be disadvantageous to himself, and afterwards during the Treaty of *Munster* privately to covenant with the Enemy of this State for his particular Profit, to obtain as much as possibly he could: I desire it may be observed, that the States of *Holland* and *West-Friesland* give quite another construction of this affair, *viz.*

Part 1. *ch.* 7. §. 7.

Which tho contrary to the Instructions given with an Oath, yet,

" That when Monsieur *Knuyt*, Plenipotentiary of this State, at the Treaty of *Munster*, by command and instruction of the Prince of *Orange*, of Laudable Memory, without the knowledg of the State, managed and concluded the forementioned Treaty; he was nevertheless bound up to the Instructions agreed on for him, and the other Plenipotentiarys of this State upon the 28*th* of *October* 1645, *viz.* That no secret Instruction, without the previous knowledg of the States of the respective Provinces, should either be given, or sent to the Ambassadors Extraordinary, and Plenipotentiarys. And in case either of the Provinces, or any other Person, should beyond expectation attempt or endeavour such a thing; They the Ambassadors Extraordinary, and Plenipotentiarys, shall not receive, but forthwith reject it, and

" give

" give immediate notice thereof to the States " General. And that the ſaid Monſieur " *Knuyt* in purſuance of the 91*ſt* Article of " the forementioned Inſtructions, had ſo- " lemnly ſworn thereunto. Whereunto the ſaid States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* in the 9*th* Chapter do add.

For the magnifying of himſelf to the detriment of the United Netherlands, eſpecially of Holland, it was carry'd on and effected.

" §. 8. That the States and the reſpective " Provinces, were certainly well informed, " what great care and vigilancy hath been " us'd on behalf of the State, that in all Places, " none excepted, comprehended in the " Treaty of Peace to be made with the King " of *Spain*, it ſhould be covenanted, That " the Sovereign diſpoſal in Matters of Reli- " gion ſhould remain in the States; and by " what ſerious and expreſs Orders the fore- " ſaid Intention of the State was recommend- " ed to the ſaid Ambaſſadors Extraordinary, " and Plenipotentiarys, and conſequently " to Monſieur *Knuyt*. Nevertheleſs the " States, and the reſpective Provinces do " find in the foreſaid Treaty of the 8*th* of " *January* 1647, That the ſaid Monſieur " *Knuyt* in the Name of his ſaid Highneſs, " did expreſly grant and agree, That in all " Places which by the ſaid Treaty were con- " ceded and granted, either to his ſaid High- " neſs, or to his ſaid Lady the Princeſs of " *Orange*, the *Roman* Catholick Religion " ſhould be maintained, as the ſame was at " the time of concluding of the foreſaid " Treaty; and alſo the Spiritual Perſons " ſhould be maintain'd in their Eſtates, " Functions, free Exerciſes, and Immuni- " ties.

" §. 9.

And unknown to the States, there was promis'd on the Prince's behalf to the King of Spain, *that the* Romiſh *Religion ſhould be maintain'd in ſeveral Places.*

" §. 9. So that in regard of the City of *Sevenbergen* only (over and above the other Places in the foreſaid Treaty mentioned) the ſaid City being within the Province of *Holland*, and lying under the Sovereign command of thoſe States; there was granted much more to the King of *Spain*, than was made over by the Act of Secluſion to the ſaid Lord Protector.

" §. 10. It is unqueſtionable that the moſt valuable Effect of the Sovereignty conſiſts in the free diſpoſal of Matters of Religion; which by the ſaid Treaty, as far as it is there ſpecified, is quitted, and yielded up to the King of *Spain*.

" §. 11. Beſides, the aforeſaid Reſignation is made by, and on behalf of them who have no diſpoſal thereof at all. So that the foreſaid Contractors did as much as in them lay clandeſtinely, to deprive the States of ſo ſenſible a ſhare of their Sovereignty.

" §. 13. That tho the States being afterwards inform'd of the Contents of the ſaid particular Treaty, did expreſly declare, that they would not be ſubject to the ſaid intolerable Stipulation, in reſpect of the practice of the ſaid Religion in *Sevenbergen*; yet they afterwards fell into many Inconveniences by that means.

And laſtly, the ſaid States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland* do ſay:

" §. 15. That ſo notable a part of their Sovereignty and Right as the free diſpoſal of Matters of Religion within their Dominions without their knowledg, by him who had not the leaſt Power or Qualification

" to

" to grant it, was without any apparent " Cauſe yielded to the King of *Spain*.

So that it doth unanſwerably appear, that our Captain-General and Stadtholder, his Secret Treaty was concluded for his private Benefit, and to the prejudice of *Holland* and the Peace thereof.

Yea, after the laſt Captain-General had in a full Peace ſeized and impriſoned ſix Deputys of *Holland* aſſembled upon Summons at the *Hague*, becauſe according to their Duty they had dared to refuſe the payment of ſome Companys of Soldiers, and to reſolve to diſband them as far as concerned the Province of *Holland*, he miſcarried in the Deſign of ſeizing our Principal City by ſurprize. So that if he had not died about three weeks after, we ſhould in a few Years have ſeen that *Holland*, and *Amſterdam* firſt of all, would have loſt all their Traffick, by contending againſt their own Governour and Captain-General, or would have been compelled to ſubmit to his Yoke; as formerly *Flanders*, *Bruges*, *Brabant* and *Antwerp* were bereft of their Traffick by the Quarrels between them and the Arch-Duke *Maximilian*, and King *Philip*.

'Tis well known that the ruin of Holland *was deſign'd by our laſt Stadtholder.*

For tho our ſaid Captain-General's attempt on *Amſterdam* ſucceeded not, yet all the flouriſhing Citys of *Holland* that were unarm'd, and much more thoſe many Citys which had Gariſons moſtly of Foreign Soldiery at his command, would have been forced eternally to have ſubmitted to his Monarchical Yoke, if his unexpected Death had not delivered them from that Slavery.

He

Deduct. *of* 1654. *Part* 2. *ch.* 2. §. 13, &c.

He that doubts of this, let him hear the States of *Holland* and *West-Friesland* as speaking of this Matter to their Allys. " But especially let the said Provinces please to remember what hapned in the Year 1650, " within our own Body. Did not in the " same Year the Rulers of the City of *Amsterdam*, to prevent greater Evils, grant " by Capitulation to his Highness Prince " *William* of immortal Memory, Father of " the present Prince of *Orange*, That the " *Heeren Andries*, and *Cornelis Bikkers* should " quit their Offices of Burgemasters, and " Counsellors, and become private Men, and " never be readmitted into the Government? " And were not the Citys of *Dort*, *Haerlem*, " *Delft*, *Horn*, and *Medemblick*, because of " some honest Regents, or Magistrates in " their Citys, compelled afterwards to do " the like? Altho God Almighty so ordered " Matters by his Providence, that some few " days after the same Persons were restored " to their former Dignitys. Those were " the true Tokens of an usurped Power; and " so much the more intolerable, because he " to whom such Conditions were granted, " was by the Nature and Virtue of his Commission, and likewise by his Oath therewith " taken, only a Subject of that Body, whose " Members he thus endeavoured to bring under subjection. It was then indeed the " true time for unfeigned Patriots, and true " lovers of Liberty to appear upon the Stage, " and with Heart and Hand to make head against such Usurpation. But what Zeal did " the foresaid Provinces then exert? Were " not they the Men, who on *June* 5. of the " fore-

Who domineer'd extremely over Holland.

" foreſaid Year 1650, granted that Autho-
" rity to be lawful, at leaſt ſo far, that un-
" der pretext thereof the ſaid Prince of
" *Orange* undertook thoſe Actions? And
" were not they alſo the Men who after-
" wards, when thoſe Actions were in part
" executed, did by ſpecial Reſolution or
" Letters Miſſive declare, that they judged
" the Reſolution aforeſaid of the 5*th* of *June*
" 1650 to be applicable thereunto: And
" who in purſuance thereof expreſly avowed,
" approved, and commended the foreſaid
" Actions; yea even thanked his Highneſs
" for it, and beſought him (tho 'tis ſcarcely
" to be believed) to perſevere in ſuch a lau-
" dable Zeal?

And had the Thanks of the other Provinces for it.

All which being true, and the Rulers of the other Provinces, who ought to have offered their helping hand to *Holland* againſt theſe violent Oppreſſions, having on the contrary either of neceſſity or willingly flattered the Prince in this, and ſought to bring our Province to a greater Thraldom: No rational Man could have expected but that Traffick and Navigation, *&c.* would have had its overthrow here, as in other Monarchical Countrys; and that conſequently all the Inhabitants of *Holland* in a few Years would neceſſarily have ſunk into unexpreſſible Miſery.

CHAP. V.

The Reaſon why the General Liberty in Holland *hath cauſed no more benefit, ſince the Death of the Prince of* Orange, *the laſt Stadtholder of* Holland *and Captain-General during Life.*

Reaſons why Holland *has injoyed a little Fruit by its free Government.*

BUT it may be objected, That God hath given us Peace with *Spain*, and ſnatch'd away our Captain-General and Stadtholder, without leaving one of Age enough to be his Succeſſor; which ſeem to be the two moſt deſirable things that the Inhabitants of *Holland* could wiſh for, ſeeing they are thereby become a People really Free, ſubject to none of what Quality ſoever, but only to Reaſon, and to the Laws of their own Country, that can only be governed by the Intereſt of their own Province and Citys: And yet for all this we can ſee no alteration, but only in this, that the Lives, Eſtates, and Reputation of the Inhabitants, do not depend upon one Man's Will; and that the Citys cannot by their Soldiery ſuddenly be ſurpriz'd. So that the Rulers, and Miniſters of the Republick of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, as well as thoſe of the particular Citys, are now, in as much as concerns every Man's Perſon and Tranſactions, liable only to the Laws and Conſtitution of the Republick, and the Citys thereof; and being abſolutely their own Maſters, they need fear no more by ruling well to offend a ſingle Head, and conſequently to loſe their Authority, Life, and Eſtate for ſo doing.

See R. Scheele Gemeene Uryheit.

In

Why there was no eaſing of the Impoſts.

In anſwer to this I muſt acknowledg, that the much wiſh'd for Accident aforeſaid hath not hitherto produced ſuch wholeſom Fruits as might rationally have been expected, eſpecially ſince hitherto there hath been no eaſe given to the People from ſuch heavy Taxes and Impoſitions. But when the reaſon of it is rightly ſcann'd, we ſhall find the Cauſe is not to be imputed to the preſent free Rulers, but to the former Uſurpation of the Stadtholders, Governors, and Captains General, together with the remaining Diſorders that had their riſe from thence. Yea, it is to be admired, that Matters in the preſent Conjuncture are already brought to ſo good a condition: For when the known and evident Cauſes of what is before expreſſed are looked into and enumeratd, every one may ſoon perceive theſe four good Effects.

In the *firſt* place, That at the time of the death of the laſt Stadtholder and Captain General, the Province of *Holland* being of ſo ſmall a Compaſs, and ſo poor in Treaſure as is before expreſſed, was left charged with ſo dreadful a capital Debt upon Intereſt, and ſuch an exceſſive number of daily incident Debts, that it will not be believed by other Nations, nor poſſibly by our Succeſſors in *Holland*, that ſo ſmall a Province could ſubſiſt under ſuch great and heavy Taxes; and that the Inhabitants thereof could bear, not only the Annual Intereſts of ſuch an immenſe Sum, but ſo many Taxes beſides for the defence of themſelves and their Allys: It being remonſtrated by the States of that Province to Prince *William*, a little before his Death, and alſo afterwards for Juſtification of their Pro-

Becauſe Holland was in debt 140 Millions, &c.

ceedings, *Anno* 1650. That the Province of *Holland* was then charged with Mony taken up at Intereſt, amounting to the Sum of one hundred and forty Millions of Guilders, beſides other Debts amounting to thirteen Millions.

Secondly, That the good Inhabitants of the ſaid Province, driving their Trade to the *Levant* about the ſame time, and eſpecially in the Years 1650, and 1651, were by the *French Corſairs* in the *Mediterranean* extremely endamaged, even ſo far, that a part only of the foreſaid Loſs, *viz.* as much as the Merchants of *Amſterdam* by Publick Command brought in, amounted to above one hundred Tuns of Gold, or ten Millions of Guilders.

Together with the Engliſh *War,*

Thirdly, That this State in the Year 1652, fell into and continued in open War with the *Engliſh* until 1654, which occaſioned a remarkable decay of Trade, and many great Loſſes to the Traders of the ſaid Province.

And the Eaſtern War.

Fourthly, The Eaſtern Wars ſoon after happened, between the Kings of *Sweden* and *Denmark*; and this State became engaged in it as Auxiliarys. All which muſt be acknowledged by every one for Reaſons of what I ſaid before; but the right Grounds and true Cauſes are curiouſly inquired into but by very few, and therefore are look'd upon by many as the Effects of the preſent Government. I have therefore thought it neceſſary to ſhew, to the beſt of my knowledg, how thoſe things came about.

And firſt concerning the one hundred and forty Millions of Guilders, with the other undiſcharged Debts abovementioned; it is well

well known, and eaſy to be comprehended, that that Debt was forcibly occaſioned by the Captain-General and his Flatterers; the ſaid immenſe Sums being waſted to promote his Ambition and Glory, by having great Armys in the Field, and undertaking great Sieges to take ſuch Citys, as at this day tend to the heavy burdening of *Holland*. And that which is moſt to be bewailed was, That the Frontier Citys were intruſted to the ſole command of the Captain-General, who placed therein Governors and Gariſons; ſo that they ſerved only for ſo many Citadels to hold poor *Holland* in Fetters. And we have often with grief been forced to ſee, that whilſt ſo many Millions were ſacrificed by Land to the Ambition of the Captain-General, the neceſſary Defence of Navigation and Commerce, muſt depend upon the Revenue of the Convoys and Cuſtoms, which are received only of the Merchant; and ſometimes a part of the ſaid Mony too was diverted to carry on the War by Land.

Our former Capt. Generals, with their Dependants, the Cauſe of our dreaful Taxations.

For the Sums ſo taken up and miſpent for the Conqueſt of Citys.

And thereby to keep Holland *in ſlavery.*

I know very well, that this way of management was not afterwards diſcommended, becauſe many of our Inhabitants had the good Fortune not to be damnified by Loſſes at Sea, and the ill Conduct of the *Weſt-India* Company, whereof mention is made in the firſt Chapter of the Second Part of this Book; ſo that they fared at leaſt as well or better than at preſent, and found there was then Mony to be got. Beſides, thoſe manifold deſtructive Wars which hapned in moſt of the neighbouring as well as remote Countrys, inclin'd many rich Fugitives to ſettle in *Holland*. But I wiſh thoſe poor People would have

Which is illuſtrated by a Similitude, how much the Country under this free Government fares better than under the Stadtholders.

Then Mony was taken up at Intereſt to conſume and waſte,

have a little foreſight, they would then conſider that it went with the Affairs of the Commonwealth, as I once remember it hapned in a certain Family that was bleſſed with a fair Eſtate. The Parents being dead, the Children were put under the Care of a laviſh Guardian, who giving no Account, ſpent the Eſtate hand over head; and when there was no more Mony in Caſh, immediately took up a good Sum upon Intereſt, at the Charge of the poor Orphans; ſo that not only the foreſaid Children, but all the Children and Servants of the Neighbourhood liv'd moſt bravely, and had and did every thing that their Hearts could wiſh for. But it afterwards hapned, that the waſteful Guardian died, and the ſaid Children fell under the care and tuition of the Chamber of Orphans, who kept a continual eye over them, and plac'd them under the daily care of an honeſt, diligent and ſober Man, who regulated the Houſe after a quite different manner, without any waſte. So that whereas in the time of the foreſaid Guardian, there was yearly more ſpent than the Revenue amounted to, and every time Mony taken up at Intereſt, the Revenue did afterwards conſiderably exceed the Expence; and the Surplus was laid out to pay off a part of the Debt which the former Guardian had contracted.

But now we husband it to pay off the Debts contracted by the former laviſh Houſekeeping.

But then the Children murmured, ſaying, That their Condition was much impaired, that they had a pleaſant Life under the former Guardian; and ſo did the Neighbours Children and Servants, they ſaid they could enjoy themſelves with delight in that Family under the former Guardian, but that it

Which diſpleaſes many unthinking and ill-meaning Inhabitants;

was now become a barren Place. But thoſe poor Orphan little thought, that in caſe the former Management had laſted longer, it would have proved fatal to them in their riper Years. And we poor ſimple *Hollanders*, who may with reaſon be called Orphans, how long ſhall we remain in our Childhood and Minority; not obſerving that the Plenty we then were ſenſible of, proceeded from the ill Husbandry of a prodigal Guardian or Steward, which hath run us in Debt as aforeſaid? At leaſt we ought to conceive, that we muſt now ſtill be taxed and fleec'd to pay off the Intereſts of that great Sum; which Taxes alone under our preſent Governors, would defray the whole Charge of the Government. So that all that we muſt now pay for our Subſiſtance and Defence, and which lies ſo heavy upon us, muſt be look'd upon as the bitter Fruits of that Tree of Wantonneſs which that laviſh Guardian hath planted among us, and which we ſilly Children danc'd about with ſo much delight; and our Neighbours Children of *Guelderland*, *Utrecht*, *Over-Yſſel*, and others, to whom Plenty was no Burden, and our hired Soldiers, with whole Regiments of *French*, *Engliſh*, *Scots*, and *Walloons*, who lived in our Family, were very well pleaſed with that kind of Life, and it makes their Hearts to rejoice when they talk of reviving thoſe Times. It is good cutting large Thongs out of another Man's Hide. But that we *Hollanders* ſhould be ſo ſtupid as not to perceive that the preſent Government is our Safety, and that the former would infallibly have procured our Ruin, is indeed not to be comprehended.

And Neighbours and other Strangers, who by our Waſtfulneſs uſe to live at eaſe.

The French *and* Engliſh *Depredations by Sea happned by means of the late Government.*

As to the Second Cauſe, *viz.* the Depredations committed in the *Mediterranean* Seas, and thereabouts: It is firſt apparent, that ſeeing all the Wealth of *Holland*, as well the ſaid borrowed Capital Sum, as that which is ſqueezed out of the Sweat and Blood of the good Inhabitants of the ſaid Province, was ſacrificed to the Ambition of the Captain-General; and by his Neglect of a vigorous Defence by Sea, there was a fair and open Field given to all Nations greedy of Prey, to ſet out Men of War againſt our rich laden Ships. Who knows not that the greateſt inticement to Evil is the hopes of Impunity? He that will always be a Sheep, muſt expect to be eaten of the Wolf at laſt.

Seeing by their endeavours our Ships of War were ſold.

To which is to be added, that under pretext of a Peace concluded with *Spain*, as if there were no more ill People in the World, and as if all coveting of one anothers Goods would have thereby ceaſed, the Captain General by his Creatures, and Flatterers, had ſo ſubtilly contrived Matters, that ſeveral of our Ships of War were ſold, and thereby we were left naked of our neceſſary Defence by Sea. Our honeſt and moſt provident Rulers could the leſs oppoſe it, becauſe there was another Miſchief impending over them by the Captain-General, *viz.* That as ſoon as he (who then paſſed his time chiefly in Hunting, Hawking, Tennis-playing, Dancing, Comedies, and other more infamous Debaucherys) ſhould begin to apply himſelf to Affairs of State, he would imploy the remaining Naval Power of the Land againſt the Government of *England* for the advancing the Intereſts of his own Family, but certainly to the

oppreſ-

oppreſſion of all the Inhabitants of *Holland*, eſpecially of the Trading part.

Upon which it alſo followed, that ſome of our Ships which were thus ſold, became the Chief of the foreſaid *Corſairs* againſt us: Which brings to my remembrance, that which was publickly ſpoken in the Year 1651, and probably very true, *viz.* That the aforeſaid Depredations, and others were to be made by Shipping that were to ſail out of the *Sorlings* (or Iſlands of *Scilly*) and elſewhere by our Captain-General's appointment; and that ſome of the Earwigs of that young Prince had perſwaded him, that robbing at Sea was the ſureſt, yea the only expedient to bring the *Amſterdammers*, with whom he had been for ſome time before his death at great variance, to his Lure or Devotion: It being accounted a ſure Maxim among ſuch great Perſons to weaken and ruin all great and ſtrong Citys which may oppoſe their deſigns; yea, and when private Methods are wanting, to make uſe of open Violence for that end: as all Hiſtorys and Examples, both Antient and Modern, do clearly teſtify. And that Conſideration alone ought to be ſufficient for us *Hollanders* (whoſe Welfare entirely conſiſts in flouriſhing, mercantile, and populous Citys) to take a firm reſolution, never to put our ſelves under a perpetual Chief Head, by what Name or Title ſoever, and to perſiſt therein immutably.

That the Pirats might bring Holland, *and eſpecially* Amſterdam, *to be divided and weakned.*

To the 3*d* Cauſe, *viz.* the War againſt *England*; I may well ſay, and that truly, that we have ſuffered that for the ſake of the Houſe of *Orange*. For thoſe of the Parliament of *England* having cut off the Head of their own

The War with England *was brought upon us for the ſake of the Houſe of* Orange.

own good King, and being therefore exceedingly hated by all the Monarchs in the World, and likely in all human appearance to be called to account and puniſhed for it by Neighbouring Princes, leſt ſuch a Crime remaining unrevenged, their own Subjects might be thereby excited to act the ſame thing againſt them: They therefore found themſelves under a neceſſity to ſeek the Friendſhip of this State; and for that end, ſoon after the death of the Prince of *Orange*, they ſent a conſiderable Embaſſy hither, without ſhewing the like Honour to any other Potentate or State in the World.

For the Engliſh *ſought our Friendſhip firſt.*

I ſhall not here particularize all that they offered to ſettle a Friendſhip between both Nations; it will be ſufficient to obſerve, That they did by Commiſſioners earneſtly inſiſt with the States General to renew that well known Treaty of Intercourſe made between both Nations *An.* 1495. Tho I am of opinion, and have before amply proved it, That it is wholly unadviſable for this State to enter into any farther League with *England*; yet by renewing the ſaid Treaty we ſhould not only have ſetled a Friendſhip, but alſo at the ſame time have eſtabliſhed our Commerce and Fiſhery; as to which the Articles of the ſaid Treaty (eſpecially in regard of the Fiſhery) are expreſſed in the moſt deſirable terms. Yet thoſe that conceived themſelves bound as Slaves to the Houſe of *Orange*, did not only oppoſe the concluding of the foreſaid deſirable Treaty, but alſo ſent away thoſe Ambaſſadors with all manner of reproach and diſhonour: Firſt, by oppoſing them in the publick Deliberations of the State againſt the progreſs

Some Rulers ſtill remaining Slaves to the Prince of Orange, *ſet themſelves againſt the Alliance with the* Engliſh.

The Engliſh *Ambaſſadors ſuffering great contempt.*

progreſs of the ſaid Treaty, eſpecially by framing delays, alledging that we firſt ought to ſee the iſſue of the Deſigns of the preſent King of *Great Britain* (then declared King in *Scotland*) and on the other ſide exciting the Rabble againſt the Perſons of the ſaid Ambaſſadors to ſuch a degree, that the States of *Holland* perceiving the averſion, and daily threats that were uttered againſt their Perſons, were neceſſitated, for preventing of greater Miſchief, to appoint a *Corps de Guarde* to be erected before their Houſe, to ſecure them from the like miſchief which befel Dr. *Doriſlaus*, Envoy from the ſaid Parliament, at the Swan Inn in the *Hague*.

Which the States of Holland *were willing, but not able to prevent.*

What averſion ſuch Proceedings might have cauſed in the ſaid Ambaſſadors, is eaſy to be apprehended, as it alſo followed; who having obſerved after they had ſtayed here a conſiderable time, that the Zeal of the honeſt and upright Governours, eſpecially in the Province of *Holland* and *Zealand*, was not able to ballance the Faction of *Orange*; they returned in great diſcontent to *England*; one of them, *viz.* Mr. *St. John* (upon taking his leave) told the States Commiſſioners: "My Lords, you have your eye upon "the Iſſue of the Affairs of the King of *Scot-* "*land*, and therefore have deſpiſed the "Friendſhip we have profered you; I will "aſſure you, that many in the Parliament were "of Opinion, that we ought not to have "come hither, or to have ſent any Ambaſſa- "dor till we had firſt overcome our difficultys, "and ſeen an Ambaſſador from you. I now "ſee my Fault, and perceive very well that "thoſe Members of Parliament judged right;

On which thoſe Ambaſſadors parted diſcontented.

One of whom predicted, that we ſhould repent to have rejected the Friendſhip of England.

"you

" you will in a little time ſee our Affairs " againſt the King of *Scotland* diſpatched, and " then you will by your Ambaſſadors come " and deſire what we now ſo cordially come " to profer. But aſſure your ſelves, you will " then repent you have rejected our Kindneſs.

As we have found by experience moſt true.

Would to God that Experience had not verified the foreſaid Diſcourſe to our great Loſs: For the King of *Scotland*'s Affairs being determined by a Battel, and a War with this State following upon it; the Wounds and Loſſes occaſioned by that War effectually brought to paſs the Repentance aforeſaid; but *fronte capillata, poſt eſt occaſio calva*: It's in vain to ſhut the Well's Mouth, when the Calf is drowned.

And this is the real Cauſe of the firſt Engliſh *War.*

This is the true Reaſon of that lamentable War: to which may be added the intolerable Humour of that Nation, their continual jealouſy of our flouriſhing Traffick, and the innate hatred of *Cromwel* againſt the Prince of *Orange*, as a Siſter's Son of that King, whom of all the World he had moſt reaſon to dread. So that every one may eaſily imagine, what pain and care it hath coſt our honeſt Rulers to regain a Peace with that Nation.

The Remainders of the former Government, the Cauſe alſo of the Eaſtern *Wars, ſo far as related to* Holland.

Laſtly, As to the Fourth Point, *viz.* that of the *Eaſtern* War: It is certain in caſe this State had had the good Fortune to have framed its Conſultations according to its true Intereſt, without having in their Breaſts the ſame Evil which had occaſioned the War with *England*, the growing Flames in all probability might eaſily have been quenched at the beginning, at leaſt in all Events the War between *Sweden* and *Denmark* had certainly been prevented;

ed; but it is to be lamented, that all the Deliberations that hapned in the Government were travers'd and thwarted by the fluctuating and changeable Humour and Interest of the Elector of *Brandenburg*, only because that Prince was related to the House of *Orange* by Marriage, and acted a considerable, but a very strange part in that Tragedy.

The D. of Brandenburg, *and those that were slavishly inclin'd to the Prince, wheedl'd* Holland *into it,*

For at the beginning, when the King of *Sweden* was preparing his Attempt against *Poland*, the Duke of *Brandenburg* opposed it with a more than ordinary Animosity; and accordingly seeking to strengthen himself by Friends and Alliances, those that were inclined to the House of *Orange* here, were able to effect so much, that the States obliged themselves firmly by a Treaty of the 27*th* of *July* 1655, to defend the said Elector against the foresaid King of *Sweden*, having after a few days deliberation undertook the Guaranty of the Electoral *Prussia*; a Point, which ever till then (tho it was uncertain whether there would have been any Attack to be feared about it in a long time) was looked upon to be of so great Weight and Importance, that for that Reason only, the Alliance profered by the said Elector for divers years together with such a Clause of Guaranty, never took effect. The States by this means being visibly left out of the Neutrality, could be no effectual Mediators to end the War between *Poland* and *Sweden*, which by their Interposition and Direction had ever been formerly accommodated.

First causing us to enter into an Alliance with the D. of Brandenburg.

Who having receiv'd a good Sum of us, got out of that Alliance, and took part with the Swede.

But it soon appeared that we were not a little mistaken; for after the said Duke began to enjoy the effect of the foresaid Treaty, espe-

eſpecially after he had received a good Sum of the promiſed Subſidies, he ſuddenly and without the privity of this State, joined with the King of *Sweden*, caſt off the Oath of Vaſſalage he had ſworn to the King of *Poland*, expreſly renounced the foreſaid Alliance with us; and ſoon after, joining his Forces with thoſe of the King of *Sweden*, gave the *Poliſh* Army Battel near *Warſaw*.

Which caus'd here a great overſion to that Elector.

It is true, this Action being in it ſelf odious, and extremely contrary to the Genius of our Nation, rais'd in them ſo very great an averſion to this Elector, that the beſt affected to the Houſe of *Orange* were for a long time aſhamed openly to patronize the Intereſts of his Electoral Highneſs; by which it hapned that the Faithful Rulers, taking to heart the true Intereſt of this State beyond all others, their wholeſom Advices took place afterwards ſo much the better.

And cauſed the advantageous Treaty of Elbing *for us.*

The Advantages that would have accru'd by that Treaty, were, viz. *Tolls no higher than in* 1640.

And accordingly with great Prudence, and upon right Maxims for a Country ſubſiſting by Trade, that Treaty was carried on with *Sweden*, on the 11*th* of *September* 1656, at *Elbing* in *Pruſſia*, between the Ambaſſadors of this State, and Commiſſioners of the King of *Sweden*; whereby it was firmly agreed, that ſeeing the *Swedes* had for ſome Years raiſed the Cuſtoms exceſſively high over their whole Country, and eſpecially had charged the Inhabitants of theſe *Netherlands* to pay more than their own Subjects; Therefore for redreſs thereof, the Cuſtoms and other Taxes under the Power of the *Swede*, as well without as within the Kingdom, ſhould be brought to the ſame Rate they were at about the Year 1640.

In

In the Second place, that in caſe of the raiſing of Cuſtoms, and new Taxes, the Inhabitants of theſe *United Provinces* ſhall be no higher or more charged than the *Swedes* themſelves: So that as to that Point, there ſhall be kept a perfect Equality in all things between both Nations. *And no higher than the* Swede *himſelf pays.*

Thirdly, That the Inhabitants of theſe *Netherlands* in all places under the *Swedes* Command, as well in regard of Cuſtoms, as to all other Advantages, none excepted, ſhall be treated as well as any other Nation ſhall be treated by the *Swede*. *And as low as any Strangers pay, including all other Lands where we are concern'd.*

Fourthly, That all thoſe on whoſe Preſervation and Peace this State, and the Commerce of its Inhabitants, is eſpecially concerned, as among others principally the King of *Denmark* and his Kingdoms, the Elector of *Brandenburg* and his Dominions, as alſo the City of *Dantzick*, and all Places belonging to them, be comprehended in the foreſaid Treaty, with an expreſs Covenant, that neither the King of *Sweden*, nor his Subjects and Inhabitants, directly nor indirectly, ſhall give them any moleſtation, or hindrance in their Traffick, much leſs make War againſt them. *Whereby much harm would have been prevented.*

Would to God, that theſe Affairs ſo well commenc'd had been purſued to perfection! Then ſhould the King of *Denmark* at this day have been Maſter of the Province of *Schonen*, and other Countrys which were taken from him; and the good Inhabitants of *Holland* have been in poſſeſſion of many Millions, which in the laſt War were conſumed on behalf of the Publick, and loſt by private Perſons at Sea.

But

But altho a Treaty concluded by thoſe that are imployed and duly authorized, ought to be ratified by thoſe who gave ſuch full Powers under their Hands and Seals; yet after the concluſion of the ſaid Treaty, there was ſuch a Fluctuation of Humours, that it could not be ratified here. I cannot with truth affirm that the Province of *Holland* was altogether blameleſs in this Matter; but what Authority was made uſe of underhand, the Sequel plainly diſcovered. For when the good King of *Denmark* being privatly excited to it, had put on his ruſty Armour, and drawn the King of *Sweden* that way; then did the Elector of *Brandenburg* effectually ſhew what that Occaſion was worth to him: for as ſoon as the King of *Sweden* had turned his Back upon *Poland* and *Pruſſia*, he made no more ſcruple again to break the Covenant of Vaſſalage he had made with *Sweden*, than he formerly made conſcience of ſolemnly renouncing the Alliance he had made with this State; and accordingly by that opportunity entred into a new Treaty with the King of *Poland*, and covenanted to have the Sovereignty of the Ducal *Pruſſia*, which he formerly held of that King in Fee, with other Advantages that are not neceſſary here to enumerate.

And the reaſon why the ſame was not ratified, viz.

Holland's *Omiſſion cauſed by their affection to the E. of* Brandenburg.

Who to obtain the Sovereignty of the Electoral Pruſſia, *fell again from the* Swede, *and join'd the* Polander;

But ſince by not ratifying the Treaty of *Elbing*, we help'd the King of *Denmark* to put on his Armour to ſo little purpoſe, and procured thoſe notable Advantages to the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, the Kingdom of *Denmark* (God amend it) hath coſt us dear enough: But that which moſt troubled us, was, that the ſaid Elector again arming himſelf againſt the *Swede* and this State, being in

To our great damage.

in manner beforementioned drawn into the War between *Sweden* and *Denmark*; the Intereſt of *Brandenburg* was ſo powerful, that it was impoſſible for us afterwards either to get out of that War, or to put an end to it, till not only *Brandenburg*, but *Poland*, and the whole Houſe of *Auſtria*, to whom the Elector of *Brandenburg* had obliged himſelf to make no Peace without them, had firſt concluded their Treaty, and had obtained their ends by the Arms of this State. So that for the Intereſt of *Brandenburg* we were juſt at the Point of falling into a War with *France*, *England* and *Sweden* all at once, and conſequently of fixing our ſelves to the Party of *Auſtria* and *Spain*, which would have tended to our utmoſt Ruin. From which being at laſt delivered by the ſage Direction and Management of the Faithful Rulers of *Holland*, tho not without their ſignal and perſonal danger, we have great cauſe to be highly thankful to God for it.

Who to pleaſe Brandenburg *have been in the utmoſt danger.*

CHAP. VI.

What good Fruits the beginnings of a Free Government have already produced, from the Death of the laſt Stadtholder and Captain-General, to the Year 1662.

AND now that I may more fully ſhew, that notwithſtanding the ſad Effects of the Relicks of the former Stadtholders, Governors and Captain-Generals; yet that our Affairs ſince the Death of the laſt, are by the pru-

Notwithſtanding the foreſaid remainders of the Stadtholders Government it is evident,

The Fruits enjoy'd by the free Government are, first, the not taking up Mony at Interest.

prudent Management and Zeal of our Faithful Rulers, brought very far on towards the Welfare of these Provinces. And first, as an eminent token of it, it is worthy observation, That not only a vigorous opposition is made against that ruinous Course of taking up excessive Sums continually upon Interest, but that in the Year 1655, by the Zeal of our good Rulers, an Expedient was found to discharge the said Province of the one hundred and forty Millions of Guilders, *viz.* by reducing the yearly Interest of the said Sum from the 20*th* to the 25*th* Penny, or from 5 to 4 *per Cent.* and employing the yearly Advance of it towards discharging those Sums: Which Advance increasing yearly, that formidable Sum of 140 Millions will in Twenty one Years (whereof a sixth part is now expired) under God's Blessing be totally discharged.

The reducing of five to four, wherewith to discharge the Capital taking up.

To the Loss of the Rulers, and the great Benefit of the Merchants, &c.

But that which is most to be gloried in is, That tho the greatest part of the Regents of that Province have lent a considerable part of their Estates to *Holland* and *West-Friesland*, nevertheless the consideration of their own Profit did not hinder them from cutting off a fifth part of their Revenue for the necessary Service of the Publick, and among others to so many thousand Merchants, Artizans, and others, who have no Estate in the hands of the Government at Interest: So is it also to be greatly lamented, that there are still Inhabitants of *Holland*, who either cannot or will not be sensible of the Benefit and Necessity of so doing. They ought in truth to consider that this Country is an Orphan, and that the Rulers being Guardians, they cannot with a good Conscience suffer Mony to run at so high an

It is a pity that many of our People comprehend not this Benefit.

an Intereſt at the Charge of that Orphan, when the Credit of the ſaid Orphan is ſo great, that he can take up Mony ſufficient at 4 *per Cent.* and it would above all be inexcuſable in the Guardians to keep their own Mony ſtill at the Orphan's Charge, and require 5 *per Cent.* for the ſame, when others, and perhaps the elder Brothers and Siſters of the Orphan, are ready to lend him their Mony at 4 *per Cent.*

And underſtand not that this Country's Guardians muſt give no higher Intereſt for the Orphans uſe, than for their own.

But above all they ought to conſider, that the Revenue of *Holland* in it ſelf was of little or no value; and if it be now otherwiſe, it doth purely and merely depend on the Bleſſing of God upon its Commerce and Traffick; and that if any conſiderable diverſion or diminution of it ſhould happen, 'twere impoſſible to raiſe the ſeven Millions from it, which before the foreſaid Reduction were yearly demanded by Petition for paiment of the foreſaid one hundred and forty Millions; which by continuation of ſuch an Oeconomy as was kept in the time of the Stadtholders and Captains-General, would in time have been ſo much increaſed, that at length it would have exceeded all the Revenue and Product of their Trade: And the neat Revenue of *Holland* being by this means brought to leſs than nothing, and its Credit thereby neceſſarily at a ſtand, the ſaid Province muſt have ſunk and come to nothing of a ſudden.

Eſpecially when the Revenue of Holland *by thoſe high Intereſts would have been ſwallow'd up.*

I can compare thoſe People to nothing better than to a certain crack'd-brain'd Son of an induſtrious Husbandman, who ſeeing his Father once and again take a great Quantity of Corn out of his Barn, and carry it to his Land and ſcatter it upon the Earth, his crazy

How great the Fruits of this diſcharge of the Debts are, is ſet forth by a Similitude.

Underſtanding began greatly to murmur, ſaying, That they had wont to take the Corn out of the Barn only by the handful, to bake Bread and Cakes, whereof he, his Brothers and Siſters were daily to eat; but by this way of taking ſo much together it would ſhrink and come to nothing; and that his Father ought not to have denied them their former Liberty. But that ſilly Fellow underſtood not that the Corn ſcattered upon the Land was in no wiſe waſted or deſtroyed, but ſowed in the Earth in order to a great Increaſe the Year following; and that his Father had taken ſufficient care to leave ſo much in the Barn as would bring the Year about without want: whereas if they had taken Corn out of that Barn from time to time for Bread and Cakes, without ſowing any, it might indeed for ſome time have cauſed a merry Life, but the Event would have been ſudden Miſery and Famine. Even ſo thoſe weak People perceive not that that which ſeems to be withheld from them or their Neighbours by the aforeſaid Reduction, is by no means ſquandred away, but laid up as good Seed, to produce more Fruit from Year to Year, that it may, by the Bleſſing of God, be truly ſaid to be only our Surpluſage; and in caſe that be neglected, according to the fancy of ſuch fooliſh Perſons as aforeſaid, and the Extremity be taken, we may for a time live in jollity, but at length the Burden of it would have ruin'd us all.

Viz. by Seed-corn, which caſt into the Earth ſeems to be loſt.

But afterwards produces abundance.

So does that Reduction bring a great Benefit to the Country.

And further, to diſcover the difference between the preſent frugal and the former laviſh Government, we may remember that in our time there was another Reduction made of

Rents

Rents and Intereſts from 16 to 20, and from 6 ¼ to 5 *per Cent.* But the benefit of it preſently dropt through our Fingers, even to the raiſing of more Horſe and Foot, that were employed contrary to the deſire of moſt of the honeſt Rulers of *Holland*, and to the great detriment of that Province ſacrificed to the Ambition of the Captain-General; ſo that the foreſaid Reduction may be truly ſaid, not to have ſerv'd to the eaſing of the Country, but to a new and heavy taxing of the Commonalty.

Which under the Stadtholders was converted, to the levying of many needleſs Soldiers.

And had we then been ſo fortunate, that the good Rulers at that time had been able to have made uſe of the Advance of the foreſaid Reduction (as they do now) for diſcharge of the capital Sum, and reducing the yearly Charge (with the Intereſt upon Intereſt) without running our ſelves again into new Negotiations to the prejudice of *Holland*, we ſhould in lieu of being ſo vaſtly in Debt as at preſent, have been free and on even ground. And if therewith we can diſcharge our ſelves of ſeven Millions of yearly Impoſts, and all Taxes on Conſumption, which lie ſo heavy upon the Commonalty, and do ſo remarkably hinder the increaſe of our Trade and Commerce, and withal a good part of the Poundage upon Lands and Houſes, and of the Cuſtoms and Convoys, and yet after that have a better and clearer Revenue than we have at preſent; beſides the Benefit we ſhould enjoy of having all Handycrafts-men, Manufacturers and Traders who would reſort to us from other Countrys, under the Advantages of having the foreſaid Taxes diſcharged: If this were, I ſay, ſo ordered, this

Yet out of its profit, had it bin managed, Holland *would now have been out of Debt.*

And have ſubſiſted without any Impoſts on Conſumption.

To the unutterable Benefit of all Trades.

State would (humanely ſpeaking) have been already, or at leaſt in a few Years be the moſt Conſiderable, Puiſſant, and moſt Formidable Republick of the whole World.

And as we ſhould certainly have poſſeſs'd and taſted that Proſperity, in caſe the former Government had had the freedom of making the beſt uſe of the Intereſt of *Holland*; ſo in all probability we may yet injoy and be ſenſible of it in our own Perſons, or at leaſt our Children after us, if we do not ſhamefully ſuffer that Golden Liberty which is put into our hands by Heaven, to be pluck'd from us, and don't with the Sow return to the Mire. This certainly no generous *Hollander* can rightly conſider, without being inflamed with an ardent Zeal to hazard his Eſtate and Life for the preſervation of the preſent Government, and maintaining our true Liberty, and thereby to leave our Children at leaſtwiſe that Happineſs and Succeſs which we, in caſe our Predeceſſors could have effected that which in our Times (as aforeſaid) is ſo commendably ſettled, ſhould now effectually enjoy.

Which Bleſſing we hope, preſerving our Liberty, to bequeath to Poſterity.

Let none imagine that during the War with the King of *Spain*, it would have been impracticable to imploy the Advance of the foreſaid Reduction for diſcharging part of the Monys taken up at Intereſt, and to continue it till the whole were paid off, and the Country out of debt; ſeeing the contrary hath effectually appeared, that during the forementioned *Eaſtern* War, where in proportion of time there was more than twice as much extraordinarily raiſed and paid by the Province of *Holland* as, ſince the foreſaid firſt Reduction, ever hapned in the War with

Spain; yet the laſt Reduction from five to four in the Hundred, by the Care and Vigilance of the preſent Rulers, hath continued by the yearly Advance thereof, without any intermiſſion or diverſion, and is imployed for the diſcharge of the capital Debt.

The third fruit of this free Government is, A great part of the ſuperfluous Soldiery, &c. is disbanded, whereby Holland *ſaves yearly* 500000 *Guilders.*

In the next place we may obſerve, as a ſingular Effect of the preſent free Government, that by their Prudence and good Direction a good part of the ſupernumerary and uſeleſs Land-forces, and eſpecially of the Foreign Soldiery, is reduced and diſcharged, to the eaſe of the Province of *Holland* in particular, of the Sum of near five hundred thouſand Guilders *per Annum*. Concerning which it is ſpecially to be noted, that the foreſaid Reduction and Diſcharge was effected by the good Conduct of *Holland*, with the univerſal Satisfaction and Approbation of all the other Provinces. Whence therefore (by comparing it with what paſſed in the Year 1650) may be inferred, that the preſent time is much better than that, when our own Captain-General thruſt his Sword into our Bowels, for no other Reaſon, but becauſe the upright and faithful Rulers, according to Juſtice and Duty, did only disband and reduce ſome part of the ſaid Forces for eaſe of the Country, and as preparatory to the neceſſary disburdening of the poor Commonalty.

The Profit of which is converted to the diſcharge of Debts.

It is alſo at preſent firmly reſolved for our Good, that the benefit of the ſaid Reduction, as alſo that of Rents and Intereſts, ſhall be imployed for diſcharging that intolerable Burden which the Ambition of our Captain-General laid upon our backs.

Whereby the Sums that oppreſt Holland *will be the ſooner diſcharged.*

By this means the above-levied capital Sums will be ſooner paid by ſix Years than otherwiſe they could: So that now in that reſpect about a full fifth part of the time requiſite for the paiment of the whole is expired; beſides, that a part of the aboveſaid one hundred and forty Millions, which were many Years ſince negotiated upon Rents for Life, an dlikewiſe grow leſs every day, will infallibly expire in a few Years. So that we do viſibly approach the Land of Promiſe; and if by reaſon of our unthankfulneſs, and murmuring againſt the Almighty, and againſt our *Moſes*, he does not caſt us back into the *Egyptian* Slavery, the remainder of the Journy through the Wilderneſs will ſoon be at an end.

The 4th *Fruit of this Government is, that all Contentions of Citys and Provinces are ended to ſatisfaction.*

Fourthly, Let us obſerve, as another ſingular Effect of the preſent Free Government, That tho it was formerly judged and maintained by many, that it would be impoſſible, without Stadtholders or Governors of the Provinces, to compoſe and reconcile the Differences and Diſputes of Province againſt Province, Quarters againſt Quarters, Citys againſt Citys, and Rulers in Citys with one another, which will infallibly ariſe from time to time; and that by this means the State for want of ſuch Stadtholders and Governors, will e're long fall into great Diſſenſions and Civil Wars, and in time come to ruin; yet Experience hath taught us that on the contrary, the many and great Diſputes and Differences that have broken out, and were moſtly cauſed by the inſtigation of thoſe that long after Slavery, have ſince the Death of the laſt Prince of *Orange* been laid down and appeaſed

Tho ſuch Differences are moſtly cauſed by ſuch as affect Slavery.

peaſed with much better Order and Effect than formerly. Yea, and which is wonderful, almoſt all the foreſaid Differences and Diſputes were ſo well allayed, by the Authority and good Conduct of the lawful Government, that at one and the ſame time the differing Partys have found their ſatisfaction and contentment in laying them aſide.

Whereas on the other hand the Stadtholders cauſed many Differences, and generally wrong'd the Injur'd Partys.

Whereas, on the other hand, we have formerly ſeen, that the Stadtholder irritated and ſtirred up ſuch Differences, at leaſt cheriſh'd them, when it was for his Intereſt and Advantage; and at laſt made the Partys who had moſt right, ſubmit to the Sword, becauſe he knew beſt how to arrive at his Ends by thoſe who leaſt regarded Right, and conſequently made little Conſcience, ſo they could pleaſe him in obſtructing Juſtice, and the Welfare of the Land: it being the Maxim of all Great Perſons, *Divide & impera*; for in troubled Waters they have beſt fiſhing.

All which appears by Examples, viz. by the Amneſty of 1651.

If ever any Governour or Stadtholder, and his Adherents, had had ſuch cauſe of Offence as was given to the Province of *Holland*, *Anno* 1650. and in caſe the ſame Stadtholder and his Adherents had had the ſame Power to revenge themſelves as the States of *Holland* had after the death of the laſt Prince of *Orange*; who can doubt but their deſire of Revenge would have made the whole State to tremble, and that much Chriſtian Blood would have been ſacrificed to their Paſſion? But ſeeing the common Good is more regarded and purſued by the Rulers of a free Republick, than the ſatisfying of any violent Paſſion; and that by executing that Revenge, or

or rather juſt Puniſhment, it would have ſuſtain'd a ſignal Damage, the ſaid Crime was wiſely and prudently buried by a general Amneſty or Pardon; and ſo that great Breach, made on purpoſe to keep the whole State a long time in a troubleſom Alarm, was preſently repair'd.

And the allaying the Diſſenſion in Over-Yſſel.

The moſt conſiderable Diſſenſion and Rent which in the memory of Man hath hapned in theſe *United Provinces*, was that of the Province of *Over-Yſſel* into two conſiderable Partys about the beginning of the Year 1654; which was of ſuch a Nature, that both the differing Partys behaved themſelves as States, and as the lawful Sovereign Powers of that Province, inſomuch that they made War againſt one another in that Quality, and after ſuch a manner, that the City of *Haſſeld* was, after a formal Siege, taken by one of the Partys. In this Diſſenſion (according to the forementioned Maxim of great Men) the Stadtholder of *Frieſland* had concerned himſelf, and was received by one of the Partys for Stadtholder, Governour, and Captain-General of *Over-Yſſel*, by which the Diſſenſion was brought to that Extremity, and laſted between three and four Years.

Which broke out into an open War.

And yet by interceſſion of the H.R. *Penſionary it was firſt ſtopt,*

But at laſt thoſe Lords obſerving, that their Diſputes were infinitely multiplied, ſo that the Wound was almoſt incurable, they ſubmitted at the Mediation of the Penſioner of *Holland*, to refer all their Differences to the deciſion and determination of two Perſons appointed by the States of the ſame Province, who were the *Heer van Polsbroek* Burgomaſter of the City of *Amſterdam*, and the ſaid Penſioner; who reconciled the contending Partys of

of the ſaid Province in moſt of their differing Points in an amicable manner: and afterwards all the neceſſary Regulations, Orders, Inſtructions and Affidavits as to Affairs of the Government of the ſaid Province, being ſet down in Writing, a ſolemn Sentence and Deciſion was made and pronounced upon the 20*th* of *Auguſt* 1657, of all the ſaid Differences, in the Name of the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, and all confirmed under the Great Seal of the ſaid States, inſerting therein the foreſaid Regulations, Orders, Inſtructions, and Oaths, for preventing the like Inconveniences for the future; and all with that Prudence and Moderation, that both Partys receiv'd intire Satisfaction. Hereupon the divided Government was immediately conſolidated and heal'd up, and the Quiet and Peace of the ſaid Province reſtored, and ſo continues to this very day.

And afterward amicably ended.

In the Province of *Groningen* and *Ommelanden*, there aroſe likewiſe a notable Diſſenſion at the beginning of 1655, and again at the end of 1656; inſomuch that the Body of the foreſaid *Ommelanden*, and half of the Province being divided, all Government and Adminiſtration of Juſtice was at a ſtand. Upon this Occaſion it manifeſtly appeared whether ſuch Diſſenſions could be beſt compoſed and quieted by Stadtholders, or by the Authority and Conduct of other Rulers. The States General having gotten information of thoſe Differences at two ſeveral times, did immediately deſire the Stadtholder of that Province to be preſent in Perſon, and allay the Difference if poſſible. But Experience taught us, that it was but like Oil caſt into the Fire:

What hapned in Groningen *is worthy obſervation.*

Where the Stadtholder, not able to allay the Differences, deſir'd the States to do it by their Deputys.

So

So that the Stadtholder was neceſſitated to return anſwer to the States General, that he found it impracticable, and deſired the States would depute ſome of their Number for that End. Which having performed, thoſe Deputys compoſed and allayed the ſaid Differences, to the ſatisfaction and contentment of both Partys; and the Government of the Country was ſettled and confirmed, in the Name, and under the Seal of the States General, with conſent of the ſaid Country.

Which alſo was amicably effected.

It would be too tedious to mention Circumſtances, how prudently and happily, by the wiſe Direction of the States of *Holland* or thoſe Authorized by them, all the Commotions that hapned in the Citys of the ſame Province, and all Differences, as well between the ſaid Citys againſt one another, as between the Rulers of one and the ſame City, were every time extinguiſhed and allay'd. Yea even old Diſputes, that from the time of the laſt Troubles had been carried on with much heat between ſome Members, and which under the Stadtholders could never be allayed, were by the States of *Holland* amicably decided to the ſatisfaction of the Partys concerned. Which Examples in reſpect of the Commotions that have heretofore, and now lately hapned at *Dort*, *Enchuyſen*, and *Medenblick*, as likewiſe the appeaſing of the Differences between the Governours of *Gornichem* and *Schoonhoven*, about the chuſing of their Magiſtrates; and of thoſe of *Rotterdam*, and the *Briel*, about the Pilotage of the *Maeſe*, aud the Paſſage into *Goeree*, as alſo the old Diſputes about the Inveſtiture of the Colleges of the Generality, between the Members of *Weſt-*

And in Holland *many Differences that aroſe have been happily ended.*

At Dort, Enchuyſen, Gornichem, Roterdam, Briel, *&c.*

As alſo in Weſt-Frieſland, *and the* North-*Quarter.*

West-Friesland and the North Quarter, which were depending beyond the memory of Man, are very notable Instances.

Where the beginnings of Mischiefs were contriv'd by our last Stadtholder.

Here might also be shewn, that the beginnings of all the said Commotions and Dissensions were first designed or contrived by the last deceased Stadtholder; and others were excited and fomented by his Creatures that he left behind him: So that all that are Lovers of Peace and Quiet, and would rather have all Discords compos'd by wise and mild Conduct, than carried on and increas'd by Passion, or decided by the Sword, have need carefully to beware of electing a Stadtholder or new Baitmaker.

The first considerable Fruit of this Free Government is, that the Powers of Holland *are disposed to strengthen our Naval Forces.*

But the greatest and most valuable Benefit of the present Free Government, is, that now, according to the true Interest of *Holland*, all the Revenues of the Land, both Ordinary and Extraordinary, that remain over and above the Paiments of the Principal and Interest of the publick Debts, are applied for the increasing and strengthening our NavalPower, whereas it was heretofore wasted upon unprofitable, nay and ofttimes pernicious Sieges and other Expeditions, according to the Vain Glory of the Captain-General. It is particularly observable, that at present the ordinary Naval Power of this State is above three or four times more formidable than ever it was during the War with the King of *Spain*. And as after the conclusion of the Peace with the said King, during the Life of the Prince of *Orange*, the first Design was (as I formerly mentioned) to sell the most considerable of our Ships; so after his Death, one of the first Cares of the States was, to put the Colleges

leges of the Admiralty in a Poſture of acting Offenſively at Sea: The States having (which is a thing incredible) during the chargeable War againſt *England*, from 1652 to 1654, built in the ſpace of two Years, ſixty new Capital Ships of War, of ſuch Dimenſions and Force as were never before uſed in the Service of this State. And thus they have proceeded with the like provident care to build other Ships, to buy Cannon, to erect vaſt Magazins and Store-houſes for ſecuring and preſerving Naval Stores, and making of publick Rope-allys, and the like, and for providing all things neceſſary for the equipping and ſetting of Ships to Sea; and generally have done all that's fit for the ſtrengthning of our Naval Power, which hath been continued diligently from time to time.

Conſideringthat in two Years, 60 new Ships of War were built.

And new Magazines built, provided with all Neceſſarys for Shipping, Cannon, &c.

This is known to be the only means whereby, under the Bleſſing of God, this State may progreſſively increaſe in Fiſhing, Commerce, and Navigation, and draw an incredible concourſe of People out of all Countrys, as we daily experience to our great joy. For who can be ignorant, that the awful regard to our foreſaid Naval Power alone hath, next under God, been the cauſe of putting a ſtop to the aforementioned intolerable Piracys of the *French* in the *Mediterranean* Seas, by which the Government is brought into a Poſture to be able, yea and did reſolve to attack, take and deſtroy, not only common Pirates, but even the King's Ships of War which were made uſe of for that end? So that two of the King of *France*'s Ships being taken by Vice-Admiral *de Ruyter* in the *Mediterranean* in 1657, his Majeſty who had cauſed all our Ships

Whereby much Pirating by Sea will be prevented,

Eſpecially in the Mediterranean.

Ships and Effects throout his Dominions to be ſeized, was thereby readily brought to free us from that Inconveniency.

Without the influence of this Naval Power, it would in all humane Probability have been impoſſible to deliver our ſelves with any reputation out of the *Eaſtern* War formerly mentioned, without being expos'd to many more Difficultys. In ſhort, by this means the Commerce and Navigation of theſe Provinces have, notwithſtanding the heavy burdens forementioned, been kept in a tolerable good Poſture and Condition, and do now conſiderably improve.

And the Eaſtern Affairs diſpatched.

And our Traffick and Navigation conſiderably encreaſed.

So that the Folly or Malice of ſome People is intolerable, who dare complain of our preſent State of Affairs, and eſteem the former Times better than the preſent. If thoſe ſtupid or ill meaning People cannot or will not be at the pains to conſider the noble Effects of the preſent Free Government, yet they ſhould at leaſt ſuffer themſelves to be convinced by the evident Proſperity of the Citys of *Holland*. What could they anſwer if they were asked, Whether it be not a manifeſt Token of Proſperity, that the moſt conſiderable and greateſt Mercantile City of the Province, *viz.* *Amſterdam*, hath been enlarged two parts in three; and that none can obſerve, that either the Houſes or Inheritances are thereby leſſened in Value; yea that it is ſo augmented in Buildings of Houſes, that the Impoſts on the Bulky Goods of that City only in the laſt Farm, yielded above thirty thouſand Guilders more than in the former, and yet the ſaid Impoſt was in the foregoing Years conſiderably improved? We may affirm the ſame

The ſtupidity of thoſe who complain of our Affairs, is inexcuſable.

Seeing the Proſperity of the Country appears by other Symptoms.

By laying out the Ground of Citys.

Gallantry and Magnificence of the Inhabitants.

And the few Bankrupts of honeſt Merchants.

ſame of *Leyden* and *Dort*, and other Citys in proportion. And that the Riches, and Plenty of many cannot be kept within the Walls of their Houſes; but that over and above their Coſtly and Stately Buildings, they are viſible in their Coaches, Horſes, and other Tokens of Plenty in every Part. There are but very few in the Citys of the foreſaid Province, that do not yearly increaſe their Capital. Yea, if the foreſaid Complainers and Murmurers look but into their own Books, I aſſure my ſelf that moſt of them (unleſs they are profuſe, negligent and debauched) ſhall find their Stock, one Year with another, conſiderably increaſed.

CHAP. VII.

The third and laſt Part of this Book concludes with this, That all good Inhabitants ought to defend the Free Government of the Republick of Holland *and* Weſt-Frieſland, *with their Lives and Eſtates.*

THEN ſince we have already enjoyed ſuch noble Fruits of the preſent Free Government, notwithſtanding the grievous Obſtructions beforementioned, and that we are as yet but in the Winter of this happy Change, wherein a great part of the ſaid good and fruitful Seed lies ſtill hid in the Ground, and the other part is but preparing to be ſowed in the Spring; who is there that may not eaſily apprehend, how noble and happy the

the approaching Spring and Summer will be; but eſpecially the Harveſt, when that horrible Burden of one hundred and forty Millions will be paid off and fully diſcharged, and when the Taxes upon Conſumption, Commerce, and immoveable Eſtates, will be leſſened by ſeven Millions, and yet the Treaſure of the Land not one Stiver leſs.

And if at preſent under ſo many intolerable Burdens as are expreſſed in the 5*th* Chapter, and what have ſince the Year 1662 befaln us (of which we might give a large account) our Citys and Inhabitants have under a free Government been viſibly enlarged and increaſed; who will not eaſily apprehend that by continuing the ſame Government we ſhall in time with God's Bleſſing be the moſt happy and mighty Country for Strength that is to be found upon the Face of the Earth? And therefore we are oblig'd to pray fervently to God Almighty, that he would be pleaſed not only to keep us in the ſame State, but alſo upon occaſion to make us willing to hazard our Lives and Eſtates, and that joyfully, to maintain the ſame; that ſo our Children may at leaſt poſſeſs that full Happineſs, and that compleat worldly Felicity which they cannot fail of, (without God's Extraordinary Judgment) unleſs we ſhould by our Revolt to a Stadtholder, Governour or Captain-General, pull up the ſtately Foundations which have ſo prudently been laid by the preſent Free Government, and which without ſuch defection will the more eaſily by continuance be kept up, yea and may from time to time be improved.

All the Inhabitants of Holland *ought to ſupport their Free Government.*

With this general Concluſion, I might now end the third Part of this Book, were it not that the great Weight of this Affair preſſeth me to ſay further, That upon this foregoing Argument, illuſtrated by Antient and Modern Hiſtorys, and alſo by our own Experience of the many Miſchiefs of the former compulſive Government, and of the many good Fruits of the preſent free Government, we might well hold it for an unchangeable Maxim, That a Country having ſuch Intereſts or Advantages as *Holland* now hath, ought in all reſpects to be governed by a Free Republick and States: And that all the good Rulers of this Land, and eſpecially all the Inhabitants that are in any meaſure concerned in the proſperity of Manufactury, Fiſhery, Commerce and Shipping, ought to maintain the preſent Free Government with all their might, and by no means to ſuffer, and much leſs to occaſion that any Inhabitant, of what Quality ſoever, do under any ſpecious Title or Denomination acquire ſo great a Power, that the Gentry and Citys of *Holland* ſhould ſubmit unto, or truckle under him, or not dare by their Deputys at their Aſſemblys to ſpeak out, and declare that which tends to the true Intereſt of the Country, and the reſpective Citys of *Holland*, when it thwarts the Intereſt of a Political or Military Head; or when they having declared it, dare not maintain it without running into eminent Danger.

Eſpecially thoſe of the Reformed Religion.

And above all we may conclude, That the Eccleſiaſticks, who in any wiſe regard the true Intereſt of the Reformed Religion, that do not impiouſly trample upon the Honour of God, and ſhameleſly ſell the Reverence due to them

themſelves for a meſs of Pottage, ought to ſupport this Free Government, and with their Spiritual Weapons defend it againſt the Incroachments of ſuch a Ruler; conſidering that the Reformed Religion will be ſurer and better preſerved by the prudent, immortal, and almoſt immutable Sovereign Aſſembly of the States of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, and other Colleges ſubordinate to them, than by thoſe Voluptuous, Laviſh, Tranſitory and Fickle Monarchs and Princes, or their Favorites, who alter the outward Form and Practice of Religion as may be moſt conſiſtent with their Pleaſures or Profits; and beſides, when they die, do often bequeath their Lands to Inheritors of others, and eſpecially of the *Romiſh* Religion, who by their high Places, Politick Conduct, and the Eminency of their Eccleſiaſtical Honour and Extraordinary Riches, attract to themſelves Great Perſons, and eſpecially the ſurviving poor Daughters and younger Sons, who by them may eaſily arrive to great Inheritances, as we have often ſeen in this and the foregoing Ages, in *France*, *England*, *Germany*, *Orange*, &c. And ſeeing the Conſiſtorys, Claſſes, and Synods being in ſome meaſure inclined to obey this Lawful Government as the Sovereign Power ſet over them by God himſelf, have a plenary and ample Freedom allow'd them in all their Eccleſiaſtical Determinations, and are likely ſo to continue, purſuant thereunto each Miniſter doing his duty during Life, and preſiding or voting among the yearly Elders, Deacons and Members that depend upon him; and he himſelf being ſubject to none ſave the Sovereign Power, is in effect a little Biſhop,

Becauſe a Republican Government can hardly alter, but a ſingle Perſon may change the Religion of the Place he lives in.

and ſo will continue; and moreover the ſaid Miniſters will retain the due freedom of expounding God's Holy Word left us in the Writings of the Old and New Teſtament, in Spirit and Truth, and may fraine their Expoſitions, and publick Prayers according to the Occaſion, Time and Place, to the greater advancement of God's Honour, and the Edification of the Church, wherein the greateſt Comfort, and higheſt Praiſe of an upright Reformed Miniſter does conſiſt. Whereas on the other ſide, a Monarchical Governour, tho not acknowledging the Pope of *Rome*, muſt and would neceſſarily turn off, and diſcharge ſuch a Church-Council, to make way for the Ruling of Biſhops, or a Political Church-Council, to cauſe them, and all other Preachers to depend on himſelf as Head of the Church. And moreover, a ſingle Perſon would for his greater Security, and Quiet in his Government, deprive the Miniſtry of their Freedom to expound the Word of God according to the beſt of their Skill, and to ſute their publick Prayers to the Edification of the People, and inſtead thereof give them formed or compoſed Sermons and Prayers; or if the Prince found himſelf not ſtrong enough to introduce this Church-Government, and thereby to curb Proud and Seditious Preachers, he would then perhaps rather endeavour to make ſuch Miniſters and Clergy ſubmit to the Pope of *Rome*, than ſuffer them to be their own Maſters, in hopes that by length of time, and manifold Accidents, and by an Eccleſiaſtical Government in ſome meaſure regulated by a Foreign Head, it would be more tolerable

to

to him than theſe upſtart Seditious People, whom no Body knows how much Power they will pretend to, and of whom, as of a hidden Diſtemper, and a ſecret Enemy, the Sovereign is always in jealouſy and fear.

Laſtly, We may well conclude, That all the forementioned Evils would certainly befal theſe Lands, as ſoon as any one ſingle Perſon, under what ſpecious Pretence or Title ſoever, ſhall have the command of our Forces, either during Life, or for a long time. We muſt conſider, that in theſe unfortified Provinces, where Foreign hired Souldiers are continually entertained in all the adjacent ſtrong Holds, ſuch a Souldiery will not only obey him in deſpite of the Civil Magiſtrates who are their Directors and Pay-Maſters, and in deſpite of the honeſt Miniſtry, and to the ruin of ſuch as live on their Rents, Trades and Husbandry; but likewiſe all other ill-diſpoſed Inhabitants, as well as the Rabble, will always be ready, tho not ſtirred up by any wicked and ſeditious Preachers, to join themſelves with the Party of ſuch a Courteous, Liberal, and Valiant Captain-General. So that the moſt honeſt, and virtuous Rulers and Magiſtrates muſt be forc'd by conſtraint to demit, and others to prevent the loſing of their Lives, Honors and Eſtates; or elſe, to gain more Wealth and Honour and Authority, muſt concur with him, and diſſolve ſuch a Government.

The matter being thus, we muſt ſay, that all Perſons, who for their particular Intereſt do wilfully introduce ſuch a Monarchical Government into our Native Country, will

The Contrary hereof would be Treaſon.

By this Crime alone all the Laws of the Land are in danger at once of being ſubverted.

commit a Crime which afterwards can never be remedied, but like *Adam*'s Original Sin be derived from Father to Son to perpetuity, and produce ſuch pernicious effects, that all the good Orders, and Laws of theſe Provinces, whether Civil or Eccleſiaſtical, muſt at length be ſubverted. And ſeeing *Crimen Majeſtatis* is properly committed againſt the Laws of the Sovereign Power, namely either to aſſault the Legiſlator himſelf, or to endeavour to alter the Sovereign Government; we muſt therefore conclude, that the ſaid Inhabitants will by ſo doing make themſelves guilty of *Crimen Majeſtatis & perduellionis non fluxum ſed permanens in æternum*, the moſt grievous, moſt durable and endleſs Treaſon againſt their Country.

The Welfare of all the Inhabitants would be likewiſe obſtructed hereby.

To conclude: We muſt grant that this Republick of *Holland* and *Weſt-Frieſland*, being deprived of their Free Government by erecting a Stadtholder or Captain-General for Life, would in a few Years loſe both the Name and Appearance of a Free Republick, and be changed into a downright Monarchical Government; which the Merchants perceiving, they would leave our Country as they have done others, that they might be under a free Government. But God forbid and divert it, that being the greateſt worldly Miſchief that can befal us; for this Country which ſubſiſts by Manufacturers, Fiſhermen, Merchants, Owners of Ships, and others depending on them, who by this means muſt be all bereft of their Livelihood, will become a Land deſolate and uninhabited, a Body without a Soul, and a lamentable Fountain of unſpeakable Miſery.

CHAP. VIII.

The Conclusion of the whole Book, with a Declaration of the Author's Design, and a Caution both to the ill and well affected Readers.

THESE my Remarks upon the three premised Parts of the True Political Maxims of the Republick of *Holland* and *West-Friesland*, hapning to be made Publick, tho very imperfect, under the Titile of *the Interest of Holland* in the Year 1662; and afterwards in the Years 1667, and 1668, being more carefully perused, and more maturely deliberated upon, the Reader ought to be forewarned, that sometimes the Affairs of those respective Years ought to be adverted to in the reading. And that my intent was, both in general and particular, to shew briefly wherein the Interest of *Holland* consists, *viz.* That as in all Countrys of the World, the highest perfection of a Political Society, and in a Land by accident labouring under Taxes, and naturally indigent, as *Holland* is; there is an absolute necessity that the Commonalty be left in as great a natural Liberty for seeking the Welfare of their Souls and Bodys, and for the Improvement of their Estates, as possible. For as the Inhabitants of the most plentiful Country upon Earth, by want only of that natural Liberty, and finding themselves every way encumbred and perplexed, do really inhabit a Bridewel or House of Correction, fit for none

The Whole concluded with this Affirmation,

That Holland's *Intereſt conſiſts in the Freedom of all its Inhabitants.*

none but miſerable condemned Slaves, and conſequently a Hell upon Earth. Whereas a Power of uſing their Natural Rights and Propertys for their own ſafety, provided it tends not to the Deſtruction of the Society, will be to the Commonalty, tho in a barren and indigent Country, an earthly Paradiſe: For the liberty of a Man's own Mind, eſpecially about Matters wherein all his Welfare conſiſts, is to ſuch a one as acceptable as an Empire or Kingdom.

That this Intereſt agrees well with that of the Rulers.

I have likewiſe ſhewn, that ſuch a Liberty and Proſperity of the Subject does very well conſiſt in *Holland* with the preſent uncontroled Power of the free Government, and with none other.

So that all good Patriots, and true Lovers of our Native Country, who peruſe this Book, are earneſtly intreated to conſider deliberately whether the two moſt weighty Points before mentioned are not ſtrongly and ſufficiently demonſtrated.

The Author's aim was not to preſcribe any thing to the Rulers as a Pattern.

But whether, when, and how the particulars here treated of, may all at once or at ſeveral times be ſet about, or peruſed, was not my intention in the leaſt to direct. For the Higher Powers, whom it only concerns in a Republick to conclude of theſe Matters, and all Politicians know * that ſuch things as may be born with leſs inconvenience than removed or changed, ought to continue, and remain in being. And when ſuch wiſe and good Patriots will make any alteration, they

* Multa facere non oportet quæ facta tenent. Multa ſcire pauca exequi.

muſt go by degrees, and as far as they conveniently may; yet they muſt rather ſtand ſtill, or remain as they are, than run their Heads againſt a Wall.

And indeed Reformation in Political Affairs depends on ſo many, and ſuch various Circumſtances, namely Cuſtoms, Times, Places, Rulers, Subjects, Allys, Neighbouring and Foreign Countrys, that ſuch a Reformation is either proper, or improper to be undertaken, according as the ſeveral Circumſtances are well weighed, ſuch eſpecially in a free Republick, which is govern'd and managed by prudent Aſſemblys of the States, venerable City Councils, and reputable Colleges; in which it would be a great Preſumption and Self-conceit, yea indeed a Crime for a private Perſon to dare to conclude any thing, and in ſo doing to arrogate it to himſelf, or to put a Hand to that Work which properly and of right belongs only to the States of *Holland*, and thoſe that are thereunto Authorized.

For that would be worthy of a ſevere puniſhment.

Eſpecially in this Country, where are ſo many Sage and Prudent Rulers.

If any Man ſhould object by way of Reply, That throughout the whole Book I uſe no doubtful Propoſals, but poſitive Reaſonings, and a concluſive cogent way of Argument: I anſwer, That all matters which not only conſiſt in knowing ſomething, but alſo and chiefly in deſiring or oppoſing any thing, and which moreover thwarts the Prejudices and Intereſts of many Men, neither can, nor ought to be otherwiſe handled. For if an Angel from Heaven ſhould propoſe to Mankind ſuch matters doubtfully and faintly, he would have but little audience upon Earth, and

and gain no Credit by People that have imbibed ſuch Prejudices beforehand. So that being deſirous of having what I write of ſuch matters to be read with conſideration, and maturely weighed, and to make ſome impreſſion on the Reader, I have been neceſſitated to uſe this manner of writing. And therefore I find my ſelf likewiſe obliged at the end of this Book, when I preſume all hath been read, and duly weighed, to declare thus much, and to give this Caution, that the ſame may be made uſe of for the good, and not for the hurt of our Native Country.

I ſhall add, That ſuch a circumſpect Cenſure of the Readers is the more requiſite, becauſe I ſhall have done much, if in propoſing matters which relate to the Proſperity of *Holland* my Judgment hath in the general been rightly directed: For it would be incredible, and almoſt above humane Power, not to have err'd and miſtaken in propoſing and relating ſo many ſeveral Particular matters. But ſince notwithſtanding my Aim hath been to ſet nothing before you but Truth, which might tend to the Benefit of my Native Country; I hope, I have not always ſtrayed, and run into miſtakes. God grant that in the Judgment of my ſeveral Readers, and eſpecially thoſe of the lawful Magiſtracy, and true Fathers of their Country, I may have come ſo near the mark in many things, that my Errors which in ſuch a Caſe I renounce, may be ſo overlooked by them, as they may commend my laudable Zeal, and be excited to greater matters them-

themſelves, or may imploy others that have more Ability and Leaſure; that by ſuch Countenance and Favour they may be encouraged to write ſomething neceſſary for the Service of their Native Country, and that more Amply, Methodically and Solidly than I have done. If this be effected, I have my principal End and Deſign.

But in caſe any Reader be ſo ill minded, tho neither willing nor able to effect ſuch a commendable Work himſelf, as to oppoſe and deſpiſe what I have here laid down; let him remember, that I deſire nothing of him but to judg of mine and other Writings with conſideration and circumſpection; and that I ſhall be far from ſuch fooliſh Ambition as to write an Anſwer which would neither be ſerviceable to my Country, the Reader, nor my ſelf: For I intend to follow this perpetual Maxim during my ſhort and tranſitory Life, To make no Man Maſter of my Time and Repoſe but my ſelf, and particularly never to grant or yield ſo much to any ill deſigning Perſon, as for their ſakes to fall into troubleſom, contentious and unprofitable Scribling. For whether my Errors be truly diſcovered, or peeviſhly and falſely laid to my charge, the ſeveral Readers muſt be the Judges.

Farewel, and remember this ſaying, * It

* Boni Civis eſt liberum Reipublicæ ſtatum tueri, nec eum mutatum velle.

is the Duty of a good Citizen, to preserve and defend the Common Freedom of his Native Country, as far as in him lies.

FINIS.

